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THE
ROMAN HISTORY,
FROM THE
BUILDING OF ROME
TO THE
RUIN OF THE COMMONWEALTH.

ILLUSTRATED WITH MAPS.

BY
N. HOOKE, ESQ.

A NEW EDITION, IN ELEVEN VOLUMES.

VOL. X.

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CONTENTS.

VOL. X.

BOOK X.

From the end of the year 703, when the civil war broke out between Pompey and Cæsar, to the second triumvirate, or the league which was formed between Lepidus, Antony, and Octavius, in the year 710.

CHAP. I.

A BRIEF relation of the rise and progress of the contest between Pompey and Cæsar.

CHAP. II.

Cæsar is ordered by a decree of the senate to disband his army, and, in case of refusal, is declared a public enemy. The consuls and other magistrates are vested with extraordinary powers. Cæsar passes the Rubicon with one legion, and in two months' time makes himself master of all Italy.

CHAP. III.

Cæsar, after settling every thing in the south of Italy, and taking measures to secure Sicily and Sardinia, sets out for Rome. In his way he has a conference with Cicero, who soon after retires to Pompey's camp. At Rome he seizes the public treasure, and, finding the senate unwilling to act

any part, he takes upon himself the public administration. After a stay of six or seven days, he sets out for Spain.

CHAP. IV.

The reduction of Sardinia by Valerius, of Sicily by Curio, and of Spain by Cæsar.

CHAP. V.

The siege of Marseilles. Caius Antonius and Dolabella, Cæsar's lieutenants in Illyricum, are defeated by M. Octavius and Scribonius Libo. Curio's unfortunate expedition into Africa.

CHAP. VI.

Cæsar is created dictator: he returns to Rome, where he holds the assembly for the election of magistrates, and settles the affairs of the city. He follows Pompey into Greece. The disturbances raised by Cœlius and Milo are quieted. The famous campaign between Cæsar and Pompey before Dyrrhachium and in Thessaly. The battle of Pharsalia. Pompey's flight and death. The dispersion of his followers.

CHAP. VII.

Cæsar follows Pompey into Egypt. The Alexandrian war. The war against Pharnaces. Illyricum saved by Vatinius. Cæsar returns to Italy. Cicero's disquietudes at Brundisium during Cæsar's absence. Cæsar puts an end to the disturbances raised by Dolabella in the city: he quells a mutiny in his army, and sets out for Africa.

CHAP. VIII.

The war of Cæsar in Africa against Scipio, Cato, and Juba.

CHAP. IX.

Cæsar returns to Rome : the honours decreed him : his four triumphs : his civil administration and clemency.

CHAP. X.

Cæsar's war in Spain against Pompey's sons. The honours decreed him by the senate. His triumph, and those of his two lieutenants Q. Fabius and Q. Pedius. Cicero's grief for the death of his daughter Tullia. His writings during his retreat at this time.

THE
ROMAN HISTORY.

BOOK X.

FROM THE END OF THE YEAR 703; WHEN THE CIVIL WAR BROKE OUT BETWEEN POMPEY AND CÆSAR, TO THE SECOND TRIUMVIRATE, OR THE LEAGUE WHICH WAS FORMED BETWEEN LEPIDUS, ANTONY, AND OCTAVIUS, IN THE YEAR 710.

CHAP. I.

A brief relation of the rise and progress of the contest between Pompey and Cæsar.

FROM the year 693, the triumvirate reigned in Rome: the whole management of the public affairs was in the hands of the three most powerful men of the state, Crassus, Pompey, and Cæsar. The latter, during his consulship in 694, had cemented and established the power of the confederacy; and Pompey directed it in his absence for his own, and the purposes of his associates. He was, therefore, in a manner, the sovereign of the republic, while Cæsar was employed in the conquest of Gaul. In the year 696, he was invested, on the proposal of Cicero, whose motion was approved of by the senate, with an absolute power for five years

Vid. supr.
Vol. VIII.
p. 404.

over all the public stores and corn-rents of the empire¹; by which means all those who were concerned in the naval, the commercial, and landed interest, became his tributaries and dependants. Another law, proposed at the same time by the tribune Messius², gave him the additional power of raising what fleets and armies he thought fit; with a greater command through all the provinces than their proper governors had in each. These extraordinary concessions to Pompey created a jealousy in Crassus, who, perceiving himself quite eclipsed by his old enemy and rival, now his partner in power, encouraged Publius Clodius to put some public affronts upon him, which Pompey openly resented, and complained of. A reconciliation, however, was speedily effected by Cæsar; and, in 697, the triple league was renewed at Lucca; where the governor of the two Gauls, after three successful campaigns, spent the winter season in the greatest splendour, attended by

¹ This law was moved and carried by the consul Lentulus Spinther, one of the heads of the aristocratical party, with a view to his own designs, and to divert Pompey from the thoughts of being employed in re-establishing Ptolemy on the throne of Egypt; an office which the consul was solicitous should be assigned to himself.

² Cicero, though he thought the law of Messius insufferable, yet held his peace, because the pontifices had yet decreed nothing concerning his house:—*Nos tacemus; et eo magis, quod de domo nostra nihil adhuc pontifices responderunt.* Melm. Vol. i. p. 56. Thus were the liberties of Rome sacrificed to the private purposes of her pretended patriots.

almost all the magistrates and great men of the republic. It was agreed upon by the triumviri that Pompey and Crassus should sue for the consulate of the following year, take to themselves what provinces they liked best, and continue Cæsar in his government of Gaul for five years more. How all this was effected has been formerly related. Crassus, before the expiration of his consulship, set out for his government of Syria, and the Parthian war; but Pompey remained in Italy, though invested with the command of an army and the government of Spain; and there continued to influence all the public transactions. His commission for the providing of corn, which expired not till the year 701, furnished him with a pretence for not going to his province. He is universally accused of having given way to all the disorders of the city, and of having inflamed public discord, with a view of forcing the senate to create him dictator; in which scheme he succeeded so far as to get himself elected sole consul by the unanimous vote of the senate, and the consent even of Cato.— But, while he was invested with the whole public authority in the year 701, in order to settle the state, he employed it to a very different purpose³. Before his law took place for

Vid. supr.
Vol. IX.
b. ix. ch.
3 and 4.

Vol. IX. p.
107.

³ Cicero often extols Pompey's third consulship, so far as to call it divine; yet he influenced the judges to condemn Milo, whom Cato loudly acquitted, while Saufeius was absolved, who headed Milo's gladiators in forcing the inn where Clodius was killed: *Milonem reum non magis invidia facti, quam Pompeii damnavit voluntas: quem quidem M.*

disqualifying all future consuls and prætors from holding any province till five years after the expiration of their magistracy, he was careful to provide an exception for himself, and got the government of Spain continued to him

Cato palam lata absolvit sententia. Vell. Pat. ii. 47. He employed his authority to save Scipio, though notoriously guilty, while he let Hypsæus be condemned by an *ex post facto* law, who had been his quæstor, and ever obsequious to his will. He abandoned Scaurus, who had served under him, and to whom he left the government of Syria after the Mithridatic war, because, says Asconius, he took offence at Scaurus's marrying Mutia, his divorced wife:—*in eo judicio neque Pompeius propensum adjutorium præbuit, videbatur enim apud animum ejus non minus offensionis contraxisse, quod judicium ejus in Mutiam, crimine impuditiæ ab eo dimissam, levius fecisse existimaretur, cum eam ipse probasset, quam gratiæ acquisisse necessitudinis jure, quod ex eadem uterque liberos haberet.* In Arg. Or. pro Scauro. He, with his father-in-law Scipio, restored also the censorship; but who were elected to this office? Two of the most notoriously profligate citizens of Rome, Appius, and Piso. How infamous must have been the character of Scipio himself, whom Pompey took for his father-in-law and colleague in the consulship, if the following story from Valerius Maximus be true: *Æque flagitiosum illud convivium, quod Gemellus tribunicius viator ingenui sanguinis, sed officii intra servilem habitum deformis, Metello Scipioni consuli, ac tribuni plebis, magno cum rubore civitatis comparavit. Lupanari enim domi suæ instituto, Mutiam et Fulviam, tum a patre tum a viro utramque abductam, et nobilem puerum Saturninum in eo prostituit.* Lib. ix. c. 1. Cæsar, in the beginning of the third book of the civil war, affirms that many of the decisions given at this time were so little conformable to law, that sentence was often pronounced by a party of judges different from those who attended the pleadings. Tacitus, it may likewise be added, is far from giving us a favourable idea of Pompey's third consulship:—*Cn. Pompeius tertium consul, corrigendis moribus delectus, et gravior remediis quam delicta erant, suarumque legum auctor idem ac subversor.* Ann. iii. c. 28.

for five years longer. His chief intention, after he had secured his own interest and power, was to quell the passions, and stop the ambitious pursuits of his fellow-grandeës. He was under a necessity, however, of providing something extraordinary for his partner Cæsar; and he consented to a law dispensing with his absence in suing for the consulship. Cœlius, tribune of the people, who promoted this law, had been engaged to it by Cicero, at the joint request of Pompey and Cæsar⁴; and it was carried with the concurrence of all the other tribunes, though not without difficulty and obstruction from the senate. This last measure in favour of Cæsar was entered into by Pompey against his inclination, and he soon had reason to repent of it. Julia's death had broken all his ties with her father, and that of Crassus had given a new turn to their several pretensions: his commission over the corn-rents of the empire was expired, and the laws loudly ordered him away to Spain, where he had no mind to go. He had been greatly caressed of late by the senate, who had trusted

⁴ "Well then: Shall I declare against Cæsar? Where then is the faith I plighted him? For I was the means of the dispensation being granted him; and, when Cæsar solicited for my vote at Ravenna, at his request, I brought over Cœlius to his party. But what do I say of Cæsar? I was solicited to the same purpose by our darling Pompey in that immortal third consulate of his." Yet Cicero, in his second Philippic, affirms, that he endeavoured to dissuade Pompey from suffering this law to pass. There are many such contradictions in Cicero's writings.

Ad Att.
vii. 1.

Philipp. ii. c.
10.

him with the whole power of the state ; but the popular party was, with very good reason, better inclined to Cæsar. In these circumstances he thought it advisable to change his scheme of politics⁵ : and, by Cicero's account to Cœlius in the very beginning of the year 702, Pompey was quite alienated from his father-in-law⁶, and associate in power, without having received the least provocation either real or pretended, and had resolved to act in concert with his enemies. Hitherto, Pompey and Cæsar had joined their interests against the chief of the nobility, and obtained from the people what the senate would not grant ; but, now that the whole power of the empire was thrown as a kind of prize between two, it was natural that they should divide, and head, re-

⁵ *Septimo ferme anno Cæsar morabatur in Galliis, cum medium jam ex invidia Pompeii male cohærentis inter Cn. Pompeium et C. Cæsarem concordie pignus, Julia uxor magni decessit ; atque omnia inter destinatos tanto discrimini duces dirimente fortuna, filius quoque parvus Pompeii, Julia natus, intra breve spatium obiit. Tum in gladios cædesque civium furente ambitu, cujus neque finis reperiebatur, nec modus, tertius consulatus soli Cn. Pompeio, etiam adversantium antea dignitati ejus judicio delatus est : Cujus ille honoris gloria, veluti reconciliatis sibi optimatibus, maxime a C. Cæsare alienatus est. Vell. Pat. lib. ii. 47.*

⁶ “ I passed several days with Pompey, conversing with him on nothing else but the republic :—Take this from me, that Pompey is an excellent citizen, prepared both with courage and counsel for all events which can be foreseen : wherefore give yourself up to the man ; believe me, he will embrace you ; for he now holds the same opinion with us of good and bad citizens.” Ep. Fam. xi. 8. Melm. III. 28. “ I left Pompey an excellent citizen, and in readiness against all events which we may dread.” Ad Att. iv. 8.

spectively, the two permanent and distinct parties in the republic, the aristocracy and the people.

Eight years successively had Cæsar conducted the Roman arms in Gaul with such amazing success as entitled him to a triumph for the actions of every campaign⁷; no wonder, therefore, that his enemies among the nobles should feel an apprehension of his growing power with the people, who, before the recent proofs he had given of his superior military abilities, and of his amiable qualities, had in many instances distinguished him by singular marks of their esteem, affection, and confidence. Pompey, too, was undoubtedly jealous of his glory as a captain, which, it must be confessed, exceeded his own; and he easily foresaw that, if Cæsar was permitted to sue for the consulship, and to enter upon it at the expiration of his military command, he would become master of the republic; and, after his magistracy, procure, by a law of the people,

⁷ *Novemque æstatibus vix ulla non justissimus triumphus emeritus. Vell. Pat. L. ii. c. 47. Dicam enim ex animo, patres conscripti, quod sentio, et quod vobis audientibus sæpe jam dixi. Si mihi nunquam amicus C. Cæsar fuisset, sed semper iratus: si aspernaretur amicitiam meam, seseque mihi implacabilem inexpiabilemque præberet, tamen ei, cum tantas res gessisset gereretque quotidie, non amicus esse non possem. Cujus ego imperio non Alpium vallum contra adscensum transgressionemque Gallorum, non Rhæni fossam, gurgitibus illis redundantem, Germanorum immanissimis gentibus objicio et oppono. Perfecit ille, ut, si montes resedissent, annes exaruisent non naturæ præsidio, sed victoria sua, rebusque gestis Italiam munitam haberemus. Cic. in Pis.*

the most considerable province, with a powerful army; while he himself in the mean time would be obliged to withdraw to his government of Spain. Thus Pompey and the aristocracy, though agreeing in little else, were induced to unite their strength against the conqueror of Gaul.

A coalition was therefore formed, and a resolution taken to revoke Cæsar's command before the time was out, and to oblige him to come as a private man to sue for the consulship; in which case he had been exposed to the mercy of his enemies, and Cato had threatened publicly to bring him to a trial. But this resolution was very difficult to be put into practice, as it would necessarily occasion, as a previous step, the repeal of two laws, the one made by the senate itself, the other by the people, with the unanimous concurrence of the tribunes, and with the approbation of Pompey.

The consuls for the year 702 were Servius Sulpitius and M. Claudius Marcellus, who had been elected by the joint interest of Pompey and Cæsar. Cato had stood candidate with them; but, having displeased the people by an ill-timed severity, he was rejected.—Plutarch informs us, that he had obtained a decree from the senate, ordering the candidates to make interest by themselves, and not by their friends; so that the people were deprived not only of their usual bribes, but of the satisfaction of being courted: and he refused also, says the same author, to condescend to

that submissive manner of soliciting which is common on such occasions, and behaved with great state, choosing rather to preserve the dignity of his character, than to acquire the dignity of consul. On the very day he had lost his election, as if quite unconcerned for what had happened, he was seen in the Campus Martius playing at tennis; a behaviour which Plutarch greatly extols, but which might have been nothing else but an affectation of singularity, or a consequence of that haughty rage, which made him declare, that he would no more stand candidate for any magistracy.

Marcellus⁸, entirely devoted to Pompey, was no sooner entered into office, than he began the attack upon Cæsar, by declaring his intention to abrogate immediately his command,

⁸ Dr. Middleton, Vol. II. p. 196, has given the following character of him: "He was the head of a family, which, for a succession of many ages, had made the first figure in Rome; and was himself adorned with all the virtues that could qualify him to sustain that dignity which he derived from his noble ancestors. He had formed himself in a particular manner for the bar, where he soon acquired great fame; and, of all the orators of his time, seems to have approached the nearest to Cicero himself in the character of a complete speaker. His manner of speaking was elegant, strong, and copious; with a sweetness of voice, and propriety of action, that added a grace and lustre to every thing that he said. He was a constant admirer and imitator of Cicero; and of the same principles in peace, and on the same side in war." His fierceness, however, it may be remarked, against Cæsar, so ill-timed, gives us no great idea of his prudence or his honour: it was this probably which procured the consulship successively to two of his relations.

Suet. in
Cæs. cap.
xxviii.
Dio. l. xl.
p. 148.

and to appoint him a successor, alleging that the war in Gaul was now brought to a conclusion. But he was stopped for some months in this pursuit, probably by Pompey's falling ill soon after his promotion to the consulship, and by the opposition of his colleague Sulpitius⁹, who, being of a more moderate temper,

⁹ " Sulpitius was of a noble and patrician family, of the same age, the same studies, and the same principles with Cicero, with whom he kept up a perpetual friendship. They went through their exercises together when young, both at Rome and at Rhodes, in the celebrated school of Milo: whence he became an eminent pleader of causes, and passed through all the great offices of the state, with a singular reputation of wisdom, learning, and integrity; a constant admirer of the modesty of the ancients; and a reprover of the insolence of his own times. When he could not arrive at the first degree of fame, as an orator, he resolved to excel in what was next to it, the character of a lawyer; choosing rather to be the first, in the second art, than the second only in the first: leaving therefore to Cicero the field of eloquence, he contented himself with such a share of it as was sufficient to sustain and adorn the profession of the law. In this he succeeded to his wish; and was far superior to all who had ever professed it in Rome; being the first who reduced it to a proper science, or rational system; and added light and method to that which all others before him had taught darkly and confusedly. Nor was his knowledge confined to the external forms, or the effects of the municipal laws; but enlarged by a comprehensive view of universal equity, which he made the interpreter of its sanctions, and the rule of all his decisions; yet he was always better pleased to put an amicable end to a controversy, than to direct a process at law. In his political behaviour he was always a friend to peace and liberty; moderating the violence of opposite parties, and discouraging every step towards civil dissension; and, in the wars which ensued, he was so busy in contriving projects of an accommodation, that he gained the name of the peace-maker.

and addicted to neither faction, over-ruled his motions. The enemies of Cæsar contented themselves therefore with making vows for the success of the Bellovaci, with whom he was engaged in war; and for the destruction of the Roman general. Marcellus had also made some attempt to deprive Novum Comum, a colony, which Cæsar, when consul, had settled at the foot of the Alps, of the freedom of the city, granted to it by a law preferred by Vatinius. He was likewise frustrated in this design, yet resolved to have no regard to the privilege of the colony; and, having caught a Comensian magistrate, who was acting the citizen at Rome, he ordered him to be seized, and publicly whipped; an indignity from which all citizens were exempted by law; bidding the man go, and shew these marks of his citizenship to Cæsar¹.

Suet. in
Cæs. 28.

Through a natural timidity of temper, confirmed by a profession and course of life averse from arms, though he preferred Pompey's cause as the best, he did not care to fight for it: but, taking Cæsar's to be the strongest, suffered his son to follow that camp, while he himself continued quiet and neuter: for this he was honoured by Cæsar, yet could never be induced to approve his government. From the time of Cæsar's death he continued still to advise and promote all measures which seemed likely to establish the public concord; and died at last, as he lived, in the very act and office of peace-making." Middl. p. 361.

¹ "All the other colonies on that side of the Po had before obtained from Pompey's father the rights of Latium, [*Jus Latii*] that is, the freedom of the city of Rome to those which had borne an annual magistracy in them. Hence Cicero blames this act of Marcellus as violent and unjust. 'Marcellus,' says he, 'behaved shamefully in the case of the Comensian; for, if the man had never been a magistrate,

The elections of magistrates for the ensuing year engaged the attention of the city in the months of July and August; and Pompey's faction generally prevailed. C. Claudius Marcellus and L. Paulus² were chosen consuls.

he was yet of a colony beyond the Po; so that Pompey will not be less shocked at it than Cæsar himself." Middl. p. 44. Those who had not been magistrates might give their votes in the assemblies of Rome, if ordered by the presiding magistrate to vote in such a tribe: but only the magistrates could pretend to any office.

² Cicero wrote congratulatory letters to them both from Cilicia, and another to M. Marcellus, which, as it informs us how the consul's thoughts were taken up before the elections, we shall insert it here:

TO MARCUS MARCELLUS, CONSUL.

"I very warmly congratulate you on your relation Caius Marcellus being elected to succeed you: as I sincerely rejoice in your having received this happy fruit of your pious affection to your family, of your patriot zeal to your country, and of your illustrious deportment in the consular office. I can easily imagine the sentiments which your address on this occasion has created in Rome; and as to myself, whom you have sent to these far distant parts of the globe; believe me, I speak of it with the highest and most unfeigned applause. I can with strict truth assure you, that I have ever had a particular attachment to you from your earliest youth: as I am sensible you have always shewn by your generous offices in promoting my dignities, that you deemed me worthy of the most distinguished honours. But this late instance of your judicious management in procuring the consulship for Marcellus, together with the proof it affords of the favour in which you stand with the republic, has raised you still higher in my esteem. It is with great complacency, therefore, I hear it observed by men of the first distinction for sense and merit, that, in all our words and actions, our tastes and studies, our principles and pursuits, we bear a

The first, who was cousin-german to M. Marcellus, carried his suit in competition with Calidius, an eminent orator and friend to Cæsar, and was zealously attached to Pompey. The second set out also in his administration with principles agreeable to those of his colleague.

Marcus Cœlius, Cicero's friend and correspondent, obtained the ædileship this year. He had been tribune of the people in Pompey's third consulship, and had distinguished himself in that office by his zeal for Milo, and was reputed of the aristocratical faction³.

Curio likewise obtained the tribunate, which he sought with no other design, as many imagined, than for the opportunity of mortifying Cæsar, against whom he had hitherto acted with great fierceness. He⁴ was a young noble-

strong resemblance to each other. The only circumstance, that can render your glorious consulate still more agreeable to me, will be your procuring a successor to be nominated to this province as soon as possible. But if this cannot be obtained, let me intreat you, at least, not to suffer my continuance here to be prolonged beyond the time limited by your decree, and the law which passed for that purpose. In a word, I hope upon all occasions to experience in my absence the benefit of your friendship and protection. Farewell." Ep. Fam. xv. 9. Melm. iii. 35.

³ See some account of him, Vol. IX. p. 141.

⁴ "The circumstance of Curio's standing candidate for the tribuneship," says Cœlius, in a letter to Cicero, in 702, "greatly alarms those who are unacquainted with the real good qualities of Curio's heart. I hope, and indeed believe, he will act agreeably to his professions, and join with the senate in supporting the friends of the republic. I am sure, at least, he is full of these designs at present; in

Ep. Fam.
viii. 4.
Melm. iii.
32.

man of great spirit, parts, and eloquence: but addicted beyond all measure or modesty to the prevailing luxury and gallantries of a most dissolute age. In his youth he had been the leader of the young nobility, and a warm assertor of the authority of the senate against the power of the triumvirate. Upon his first taste of public honours, his ambition and thirst of popularity had engaged him in such expense and prodigality, that, to supply the magnificence of his shows and plays, he had contracted an immense debt.

The consul Marcellus, who, when taken up in these elections, had seemed to have dropped the design of abrogating Cæsar's proconsular power⁵, upon which he was so intent in the beginning of his magistracy, resumed the affair after the consuls were chosen. "At a meeting of the senate [says Cœlius to Cicero] held on the 22d of July, in the temple of Apollo⁶, upon

Ep. Fam.
viii. 4.
Melm. iii.
32. [Dated
Aug. 1,
702.]

which Cæsar's conduct has been the principal occasion of engaging him. For Cæsar, though he spares no pains or expense to gain over even the lowest of the people to his interest, has thought fit to treat Curio with singular contempt. The latter has behaved with so much temper upon this occasion, that he, who never acted with artifice in all his life, is suspected to have dissembled his resentment, in order the more effectually to defeat the schemes of those who oppose his election; I mean the Lælii and the Antonii, together with the rest of that wonderful party."

⁵ "Marcellus," says Cœlius to Cicero, "has dropped the design upon which he was lately so intent: but not so much from indolence, I believe, as prudence." Ep. Fam. viii. 2. Melm. iii. 29.

⁶ The temple of Apollo was situated without the town,

a debate relating to the payment of the forces commanded by Pompey, mention was made of that legion, which, as appeared by his accounts, had been lent to Cæsar; and he was asked of what number of men it consisted, and for what purpose it was borrowed? In short, Pompey was pushed so strongly upon this article, that he found himself under a necessity of promising to recal this legion out of Gaul; but he added at the same time, that the clamours of his enemies should not force him to take this step too precipitately. It was afterwards moved, that the question might be put concerning the election of a successor to Cæsar. Accordingly the senate came to a resolution that Pompey (who was just going to the army at Ariminum⁷, and did immediately after

and the senate was assembled there, that Pompey, who was actually governor of Spain, and commanded a considerable army, might be present: and all the matter of this deliberation had been probably concerted with him.

⁷ This army was probably part of the four legions which were decreed to Pompey for the support of his government of Spain. He feigned at this time a resolution of going to that province, which was opposed by Cæsar's enemies and Cicero himself. The last writes thus to Atticus on the 6th of July: "It appeared to me likewise as if Pompey (according to what you wrote me Varro had said) would most certainly go to Spain. This resolution by no means met with my approbation. I easily made Theophanes* sensible that he could do nothing better than to remain where he was. That Græcian therefore will do all he can to detain him, and indeed I know that Pompey has a great deference for his opinion." From this it appears that Cicero

Ad Att.
v. 11.

* A learned Greek of Mitylene, who was Pompey's constant companion, and wrote his life.

set out for that purpose) should be ordered to return to Rome with all expedition; that the affair relating to a general election of new governors for all the provinces might be debated in his

and all the aristocrats thought, that on Pompey's presence rested the safety of what they called the republic.

In another letter to his friend Atticus, he writes: "As to the affairs of Rome, we have ugly accounts of Curio and Paulus; not that I see any danger while we have Pompey: let him only keep his health, and we are safe." [*Non quo ullum periculum videam stante Pompeio, vel etiam sedente; valeat modo.*]

"But I am concerned for my friends Curio and Paulus." Ad Att. vi. 3. Yet the same Cicero has the confidence, in a subsequent letter, written to Aulus Cæcina, in 707, to affirm solemnly, that he always advised Pompey to go to his government, and boasts, at the same time, of his having never been deceived in the foresight of future events. "Now, if the principles," says he, "of the Etruscan science, in which you were instructed by your illustrious and excellent father, did not deceive you with respect to me; neither will my presages be less infallible with regard to you. They are derived, indeed, not only from the maxims and records of the most distinguished sages, whose writings, you well know, I have studied with great application; but from a long experience in public affairs, and from having passed through various scenes, both of prosperity and adversity. I have the stronger reason to confide in this method of divination, as it has never once deceived me, during all these dark and distracted times: insomuch that, were I to mention my predictions, I am afraid you would suspect that I framed them after the events I pretend to have foretold—I always gave it as my opinion, that Pompey should go to his government of Spain: with which, if he had happily complied, we should never have been involved in this fatal civil war."—Ep. Fam. vi. 6. Melm. ix. 34. This is most evidently false; and we shall see him out in his politics in almost every circumstance: yet Cornelius Nepos, and all Cicero's commentators, have taken his word for it, and are astonished at his prophetic discernment.

presence. "This point," adds Cœlius, "I imagine will be brought before the senate on the thirteenth of this month; when, if no infamous obstacles should be thrown in the way by the tribunes, the house will certainly come to some resolution; for Pompey, in the course of the debate, let fall an intimation, that he thought every man owed obedience to the authority of that assembly."

Thus the senate threw themselves precipitately into the arms of Pompey. The affair was not debated on the thirteenth of August, because Marcellus, though he had exerted himself in the pursuit of his design, was not able to assemble a complete number of senators. Many absented themselves, being in Cæsar's interest; others were backward because they saw that these motions tended to a rupture, and that nothing could be legally determined; the tribunes of Cæsar's party being always ready to interpose their negative. At last, an assembly was held on the thirtieth of September; and Pompey, who, in a preceding meeting, had opened himself so far as to declare, that Cæsar ought not to be admitted as a candidate for the consulship, whilst he retained his command in Gaul, now let fall an expression which was much observed, and gave, says Cœlius to Cicero, confident hopes of his good intentions; that he could not, without great injustice, determine any thing in relation to the provinces under Cæsar's command before the first of March; but that, after that time, he should have no sort of scruple. It was resolved accordingly by the

senate, that the consuls elect, L. Paulus and C. Metellus, should move them on the first of March to settle the consular provinces; and if any magistrate should interpose to hinder the effect of their decrees, that he should be deemed an enemy to the republic; and, if any one actually interposed, that this vote and resolution should be entered into the journals as an order of the senate, to be considered some other time by the house, and laid before the people. In this same assembly, Pompey being asked what if a negative should be put on the first of March, upon the decree for recalling Cæsar? He declared, that he looked upon it just as the same thing, whether Cæsar openly refused to obey the orders of the senate, or secretly procured some magistrate to obstruct them. “What, (said another) if he should insist on being consul, and holding his province also?” “What, (replied Pompey), if my son should take a stick and beat me?”—From expressions of this kind, it was generally conceived that a rupture would undoubtedly ensue between Pompey and Cæsar: and indeed the votes of the senate, and the measures taken at the same time by Pompey, were no less than a declaration of war against Cæsar, who lost no time to prepare himself against this attack of his enemies. As soon as he had vanquished the Bellovaci, he applied himself to quiet the affairs of his province, that he might be able to give all his attention to the city, and have his army in readiness to support him. At the same time he left no

stone unturned to procure friends among the magistrates of the ensuing year. He first attempted to gain C. Marcellus; but finding him too rigid, he addressed himself to L. Paulus, to whom he is said to have given fifteen hundred talents, or about three hundred thousand pounds, which he employed in building a noble palace adjoining to the forum. He gave a much greater sum to the tribune Curio, who, by his prodigalities, had not only wasted his immense fortune, but had contracted a debt of six hundred thousand sesterces, or about half a million⁸. The consul and tribune agreed therefore, secretly, to suffer nothing prejudicial to Cæsar's interest to pass during their magistracy; but both continued to appear in the party of Pompey?

⁸ *Momentumque fuit mutatus Curio rerum,
Gallorum captus spoliis, et Cæsaris auro.*

Lucan. Lib. iv. 819.

Caught by the spoils of Gaul, and Cæsar's gold,
Curio turn'd traitor, and his country sold.

The *vendit hic auro patriam* of Virgil is also applied to the case of Curio. Servius.

⁹ "As for Paulus," says Cælius, in a letter to Cicero, dated the eighteenth of November, "he declares most vehemently against suffering Cæsar to continue in Gaul, and our friend Furnius is the only tribune, whom I suspect of obstructing his measures for that purpose. Curio," says he, in the same letter, "I foresee will undertake two things; he will in the first place attempt to weaken the authority of Cæsar; and in the next endeavour to throw some little advantages on the side of Pompey." Ep. Fam. viii. x. Melm. iv. 14.

Ep. Fam.
viii. 10.
Melm.
iv. 14.

In the last months of this year, the city was greatly alarmed by the news sent them by Cassius of an invasion of the Parthians. As the senate had no opinion of the military skill of Bibulus and Cicero, who governed in Syria and Cilicia, the two frontier provinces, some were of opinion that the command should be given to Pompey; and he himself seemed to relish the proposition¹. This project would serve his ends in Asia, and would furnish a pretext for staying in Italy, and taking from Cæsar two of his legions. Others were for assigning this expedition to Cæsar and his army; and many named the consuls as the most proper persons to be employed. And these magistrates, in the apprehension that they would either be nominated to a commission, which they did not relish, or suffer the disgrace of its being delegated to others, forbore to convene the senate; though they thereby incurred the censure of neglecting the public interest. But whether indolence, or pusillanimity, was the real motive of their declining the conduct of the war, it was concealed under the specious appearance of modesty; and thus the year was spun out without doing any effectual business. The senate, however, with a view to weaken Cæsar, taking

¹ "I shall be able," says Cicero to Atticus, "with the reinforcement of Dejotarus, to keep the Parthians in play till Pompey arrives: his letter informs me that he will be appointed to that command." Ad Att. vi. 1.

advantage of the general apprehension of an irruption of the Parthians into Syria, ordered that Pompey and Cæsar should each of them furnish a legion to be sent into that province. But Pompey, instead of giving one of his, called for that which he had formerly lent to Cæsar; and Appius was dispatched to take the command of it, and to bring it into Italy. Cæsar, though he easily saw through the policy of his enemies, obeyed without demur the decree of the senate, and not only delivered to Appius Pompey's legion, but also the fifteenth, cantoned at that time in hither Gaul, which was immediately replaced by the thirteenth. Plutarch says that he gave to each soldier of the two legions two hundred and fifty drachms, about eight pounds sterling; a circumstance which Cæsar himself has not mentioned. These troops were no sooner arrived in Italy, but they had quarters assigned them in Campania, near Capua, instead of being sent into Syria.

L. ÆMILIUS PAULUS, }
C. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS, } Consuls.

The beginning of the year 703 was very quiet, but the calm soon ended in a mighty tempest. Curio, who had already sold himself to Cæsar, and who had hitherto acted insidiously with the friends of Pompey, and even signed the decrees of the senate against Cæsar, was now looking out for a pretext to quarrel with his party: with this view he applied to the pontifical college for an intercalation, in order to lengthen out the period of his tri-

Y. R. 703.

Bef. Chr.

49.


402 Cons.

Y. R. 703.

Bef. Chr.

49.

402 Cons.



bunitian ministry; and the priests rejecting his demand, their refusal furnished him with the pretence he wanted, and gave a colour, such as it was, to the desertion he had long meditated. He instantly declared against the senate, and harangued the people in favour of Cæsar, threatening, at the same time, to propose not only an agrarian and a viarian law², but a law also which would impower the

² *Consules autem habemus summa diligentia: adhuc senatusconsultum nisi de feriis Latinis nullum facere potuerunt. Curioni nostro tribunatus conglaciat: sed dici non potest quomodo hic omnia jaceant: nisi ego cum tabernariis et aquariis pugnarem, veternus civitatem occupasset... Quod tibi supra scripsi Curionem frigere, jam calet. Nam ferventissime concerpitur. Levissime enim, quia de intercalando non obtinuerat, transfugit ad populum et pro Cæsare loqui cæpit; legemque viariam non dissimilem agrariæ Rulli et alimentariam, quas jubet ædiles metiri, jactavit. Hoc nondum fecerat, cum priorem epistolæ partem scripsi. Cælius Ciceroni.* He threatens likewise to propose a viarian law, somewhat of the same tendency with the agrarian one which was formerly attempted by Rullus. This place must be corrupted; for the viarian and agrarian laws were different. The former regarded the keeping of the high roads in repair, and regulated the equipages of travellers, imposing a tax on them; and the latter is thus explained by Cælius, in a letter written in the end of the year 702: "I forgot to mention that Curio designs to make an attempt to procure a division of the lands in Campania: it is pretended that Cæsar does not concern himself in this matter; certain however it is, that Pompey is very desirous of having the distribution settled before Cæsar's return, that he may be precluded from applying them to his own purposes." Ep. Fam. viii. 10. Melm. iv. 14. Cæsar's agrarian law had not probably been executed in its whole extent, and Curio meant to carry the remaining part into execution. Cælius compares the agrarian law of Curio to that of Rullus, to shew his disapprobation of it.

ædiles to distribute corn among the people. These motions, however, soon gave way to one that was more important and interesting. C. Marcellus proposed, on the first of March, the affair of the consular provinces, as it had been ordered by the vote of the senate of the thirtieth of September. Paulus, the other consul, was silent; but Curio, after giving his approbation to the proposition, demanded that Pompey should likewise be ordered to renounce the government of Spain, and the command of the legions allotted to him; declaring, that the republic could never be free, till both he and Cæsar were reduced to the condition of private citizens; and that, if the one was continued in command, the other ought not to be stripped of his authority; which, in that case, was necessary to preserve the balance, and to prevent the republic from being at the disposal of one man. The senate, not being willing to make a decree so contrary to the interest of Pompey, rejected the tribune's proposal; who, in return, put his negative on every other resolution.

Y. R. 703.
Bef. Chr.
49.
402 Cons.

Appian.
Bel. Civ.
l. ii.

When the news of the debate reached Pompey, who was then in Campania, he wrote, with a false modesty which deceived nobody, "that, whatever honours had been heaped upon him, they had been freely granted him by the good-will of his fellow-citizens, without his ever soliciting any: that, lately, he had been forced into a third consulship, and to take the government of Spain for another five years, and that they should always find

Ibid.

Y. R. 703.
 Bef. Chr.
 49.
 402 Cons.

him ready to resign, at their will, an employment which he had received with reluctance." These protestations he even renewed on his return to Rome; but Curio, who was not to be put off with fair words, insisted upon his carrying his promises into execution, assuring him of a like submission from Cæsar.

Ep. Fam.
 viii. 12.
 Melm. vi.
 6.

There were fresh debates upon this subject; and Cœlius has given the following accounts of them to Cicero: "As to political affairs; the efforts of all parties are at present directed to a single point: and the general contest still is, in relation to the provinces. Pompey seems to unite in earnest with the senate, that the thirteenth of November may be limited for Cæsar's resigning his government. Curio, on the contrary, is determined to oppose this to the utmost; and, accordingly, has relinquished all his other schemes, in order to apply his whole strength to the affair in question. As to our party, you well know their irresolution; and consequently will readily believe me when I tell you they have not the spirit to push their opposition to the last extremity. The whole mystery of the scene in short is this: Pompey, that he may not seem to oppose Cæsar, or to aim at any thing but what the latter shall think perfectly equitable, represents Curio as acting in this affair merely upon his own authority, and with no other view than to create disturbances. It is certain, at the same time, that Pompey is much averse to Cæsar's being elected consul before he shall have delivered up his government,

together with the command of his army: and indeed he seems to be extremely apprehensive of the consequences, if it should prove otherwise. In the mean time he is severely attacked by Curio: who is perpetually reproaching him with deviating from the principles on which he acted in his second consulship. Take my word for it, notwithstanding all the difficulties they may throw in Curio's way, Cæsar will never want a friend to rise up in his cause: and if the whole turns, as they seem to fear, upon his procuring some tribune to interpose his negative to their decrees, I will venture to pronounce that he may remain in Gaul as long as he shall think proper."

"Do you know, my dear Cicero, what a victory Curio has lately obtained in relation to the provinces? The senate, in pursuance of a former order, having assembled to consider of the obstruction which some of the tribunes had given to their decree; M. Marcellus moved that the application might be made to those magistrates to withdraw their protest; but it was carried in the negative by a considerable majority. Pompey is at present in such delicate circumstances, that he will scarce find any measures, I believe, perfectly to his satisfaction. The senate, however, seem to intend, by the resolution I just now mentioned, that Cæsar shall be admitted as a candidate for the consulship, notwithstanding he should refuse to resign his government." Cicero speaks of this resolution in a letter to Atticus, and produces it as a proof that the

Y. R. 703.
Bef. Chr.
49.
402 Cons.

Ep. Fam.
viii. 13.
Melm.
vi. 8.

Ad Att.
vii. 7.

Y. R. 703.
Bef. Chr.
49.
402 Cons.

intentions of the senate were not true to the interest of the commonwealth: "For, had the motion," says he, "of Marcellus been vigorously supported, Curio's opposition would have been vain, and Cæsar must necessarily have resigned his command." But this measure had been certainly unconstitutional: and Pompey, who had often shewn himself ungrateful to his friends, and cruel to his enemies, had no merit with the greater part of the senate, comparatively with Cæsar, who never courted them, but relied intirely upon the people, while his antagonist, as induced by his interest, had applied to the one and to the other.

Ep. Fam.
viii. 14.
Melm.
vi. 15.

"As to political affairs; we have often mentioned to you, that I imagined the public tranquillity could not possibly be preserved beyond the present year: and the nearer we approach to those contentions, which must inevitably arise, the more evident this danger appears. For Pompey is determined most strenuously to oppose Cæsar's being consul, unless he resigns his command: and Cæsar, on the contrary, is persuaded that he cannot be safe upon those terms. He has offered, however, to throw up his commission, provided Pompey will do the same. And thus their very suspicious alliance will probably end at last in an open war With respect to our present divisions, I foresee that the senate, together with the whole order of judges, will declare in favour of Pompey: and that all those of desperate fortunes, or who are

obnoxious to the laws, will list themselves under the banners of Cæsar. As to their armies, I am persuaded there will be a great inequality. But to answer your question in a few words, concerning my sentiments of public affairs; if one or other of our chiefs should not be employed against the Parthians, I am persuaded great dissensions will soon ensue: dissensions, my friend, which nothing can terminate but the sword, and which each of them seem well inclined and prepared to draw³."

Y. R. 703.
Bef. Chr.
49.
402 Cons.

³ These accounts are the most authentic we have: what Suetonius, or Plutarch, or Appian, add to them, cannot be depended upon, being full of blunders and absurdities. The relations, nevertheless, of these authors are copied by almost every writer of Roman history. Appian talks of a debate in the senate, in which the consul, C. Marcellus, having put the question separately, first, whether they were of opinion that Pompey should lay down his command, the majority answered in the negative: then putting the question, whether a successor should be named to Cæsar? All agreed to it. But that Curio, re-uniting what the consul had separated, put to the vote another question. Whether they should not both be ordered to dismiss their armies; twenty-one rejected it, and three hundred and seventy answered in the affirmative; all, says he, affectionate to the public good: whereupon the consul dismissed the assembly, crying, "Well then, take Cæsar for your master." He adds, that soon after, a false rumour coming that Cæsar had passed the Alps, and was marching directly to Rome, the city was alarmed, and the consuls proposed to the senate to send for the legions at Capua, to employ them against him as an enemy to the state; but that, upon Curio's declaring the report to be false, the consul, in great wrath, said: "Since, in consulting with the senate, I am hindered to provide for the safety of the commonwealth, I will provide alone, according to the

Y. R. 703.

Bef. Chr.

49.

402 Cons.



The consular elections were carried by Pompey and his party. Sergius Galba, a lieutenant of Cæsar, who stood candidate, was rejected; and L. Lentulus Crus and C. Marcellus, his fiercest enemies, were chosen.

Cæsar, after the campaign of the year 702, had made it his business in the winter-season to pacify his province, and to take away all occasion of future insurrections. He treated the cities honourably; rewarding generously the noblemen and leading men, and did not burden the country with new impositions. In the spring, he hastened into Italy, under the pretence of assisting his quæstor Antony in his suit for the augurate; but in reality to take a nearer view of the transactions in the city, and to encourage his party there. The

power I am intrusted with." Then, rushing out of the city with his colleague, [who was L. Æmilius Paulus, Cæsar's fast friend] and presenting a sword to Pompey, "We order you," said he, "my colleague and I, to march against Cæsar, and fight for your country; and to that end, we give you the command of the army at Capua, and all the forces in Italy, with power to raise troops at your discretion." Pompey declared he would obey them, because it was their command; adding, however, these words, "if no better expedient can be found." Plutarch has much the same tale, but has added, most ridiculously, that the senate followed the consul, and that the whole city put on mourning. Dio has adopted only a part of the story, and tells us that the subject of the debate was, whether Curio should be turned out of the senate; Appius, the censor, having declared that, in his judgment, he ought to be degraded. He observes, that only C. Marcellus and the two consuls elect went to Pompey. Lib. xl. p. 151.

news therefore which he received of Antony's⁴ success, before he reached Italy, did not stop him. It was then time to thank the municipal towns for the assistance they had given his friend upon his recommendation, and to recommend unto them his own case touching the consulate, which he purposed to apply for the next year. He was received with extraordinary respect and affection: all the people came forth to meet him; sacrifices were offered over the whole country; and the gates where he was to pass, the market-places, and the temples were adorned as in a day of triumph. After making his tour through the municipal towns, and agreeing with his friends

Y. R. 703.
Bef. Chr.
49.
402 Cons.

⁴ We have an account of this election in a letter from Cœlius to Cicero: "If you had taken the king of Parthia himself prisoner, and sacked his metropolis, it could not make you amends for your absence.—You have lost indeed a subject of inexhaustible mirth, by not being spectator of the very ridiculous figure which the luckless [L.] Domitius displayed, when he lately found himself disappointed in his election. The assembly of the people was exceedingly numerous upon this occasion; but the force of party bore down all before it, and even carried away many of the friends of Domitius from his interest. This circumstance he imputes to my management; and as he considers the preference which has been given to his competitor Antony as a real injury done to himself, he honours me with the same marks of his displeasure with which he distinguishes the most intimate of his friends. He is at present indeed a very diverting compound of wrath and indignation; which he impotently discharges, in the first place against myself for promoting the election of M. Antony; and in the next against the people, for expressing too much satisfaction in his repulse." Ep. Fam. viii. 14. Melm. vi. 15.

Y. R. 703.
Bef. Chr.
49.
402 Cons.

at Rome, he left T. Labienus to command in Italy, and went himself into Gaul to review his army, and put it in readiness to act on the first call.

In the end of the year 703, he returned to Italy: and, when he came thither, he found that the two legions which he had dismissed, and which by the decree of the senate, should have been employed against the Parthians, had been delivered to Pompey by C. Marcellus, the consul, and were kept in the neighbourhood of the city, and that every measure had been taken to abrogate his command, and reduce him to the state of a private citizen. Here he was joined by Curio, who, after some fruitless attempts to prohibit Pompey's levies, seeing the opposite party greatly incensed against him, had left the city before the expiration of his office.

Mark Antony^s succeeded him in the tri-

^s Dr. Middleton has collected, from Cicero's writings, the history of M. Antony's life to the commencement of the civil wars; and the reader will allow me to transcribe this article from that intelligent historian.

"M. Antony, who now began to make a figure in the affairs of Rome, was of an ancient and noble extraction; the grandson of that celebrated statesman and orator who lost his life in the massacres of Marius and Cinna: his father had been honoured with one of the most important commissions of the republic; but, after an inglorious discharge of it, died with the character of a corrupt, oppressive, and rapacious commander. The son, trained in the discipline of such a parent, whom he lost when he was very young, launched out at once into all the excess of riot and debauchery, and wasted his whole patrimony before he had

bunate on the tenth of November, and in all his zeal for Cæsar. He was no sooner in

Y. R. 703.

Bef. Chr.

49.

402 Cons.

put on the manly gown; shewing himself to be the genuine son of that father, who was born, as Sallust says, to squander money, without ever employing a thought on business, till a present necessity urged him. His comely person, lively wit, insinuating address, made young Curio infinitely fond of him; so that, in spite of the commands of a severe father, who had often turned Antony out of doors and forbidden him his house, he could not be prevailed with to forsake his company; but supplied him with money for his frolics and amours, till he had involved himself on his account in a debt of fifty thousand pounds. This greatly afflicted old Curio; and Cicero was called in to heal the distress of the family; whom the son intreated, with tears in his eyes, to intercede for Antony, as well as for himself, and not suffer them to be parted; but Cicero, having prevailed with the father to make the son easy, by discharging his debts, advised him to insist upon it as a condition, and to enforce it by his paternal power, that he should have no further commerce with Antony. This laid the foundation of an early aversion in Antony to Cicero, increased still by the perpetual course of Antony's life, which fortune happened to throw among Cicero's inveterate enemies: for, by the second marriage of his mother, [Julia, a relation of Cæsar's] he became son-in-law to that Léntulus who was put to death for conspiring with Catiline, by whom he was initiated into all the cabals of a traitorous faction, and infected with principles pernicious to the liberty of Rome. To revenge the death of this father [in-law] he attached himself to Clodius; and during his tribunate, was one of the ministers of all his violences; yet was detected at the same time in some criminal intrigue in his family, injurious to the honour of his patron. From this education in the city, he went abroad to learn the art of war under Gabinius, the most profligate of all generals: [Plutarch tells us, that Antony not being able to endure the madness of Clodius, and apprehensive of the power of his enemies, withdrew himself, and retired into Greece, where he inured his body

Y. R. 703.

Bef. Chr.

49.

402 Cons.



possession of his office, than he proposed that the two legions taken from Cæsar should be

to warlike exercises, and applied his mind to the study of eloquence; and that it was with difficulty that he was prevailed upon by Gabinius to serve under him,] “who gave him the command of his horse in Syria; where he signalised his courage in the restoration of king Ptolemy, and acquired the first taste of martial glory, in an expedition undertaken against the laws and religion of his country.” [An expedition which Cicero encouraged his great and noble friend Lentulus Spinther to undertake.] “From Ægypt, instead of coming home, where his debts would not suffer him to be easy, he went to Cæsar into Gaul, the sure refuge of all the needy, the desperate, and the audacious:” [This is not a fair manner of representing Antony’s behaviour. Was not Cæsar’s camp the school of military skill, and the field of glory? Had not Cæsar, among his lieutenants, P. Crassus, so much extolled by Cicero: Quintus Cicero, M. Brutus, and many other officers of great merit: and where could Antony spend his youth better?] “And, after some stay in that province, being furnished with money and credit by Cæsar, he returned to sue for the quæstorship.—Cæsar recommended him in a pressing manner to Cicero, intreating him to accept Antony’s submission, and pardon him what was past, and to assist him in his present suit: with which Cicero readily complied, and obliged Antony so highly by it, that he declared war presently against Clodius, whom he attacked with great fierceness in the forum, and would certainly have killed, if he had not found means to hide himself under some stairs. Antony openly gave out, that he owed all this to Cicero’s generosity, to whom he could never make amends for former injuries, but by the destruction of his enemy Clodius. Being chosen quæstor, he went back immediately to Cæsar, without expecting his lot, or a decree of the senate to appoint him his province; where, though he had all imaginable opportunities of acquiring money, yet, by squandering, as fast as he got it, he came, a second time, empty and beggarly to Rome, to put in for the tribunate; in which office, after the example of

sent into Syria; that all new levies should be stopped, and that all those who had already given in their names, and taken the oath, should be released from their obligation, and even be forbid to serve. On the twenty-first, he made a speech to the people, which was a perpetual invective on Pompey's conduct from his first appearance in public, with great complaints against the violent and arbitrary condemnation of citizens, and the terror of his arms; and it was probably on this occasion that he read Cæsar's letter to the people, mentioned by Plutarch, in which he expressed a desire that both Pompey and he, quitting their governments, and dismissing their armies, should submit to their judgment. According to Suetonius, Plutarch, and Appian, Cæsar made other equitable overtures, proposing to part immediately with eight of his legions and Transalpine Gaul, provided he might keep two legions with the Cisalpine province, or but one legion with Illyricum and Cisalpine Gaul, till he was made consul. Plutarch and Appian add, that Pompey was satisfied with these conditions, but that they were rejected by the consuls; a circumstance extremely improbable: for Pompey, it is certain, was as averse to peace, as the most determined of Cæsar's enemies. In an interview that Cicero had with him, on the tenth of December, Pom-

Y. R. 703.

Bef. Chr.

49.

402 Cons.

Ad Att. vii.

8.

In Pomp.

his friend Curio, having sold himself to Cæsar, he was, as Cicero says, as much the cause of the ensuing war, as Helen was of that of Troy." Phil. ii. 21, 22. Midd. p. 64.

Y. R. 703.

Bef. Chr.

49.

402 Cons.



pey told him, that there was no hope of an accommodation, and that war was inevitable; and, finding Cicero wholly bent on peace, he contrived to have a second conference with him at Lavernium, on the twenty-seventh, before he reached the city, in hopes to allay his fears, and to turn him from the vain project of an accommodation, which might contribute to cool the zeal of his friends in the senate. He declared, that there could be no pacification, but such as was treacherous and dangerous; and that, if Cæsar should resign the command of his army, and take the consulship, he would throw the republic⁶ into confusion. At this time he was even actually disposing of all the governments; and he tried to engage Cicero to go to Sicily, though neither the resolution of the senate nor the orders of the people had given him any command in that quarter. He farther assured Cicero, that, when Cæsar heard of the earnest and mighty preparations that were making against him, he would throw up his pretensions to the consulship, and stick by his army and government: "But supposing," added he, "that Cæsar should act like a madman, and fly to extremities, I should despise every thing he could do, and should place an intire confidence in my own and the republic's forces⁷." "In short," says Cicero,

⁶ He means the aristocratic faction.

⁷ This extravagant confidence betrays great weakness in Pompey, and the historians bring several reasons to account for it. He looked upon himself, it is said, as the idol of the

“ though I was frequently checked by reflecting on the doubtful events of war, yet I was made the more easy, when I heard a general, of such courage and such experience and authority, discoursing, like a statesman, upon the dangers that might attend an insincere accommodation ?.”

Y. R. 703.
Bef. Chr.
49.

402 Cons.

Ad Att. vii.
8.

people of Italy: for, having fallen dangerously ill, in the beginning of this same year, in Campania, the whole country made sacrifices to the gods for his recovery, and the example was followed by the rest of Italy; and, when he appeared in public, such multitudes came forth to see him, that no place could contain them. Plutarch, it may likewise be observed, has informed us, that Appius, and those who brought him the two legions from Gaul, very much vilified Cæsar's actions there, and gave out scandalous reports in derogation of his honour, telling Pompey that he was unacquainted with his own strength and reputation, if he made use of any other forces against Cæsar than his own; for such was the soldiers' hatred to Cæsar and their love to Pompey, that they would all come over to him upon his first appearance. Whatever were the causes which raised in him so favourable an opinion of his power and security, certain it is that he proceeded so far as to laugh at those who seemed to dread the war; and somebody telling him, that, if Cæsar determined to march to Rome, there was nothing to oppose him, Pompey answered: “ In whatever part of Italy I stamp with my foot, there will rise up legions.”

⁸ Cicero, in a letter to Atticus on the subject of his interview with Pompey on the tenth of December, writes thus: “ Pompey said, that he had long perceived Cæsar to be alienated from him, but had received a very late instance of it: for that Hirtius came from Cæsar a few days before, and did not come to see him; and, when Balbus promised to bring Scipio an account of his business the next morning before day, Hirtius was gone back to Cæsar in the night: this he takes for a clear proof of Cæsar's resolution to break with him.” Ad Att. vii. 4. Had not Pompey given Cæsar

CHAP. II.

Cæsar is ordered, by a decree of the senate, to disband his army, and, in case of refusal, is declared a public enemy.—The consuls and other magistrates are vested with extraordinary powers. Cæsar passes the Rubicon with one legion, and, in two months' time, makes himself master of all Italy.

C. CLAUDIUS MARCELLUS, } Consuls.
L. LENTULUS CRUS, }

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

ON the first of January⁹, Curio came to Rome, and produced letters from Cæsar to the senate, in which, after enumerating his many services to the republic, and answering

sufficient provocation? If Cæsar had acted with the perfidious insincerity of Pompey, it had been an eternal blemish upon his character.

⁹ The months of the Roman kalendar, at this time, did not perfectly correspond with those of our Julian year; but the difference was not so great as our learned bishop Usher has made it. *Annals*, p. 639. According to him the first of January of this Roman year answered to the twenty-second of October of the Julian year, 50 before Christ; so that the autumnal months were carried back into summer, and the winter months into autumn. It is impossible to reconcile this way of reckoning with the unanimous testimony of the ancient historians. And the primate pretends that they were deceived by Cæsar's reformation of the kalendar. But it is also irreconcilable with the facts related by them; and it is astonishing that Abbé Mongault, Dr. Middleton, and M. Crevier, who have examined so narrowly into every thing relating to these times, did not perceive this mistake. Cicero, in a letter to Tiro, whom he had left sick beyond seas, dated the twenty-ninth of January, charges him not to sail during winter: *Cave festines aut committas, ut aut æger aut*

the accusations of his enemies, he declared, "that he was willing to lay down his command, if Pompey should also consent to that measure; and that, as there could be no safety for him upon any other terms, he would immediately, if his demand was not complied with, march into Italy, and revenge the injuries done to himself and the commonwealth."

It was with great difficulty that the tribunes procured these letters to be read; but nothing could prevail with the consuls to permit their contents to come under the deliberation of the house: and they proposed to debate on the state of the commonwealth. Lentulus declared that he would not be wanting to the senate and the common cause, if they would deliver their opinions with freedom and courage; but that, if they continued to regard Cæsar, and affected to court his friendship, he would disclaim intirely their authority. Scipio, father-in-law to Pompey, spoke to the same

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Cæsar de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib. i.

hieme naviges; and he adds, that he imagines the hard winter has prevented his letters from reaching him: *Neque enim meas puto ad te litteras tanta hieme perferre.* Ep. Fam. xvi.

11. Could Cicero, then in the southern parts of Italy, call the beginning of November hard winter? No; he speaks of letters written in the end of December. In a letter dated the seventh of April, ad Att. x. 2. he says, the swallow is come, *garrula* [*hirundo*] *en adest*, or the spring is come. The first of April therefore, could not answer to any part of the month of January; it was certainly March. The ingenious M. de le Nauze, member of the Royal Academy of Literature in Paris, has proved the first day of this Roman year to be the sixteenth of December of the Julian year, which is fifty-five days later than our learned primate.

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

purpose: he said that Pompey was firmly bent not to abandon the republic, if he found the senators ready to support him: but that if they cooled or were remiss in their resolves, it would be in vain for them to expect his aid, if they should afterwards find it necessary to apply for it. The speech of Scipio was considered as proceeding from Pompey, who was at that time in the suburbs. Others proposed milder councils. M. Marcellus objected to any deliberation on this matter till troops were raised over all Italy, and an army got ready, under whose protection the senate might proceed with freedom and safety in their debates. It was moved by Callidius, that Pompey should be sent to his government of Spain, in order to take away all occasion of discord; because Cæsar, it was said, had reason to fear that the two legions, taken from him, were retained by Pompey in the neighbourhood of Rome, to be employed against him. M. Cœlius spoke to the same purpose. But they were all severely reprimanded by the consul Lentulus, who expressly refused to put Callidius's motion to the vote: and M. Marcellus, awed by the consul's rebuke, retracted what he had said. Thus the clamours of Lentulus, the dread of an army at the gates of Rome, and the menaces of Pompey's friends, intimidating the greatest part of the senate, it was carried, though with great difficulty, that Cæsar should be ordered to disband his army before a certain day then fixed; and that, in case of disobedience, he

should be declared an enemy to the republic. This is Cæsar's account, and it appears to be a true one, from the conduct of the senate in the last year, and from Cicero's letters¹. The boasted advantage of Pompey's having the support of the senate must be considered of consequence, as nothing more than a fair appearance; and was in reality a new infringement of the liberty of his country; since it was procured by the most illegal and tyrannical means.

M. Antony and Q. Cassius, tribunes of the people, put their negative on the decree of the senate; but their prerogative was disputed, and a debate ensued, in the course of

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib. i.

¹ He writes to Atticus in the end of December: "I am daily more apprehensive of the public commotions, for even our patriots are not so unanimous as they ought to be: how many knights, how many senators have I seen, who have bitterly inveighed against the whole of Pompey's conduct, and especially the unseasonable journey he has undertaken?" Ad Att. l. vii. 5. [This journey was probably to give directions for the raising of troops.] Ibid. 6. "I am in great concern about the public, nor have I hitherto found a man, who did not think it better to yield to Cæsar all he demands, than enter upon a civil war." Cicero himself was of the same opinion, as he declares in the same letter: "You will ask me then, what are my real sentiments? Why, truly, they are not the same with my words. My sentiments are, that any concession is preferable to a civil war: but I will talk, and that too from no servile motive, in the same strain that Pompey does. For indeed it would be of the worst consequence to the public, and particularly unbecoming in me, should I differ from Pompey at this important juncture." Unbecoming to speak his real sentiments, and to advise what he thought was for the public good! This, it must be confessed, is a very strange morality.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

which many severe speeches were made against them. He who spoke with the greatest warmth and passion was most applauded by the Pompeian faction. The assembly broke up without coming to any determination; and Pompey, in the evening, sent for all those who were of his party, and commended the forward, and reproved and animated the more moderate. Multitudes of veterans, who had formerly served under him, flocked to Rome from all parts, allured by the expectation of rewards and dignities: and a great number of officers belonging to the legions lately returned by Cæsar had likewise orders to attend him. The city was filled with troops.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib. i.

The contest between the consuls and the tribunes was renewed the following days, and continued till the seventh, during which time Piso, the censor, father-in-law to Cæsar, and L. Roscius, the prætor, who had served under Cæsar in Gaul, offered to go to him and acquaint him with the state of affairs, demanding only six days for that purpose. Others proposed to send deputies to him: but all these proposals were rejected by the consuls, and by Scipio, Cato, and the other chiefs of the aristocratical faction. The tribunes were threatened, or, according to Appian², were

² Appian says, "that Marcellus and Lentulus ordered Antony and Cassius to leave the senate, lest no regard should be had to their dignity: that Antony, leaping from his seat in great rage, invoked the faith of the gods and men, and lamented that an authority, which had been hitherto held

ordered to leave the house: and the senate had recourse to that decree, which was never used but in the greatest extremity, that the consuls, prætors, tribunes of the people, and the proconsuls that were near Rome, should take care that the commonwealth received no detriment³. Antony and Cassius left the city that same night, disguised like slaves, in a hired carriage, and stopped not till they got to Rimini. Curio and M. Coelius soon followed them.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

The following days the senate assembled without the city, where Pompey confirmed every thing he had before intimated by the mouth of Scipio: he applauded the resolution and courage of the senators, and acquainted

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib. i.

sacred, was no longer a security; and that those who proposed salutary advice were driven out of the senate, as if they had been guilty of murder or some other crime: that, after pronouncing these words, he instantly departed in a fury, foretelling, in a prophetic strain, the wars, proscriptions, banishments, and confiscations with which the city was threatened, and making horrid imprecations against those who were the cause of all these miseries." On the contrary, Cicero, in a letter to Tiro, dated the twelfth of January, writes thus: "Curio, in conjunction with Q. Cassius and M. Antony, without the least violence being offered to them, have withdrawn themselves to Cæsar. They took this step immediately after the senate had given in charge to the consuls, the prætors, and the tribunes of the people, together with those of us who are invested with proconsular power, to take care of the interest of the republic." Ep. Fam. xvi. 11. Melm. vii. 1.

³ Id. Jan. or the seventh of January: the twenty-eighth of October, according to Bishop Usher, but rather the twelfth of December.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

them, that he had ten legions already in arms, and was besides well informed that Cæsar's troops were by no means satisfied with their general, and had even refused to support and follow him. It was then proposed that troops should be raised all over Italy; that Pompey should be supplied with money out of the public treasury; that Faustus Sylla should be sent proprætor to Mauritania; and that King Juba should have the title of king and ally to the people of Rome. Marcellus, the consul, opposed the last of these motions, and Philippus, tribune of the people, would not agree to the proprætorship of Sylla. The other motions were approved of. The affair of the provinces, two of which were consular, and the rest prætorian, came next to be canvassed. Syria was allotted to Scipio, and Transalpine Gaul to L. Domitius. To the prætorian provinces governors were assigned without the privity or approbation of the people, and they instantly departed for their several commands. Thus war was in effect declared against Cæsar; and measures were taken to arm the whole empire in order to crush him. The Pompeians flattered themselves that, before Cæsar could draw his forces together from the several quarters of Gaul where they were quartered, Pompey would have a considerable army on foot, with which he might possess himself of the principal parts of Italy, obstruct his access to Rome, and hold him continually employed, till the army from Spain, consisting of five legions under the

Ep. Fam.
xvi. 12.
Melm. vii.
5.

command of Afranius, Petreius, and Varro, came up upon his rear, to complete his overthrow. They did not doubt but he would be deserted by great numbers of his officers and soldiers, and that the two Gauls would rise against him; every part of those provinces, excepting only the colonies beyond the Po, being thought utterly averse to him.

Cicero arrived at Rome on the fourth of January, with all the pomp of his proconsular and imperatorial dignity: and, in this disordered state of the city, he solicited a decree for his triumph, to which, as he informs us, in a letter to Tiro, “the senate, in a very full house, immediately consented: but that the consul Lentulus, in order to appropriate to himself a greater share in conferring this honour, told them, that he would propose it himself in proper form as soon as he should have dispatched the affairs that were necessary in the present conjuncture.” In the same letter, which is dated the twelfth of January, he adds, “I am unhappily fallen into the very midst of public dissension, or rather indeed, I find myself surrounded with the flames of a civil war. It was my earnest desire to have composed these dangerous ferments: and I probably might, if the passions of some in both parties, who are equally eager for war, had not rendered my endeavours ineffectual.—We are raising forces with all possible diligence, under the authority and with the assistance of Pompey: who now begins, somewhat too late, I fear, to be apprehensive of Cæsar’s power.—I

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Ep. Fam.
xvi. 11.
Melm. vii.
1.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Ep. Fam.
xvi. 12.
Melm. vii.
5.

Ep. Fam.
iv. 1.
Melm. vii.
12.

act with great moderation: and this conduct renders my influence with both parties so much the stronger. The several districts of Italy are assigned to our respective protections: and Capua is the department I have taken for mine.” And in a letter dated the twenty-ninth of January, he observes, “ It has been the perpetual purpose of all my speeches, my votes, and my actions, ever since I returned to Rome, to preserve the public tranquillity, but an invincible rage for war had unaccountably seized not only the enemies, but even those who are esteemed the friends of the commonwealth; and it was in vain I remonstrated that nothing was more to be dreaded than a civil war.—Upon my return to Rome, it was too late to inforce my pacific sentiments: I was wholly unsupported in my opinion, and not only found myself among a set of men, who were madly inflamed with a thirst of war, but was considered likewise as one, who, by a long absence, was quite unacquainted with the true state of the commonwealth⁴.”

Cæsar was at Ravenna when he received the first intelligence of the proceedings against him. He assembled his troops, and acquainted them with the grateful requital which his long and glorious services had met with from the senate. In his speech, he insisted on

⁴ It is remarkable that Cicero, in his letter to Tiro, talks of his influence with both parties, and that here he complains of his being totally disregarded.

nothing so much as the violation of the tribunitian power in the persons of Antony and Cassius. He complained of the innovation introduced into the commonwealth, which checked, by the terror of arms, the authority of the tribunes: he said, “that Sylla, who had made it his business to humble, and almost annihilate that magistracy, had yet left it the liberty of opposition; but that Pompey, who valued himself for having restored it to all its prerogatives, deprived it now of that privilege which it had always enjoyed.” His officers and soldiers having testified their readiness to defend him and the tribunes, he sent dispatches to his lieutenants in Gaul to quit their winter-quarters and come to him with all expedition; and he himself entered immediately upon action, and marched to Ariminum. There he found Antony and Cassius, whom he produced in the servile disguise they had been forced to put on for their security: and the sight of them greatly exasperated the soldiers, who made fresh protestations to their general, that they would follow him wherever he should think proper to lead them⁵.


Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib. i.

⁵ Suetonius (in Vit. Cæs. c. 31.) mentions several particulars which I have not thought worthy of being inserted into the text of this history. He says, “that, as soon as Cæsar was informed that the interposition of the tribunes had been over-ruled, and that they themselves had been forced to save themselves by flight, he privately dispatched away some battalions; and, to prevent any suspicion of his design, he attended at a public show, and examined the model of a school for gladiators, which he intended to build: and sat down to table with his friends as usual: that after

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Cæsar, sensible of what importance celerity was in his present situation, to prevent the



sun-set, having caused mules from a neighbouring mill to be put to his chaise, he set out with all possible secrecy and a small retinue; but, his lights going out, he lost his way, and wandered a long time in the dark, till, meeting at break of day with a guide, he got on foot through some narrow paths into the road again, and came up with his troops on the banks of the Rubicon, which was the boundary of his province: and that there he remained silent and pensive for some time, musing on the greatness of his attempt; then, turning to those about him, ‘We may still retreat,’ said he, ‘but if we pass this little bridge, we must put all to the decision of the sword.’” Cæsar mentions nothing of all this. The great secrecy so much insisted on could serve no purpose; nor is it consistent with Cæsar’s speech to his soldiers at Ravenna. His hesitation on the banks of the Rubicon is quite ridiculous: his determination had been taken long before, and indeed was not free: but let us proceed with this curious narrative.

“Whilst Cæsar was demurring upon the matter, a man of an extraordinary size and shape appeared of a sudden, sitting by the river, and playing on a rural flute. The novelty of the sight drew together a great many of the soldiers, and among the rest a trumpeter, from whom the extraordinary man, snatching the trumpet, leaped into the water, and sounding a charge, went over to the other side; upon which Cæsar, without farther consideration, crossed the river, crying out aloud, ‘Let us go where the gods so remarkably call us, and where the fury of our enemies drives us: the lot is cast.’”

The same historian adds, “and accordingly, passing the river with his army, and having received the tribunes of the people, he, with tears in his eyes, and his clothes torn away from his breast, implored the protection of the soldiers.” Could Cæsar be ignorant of the attachment of his soldiers to him? Had they not followed him with an intire confidence for nine years? Had he not endeared himself to them by the unwearied care he had taken of their sub-

efforts of his enemies, and to raise the courage of his friends, did not lose a moment, but sent M. Antony with five cohorts to seize Aretium, and other officers to secure Pisaurum, Fanum, and Ancona, while he himself remained at Ariminum to levy troops. And, being informed that the prætor Thermus had entered Iguvium with five cohorts, and was endeavouring to fortify the town, whose inhabitants he knew to be well inclined to his interest, he detached instantly Curio to oppose him with three cohorts, drawn from the towns he had already got possession of. Thermus left the place on Curio's approach, and was deserted by his soldiers in his retreat. Attius Varus also, who commanded in Auximum, was obliged to abandon it, on account of the disaffection of the townsmen to his cause, and, being attacked in his retreat, was likewise deserted by his troops, part of which went to their homes, and the rest joined themselves to Cæsar.

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

Arezzo.

Pesaro.

Fano.

Eugubio.

Osino.

The first report of this march towards Rome struck the magistrates with such a panic, that they precipitately came to the shameful resolution of forsaking the city. Pompey had treated with contempt the menaces of his rival, but it plainly appeared that he was utterly unprepared to oppose him. Instead of marching towards Cæsar, and taking the

sistence, and by his magnificent presents? Did not both the soldiers and officers ground the hopes of their fortunes upon his generosity and protection?

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

command of the troops cantoned in Picenum and the neighbouring provinces, he withdrew to the two legions near Capua, whither he was soon followed by the consuls and the chief senators of his faction. Cæsar affirms that their consternation was so great, that, when the consul Lentulus came to the treasury to deliver out the money to Pompey, in consequence of the decree of the senate, he scarce waited the opening of the inner door, but hastily left the place, upon a false rumour that Cæsar was approaching, and that some of his cavalry were already in view. However, Pompey sent orders to the commanders in the north of Italy, to stop Cæsar's progress as much as possible; and Lentulus Spinther threw himself into Asculum, a town of Picenum, with ten cohorts, while at the same time L. Domitius took possession of Corfinium, a strong town in the country of the Peliani, at the foot of the Appennine, on the Adriatic side, where he proposed to make a stand till Pompey could come up.

Ascoli.

Mid. p. 69.

At Capua, the consuls took courage, and began to renew their levies in the surrounding colonies. This town had always been the common seminary or place for educating gladiators for the great men of Rome; and there Cæsar had a famous school of them at this time, which he had long maintained under the best masters, for the occasions of his public shows in the city. And, as they were very numerous and well furnished with arms, there was reason to apprehend that they

would break out, and make some attempt in favour of their master, which, in the present state of affairs, might be of dangerous consequence. Pompey therefore, we are told, thought it necessary to take them out of their school, and to distribute them among the principal inhabitants of the place, assigning two to each master of a family, by which he secured them from doing any mischief. But Cæsar's account is very different; he tells us, "that Lentulus summoned the gladiators into the forum, gave them their liberty, furnished them with horses, and commanded them to follow him: but, being admonished by his friends that this step was unanimously condemned, he dispersed them into the neighbouring towns of Campania to keep garrison there." It is probable that Lentulus had rashly employed, or thought of employing, the gladiators, in the manner here mentioned, but that Pompey, sensible of the impropriety of arming slaves against their master, had disposed of them as we have just now related ⁶.


Y. R. 704,
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

De Bell,
Civ. Com,
lib. i.

While preparations were thus making on

⁶ It appears from a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that, in relation to these gladiators, there were two different reports at different times: "I was misinformed," says he, "as to what I wrote to you, upon the strength of Torquatus's intelligence, with regard to Cæsar's gladiators at Capua: for Pompey has quartered them very judiciously among the inhabitants, two to each family. There were five thousand, and they threatened to break out. This was a measure greatly for the service of the public." Ad Att. vii. 14. I cannot think there could be five thousand gladiators in one school; perhaps there may be an error in the number.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



the side of Pompey, and while Cæsar was pushing on the war with incredible vigour, messages were sent by the two generals to each other concerning an accommodation. Before Cæsar left Ariminum, young L. Cæsar, whose father was one of his lieutenants, came to him, and told him, that he was impowered to inform him, “that Pompey was desirous of clearing himself to Cæsar, lest he might interpret those actions as designed to affront him, which had no other aim but the good of the commonwealth; the advantage of which it was Pompey’s constant maxim to prefer to any private interest; and that Cæsar, in the opinion of Pompey, should sacrifice his passion and resentment to the same noble motive, and not prejudice his country by pushing too far his resentment against his private enemies.” The prætor Roscius, who had a commission of the like nature from Pompey, joined likewise in the negotiation. Cæsar made answer, “that the interest of the commonwealth had always been dearer to him than life; and that, though he could not help being alarmed at the malice of his enemies, who had frustrated the good intentions of the Roman people in his favour, by cutting off six months from his command, and obliging him to return to Rome to sue for the consulship, he had yet, for the sake of his country, patiently submitted to this assault upon his honour. That his proposal of disbanding the armies, on both sides, which he had made in his letter to the senate, had been rejected; and that new levies

were making all over Italy. That the two legions, which had been taken from him under the pretence of the Parthian war, were still retained in the service of his enemies; and that the whole state was in arms. That all this aimed evidently at his destruction: but that, nevertheless, he was ready to agree to any proposal, and expose himself to any danger for the sake of his country. Let Pompey [he continued] go to his government: let all the armies be disbanded: let every one throughout Italy lay down his arms: let every thing that participates of terror and force be removed: let the elections of magistrates be made with perfect freedom: and let the republic be administered by the authority of the senate and people. And, the better to settle all these articles, and in order to corroborate them with an oath, let Pompey himself draw nearer, or suffer Cæsar to approach him; as all differences may most easily be determined by a conference⁷."

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

⁷ Cicero, in a letter to Tiro, dated the twenty-ninth of January, gives a quite different account of Cæsar's proposals, which is followed by Dr. Middleton: "Cæsar is reported to have offered us [*feruntur conditiones*] the following conditions: in the first place, that Pompey shall retire to his government of Spain; in the next, that the army we have raised shall be disbanded, and our garrisons evacuated. Upon these terms he promised to deliver up the farther Gaul into the hands of L. Domitius; and the nearer into those of Considius Nonianus; the persons to whom these provinces have been respectively allotted. He farther engages to resign his right of suing for the consulship in his absence, and is willing to return to Rome in

Ep. Fam.
xvi. 12.
Melm. vii.
5.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

L. Cæsar and Roscius, having received this answer, departed for Capua, near which place


order to appear as a candidate in the regular form. We have accepted these propositions, provided he withdraws his forces from the several towns he has taken, that the senate may assemble at Rome in order to pass a decree for that purpose. If he should think proper to comply with this proposal, there are hopes of peace; not indeed of a very honourable one, as the terms are imposed upon us: yet any thing is preferable to our present circumstances. But, if he should refuse to stand to his overtures, we are prepared for an engagement: but an engagement which Cæsar, after having incurred the general odium of retracting his own conditions, will scarce be able to sustain." It is not at all probable that Cæsar made the proposals here mentioned: because he would thereby have given himself up to his enemies. Cicero, therefore, was either ill informed, or L. Cæsar added to what Cæsar had proposed: and this, according to Dion Cassius, was really the case. The following extracts from Cicero's letters to Atticus, concerning this whole negotiation, cannot, I think, be disagreeable to the reader, who may compare them with Cæsar's relation, to which I have given the preference:

"I saw L. Cæsar at Minturnæ on the twenty-third of January, in the morning. This rope of sand, for I cannot call him a man, was charged with propositions so absurd, that I imagine Cæsar designed them as a ridicule upon all negotiations, especially as he gave so important a commission to so inconsiderable a creature. I cannot account for his conduct any other way, unless (which may possibly be the case) this envoy has catched up some random expressions of Cæsar, and converted them into a commission for himself." *Ad Att. vii. 13.* Guthrie's transl. It is plain, that L. Cæsar did not explain his commission to Cicero on the twenty-third, as Cicero explained it six days after to Tiro, or Cicero would not have treated it with such contempt.

"On the twenty-third, L. Cæsar delivered Cæsar's proposals to Pompey, while he was at Theanum with the consuls. The terms were approved of, on condition that he

they found Pompey and the consuls, and laid Cæsar's proposals before them. After deli-

Y. R. 704.
Ref. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



should withdraw his troops from all the places, not within his own government, that he had seized. If he would do that, it was agreed that we should return to Rome, and that the senate should ratify the treaty. At present I am in hopes we shall have peace; because Cæsar thinks he has gone too far, and Pompey that his army is too weak." Ad Att. vii. 14. [dated the twenty-fifth.]

"Upon my arrival at Capua yesterday, being the twenty-fifth of January, I had a meeting with the consuls and many others of the senate. All of them wished that Cæsar would draw off his troops and stand to the terms he had proposed. Favonius was the only man who expressed his dislike of his imposing terms upon us; but he was very little regarded in the meeting, for Cato himself would now rather comply than fight. He declares, however, that he intends to be present in the senate, where, I am afraid, he will do great hurt.—We have here great variety of opinions as to public matters. It is generally imagined that Cæsar will not stand to his proposals, which he is thought to have made to divert us from making the necessary preparations to oppose him in the field. For my own part, I am of opinion, that he will stand to them so far as to withdraw his troops from the towns not in his government. For he will have gained his ends, if he should be made consul, and the conclusion of this scene will be less guilty than its commencement. But still we must be under his buffet; for we are scandalously unprovided both as to troops and money; having left to his mercy not only the private property, but the public treasury of Rome." Ad Att. vii. 15. [dated the twenty-sixth.]

"We are now in great suspense concerning two points. The one is, how Cæsar will proceed upon the answer which L. Cæsar was charged with to lay before him. The other is, how Pompey will act, who writes to me, that, in a few days, he will be at the head of an effective army, and gives me hopes that, when he arrives at Picenum, we shall be in a condition to return to Rome. He has with him Labienus, who takes it for granted that Cæsar's army is but weak,

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

berating upon the affair, they sent a reply in writing by the same messengers, which in-



and his desertion has put our friend Pompey into high spirits." Ibid. Ep. xvi. [dated the twenty-ninth.]

"Now you doubtless know the answer which Pompey sent to Cæsar by L. Cæsar, and the letter he sent him by the same hand; for they were written and delivered with a view of making them public. I have blamed Pompey in my own mind, as he himself has a very perspicuous style, for employing our friend Settius in drawing up a writing of so great importance, especially as it is to be made public: nor, to say the truth, did I ever see any thing more truly in the Settian style. But from Pompey's letter it is plain that Cæsar has been denied nothing; that he has obtained all, and more than he demanded: and, as he has obtained his demands, impudent as they are, he would be the worst of madmen, should he break off the accommodation. For what right had he, or you, or any man to say, I will do so and so, if Pompey will go to Spain, and if he will withdraw his troops from Italy? Yet even this has been complied with, though I own the compliance does not now come with so good a grace, after the government has been attacked and hostilities commenced, as it would have done before, when he demanded the dispensation with his absence while he stood for the consulate. After all, I am apprehensive, that even these terms will not satisfy him. It was no good symptom that he continued his operations during the dependence of the treaty which he committed to L. Cæsar, and before he had any answer. At present he is said to proceed more violently than ever." Ibid. Ep. xvii. [dated February 2.]

"We hear that the city is wonderfully pleased with Pompey's answer, and that it was approved of in an assembly of the people. I always thought it would; and that Cæsar would lose his interest, should he reject it. But, should he accept it—alas, say you, which is the lesser evil? This is a question I cannot answer, unless I knew in what forwardness our preparations are." Ibid. Ep. 18. [dated February 3.]

"I am really so far from having any thing to write, that

formed Cæsar that he must quit Ariminum, return to Gaul, and disband his army; which conditions being performed, Pompey would go into Spain: and that, in the mean time, till he gave security for the performance of what he had promised, neither Pompey nor the consuls would discontinue their levies.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

It was by no means, in the opinion of Cæsar, a fair proposal, that he should be obliged to quit Ariminum and return to Gaul: whilst Pompey held provinces and legions that had not been legally allotted to him; and that he should dismiss his army, whilst Pompey was levying troops, and only promised to

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib. i.

I have withdrawn a letter which I was to have sent you, because it was so full of hopes for the best, founded upon my informations of the dispositions of the assembly of the people of Rome, and upon my own suggestions that Cæsar would never reject the terms that were granted him, especially as they were proposed by himself. Mean while, on the morning of the fourth of February, I received letters from you, from Philotimus and Furnius, with one to the latter from Curio, ridiculing the whole of L. Cæsar's negotiation. We are indeed reduced to a desperate pass.—I am setting out for Capua, where I can be better informed of Pompey's situation." Ibid. Ep. xix. [dated February 4.]

"This juncture requires fewness of words. I despair of peace: we are unprovided for war. You cannot imagine two more despicable creatures than our consuls. After coming, as I was ordered, to Capua, through a deluge of rain upon the fourth instant, in hopes of hearing and understanding our preparations, I have missed them here, and when they come they will come unprovided and unprepared. As to Pompey, he is said to be at Luceria to put himself at the head of some cohorts of Attius's legions, who are thought to be wavering." Ibid. Ep. xx. [dated February 5.]

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

go to his government without fixing a day: an evasion by which, was he to be found in Italy even at the expiration of Cæsar's consulship, he could not be charged with a breach of faith. His forbearing to appoint a time for a conference, and his declining to approach nearer, gave little reason to hope for a peace^s.

^s "It seems very evident," says the ingenious author of the life of Cicero, "that Cæsar had no real thoughts of peace, by his paying no regard to Pompey's answer, and the trifling reasons which he gave for slighting it. The sending a message so important by a person so insignificant as young L. Cæsar looked, says Cicero, as if he had done it by way of contempt, or with a view to disclaim it, especially when, after offering conditions which were likely to be accepted, he would not sit still to wait an answer but continued his march with the same diligence, and in the same hostile manner as before." He is therefore of opinion, "that Cæsar had a double view in offering these conditions; for by Pompey's rejecting them, as there was reason to expect, from his known aversion to any treaty, he hoped to load him with the odium of the war; or, by his embracing them, to slacken his preparations and retard his design of leaving Italy, whilst he himself, in the mean time, by following him with a celerity that amazed every body, might chance to come up with him, and give a decisive blow to the war; from which he had nothing to apprehend, but its being drawn into length. 'I now plainly see,' says Cicero, 'though later indeed than I could have wished, on account of the assurances given me by Balbus, that he aims at nothing else, nor has ever aimed at any thing from the beginning but Pompey's life.'" Midd. p. 72, 73. But this is the conclusion of a man whose mind was confounded by continual disappointments, (for indeed he was no prophet, as he is commonly supposed to have been), and disturbed by a thousand vain fears. Cicero apprehended also that Cæsar would prove a Phalaris, sack Rome, and commit all manner of cruelties. Such passionate expressions

T. Labienus, Cæsar's principal lieutenant in the Gallic war, who had not only eminently

Y. R..704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

are no authorities. Velleius Paterculus, (l. ii. c. 50.) has, from the consideration of Cæsar's conduct, inferred just the contrary: *At Cæsar Domitio legionibusque Corfinii, quæ una cum eo fuerant, potitus, duce aliisque qui voluerant abire ad Pompeium, sine dilatione dimissis, persecutus Brundisium, ita ut appareret, malle, integris rebus & conditionibus, finire bellum, quam opprimere fugientes.*—As to the arguments brought in proof of Cæsar's insincerity, they are very weak. 1. Cæsar's reasons for paying no regard to Pompey's answer are no ways trifling. If he had submitted to go back to his province, whilst Pompey remained in Italy to influence the public deliberations, his cause was discredited, and he was evidently undone. He would have been obliged to submit to every thing imposed upon him by Pompey and his adherents, backed by the forces he would soon have had at hand. 2. Cæsar's message was given not only to L. Cæsar, but also to the prætor Roscius; and L. Cæsar was employed for no other reason, than because he had brought a message from Pompey. 3. It would have been folly in Cæsar, while his enemies were making preparations against him with the utmost diligence, to have suspended his military operations in a conjuncture, when all depended upon expedition. And I oppose to the authority of Dr. Middleton that of Matus, of whom Cicero gives this character: (Ad Att. ix. 11.) “Indeed I think him a discreet wise man, and he has been always reckoned an adviser of peaceable measures.”—“As we had a great deal of conversation,” says Cicero, “I shewed him Cæsar's letter to me, and I begged to know what he meant by his expressions of his wanting to be directed by my advice, interest, authority, and assistance in all things. His answer was, that he made no doubt Cæsar applied to me for my assistance and interest in bringing about an accommodation.—He was very positive that Cæsar's sentiments were pacific, and promised to recommend the thing to himself.” Velleius Paterculus, who, in general, is not unfavourable to Pompey and his cause, intirely condemns the Pompeians in this negotiation. After saying: *Alterius ducis causa melior videbatur, alterius erat firmior: hic omnia*

See Chap.
III.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.
Midd. p.
70.

distinguished himself by his military exploits, but had raised an immense fortune, deserted his general about this time, and came over to Pompey. This added a new life to his cause, and raised an expectation that many more would follow the example. He was much caressed and carried about every-where by Pompey, who promised himself great service from his fame and experience, and especially from his credit in Cæsar's army, and his knowledge of his councils: but his account of things, like that of all deserters, was accommodated rather to please than to serve his new friends; representing the weakness of Cæsar's troops, their aversion to his present designs, the disaffection of the two Gauls, and disposition to revolt; the contrary of all which was found to be true in the event: and as he came to them alone, without bringing with him any of those troops with which he had acquired his reputation, so his desertion had no other effect than to ruin his own fortunes without doing

speciosa, illic valentia :—Pompeium senatûs auctoritas, Cæsarem militum armavit fiducia :—vir antiquus et gravis Pompeii partes laudaret magis, prudens sequeretur Cæsaris : et illa gloriosa, hæc terribiliora duceret : He adds, Nihil relictum a Cæsare, quod servandæ pacis causa tentari posset : nihil receptum a Pompeianis ; cum alter consul justo esset ferocior ; Lentulus vero salva rep. salvus esse non posset ; M. autem Cato moriendum ante, quam ullam conditionem civis accipiendam reip. contenderet : ut deinde spretis omnibus quæ Cæsar postulaverat, tantummodo contentus cum una legione titulum retinere provinciæ ; privatus in urbem veniret, et se in petitione consulatus suffragiis pop. Rom. committeret decrevere.
L. ii. c. 49.

any service to Pompey⁹. Cæsar behaved on this occasion with great magnanimity: he

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

⁹ Cicero thinks aloud in his letters to his friend Atticus, and it is entertaining to consider his various views of the same objects, and the shiftings of his mind. Ep. vii. 12. ad Att. dated January 22. "It is next to certain that Labienus has left Cæsar. In that case, if he had gone to Rome, while the magistrates and the senate were there, he would have been of great use to our party. It would have intimated that the best of Cæsar's friends had condemned him as a traitor to his country. The fact is indeed so, but, at the present juncture, it is of less use, because our party cannot avail itself of it; and I believe that Labienus himself repents of what he has done. Yet, after all, there is a possibility that his leaving Cæsar is false; we, however, depend upon it as a certainty."

Ep. xiii. "I look upon Labienus to be a hero. We have not for these many years had so noble an instance of Roman spirit. Had it no other effect, it has that of galling Cæsar, but I am in hopes of seeing it productive of more solid consequences."

Ibid. "Labienus, whom I think a truly great man, came on the twenty-second instant to Theanum, where he had a conference with Pompey and the consuls. What the import and result of it was, I will write to you when I am better informed.—Labienus seems to have given us spirits." Yes, Pompey, encouraged by him, talked big, that he would soon be at the head of an effective army; that he would march into Picenum, and put things into such a posture that the senate might safely return to Rome.

Ad Att. viii. 2. February 17. "There is no dignity in Labienus." And thus the hero, the high-spirited Roman, sinks into a base deserter:

——— *Fortis in armis*

Cæsareis Labienus erat; nunc transfuga vilis.

Lucan. v. 345.

About the same time Piso, Cæsar's father-in-law, left the city: this step engages all Cicero's affection to him, and raises his prophetic spirit: "I am in love with Piso, and I can

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

took very little notice of his lieutenant's desertion, though the example might have been of dangerous consequence in the beginning of a war of this nature ; and sent after him all his equipage, and every thing he had left behind.

There were now little hopes of an accommodation between the two ambitious chiefs : matters were too far engaged, and their enmity too openly declared. Their reciprocal proposals, which were drawn up in writing and immediately published, were no more than manifestoes to justify their conduct. Pompey, whose chief reliance was on his troops in Spain, and the forces of the East, which were absolutely in his interest, resolved to hazard nothing in Italy, and, while he remained there, his sole aim was to gain time. Cæsar, on the contrary, who had nothing to depend on but his army, and the present favourable dispositions of the people of Rome, was bent upon pushing his point, with all possible celerity. From Auximum, where we left him, he traversed the whole country of Picenum¹, as far as Cingulum, with only one legion. He was joyfully received in all parts by the inhabitants, who were dazzled undoubtedly by the

foresee the dislike he has signified of his son-in-law's conduct will make a great impression on the public."

¹ Picenum was reduced before the eighth of February, for Cicero, in a letter to Atticus of that date, (vii. 21.) writes, " Picenum is lost ; nobody knows it but myself, by letters I have received from Dolabella. I expect every moment to hear of Cæsar's being in Apulia, and Pompey on shipboard."

splendor of his victories, and the reputation of his generosity: and they furnished his army with every thing necessary. Even Cingulum itself, a town founded by Labienus, and built at his own expense, sent deputies to him with an offer of their submission and services; and he demanded from it a certain number of soldiers, which were immediately sent to him. There he was joined by the twelfth legion, and, with this additional force, he continued his march to Asculum, of which Lentulus Spinther had taken possession, with ten cohorts. Lentulus, on the first news of his approach, quitted the place, and, in his retreat, was almost entirely deserted by his men: he joined, with the few that remained, Vibullius Rufus, whom Pompey had sent into Picenum, to encourage his followers in those parts. This commander, understanding the state of affairs, and seeing himself unable to make head against Cæsar, drew together, from the neighbouring provinces, as many of Pompey's levies as he could meet with, and, among the rest, six cohorts under the command of Ulcilles Hirrus, who were flying from Camerinum, where they had been quartered; and, having formed, out of all these, thirteen cohorts, he posted by great journeys to Corfinium, where Domitius had already got together twenty-two, well disposed to Pompey's cause.

Pompey's intention was not that those numerous cohorts should remain in Corfinium, and there become a prey to Cæsar: he wrote the most pressing letters to L. Domitius to

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

Cæs. de

Bell. Civ.

Com. lib. i.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

bring them to him; and these, as their contents are both interesting and necessary for the understanding of Pompey's conduct, should not be omitted, I think, by any one who writes the history of these times.

CN. MAGNUS, PROCONSUL, TO DOMITIUS,
PROCONSUL.

Ad Att.
viii. 12.

"I am surprised at my not hearing from you, and that all my public intelligence comes through other hands than yours. With forces so disunited as ours are, it is impossible for us to be a match for our enemies; but, were they united, I am in hopes we may be yet the means of saving our country, and providing for our own safety. Therefore, as Vibullius wrote to me, on the ninth of February, that you were about to march from Corfinium to join me with your army, I cannot comprehend why you have altered your resolution. The reason Vibullius intimated to me, viz. that you had intelligence of Cæsar's march from Firmum to the castle of Truentum, was a trifling one: for, the quicker the enemy's advances were towards you, your dispatch ought to have been the greater to join me, before Cæsar could have the means of either obstructing your march, or of cutting off my communication with you. I therefore, in the most earnest manner, intreat you again to take the very first opportunity of marching to Luceria, before the troops which Cæsar proposes to draw together can cut off our com-

munication with one another. Should any endeavour to persuade you to remain as a guard to their properties, you cannot refuse to send me the cohorts which came from Picenum and Camerinum, and which have left behind them all their fortunes."

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.




CN. MAGNUS, PROCONSUL, TO DOMITIUS,
PROCONSUL.

"M. Calenius brought me a letter from you the sixteenth of February, informing me, that you intended to observe Cæsar's motions; and, should he point his march for me by the sea, that you would forthwith join me in Samnium; but, should he tarry about those parts, that you was resolved to check him, in case he should attempt to extend his quarters. I am sensible this resolution proceeds from your courage and magnanimity; but we must be upon our guard, lest our being divided may give the enemy a superiority, as his army, which is already strong, is hourly increasing. It is inconsistent with your wisdom to have an eye only to the number of cohorts which Cæsar at present commands against you, without reflecting upon the great force of cavalry and infantry which he will, in a very short time, assemble. The letter I received from Bussenius is an evidence that his strength will be much more considerable soon; for he tells me, and his intelligence is confirmed by many other correspondents, that Curio has drawn all the garrisons out of Umbria and Tuscany,

Ad Att.

viii. 12.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.


and is marching at their head to join Cæsar. Now should all these troops join, and part of them be detached towards Alba, while part of them defile towards you, you must be shut up, as the enemy needs not fight you but upon his own terms: neither can you, singly, in the face of such an enemy, send out foraging parties to maintain your numbers. I therefore again earnestly conjure you forthwith to march all your troops hither, the consuls having come to the same resolution.

“ I ordered Metuscilius to acquaint you, how necessary it was for me to take care, that the two legions should not, without the Picentine cohorts, come in sight of Cæsar’s quarters. You are therefore to give yourself no concern, if you shall hear that I retreat upon Cæsar’s advancing against me. I must take care not to engage myself too far; for both the season of the year, and the dispositions of my soldiers, render it impracticable for me to form a regular incampment; nor would it be adviseable for me to draw all our garrisons from the fortified places, lest I should be cut off from all retreat. I have, therefore, assembled no more than fourteen cohorts at Luceria. The consuls are either to join me with the troops they have drawn from the fortified places, or they are to go to Sicily. For we must either have an army strong enough to force our way through the enemy, or we must take possession of such passes as they cannot force. Now both these expedients are impracticable at this juncture, both because Cæsar is master of a great part

of Italy, and because Cæsar is master of great part of Italy, and because our army is neither so well provided, nor so numerous as his. We are therefore to be the more cautious in exposing the interests of the republic. I again conjure you instantly to join me with all your troops. We may yet restore the government, if we serve her in concert with one another; but, by being dissipated and disunited, we shall become weak. Such are my sentiments.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

“ P. S. When I had finished this letter, Sica delivered to me your letter and commission, exhorting me to march towards Corfinium; but that, I think, is what I cannot venture to do, especially as I put no great trust in the fidelity of the legions I command.”

Pompey, who had become sensible of the impossibility of defending Rome, and of his error in leaving the public money a prey to Cæsar², had sent, on the seventh of February,

² “ The leaving the public treasure at Rome a prey to Cæsar is censured more than once by Cicero, as one of the blunders of his friends: [See Ad Att. vii. 12. 15.] but it is a common case in civil dissensions, for the honester side, through the fear of discrediting their cause by any irregular act, to ruin it by an unseasonable moderation. The public money was kept in the temple of Saturn, and the consuls contented themselves with carrying away the keys, fancying that the sanctity of the place would secure it from violence; especially when the greatest part of it was a fund of the sacred kind, set apart by the laws for occasions only of the last exigency, or the terror of a Gallic invasion.” Dr. Middl. p. 104. Cicero says that he advised the carrying away of this sacred treasure. [Ad Att. ix. 2.] And it was

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



Ad Att.
vii. 21.

the tribune C. Cassius to Capua with directions to the consuls to return to the city, which they were to leave, after taking all the money out of the sacred treasury. But one of the consuls wrote back to Pompey, that he should first make himself master of Picenum. The thing was now become impracticable: "Return to Rome," says Cicero, "where is their convoy? Return from Rome, how shall they obtain leave?" Notwithstanding this testimony of Cicero, our modern historians commonly suppose that Lentulus did venture to go to Rome, and that it was on this occasion, that, frightened by a false report of Cæsar's approach, he betook himself to flight without waiting till the inner door was opened, which is also contrary to the express testimony of Cæsar.


Cæsar, having made himself master of Asculum, ordered the soldiers who had deserted Lentulus to be sought after, and new levies to be made. He remained there but one day, to settle what related to provisions, and pursued his march to Corfinium. His advanced parties found five cohorts employed in breaking down a bridge three miles distant from the town, who instantly retired upon the first attack; and Cæsar brought his legions under the very walls where he pitched his camp.

As this was the first place which dared to

all along the intention of Pompey and the consuls so to do, and it would have been done, had not their fears deprived them of their senses.

make head against Cæsar, every body expected with impatience what would be the success of the enterprise. The Pompeians³, both at Rome and in other parts of Italy, conceived great hopes, and did not doubt but Pompey would advance to the assistance of Domitius, to which he was earnestly pressed by that commander; who represented by letters, "that it would be easy in that close country to shut up Cæsar between two armies, and cut off all his provisions; and that, unless this course was followed, a great number of senators and Roman knights would be exposed to imminent danger." He, at the same time, made preparations for a vigorous defence: he disposed

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



³ "A letter from Philotimus informed me on the ninth of February, in the evening, that Domitius was at the head of a strong army, which had been joined by the cohorts from Picenum, under the conduct of Lentulus and Thermus; that Cæsar was apprehensive his communication would be cut off, which could be easily effected; and that the patriot party at Rome had recovered their spirits, and that the rebels were in a manner thunderstruck. Though I am informed that this good news is little better than visionary; yet this letter from Philotimus has brought to life M. Lepidus, L. Torquatus, and the tribune C. Cassius, who are with me at Formiæ. For my own part, I am afraid they are not so well founded as the accounts are of our being almost surrounded by the enemy, and that Pompey is retiring from Italy." Ad Att. vii. 23.

"At present I have a small gleam of hope, and it is chiefly occasioned by the letter which came from Rome concerning L. Domitius and the Picentine cohorts. Every thing since has put on a more cheerful aspect, and nobody thinks of flying, as they intended. Cæsar's threatening manifestos are despised; in short, our reports concerning Domitius are good, those concerning Afranius still better." Ibid. Ep. 26.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

engines all round the walls, appointed every one his particular post, and to animate his men, promised every soldier four acres of land out of his own estate, and in proportion to every centurion and volunteer.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib. i.

Cæsar, who was not without apprehensions of being attacked by Pompey, employed the three first days after his sitting down before Corfinium in strongly fortifying his camp, and in procuring corn from the neighbouring towns. He did not, however, keep altogether within his intrenchments. Being informed that the people of Sulmona, a town seven miles distant from Corfinium, desired to put themselves under his protection, but were hindered by Q. Lucretius, a senator, and Attius, a Pelignian, who held them in subjection with a garrison of seven cohorts; he sent thither M. Antony with five cohorts, whose ensigns were no sooner descried from the walls, than the gates were thrown open, and the whole people in a body, both soldiers and townsmen, came out to congratulate Antony on his arrival. Lucretius and Attius endeavoured to escape over the walls; but Attius was taken. Antony returned the same day; and Cæsar, having joined the cohorts to his army, set Attius at liberty. His army was now also considerably increased by the arrival of the eighth legion, with two and twenty cohorts of new levies, and about three hundred horse from the king of Noricum. This obliged him to form a second camp on the other side of the town under the command of Curio, who had brought

up these recruits, as Pompey had foreseen, and foretold to Domitius. He employed the following days in drawing a line with redoubts round the place ; which was nearly completed, when the messengers that had been sent by Domitius to Pompey returned with this answer :


Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

CN. MAGNUS, PROCONSUL, TO DOMITIUS,
PROCONSUL.

“ Your letter of the seventeenth of February came to my hands, advising me of Cæsar’s having incamped before Corfinium. I foresaw and forewarned you of what has happened ; that, as things now stand, he would not venture to fight you ; and that he would draw together all his forces to coop you up, to obstruct the communication between you and me, and to prevent your joining the well-affectioned troops you command with my suspected legions. Your letter alarms me the more, because I cannot stake the whole fortune of the republic upon the loyalty of the troops that serve under me ; nor am I yet joined by those the consuls have levied. I therefore recommend it to you to do all you can, if it is now possible, to disengage yourself, and immediately to join me, before the enemy’s junction can be completed ; for our new recruits cannot march time enough to this rendezvous ; and, though they were already come up, you are sensible how little depend-

Ad Att.
viii. 13.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



ence there is on raw men, who are strangers to one another, against a veteran army." Pompey wrote at the same time the following letter to the consuls :

CN. MAGNUS, PROCONSUL, TO C. MARCELLUS
AND L. LENTULUS, CONSULS.

Ad Att.
viii. 13.

" Being persuaded, that, while we remained scattered, we could neither serve the republic, nor defend ourselves, I wrote to L. Domitius, that he should make all haste to join me with his whole force ; and, if he had any apprehensions with regard to himself, that he should send me the nineteen cohorts, which were upon their march to join me from Picenum. It happened, as I dreaded, that Domitius was surrounded, without having with him forces sufficient for a regular incampment ; my nineteen cohorts and his twelve being quartered in three different towns : (for he had stationed some of them at Alba, and some at Sulmo ;) nor, indeed, could he escape should he attempt it. Now, you must know, that this accident gives me the greatest disquiet imaginable. At the same time that I earnestly desire to deliver so many illustrious Romans from the danger of being besieged, it is impossible for me to relieve them ; because I judge it unsafe to march the two legions I command here into those quarters ; and of those two legions I can bring together no more than fourteen cohorts ; having thrown a garrison into Brundusium, and taken care of Canusium, which I did not

think proper to leave without a sufficient force to defend it.

“ As I was in hopes that our army would grow stronger, I charged Lælius with a request, if you thought proper, that one of you should repair to me, and that the other should go to Sicily with the troops you have raised at Capua or in its neighbourhood, and with the levies of Faustus; that Domitius should join them with his twelve cohorts; and that the rest of the troops should assemble at Brundisium, and be shipped over from thence to Dyrrachium. Now, as things are circumstanced, it is as much out of my power, as out of yours, to relieve Domitius, who cannot get off by the mountains: and we are to take care that the enemy shall neither come up with those fourteen wavering cohorts, nor overtake me in my march. I therefore think proper, and I am joined in sentiments by Marcellus, and the other senators in this place, to march the troops I have with me here to Brundisium. I therefore request you to make all possible dispatch to join me there, with as many troops as you can get together. My opinion is, that you give to the troops you have with you, the arms you proposed to send to me; and, if you have more than are requisite for that purpose, it will be of great service, if they can be conveyed in waggons to Brundisium. I beg that you will give our friends advice concerning that matter. I have sent to require the prætors, P. Lupus and C. Coponius, to join

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Cl. r.

48.

403 Cons.



Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

me, and to resign to you the command of their forces⁴.”

⁴ In a letter from Cicero to Atticus, there is a short letter from Pompey to the consuls on this occasion, which was written before that which we have now transcribed : it runs thus : “I received a letter from L. Domitius on the seventeenth of February, of which I inclose you a copy. Now, though I had not written to you, I know you are sensible how important it is for the commonwealth, that, as soon as possible, there should be a general muster at one place of all our forces. Therefore, if you please, you will make all possible dispatch to join me ; and leave at Capua such a garrison as you shall judge sufficient.” Ad Att. viii. 6. Here Pompey conceals his answer to Domitius, and his resolution of leaving Italy. Cicero, who did not doubt but the rendezvous was in order to march forwards, is in great terror for the event on the meeting of the two armies. In the next letter he seems to have penetrated into Pompey’s design ; and, in the eighth, he reflects thus on Pompey’s conduct : “Disgraceful and therefore miserable measure ! for such are my sentiments that what is disgraceful is the last, nay the only character of misery. He had fostered up Cæsar’s power ; of a sudden he begins to fear him, he discourages all advances to an accommodation, he neglects all preparation for war, he abandons the city, his misconduct loses Picenum, he pins himself up in Apulia, he prepares to go to Greece, he forsakes us without bidding us adieu, and utter strangers to those mighty, those monstrous resolutions. Well, all at once a letter comes from Domitius to him, and another from him to the consuls.—Pompey retires to Brundisium.” [Cicero is often too severe upon his friend Pompey even in regard to his military capacity : the letters above do not shew him to have been at this time so bewildered and out of his senses, as Cicero represents him in several of his epistles, for no other reason, perhaps, than because he did not think proper to make this timorous and talkative orator privy to his motions.] “Where or when are we to emerge, headed as we are by a general who knows so little of his profession, that he was a stranger to the important


Domitius thought proper to dissemble the contents of the letter he had received from Pompey, and declared in council, that this general of the republic would speedily come to their assistance: and he exhorted his troops to behave with courage, and to obey those orders which were necessary for providing every thing for a vigorous defence. But as his looks and speech were found to disagree, and as he behaved not with his usual composure and firmness, and was observed, contrary to his custom, to be much in conference with his friends, it was not possible to conceal the truth. In the evening of the same day, the soldiers discovered that they were not to receive any succour, and that their commander was meditating his escape: and they began to mutiny, and by means of their under-officers to make known their thoughts to one another. "They were besieged (they said) by Cæsar, who had already in a manner completed his works; and their general Domitius, in whose promises of assistance they had placed their chief hope, abandoning all concern for their safety, was contriving to escape privately by flight: wherefore it was their business to look to their own preservation." The Marsi, ignorant of the motive that prompted their

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib. i.

situation of Picenum? His misconduct carries its condemnation upon its own face.—Even at this time I am ignorant of his designs, but am incessantly endeavouring to fish somewhat out of him by letters: nothing can be more unmanly or unmeaning than the whole of his management." Ad Att. vii. 13.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



companions to mutiny, at first opposed this resolution, and possessed themselves of the strongest part of the town; and the dispute grew so warm that it almost came to be decided by the sword. But, as soon as they understood that Domitius was preparing for a private escape, they dropped their opposition, and joined in the sedition. The person of Domitius was then secured, and deputies were sent to Cæsar, to inform him, "that the town and the garrison were ready to receive his orders."

Though Cæsar was fully sensible of what great importance it was to get possession of the town immediately, and join so numerous a garrison to his own army, lest by largesses, promises of speedy relief, or false reports, any change should be produced in the minds of the soldiers; yet fearing that, if he introduced his troops into it in the night, they would take that opportunity to plunder it, he sent back the deputies with thanks for their proffer, and delayed the taking possession of it till the next day. But he caused the walls and the gates to be watched with the greatest care: he disposed his men along the works, not at certain distances, as usual, but in one continued range, so as to touch each other, and to form a circle; and he ordered the military tribunes and officers of the cavalry to patrol about the works; and not only to be upon their guard against sallies, but to take care to prevent the escape of any particular persons. Not a man in the camp closed his eyes that

night: all were busy in executing the general's orders, and in conjecturing the fate of the Corfinians, of Domitius, Lentulus, and the other illustrious Romans confined in the town.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

About the fourth watch of the night, Lentulus Spinther called from the wall to the guard, and desired to be conducted to Cæsar. His request being granted, he came out of the town; attended by some of Domitius's soldiers, who never left him till he was in Cæsar's presence: "He begged Cæsar to spare his life and pardon the injuries he had done him, in consideration of their former friendship. He owned the many great favours he had formerly received from him: that, by his interest, he had been elected into the college of priests, obtained the government of Spain, after the expiration of his prætorship, and that he had been assisted by him when he was candidate for the consulship." Here Cæsar, interrupting him, said, "that he was not come out of the bounds of his province with an intent to injure any one: but to repel the injuries done to him by his enemies; to revenge the wrongs of the tribunes; and to restore the Roman people, who were oppressed by a small faction of the nobles, to their liberty and privileges." Lentulus, encouraged by this speech, asked leave to return into the town; "where," he said, "the assurances he had obtained of his own safety, would contribute not a little to the consolation of others, some of whom were so terrified, that they were ready to take desperate resolutions."

Three in
the morn-
ing.

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.



As soon as it was light, Cæsar ordered before him all the principal men. These were L. Domitius, P. Lentulus Spinther, L. Vibullius Rufus, Sextus Quinctilius Varus, quæstor, and L. Rubrius; who were of senatorian rank; and Domitius's son, and several young men of quality, with some Roman knights, and a few decurions or senators of the neighbouring municipal towns. When they appeared, he gave orders to secure them from the insults of the soldiery; and, addressing them in a few words, he reproached them with their animosity to him, which he said he had not deserved, and then set them all at liberty. He likewise restored to Domitius six millions of sesterces, which that general had brought with him to Corfinium, and had deposited in the hands of the two treasurers of the town. As this was public money assigned by Pompey for the payment of his forces, Cæsar might justly have seized it; but, he says, he was willing to shew himself generous as well as merciful. He ordered Domitius's soldiers to take the usual oath to him, and set out immediately for Apulia, in pursuit of Pompey; who, having now lost, by the rashness of Domitius, the half of his forces, and the only troops well-affectioned to his cause, was under the necessity of retiring with all expedition, and of abandoning Italy to his rival⁵.

48,437l.
sterl.

⁵ Cæsar made himself master of Corfinium viii. kal. Mar. or the twenty-second of February, of the Roman year: according to Usher, the eleventh of the Julian December; but really on the twenty-sixth of January. Cœlius, in a letter written to Cicero, while Cæsar was marching from

Meanwhile, a notion universally prevailed among the Pompeians, of Cæsar's cruel and revengeful temper, from which horrible effects were apprehended : Cicero himself was strongly possessed with it, as appears from many of his letters ; where he seems to take it for granted, that he would be a second Phalaris, not a Pisistratus ; a bloody, not a gentle tyrant. This he inferred from the violence of his past life ; the nature of his present enterprise ; and, above all, from the character of his friends and followers ; who were, generally speaking, a needy, profligate, audacious crew ; prepared for every thing that was desperate. It was affirmed likewise with great confidence, he had openly declared, that he was now coming to revenge the deaths of Cn. Carbo, M. Brutus, and all the other Marian chiefs, whom Pompey, when acting under Sylla, had cruelly put to death for their opposition to the Syllan cause. His generous and magnanimous behaviour to his most inveterate enemies, taken at Corfinium, allayed all these vain suspicions and fears, and confirmed what he had always given out, that he sought nothing by the war,

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.
Middl. p.
79.

Corfinium to Brundisium, says : " Look upon Cæsar's troops, my friend, and tell me whether one would not imagine, by the gaiety of their countenances, that, instead of having fought their way through the roughest and coldest countries in the hardest winter, they had been regaling themselves in all the delicacies of ease and plenty ?"—
" Nonne tibi nostri milites, qui durissimis et frigidissimis locis, teterrima hieme, bellum ambulando confecerunt, malis orbiculatis esse pasti videntur ?" Ep. Fam. viii. 15. Melm. vii. 7.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

but the security of his person and dignity. The following letter to Oppius and Balbus was published at that time, and expresses the motives of his conduct.

CÆSAR TO OPPIUS AND BALBUS.

Ad Att. ix.
7.

“ I am extremely glad at your expressing under your hands, your great approbation of what has passed at Corfinium: I will follow your advice with the greater pleasure, that it was always my own disposition to act with the utmost lenity, and to court an accommodation with Pompey. Let us try whether it be possible, by this means to regain the affections of mankind, and to make our successes durable; since others by cruelty fell into detestation: and none of them, excepting Sylla, whom I don't choose to imitate, enjoyed his successes long: let us shew the world a new method of conquering; and let clemency and munificence be my only guards. I have already formed some schemes; and many more may be formed, for effecting this. I desire you to turn your thoughts to the same subject.

“ I took prisoner Cn. Magius, one of Pompey's masters of the works; but, according to the plan I laid down, I instantly dismissed him. He is the second master of the works who has fallen into my hands, and whom I have dismissed. If they want to shew their gratitude, they will exhort Pompey to prefer my friendship to that of those men, who have

ever shewn themselves both his and my enemies; and by whose practices the public is reduced to its present state."

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

This conduct gave a considerable turn to his affairs⁶; while the behaviour of Pompey, on

⁶ "Are you not sensible," says Cicero to Atticus, "what a discerning, what a vigilant, what a resolute commander the commonwealth has to do with? By Heavens! if he does not imbrue his hand in blood, or stretch it out in rapine, he will become the darling of those who dreaded him most. I have had a great deal of talk with our townsmen and a great deal with our country gentlemen in these quarters: and, take my word for it, they have no concern but about their lands, their farms, and their money. You see what a pass things are come to. They fear the man they trusted; they love the man they feared. It is with anguish that I recollect the miscarriages and misconduct that have brought us to this."

Ad Att. viii.
13.

From this first experiment of Cæsar's clemency, Cicero took occasion to send him a letter of compliment, and to thank him particularly for his generous treatment of Lentulus, who, when consul, had been the chief author of his restoration; to which Cæsar returned the following answer:

Midd. p.
81.

"You judge rightly of me, for I am thoroughly known to you, that nothing is farther removed from me than cruelty; and, as I have a great pleasure from the thing itself, so I rejoice and triumph to find my act approved by you: nor does it at all move me, that those, who were dismissed by me, are said to be gone away to renew the war against me; for I desire nothing more, than that I may always act like myself; they like themselves*. I wish that you

* Domitius retired to his country-house at Cosa, in Tuscany; and having manned some ships with his own servants, set sail for Marseilles; which he held for Pompey, with consent of the inhabitants, and defended it, as we shall soon see, against Cæsar. Ad Att. ix. 6. Cæsar de Bell. Civ. lib. ii. Lentulus went secretly to his house at Puteoli; and, after concealing himself for some time, he joined Pompey. Vibullius Rufus went also to Pompey, who sent him into Spain, charged with orders to his lieutenants there: and Varus sailed for Africa.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

the other hand, appeared every day more and more despicable. He fled perpetually before an enemy whom his pride and perverseness were said to have driven to the necessity of taking arms; and he was continually throwing out threats against those who did not follow him: before he set out from Brundisium, he talked of nothing but proscriptions, and of acting in imitation of Sylla; and his future conduct sufficiently answered these early professions.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib. i.

As soon as he got intelligence of the surrender of Corfinium, he retreated from Luceria to Canusium, and from thence to Brundisium⁷. Here he ordered all the new levies

would meet me at the city, that I may use your counsel and assistance as I have hitherto done in all things. Nothing, I assure you, is dearer to me than Dolabella; I will owe this favour therefore to him: nor is it possible for him indeed to behave otherwise, such is his humanity, his good sense, and his affection to me. Adieu!" Ad Att. ix. 16.

⁷ Pompey was now obliged to declare what he had never before owned, his design of quitting Italy, and carrying the war abroad; he gave notice of it to Cicero, and wrote two letters to him at Formiæ, to press him to come away directly; but Cicero, already much out of humour with him, was disgusted still the more by his short and negligent manner of writing, upon an occasion so important: the second of Pompey's letters, with Cicero's answer, will explain the present state of their affairs, and Cicero's sentiments upon them.

CN. POMPEIUS MAGNUS, PROCONSUL, TO M. CICERO,
EMPEROR.

"If you are in good health, I rejoice: I read your letter with pleasure: for I perceived in it your ancient virtue by your concern for the common safety. The consuls are

to join him ; and, arming three hundred slaves and shepherds, he furnished them with horses.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

come to the army, which I had in Apulia ; I earnestly exhort you, by your singular and perpetual affection to the republic, to come also to us ; that, by our joint advice, we may give help and relief to the afflicted state. I would have you make the Appian way your road, and come in all haste to Brundisium. Take care of your health." Ad Att. viii. 11.

M. CICERO, EMPEROR, TO CN. MAGNUS, PROCONSUL.

"When I sent that letter, which was delivered to you at Canusium, I had no suspicion of your crossing the sea for the service of the republic, and was in great hopes that we should be able either to bring about an accommodation, which to me seemed the most useful, or to defend the republic with the greatest dignity in Italy. In the mean time, before my letter reached you, being informed of your resolution by the instructions which you sent to the consuls, I did not wait till I could have a letter from you, but set out immediately towards you, with my brother, and our children, to Apulia. When we were come to Theanum, your friend, C. Messius, and many others, told us, that Cæsar was in the road to Capua, and would lodge that very night at Æsernia ; I was much disturbed at it ; because, if it was true, I not only took my journey to be precluded, but myself also to be certainly a prisoner. I went on, therefore, to Cales, with intent to stay there, till I could learn from Æsernia the certainty of my intelligence : at Cales, there was brought to me a copy of the letter which you wrote to the consul Lentulus, with which you sent the copy also of one that you had received from Domitius, dated the eighteenth of February, and signified that it was of great importance to the republic that all the troops should be drawn together, as soon as possible, to one place ; yet so as to leave a sufficient garrison in Capua. Upon reading these letters, I was of the same opinion with all the rest, that you were resolved to march to Corfinium with all your forces ; whither, when Cæsar lay before the town,

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

The prætor, L. Manlius, in his retreat from Alba, with six cohorts, and the prætor Ru-

I thought it impossible for me to come. While this affair was in the utmost expectation, we were informed at one and the same time both of what had happened at Corfinium, and that you were actually marching towards Brundisium; and, when I and my brother resolved, without hesitation, to follow you thither, we were advertised by many, who came from Samnium and Apulia, to take care that we did not fall into Cæsar's hands; for that he was upon his march to the same places where our road lay, and would reach them sooner than we could possibly do. This being the case, it did not seem adviseable to me, or my brother, or any of our friends, to run the risk of hurting, not only ourselves, but the republic, by our rashness: especially when we could not doubt, but that, if the journey had been safe to us, we should not then be able to overtake you. In the mean while I received your letter, dated from Canusium, the twenty-first of February, in which you exhort me to come in all haste to Brundisium: but, as I did not receive it till the twenty-ninth, I made no question but that you were already arrived at Brundisium; and all that road seemed wholly shut up to us, and we ourselves as surely intercepted as those who were taken at Corfinium: for we did not reckon them only to be prisoners, who were actually fallen into the enemy's hands, but those too not less so, who happen to be enclosed within the quarters and garrisons of their adversaries. Since this is our case, I heartily wish, in the first place, that I had always been with you, as I then told you, when I relinquished the command of Capua, which I did not do for the sake of avoiding trouble, but because I saw that the town could not be held without an army, and was unwilling that the same accident should happen to me, which, to my sorrow, has happened to some of our bravest citizens at Corfinium: but, since it has not been my lot to be with you, I wish that I had been made privy to your councils; for I could not possibly suspect, and should sooner have believed any thing, than that, for the good of the republic, under such a leader as you, we should not be able to stand our ground in Italy:

tilius Lupus, from Terracina, with three, perceiving Cæsar's cavalry at a distance, com-

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

nor do I now blame your conduct, but lament the fate of the republic; and, though I cannot comprehend what it is which you have followed, yet I am not the less persuaded that you have done nothing but with the greatest reason. You remember, I believe, that my opinion always was, first, to preserve peace, even on bad conditions; then about leaving the city; for, as to Italy, you never intimated a tittle to me about it; but I do not take upon myself to think that my advice ought to have been followed: I followed yours; nor that for the sake of the republic, of which I despaired, and which is now overturned, so as not to be raised up again without a civil and most pernicious war. I sought you; desired to be with you; nor will I omit the first opportunity which offers of effecting it. I easily perceived, through all this affair, that I did not satisfy those who are fond of fighting: for I made no scruple to own, that I wished for nothing so much as peace; not but that I had the same apprehensions from it as they; but I thought them more tolerable than a civil war: then, after the war was begun, when I saw that conditions of peace were offered to you, and a full and honourable answer given to them, I began to weigh and deliberate well upon my own conduct, which, considering your kindness to me, I fancied that I should easily explain to your satisfaction: I recollected that I was the only man who, for the greatest services to the public, had suffered a most wretched and cruel punishment; that I was the only one, who, if I offended him, to whom, at the very time when we were in arms against him, a second consulship and most splendid triumph were offered, should be involved again in all the same struggles; so that my person seemed to stand always exposed as a public mark to the insults of profligate citizens: nor did I suspect any of these things till I was openly threatened with them: nor was I so much afraid of them, if they were really to befall me, as I judged it prudent to decline them, if they could honestly be avoided. You see, in short, the state of my conduct while we had any hopes of peace; what has since happened deprived me of all power

Y. R. 704.
 Bef. Chr.
 48.
 403 Cons.

manded by Bivius Curius, were extremely disconcerted; and, while they meditated what step to take, their soldiers deserted them and joined the troops under the conduct of Curius. Several other parties, flying different ways, fell in, some with Cæsar's foot, others with his cavalry. Cn. Magius, of Cremona, Pompey's master of the works, or chief engineer, being taken in his way to Brundisium, was brought to Cæsar, who sent him back to Pompey with this message: "That, as he had not yet obtained an interview, his design was to come to Brundisium, there to confer with him in relation to the common safety; because they soon would be able to dispatch, in a personal treaty, what, if managed by the intervention of others, might run into a tedious negotiation." It appears, by a letter of Cæsar to Oppius^s, that Pompey sent back Magius, as

to do any thing: but to those whom I do not please I can easily answer, that I never was more a friend to C. Cæsar than they, nor they ever better friends to the republic than myself: the only difference between me and them is, that as they are excellent citizens, and I not far removed from that character, it was my advice to proceed by way of treaty, which I understood to be approved also by you; theirs by way of arms; and, since this method has prevailed, it shall be my care to behave myself so, that the republic may not want in me the spirit of a true citizen, nor you of a friend. Adieu." Ad Att. viii. 11. The expostulations in the latter part of this letter were certainly useless, unfriendly, and ill-timed. His excuses in the first part were all false; for he owns to Atticus, that, in truth, he was willing to consider a little longer what was right and fit for him to do. —viii. 12.

^s "On the ninth of March, I arrived at Brundisium, and

soon as Cæsar arrived before Brundisium, with some proposals which we know nothing of; nor of those in return which were then made by Cæsar. Young Balbus was sent also after the consul Lentulus, to endeavour to engage him to stay in Italy, and to return to the city, by the offer of every thing that could tempt him; and Cicero seems to think that Lentulus might have complied with the invitation, if Balbus and he had met; but the consul had sailed before Balbus could come up with him.

In fine, Cæsar was so bent upon an accommodation, that, seeing Magius⁹ did not

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Cæsar de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib. i.

have invested it. Pompey is within the place. He sent Magius to me, to treat of peace. I answered him as I thought proper. I was willing you should be instantly informed of this. When I shall have any prospect of an accommodation, I will let you know without loss of time." Ad Att. ix. 13. "I have no copy," says Cicero, "of the proposals you ask for, sent by Cæsar to the consuls and to Pompey: while I was upon the road, I sent you those brought by Ægypta; by which, I suppose, you may gather the substance of the others." Ad Att. ix. 15.

⁹ M. Crevier (Vol. XIII. p. 255.) taking it for granted that Cæsar means to say in this place that Magius was never sent to him by Pompey, makes a very severe and hasty reflection upon his veracity. "Cæsar" [to use the words of this historian] "says, in his Commentaries, that Magius brought him back no answer from Pompey; but we have a letter from Cæsar to Oppius and Balbus, which proves the contrary. 'Pompey,' says he, 'has sent Magius to me, with overtures of peace, and I have answered him what I thought proper.' It is difficult to reconcile these contradictions, but by supposing that Cæsar has not been scrupulously faithful as to facts in his Commentaries; particularly in what regards the civil war. Asinius Pollio, who accompanied him

Y. R. 704.
 Bef. Chr.
 48.
 403 Cons.

return to him, as he expected, he dispatched Caninius Rebilus, one of his lieutenants, a relation and intimate friend of Scribonius Libo, to confer with him on the subject. His orders were to exhort Libo, in the most earnest manner, to procure an interview between him and Pompey: to represent to him that, by this means, peace might be concluded upon reasonable terms; and that the honour of it would redound to him by whose mediation both parties should be prevailed with to lay down their arms. Libo, after conferring with Caninius, waited on Pompey, and returned with this answer: "That the consuls were absent, without whom Pompey had no power to treat of an accommodation." Pompey's aversion to all negotiations was known to his party¹; and, lest the consuls should engage in

in several expeditions, expressly accused him of it. So that this great man, this generous, elevated soul, disdained not to dishonour himself by falsehood, and to suppress the truth in a work destined for posterity." The letter cited by M. Crevier, and which is copied above, proves that Cæsar expected Magius again. His first message by him, when taken prisoner, was only in general terms, to demand an interview; he made no proposals. Cæsar has neglected to mention Magius's first visit; or, perhaps, as in many other places of his Commentaries, there are some lines wanting.

¹ "Your last letter is dated the first of March; and in it you wish for an interview, and do not despair of an accommodation between Cæsar and Pompey; but, in my present way of thinking, I cannot believe that there will be any interview; or, if there is, that Pompey will agree to any terms." Ad Att. viii. 15.

one against his will, he was all along very desirous of sending them out of Italy.

Cæsar sat down, on the ninth of March, before Brundisium, with six legions; three of which were composed of veteran soldiers, and the rest of new levies drawn together upon his march. He had sent Domitius's troops directly from Corfinium towards Sicily, not caring to bring them near Pompey's quarters. The consuls had sailed on the fourth with thirty cohorts, and there were still twenty in the town with Pompey. Nor was it certainly known whether he continued there for want of shipping to transport his troops, or with the design to keep possession of Brundisium, that he might be master of the whole Adriatic sea, the farthest parts of Italy, and the country of Greece, in order to make war on both sides the gulph. Cæsar, having lost all hopes of an accommodation, and fearing that it was his intention to keep footing in Italy, resolved to push the war with vigour, and to deprive him of the advantages he might reap from the port of Brundisium. The following works were contrived by him for this purpose. He carried on a mole on each side of the haven where the entrance was narrowest, and the water shallow. But as this undertaking could not be carried quite across the port, by reason of the great depth of the sea, he prepared double floats of timber, thirty feet square, which were each secured by four anchors, to enable them to resist the fury of the waves. These, which were to extend all

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.

403 Cons.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib. i.

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

the way between the two moles, were covered over with earth and fascines, that the soldiers might pass and repass with ease, and have firm footing to defend them. The front and sides were armed with a parapet of hurdles; and every fourth float had a tower of two stories, the better to keep the enemy's ships at a distance, and to guard the work from fire and the shocks of vessels.

Against these preparations Pompey made use of several large ships, upon which he raised turrets three stories high; and, having filled them with engines and darts, he let them loose upon Cæsar's floats in order to break through the staccado, and interrupt the progress of the works. Thus daily skirmishes happened with darts, arrows, and slings, at a distance; and Cæsar had spent nine days in these works, and had half finished the staccado, when the ships employed in the first embarkation were sent back by the consuls. Pompey, either alarmed at Cæsar's works, or because from the first he had resolved to abandon Italy, immediately prepared to carry off the rest of his forces: and, the better to secure his retreat, and to hinder the enemy from breaking into the town during the embarkation, he walled up the gates, barricaded the streets, or cut ditches across them, which he filled with pointed stakes, and covered with hurdles and earth. The two streets which led to the port, and which he left open for the passage of his men, were fortified with a double pallisado of very strong well-sharp-

ened stakes. After these precautions, he ordered the soldiers to embark in silence, having placed on the walls and towers some select archers and slingers, who were to wait till all the troops had got aboard; and were then, upon a signal given, to retire to some small ships that waited for them at a convenient distance.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

The inhabitants of Brundisium, dissatisfied with Pompey's soldiers, and provoked by the damage done to their town by his works, found means to give notice to Cæsar of his departure, from the tops of their houses. He immediately, upon this intelligence, ordered scaling-ladders to be prepared, and the soldiers to repair to their arms, that he might not lose any opportunity of acting. Pompey weighed anchor a little before night, and gave the signal for recalling the soldiers that were upon the walls, who retired with all possible expedition to the ships prepared for them. At the same time the scaling-ladders were applied to the walls, and Cæsar's troops entered the town: but, being informed by the Brundisians of the snares and ditches provided for them by the enemy, they were obliged to take a circuit; which gave Pompey time enough to put to sea. Two transports only, impeded by Cæsar's mole, were taken with the troops on board.

Thus Pompey, on the seventeenth of March, abandoned all Italy to his rival. It is the opinion of many, that he saw from the beginning he should be reduced to this necessity;

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Ad Att.
viii. 11.

but had kept the secret to himself, and had humoured his party in the contrary notion, often talking big to keep up their spirits. In this view, after the desertion of Labienus, he wrote to Cicero, "that in a few days he would have a firm army, with which he would march against Cæsar into Picenum; so that the senate might have an opportunity of returning to the city." Cicero may be quoted as of this opinion. In a letter to Atticus, he writes to the following purpose: "Pompey and Cæsar are rivals in power—Pompey did not abandon Rome because it was untenable, nor Italy because he was driven out of it; it had all along been his intention to move earth and sea, to rouse barbarous monarchs, to introduce the troops of barbarous nations into Italy, and to levy numerous armies. He has many to second him in what he has long thirsted for, a species of Sylla's tyranny." But Cicero writes not always to his friend his real sentiments; he says and unsays: he is now all love, and the moment after all indignation. He begins the tenth letter of the ninth book with these words: "I have nothing to write to you; because, since I answered yours, the day before yesterday, I have had no fresh intelligence. But as fretting not only keeps me from sleeping, but gives me the greatest pain while I am awake; I set myself down to scribble somewhat or other, in which I have no manner of meaning, but to converse as it were with you, who are my only comfort." And I do not perceive any

thing in the history of the commencement of this war, but what convinces me that Pompey thought himself capable of defending Italy; in which opinion he was certainly confirmed by Labienus, who would never have quitted Cæsar, if he had thought otherwise. He gave the strongest assurances to his party before the rupture, that Cæsar would never dare to proceed in an hostile manner; and that, if he was mad enough to do so, he held him in the utmost contempt. He had provided himself with two legions of veteran troops, and ordered levies all over Italy sufficient to form eight other legions: and he sent his officers with troops to stop Cæsar's progress. But he was greatly disappointed in every thing he relied upon, and his spirits were sunk by these disappointments. The sudden panic that seized the town on the first news of Cæsar's march, and made the two consuls and all the senators of Pompey's faction fly out of it, put a stop to all levies there. In the southern parts, on whose affection Pompey depended so much, the levies went on but slowly: the people shewed a great backwardness to enlist. The northern parts shewed themselves, contrary to his expectation, to be in Cæsar's interest, and surrendered to him upon the first summons: even many towns declared for him before they were summoned. The Pompeian commanders were deserted every where by their troops, which inspired Pompey with a just diffidence of the two legions that had been taken from Cæsar; and which consti-

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Ad Att.
viii. 3.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

tuted, in reality, his chief strength. Lastly, Cæsar's astonishing celerity baffled all his attempts to preserve Italy: for, from his setting out at Ravenna with one legion, though he was forced to take in all the great towns on his road, and spent seven days before Corfinium, and nine before Brundisium; yet in two months he marched the whole length of Italy, entered Brundisium with six legions, and was master of four more at least in different parts of the country.

Midd. p.
73.

A very ingenious and justly-admired writer, to whose performance we are much indebted, but to whose opinions we are not always disposed to subscribe, speaks in the following manner of Cæsar's enterprise: "If we consider the famous passage of the Rubicon, abstractedly from the event, it seems to have been so hazardous and desperate, that Pompey might reasonably condemn the thought of it, as of an attempt too rash for any prudent man to venture upon. If Cæsar's view indeed had been to possess himself only of Italy, there could have been no difficulty in it: his army was undoubtedly the best which was then in the world; flushed with victory, animated with zeal for the person of their general, and an overmatch for any which could be brought against it into the field: but this single army was all that he had to trust to; he had no resource: the loss of one battle was certain ruin to him; and yet he must necessarily run the risk of many before he could gain his end: for the whole empire was armed

against him ; every province offered a fresh enemy, and a fresh field of action, where he was like to be exposed to the same danger as on the plains of Pharsalia. But, above all, his enemies were masters of the sea, so that he could not transport his forces abroad without the hazard of their being destroyed by a superior fleet, or of being starved at land by the difficulty of conveying supplies and provisions to them : Pompey relied chiefly on this single circumstance, and was persuaded that it must necessarily determine the war in his favour : so that it seems surprising how such a superiority of advantage, in the hands of so great a commander, could possibly fail of success ; and we must admire rather the fortune, than the conduct of Cæsar, for carrying himself safe through all these difficulties to the possession of the empire.”

But it must be remembered, on the other hand, that a certain destruction would have attended Cæsar, if he had submitted to the decree made against him by the senate. He would thereby have been disarmed at once, and reduced to the condition of a private citizen : and Pompey, with all the power of the state in his hands, would easily have disappointed him of the consulship. He intended, it is certain, to do so, and even to bring him to trial, as Cato and others were continually threatening him : and, of this last circumstance, Cæsar, according to Suetonius, was really apprehensive. “ He engaged in the war,” says that historian, “ because he was

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

Suet. in
Cæs. 30.

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

afraid of being called to an account for what he had done in his first consulship, contrary to the religion, the laws, and the authority of the tribunes : for Cato often declared, and with an oath too, that he would impeach him as soon as he disbanded his army : and it was commonly talked, that, if he returned a private person, he would, like Milo, be tried with a guard to attend the court. This circumstance Asinius Pollio has confirmed, when he says that Cæsar, upon viewing his enemies slaughtered and put to flight upon the plains of Pharsalia, spoke these words : “ They would have it so : I Caius Cæsar, who have performed such great things, must have undergone a sentence of condemnation, had I not desired the assistance of my army.”

If it was so evident [as Dr. Middleton will have it] that Pompey could not defend Italy, this threw at once an immense power into Cæsar’s hands, and put him in possession of the fortunes of all his enemies : which consideration he might think sufficient to induce them not to pursue their scheme of depriving him of his government ; and it certainly would have had this effect, if Pompey had not deceived the senate by assuring them that he had an army sufficient to defend the city. This is very plain from the many reproaches which were thrown on Pompey, when things went contrary to the general expectation.

Cæsar, with an army of martial and experienced soldiers, and possessed of Italy, Gaul, and the adjacent islands, was an overmatch

for the rest of the world. For what was the fighting world? Truly, six legions of veterans in Spain, and an army of new levies out of Italy and the oriental provinces, with two legions that had served under Cæsar, and three more dispersed in Asia. But Cæsar, it is said, must run the risk of many battles, all the empire was armed, and every province offered a fresh field of action: this, however, was not the case: it was, on the contrary, most evident from the beginning, that one general engagement would decide the fate of the two chiefs; and, with regard to the provinces, it must be observed, that they were quite indifferent in the quarrel, and could not stop, if they intended it, the progress of the conqueror.

In fine, Cicero does not always represent Cæsar's enterprise as a kind of madness. Here is his account to his friend Atticus: "I perceive Cæsar to be very strong in infantry, in cavalry, in shipping, and in auxiliary Gauls; whose numbers Matius, I believe, exaggerated, when he said they had offered to maintain for him, at their own expense, ten thousand foot, and six thousand horse. But, supposing this to be a vaunt, yet it is certain that he is very strong; and he will not, like Pompey, be obliged to maintain his forces upon extraordinary imposts; for he will have the riches of all Rome at his command: and add to this Cæsar's enterprising spirit, and the weakness of our patriots, who are grieved at war for no other reason, than be-

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

See Middl.
p. 74.
Ad Att.
ix. 13.

Y. R. 70½.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

Ad Att.
vii. 7.

cause they have incurred Cæsar's resentment. —Cæsar, however, has been more moderate than he appeared to be at setting out, and the common people have lost the great affection they had for Pompey, and seem fond of him. The situation, therefore, of Cæsar is such, that, supposing he cannot conquer, yet I cannot see how he can be conquered.—I do not understand whom you call patriots: I know of none: I mean I know of no order of men deserving that appellation: take them man by man, they are very worthy gentlemen: but, in civil dissensions, we are to look for patriotism in the constituent members of the body politic. Do you look for it in the senate? Let me ask you by whom were the provinces left without governors?—Do you look for patriotism among the farmers of the revenue? Alas! they never were steady, and now they are entirely devoted to Cæsar. Do you look for it in our trading, or in our landed interest? They are fondest of peace. Can you imagine that they have any terrible apprehensions of living under a monarchy; they, to whom all forms of government are indifferent, provided they enjoy their ease?—When his stream of power was weak, it might have been easily stopt. But now he is master of eleven legions [of veterans] and as much cavalry as he pleases to draw into the field. Think upon the towns beyond the Po, the mob of Rome, upon so great a majority of the tribunes, upon a profligate rising generation, upon a gene-

ral, with such sagacity to contrive, and such boldness to execute.

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

“It was with reluctance I undertook that commission at Capua; not that I would have declined it, had we been acting upon any concert: but I could see no declared, sincere concern for their country in any of our public bodies; nor in reality among private persons. Our patriots were without spirit and activity, as usual, and as I had foreseen; while the mob discovered a manifest bias to Cæsar; and most of them were fond of a change.” These extracts from Cicero seem to contain a very natural and true description of the times; and this description leads us to consider the justice of Pompey’s or Cæsar’s cause. The ingenious author above-cited has given his decision on this head, in the following passage from Cicero; which we must beg leave to accompany with our remarks. “You have held [Cicero had been speaking of Cæsar] your government ten years, not granted to you by the senate, but extorted by violence and faction: [Was not this the case with every other grant at this time? Was the Gabinian, or the Manilian, or the Messian law, more legally preferred? The government of Gaul was given to Cæsar by a law of the people, which the senate thought fit to confirm by a decree of their own] the full term is expired, not of the law, but of your licentious will: but allow it to be a law; [Cicero allowed it to have been such, and voted for it; and he himself engaged Cœlius to propose, in favour

Ad Att.
viii. 3.Middl. p.
67.
Ad Att.
vii. 9.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

of Cæsar, another bill to dispense with his presence in suing for the consulate during the continuance of the law in question] it is now decreed, that you must have a successor: [By whom? By the people? No: By decree of the senate? No: for the tribunes interposed: By a vote of the senate? Yes: but of the senate awed illegally by the power of Pompey] you refuse; and say, have some regard to me: do you first shew your regard to us: will you pretend to keep an army longer than the people ordered, and contrary to the will of the senate?" To this passage from Cicero Dr. Middleton has added: "But Cæsar's strength lay not in the goodness of his cause, but of his troops:—The flight of the tribunes gave him a plausible handle to begin, and seemed to sanctify his attempt: but his real motive, says Plutarch [in Ant.] was the same that animated Cyrus and Alexander before him to disturb the peace of mankind: the unquenchable thirst of empire, and the wild ambition of being the greatest man in the world; which was not possible, till Pompey was first destroyed."

In this state of the merit of Cæsar's cause, we have two assertions which require a particular consideration. It is affirmed, that the full term appointed for Cæsar's government of Gaul was expired; and that he continued to hold his province against law in defiance of the senate and of the people of Rome: and Dr. Middleton has said, in another place, that the first of March of the year 703 was the

term prescribed to it by law. Secondly, Cæsar is condemned as guilty of an impudent and treacherous behaviour in not obeying the orders of the senate.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Now, as to the first point, Dr. Middleton is certainly mistaken, and contradicts Cicero himself, when he supposes that Cæsar's government was to last but eight years, and ended on the first of March, 703. Dio Cassius indeed says, that Cæsar's government was only prolonged to him for three years; but he is in this contradicted by every other historian, and by indubitable facts. Cæsar, in his harangue to his soldiers at Ravenna, tells them, that they had served under him for nine years; and it appears by what he mentions soon afterwards, that, beyond the period fixed by the decree of the senate for disbanding his forces, there wanted six months to complete the time allotted to him by law. The complaints of the tribunes of the people against the senate, for pretending to abrogate a law of the people, were evidently grounded upon this supposition. What could mean the privilege granted him in the year 701, when Pompey was sole consul, of suing for the consulship in his absence, if his government was to expire before he could legally present himself as a candidate? And it would have expired, if it had not been decennial. In fine, Cicero owns, in other places, that Cæsar had law on his side: "Yet, such is the general we are either to encounter, or we are to gratify him in what he can already claim by

l. 39.

Ad Att.
vii. 7.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

law.” And Monsieur l’Abbé Mongault has thus remarked on the passage of Cicero cited above: “Cicero writes here in the Pompeian style, or he means only that Cæsar’s government would nearly expire about the time of the elections of the next consuls; and that, therefore, he might well consent to leave it, in order to come and stand candidate in person, as was required of him: or, perhaps, Pompey’s faction began to reckon the years of Cæsar’s government, from the very moment that the law was passed at Rome, allotting that province to him; but the general and legal method was to reckon from the day in which the governor entered his province.”


As to the second point, I shall not interpose my judgment: the reader who has had the whole evidence laid impartially before him, will, probably, have determined for himself. I shall, however, beg leave to insert a paragraph or two from the spirited performance of our late poet laureat.

The character and conduct of Cicero considered from the history of his life, by Dr. Middleton, p. 183.


“After several difficulties, doubts, debates, and political schemes, to make bad matters worse, at last the senate, without any notice taken of the people’s right to confirm or reject it, came to this bold resolution, that Cæsar should dismiss his army by a certain day, or be declared an enemy, &c. Does not the very menace in this vote imply a doubt or apprehension of its not being obeyed? and whence could that doubt come but from a consciousness of their severity in taking his command from Cæsar, before the time of its legal

duration was expired? Was this a treatment that the high spirit of Cæsar could comply with or quietly bear? Or, indeed, if he would have borne it, where, at that time, was the policy of it? What good was the senate or the public to reap by it? Would they have less reason to be afraid of Pompey's power, because Pompey then must have had less reason to be afraid of Cæsar; while they were both rivals, they could be but candidates for empire; but, when one of them was destroyed, the other of course became equal to their master duly elected. Could they then imagine that Cæsar, whose strength (says Dr. Middleton) lay not in the goodness of his cause, but of his troops, would choose to come from the head of them merely to humble himself into a private innocent man, and to depend upon the favour of Pompey for his future preferment? Or, if this was really what their wisdom proposed by their sage and sober vote, why at least, when they knew Cæsar was so formidable in the field, would they not previously choose to soften him into obedience by giving him a reasonable hope that some such great and gracious honour should be secured to him? But, perhaps, the neglect of this civility might be owing to the *sic volo* of Pompey, whose disregard of Cæsar might not as yet have given them his orders to make him any such proposal; his orders, I call them, because, whatever at this time was proposed in the senate went but very slowly forward, that had not an eye to the interest or good-liking of

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



Pompey. It would be therefore the greatest absurdity to suppose so rash and enterprising a vote could have come from them *ex mero motu*, as the free and voluntary act of their own pious care of the public. No, had that been their case, had they been their own masters, it can admit of no doubt but that Pompey, as well as Cæsar, would have had the same disbanding vote passed upon him too. But, Cæsar being then abroad and Pompey at home, they naturally chose to be most afraid of the danger that was nearest to them."

Vid. supr.
Chap. I.

Cicero, we may remember, in the account he gives of his interview with Pompey, tells us, that, as to public affairs, Pompey talked in such a strain, as if a war was inevitable, without giving the least hopes of an accommodation.


Cibber, p.
186.

"While such [continues our laureat] was the disposition of Pompey's mind, we can be no longer in doubt from whence came this peremptory vote upon Cæsar.

"Thus the government *de jure* having utterly lost its power, the only debateable question now was, whether Pompey or Cæsar should be the sole governor *de facto*. A melancholy election for liberty! Nor had it a better appearance to Cicero, who tells us, that which side soever got the better, the war must necessarily end in tyranny; the only difference was that, if their enemies conquered, they should be proscribed; if their friends, be slaves.


"This being the most equal light that the cause of Pompey or of Cæsar can stand in, we

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



must either suppose, that had Cæsar, in obedience to the senate, disbanded his army, the public liberty would have been of course restored; or that, if it would not, (as there is not the most distant pretence to say it would) it then must follow, that whether Pompey or Cæsar had prevailed, it could have wrought no different consequence to the Roman liberty; the ruin of which, under the sole dominion of either, must (as Cicero confesses) have been equally inevitable: let this be granted, and neither the virtue, nor the critical learning of posterity, will ever think this cause a disputable point, or give the least preference to the pretensions of either of these celebrated competitors. 'Tis true, they may tell us, that Pompey had the fairer appearance in the senate's support. Yes, but in nothing more than appearance; not by their free and independent choice, but by the palpable terror of his arms; nor from their opinion of his better intentions to the public, than they conceived of Cæsar's; but the plain truth is, that in this situation, they rather chose to let Pompey's orders seem to be their own, than that any thing should appear to be transacted without their authority. If Cæsar then was not so tame as the senate in yielding up his liberty, or refused to obey the mandate of an intimidated authority; rather choosing, if he could not live like a Roman, to die like Cæsar: will this stand in no excuse for him? or, will it be too partially favourable, should we call his slighting such a senate an almost laudable

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



ambition? for never surely can it be urged, that Cæsar's disobeying them was a more criminal infringement of the public liberty than was Pompey's keeping them in fear of him. And yet, again, if the presumption of either their disobeying or commanding could be mitigated by appearances, Cæsar, by his offering to lay down his arms, provided Pompey might be under the same obligation at the same time, made an advancement to the patriot, which Pompey had not virtue enough to dissemble. And though it may have been objected, that this compliance of Cæsar was all but grimace, without the least intention of his making it good; yet as this is but an imaginary charge, it ought at least to have been brought to a proof before Cæsar could be justly condemned upon it. But Pompey's absolutely, and without hesitation, refusing the proposal, was an open declaration, that no peaceable terms should prevail upon him to part with a grain of his power. While Pompey, therefore, lies under this imputation, he stands in a less favourable light, or was, rather, a more notorious offender than Cæsar."

CHAP. III.

Cæsar, after settling every thing in the South of Italy, and taking measures to secure Sicily and Sardinia, sets out for Rome. In his way, he has a conference with Cicero, who soon after retires to Pompey's camp. At Rome, he seizes the public treasure ; and, finding the senate unwilling to act any part, he takes upon himself the public administration. After a stay of six or seven days, he sets out for Spain.

CÆSAR was very sensible, that, to put a speedy end to the war, the best plan he could follow was to pass the sea immediately, and endeavour to come up with Pompey and the consuls in their present defenceless state, before they could draw the transmarine forces together. But the execution of this design was at present absolutely impracticable ; for all the ships had been carried off the coast ; and to gather others from Picenum, Sicily, and the coasts of Gaul, was a tedious business, and in the winter season subject to great uncertainty. Dreading, therefore, this delay and loss of time, he determined to go to Spain, whither also a very interesting consideration called him. It appeared of dangerous consequence to suffer a veteran army to strengthen themselves in his rival's interest by new levies of horse and foot, and to prepare a sure resource for their general, when driven out of Greece and Asia : and he could never have a more favourable opportunity of conquering Spain, and the legions there, than when Pompey was at such a distance from them, and

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.

403 Cons.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Middl. p.
118.

unable to give them any assistance. He resolved therefore upon this expedition, saying, he would go first to find an army without a general, and then return to a general without an army. It is commonly supposed, that Pompey committed a capital error in not going to Spain, and in neglecting to put himself at the head of the best troops he had, in a country devoted to his interest, and commodious for the operations of his naval force; and Cicero is cited, as being so much of this opinion, that, when he first heard of Pompey's resolution to go to Greece, he called it monstrous. But it is to be considered, that Pompey had at this time no fleet in readiness; and, if he had sailed for Spain directly, he would not have had influence enough in the East to have raised the fleets and armies, which, by his presence there, he was enabled to collect. Cæsar would have been beforehand with him; and, by transporting a few legions into Greece, would have awed all the states of the East, who were most of them very indifferent about this quarrel: and Pompey, in the mean time, would have been cooped up in Spain, and precluded from every province of the empire besides Africa.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib. i.

Cæsar, before he left Brundisium, sent orders to all the municipal towns upon the several coasts to assemble all the vessels they could, and send them to that port: and, knowing of what importance it was to his credit, that Italy should be abundantly supplied with provisions, which Pompey was determined to

cut off by every possible method², he immediately dispatched Valerius, one of his lieutenants, into Sardinia, with one legion; and Curio into Sicily with three; commanding him, as soon as he had mastered this island, to pass over into Africa. Then, having put his legions into winter-quarters in the towns along the coast, at Brundisium, Tarentum, Sipontum, and other places, in such a manner as to lock up all the passages by sea, and having ordered levies over the whole country, he set out for Rome.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Ad Att.
ix. 15.

Ad Att.
ix. 19.

In the midst of his military operations, he had neglected no means of gaining over to his party all those who were not his avowed enemies. As soon as he was informed that the senators had left Rome, he wrote to many of them to return, and desired Trebatius to write to Cicero to beg of him not to absent himself from the city; and, after Cicero had left it, he employed all their common friends to use their

Ad Att.
vii. 17.

² (Ad Att. ix. 9.) "I perceive a most destructive war ready to break out, which Pompey will begin by famishing Italy; and yet I mourn for not taking part in this war; a war! so detestable, that, though there is nothing more unnatural than not to assist our parents, yet have the leaders of it taken their measures for famishing the most venerable, the most sacred of all parents, I mean their country. My apprehensions are not founded upon conjecture, but upon what I have heard from themselves. This fleet that is gathering from Alexandria, Colchis, Tyre, Sidon, Aradus, Cyprus, Pamphylia, Lycia, Rhodes, Chios, Byzantium, Lesbos, Miletus, Smyrna, and Coos, is designed to intercept the provisions of Italy, and to seize the coasts of the corn countries."

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

endeavours to induce him to imitate the conduct of some other consulars, who had determined to preserve a neutrality. Cicero, upon these applications, keeping at a distance from Pompey, Cæsar imagined they had made an impression upon him; and he began to attempt another point with him, viz. to persuade him to come back to Rome, and assist in the councils of the senate, which he designed to summon at his return from following Pompey. With this view, in the hurry of his march towards Brundisium, Cæsar sent him the following letter.

Middl. p.
90.

CÆSAR, EMPEROR, TO CICERO, EMPEROR.

Ad Att.
ix. 6.

“ When I had but just time to see our friend Furnius, nor could conveniently speak with, or hear him, was in haste, and on my march, having sent the legions before me; yet I could not pass by without writing, and sending him to you with my thanks: though I have often paid this duty before, and seem likely to pay it oftener, you deserve it so well of me. I desire of you, in a special manner, that, as I hope to be in the city shortly, I may see you there, and have the benefit of your advice, your interest, your authority, your assistance in all things. But to return to the point: you will pardon the haste and brevity of my letter, and learn the rest from Furnius.” To this very polite letter Cicero made the following answer.

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

CICERO, EMPEROR, TO CÆSAR, EMPEROR.

“Upon reading your letter, delivered to me by Furnius, in which you pressed me to come to the city, I did not so much wonder at what you there intimated, of your desire to use my advice and authority, but was at a loss to find out what you meant by my interest and assistance: yet I flattered myself into a persuasion; that, out of your admirable and singular wisdom, you were desirous to enter into some measures for establishing the peace and concord of the city; and in that case I looked upon my temper and character as fit enough to be employed in such a deliberation. If the case be so, and you have any concern for the safety of our friend Pompey, and of reconciling him to yourself, and to the republic; you will certainly find no man more proper for such a work than I am, who, from the very first, have always been the adviser of peace both to him and the senate; and, since this recourse to arms, have not meddled with any part of the war, but thought you to be really injured by it, while your enemies and enviers were attempting to deprive you of those honours which the Roman people had granted you. But as at that time I was not only a favourer of your dignity, but an encourager also of others to assist you in it; so now the dignity of Pompey greatly affects me: for many years ago I made choice of you two, with whom to cultivate a particular friendship.


Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

and to be, as I now am, most strictly united. Wherefore I desire of you, or rather beg and implore with all my prayers, that in the hurry of your cares, you would indulge a moment to this thought, how by your generosity I may be permitted to shew myself an honest, grateful, pious man, in remembering an act of the greatest kindness to me. If this related only to myself, I should hope still to obtain it from you: but it concerns, I think, both your honour and the republic, that by your means I should be allowed to continue in a situation the best adapted to promote the peace of you two, as well as the general concord of all the citizens. After I had sent my thanks to you before on the account of Lentulus, for giving safety to him who had given it to me; yet, upon reading his letter, in which he expresses the most grateful sense of your liberality, I took myself to have received the same grace from you, which he had done: towards whom, if by this you perceive me to be grateful, let it be your care, I beseech you, that I may be so too towards Pompey³.”

³ (Middleton, p. 92.) Cicero was censured for some passages of this letter, which Cæsar took care to make public, viz. the compliment on Cæsar's admirable wisdom; and, above all, the acknowledgement of his being injured by his adversaries in the present war: in excuse of which he says: (Ad Att. viii. 9.) “that he was not sorry for the publication of it, for he himself had given several copies of it; and, considering what had, since happened, was pleased to have it known to the world how much he had always been inclined to peace; and, that in urging Cæsar to save his country, he thought it his business to use such expressions

In his way to Rome, Cæsar had a conference with Cicero, at Formiæ, on the twenty-ninth

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.




as were the most likely to gain authority with him, without fearing to be thought guilty of flattery, in urging him to an act for which he would gladly have thrown himself even at his feet."

He received another letter on the same subject, and about the same time, written jointly by Balbus and Oppius, two of Cæsar's chief confidants: "The advice, not only of little men, such as we are, but even of the greatest, is generally weighed, not by the intention of the giver, but the event; yet, relying on your humanity, we will give you what we take to be the best in the case about which you wrote to us; which, though it should not be found prudent, yet certainly flows from the utmost fidelity and affection to you. If we did not know from Cæsar himself, that, as soon as he comes to Rome, he will do what in our judgment we think he ought to do, treat about a reconciliation between him and Pompey, we should give over exhorting you to come and take a part in those deliberations; that, by your help, who have a strict friendship with them both, the whole affair may be settled with ease and dignity: or, if, on the contrary, we believed that Cæsar would not do it, and knew that he was resolved upon a war with Pompey, we should never try to persuade you to take arms against a man to whom you have the greatest obligations, in the same manner as we have always intreated you, not to fight against Cæsar. But, since, at present, we can only guess, rather than know what Cæsar will do, we have nothing to offer but this, that it does not seem agreeable to your dignity, or your fidelity, so well known to all, when you are intimate with them both, to take arms against either; and this we do not doubt but Cæsar, according to his humanity, will highly approve: yet, if you judge proper, we will write to him, to let us know what he will really do about it; and, if he returns us an answer, we will presently send you notice what we think of it, and give you our word, that we will advise only, what we take to be most suitable to your honour, not to Cæsar's views; and are persuaded that Cæsar, out of his indulgence to his friends, will be pleased with it." Ad Att. ix. 8.

Y. R. 70 $\frac{1}{2}$.
 Bef. Chr.
 48.
 403 Cons.

of March; of which, the latter gives the following account to his friend Atticus. “ My




This joint letter was followed by a separate one from Balbus: “ Immediately after I had sent the common letter from Oppius and myself, I received one from Cæsar, of which I have sent you a copy; whence you will perceive how desirous he is of peace, and to be reconciled with Pompey, and how far removed from all thoughts of cruelty. It gives me an extreme joy, as it certainly ought to do, to see him in these sentiments. As to yourself, your fidelity, and your piety, I am entirely of the same mind; my dear Cicero, with you, that you cannot, consistently with your character and duty, bear arms against a man, to whom you declare yourself so greatly obliged; that Cæsar will approve this resolution, I certainly know from his singular humanity; and that you will perfectly satisfy him, by taking no part in the war against him, nor joining yourself to his adversaries; this he will think sufficient, not only from you, a person of such dignity and splendor; but has allowed it even to me, not to be found in that camp, which is likely to be formed against Lentulus and Pompey, from whom I have received the greatest obligations: it was enough, he said, if I performed my part to him in the city and the gown, which I might perform also to them, if I thought fit; wherefore I now manage all Lentulus’s affairs at Rome, and discharge my duty, my fidelity, my piety to them both: yet, in truth, I do not take the hopes of an accommodation, though now so low, to be quite desperate, since Cæsar is in that mind in which we ought to wish him: one thing would please me, if you thought it proper, that you would write to him, and desire a guard from him, as you did from Pompey, at the time of Milo’s trial, with my approbation: I will undertake for him, if I rightly know Cæsar, that he will sooner pay a regard to your dignity, than to his own interest. How prudently I write these things, I know not; but this I certainly know, that, whatever I write, I write out of a singular love and affection to you; for, (let me die, so as Cæsar may but live) if I have not so great an esteem for you, that few are equally dear to me. When you have taken any resolution in this affair, I wish that you would let me know

discourse with him," says he, "was such as would rather make him think well of me than thank me. I stood firm in refusing to go to Rome; but was deceived in expecting to find him easy; for I never saw any one less so: he was condemned, he said, by my judgment; and, if I did not come, others would be the more backward: I told him that their case was very different from mine. After many things said on both sides, he bad me come, however, and try to make peace: 'Shall I do it,' says I, 'in my own way?' 'Do you imagine,' replied he, 'that I will prescribe to you?' 'I will move the senate then,' says I, 'for a decree against your going to Spain, or transporting your troops into Greece, and say a great deal besides in bewailing the case of Pompey:' 'I will not allow,' replied he, 'such things to be said:' 'So I thought,' says I, 'and for that reason will not come; because I must either say them, and many more, which I cannot help saying, if I am there, or not come at all.' The result was, that, to shift off the discourse, he wished me to consider of it; which I could not refuse to do, and so we parted. I am persuaded, that he is not pleased with me; but I am

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

it, for I am exceedingly solicitous that you should discharge your duty to them both, which in truth I am confident you will discharge." Dr. Middleton is of opinion, that the offer of a guard was insinuated to deprive him of the liberty of retiring: but considering Cæsar's most generous behaviour, even to his enemies, this suspicion seems to be entirely groundless.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.


pleased with myself; which I have not been before of a long time. As for the rest; good gods, what a crew he has with him! What a hellish band, as you call them⁴!—What a deplorable affair! What desperate troops! What a lamentable thing, to see Servius's son, and Titinius's, with many more of their rank in that camp, which besieged Pompey! He has six legions; wakes at all hours; fears nothing; I see no end of this calamity. His declaration at the last, which I had almost forgot, was odious; that, if he was not permitted to use my advice, he would use such as he could get from others; and pursue all measures that were for his service."

Cicero fancied to himself, that Cæsar deemed his presence in the city as of the greatest importance to his cause, and meant to get a decision from him, that, in the absence of the consuls, the assembly for the elections of the new magistrates might be held by a prætor: but Cæsar, it is probable, did not think his presence of so much use, and certainly never intended to force him into a compliance, but to win him by address, and the counsels of his friends.

⁴ "There was a time [says Cibber, p. 192.] when these followers of Cæsar were all heroes with Cicero, they being still the same ragamuffins that had done glorious business abroad for the republic under the same command of Cæsar, and did as effectually (valiant rascals as they were) as if they had been all saints or patriots." Has not the illustrious consul, who saved Rome, condescended to sing their exploits in Greek verse?

While Cæsar was on the road to Rome, young Quintus Cicero, the nephew, a fiery, giddy youth, privately wrote to him to offer his service, with a promise of some information concerning his uncle; upon which, being sent for, and admitted to an audience, he assured Cæsar, that his uncle was utterly disaffected to all his measures, and determined to leave Italy and go to Pompey. The boy was tempted to this rashness by the hopes of a considerable present, and gave much uneasiness by it both to the father and the uncle, who had reason to fear some ill consequence from it; but Cæsar, desirous to divert Cicero from declaring against him, and to quiet the apprehensions which he might entertain for what was past, took occasion to signify to him, in a kind letter from Rome, that he retained no resentment of his refusal to come to the city, though Volcatius Tullus and Servius Sulpicius [two consular senators] had complained that he had not shewn the same indulgence to them. And Curio told him a few days after, that, when Dolabella was earnestly solicitous that he should come to Rome, Cæsar, in an answer, returned him many thanks, and told him, that he was not only satisfied, but pleased at his not coming. He assured him also that Cæsar would have made no difficulty in granting him the favour he had granted to Philippus, that of remaining neuter: that he might act as if the thing was agreed on with Cæsar himself; and that he would write to him, that matters were so settled between them: he

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

Middl. p.

97.

Ad Att.

x. 4, 5, 7.

Y. R. 704.
 Bef. Chr.
 48.
 453 Cons.



added, that, if he pleased, he might leave Italy, and pass through Sicily to go into Greece. Yet Cicero's behaviour and residence in those villas of his, which were nearest to the sea, gave rise to a general report, that he was waiting only for a wind to carry him over to Pompey; upon which, Cæsar sent him another pressing letter to try, if possible, to dissuade him from that step.

CÆSAR, EMPEROR, TO CICERO, EMPEROR.

Ad Att.
 x. 8.

“ Though I never imagined that you would do any thing rashly or imprudently; yet moved by common report, I thought proper to write to you, and beg of you, by our mutual affection, that you would not run to a declining cause, whither you did not think fit to go while it stood firm. For you will do the greatest injury to our friendship, and consult but ill for yourself, if you do not follow where fortune calls: for all things seem to have succeeded most prosperously for us, most unfortunately for them: nor will you be thought to have followed the cause (since that was the same, when you chose to withdraw yourself from their councils) but to have condemned some act of mine; than which you could do nothing that could affect me more sensibly, and what I beg, by the rights of our friendship, that you would not do. Lastly, what is more agreeable to the character of an honest, quiet man, and good citizen, than to retire from civil broils? from which some, who would

gladly have done it, have been deterred by an apprehension of danger: but you, after a full testimony of my life, and trial of my friendship; will find nothing more safe or reputable, than to keep yourself clear from all this contention. The sixteenth of April, on the road.”

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Antony, also, whom Cæsar left to guard Italy in his absence, wrote to him to the same purpose, and on the same day.

ANTONIUS, TRIBUNE OF THE PEOPLE AND PRO-
PRÆTOR, TO CICERO, EMPEROR.

“ If I had not a great esteem for you, and much greater indeed than you imagine, I should not be concerned at the report which is spread of you, especially when I take it to be false. But, out of the excess of my affection, I cannot dissemble, that even a report, though false, makes some impression on me. I cannot believe that you are preparing to cross the sea, when you have such a value for Dolabella, and your daughter Tullia, that excellent woman, and are so much valued by us all, to whom, in truth, your dignity and honour are almost dearer than to yourself: yet I did not think it the part of a friend not to be moved by the discourse even of ill-designing men, and wrote this with the greater inclination, as I take my part to be the more difficult on the account of our late coldness, occasioned rather by my jealousy than any injury from you. For I desire you to assure

Ad Att.
x. 8.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

-yourself, that nobody is dearer to me than you, excepting my Cæsar, and that I know also that Cæsar reckons M. Cicero in the first class of his friends. Wherefore, I beg of you, my Cicero, that you will keep yourself free and undetermined, and despise the fidelity of that man who first did you an injury, that he might afterwards do you a kindness; nor fly from him, who, though he should not love you, which is impossible, yet will always desire to see you in safety and splendour. I have sent Calpurnius to you with this, the most intimate of my friends, that you might perceive the great concern which I have for your life and dignity."

Ad Att.
x. 9.

Cœlius also wrote to him on the same subject; but finding, by some hints in Cicero's answer, that he was actually preparing to run away to Pompey, he sent him a second letter, in a most pathetic, or, as Cicero calls it, lamentable strain, in hopes to work upon him by alarming all his fears.


CŒLIUS TO CICERO.

Ep. Fam.
viii. 16.

"Being in a consternation at your letter, by which you shew that you are meditating nothing but what is dismal, yet neither tell me directly what it is, nor wholly hide it from me, I presently wrote this to you. By all your fortunes, Cicero, by your children, I beg and beseech you not to take any step injurious to your safety: for I call the gods and men and our friendship to witness, that what I have

told, and forewarned you of, was not any vain conceit of my own, but after I had talked with Cæsar, and understood from him, how he resolved to act after his victory, I informed you of what I had learned. If you imagine that his conduct will be always the same, in dismissing his enemies and offering conditions, you are mistaken: he thinks and even talks of nothing but what is fierce and severe⁵, and is gone away much out of humour with the senate, and thoroughly provoked with the opposition which he has met with, nor will there be any room for mercy. Wherefore, if you yourself, your only son, your house, your remaining hopes be dear to you; if I, if the worthy man your son-in-law, have any weight with you; you should not desire to overturn our fortunes, and force us to hate or to relinquish that cause in which our safety consists, or to entertain an impious wish against yours. Lastly, reflect on this, that you have already given all the offence which you can give by staying so long behind; and now to declare against a conqueror, whom you would not offend, while his cause was doubtful, and to fly after those who run away, with whom you would not join while they were in a condition

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



⁵ It is evident that Cælius writes thus to frighten Cicero, whom he knew to be a coward. Curio told him also, in his way to Sicily, that Cæsar's clemency flowed not from his natural disposition, but because he thought it popular; and that, if he once lost the affections of the people, he would be cruel. Ad Att. x. 4.

Y. R. 704.

Ref. Chr.


48.

403 Cons.

to resist, is the utmost folly. Take care that, while you are ashamed not to approve yourself one of the best citizens, you be not too hasty in determining what is the best. But, if I cannot wholly prevail with you, yet wait at least till you know how we succeed in Spain, which, I now tell you, will be ours as soon as Cæsar comes thither. What hopes they may have when Spain is lost, I know not; and what your view can be in acceding to a desperate cause, by my faith, I cannot find out. As to the thing, which you discover to me by your silence about it, Cæsar has been informed of it; and, after the first salutation, told me presently what he had heard of you: I denied that I knew any thing of the matter, but begged of him to write to you in a manner the most effectual to make you stay. He carries me with him into Spain; if he did not, I would run away to you, wherever you are, before I came to Rome, to dispute this point with you in person, and hold you fast even by force. Consider, Cicero, again and again, that you do not utterly ruin both you and yours; that you do not knowingly and wilfully throw yourself into difficulties, whence you see no way to extricate yourself. But, if either the reproaches of the better sort touch you, or you cannot bear the insolence and haughtiness of a certain set of men, I would advise you to chuse some place remote from the war, till these contests be over, which will soon be decided: if you do this, I shall think that you

have done wisely, and you will not offend Cæsar⁶.”

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



⁶ The conclusion, the partial conclusion of Dr. Middleton, p. 106, from these letters, is as follows: “These letters give us the most sensible proof of the high esteem and credit in which Cicero flourished at this time in Rome: when in a contest for empire, which force alone was to decide, we see the chiefs on both sides so solicitous to gain a man to their party, who had no peculiar skill in arms, or talents for war; but his name and authority was the acquisition which they sought; since, whatever was the fate of their arms, the world, they knew, would judge better of the cause which Cicero espoused. The same letters will confute, likewise, in a great measure, the common opinion of his want of resolution in all cases of difficulty, since no man could shew a greater than he did on the present occasion, when, against the importunities of his friends, and all the invitations of a successful power, he chose to follow the cause which he thought the best, though he knew it to be the weakest.”

The same elegant panegyrist of Cicero has laid open, in the following manner, the motives of his conduct at this time. P. 109, 110, 113. “From the time of his leaving the city, together with Pompey and the senate, there passed not a single day in which he did not write one or more letters to Atticus, the only friend whom he trusted with the secret of his thoughts. From these letters it appears, that the sum of Atticus’s advice to him agreed intirely with his own sentiments, that, if Pompey remained in Italy, he ought to join with him; if not, should stay behind, and expect what fresh accidents might produce. This was what Cicero had hitherto followed; and as to his future conduct, though he seems sometimes to be a little wavering and irresolute, yet the result of his deliberations constantly turned in favour of Pompey. His personal affection for the man, preference of his cause, the reproaches of the better sort, who began to censure his tardiness, and, above all, his gratitude for favours received, which had ever the greatest weight with him, made him resolve at all adventures to run after him; and though he was displeased with his management of the war, and without any hopes of his success; though he knew him

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

The substance of his answers to these letters from Cæsar, Antony, and others, is contained


before to be no politician, and now perceived him, he says, to be no general; yet, with all his faults, he could not endure the thoughts of deserting him, nor hardly forgive himself for staying so long behind him.—What held him still a while longer was the tears of his family, and the remonstrances of his daughter Tullia, who intreated him to wait only the issue of the Spanish war, and urged it as the advice of Atticus.—Pursuing at last the result of all his deliberations, and preferring the consideration of duty to that of his safety, he embarked to follow Pompey on the eleventh of June.”

Cic. Lett.
b. vii. 17.

Mr. Melmoth has given a quite different, and, I think, a truer account of Cicero's motives. He thinks that his conduct, during this important crisis, evidently shews the strength and measure of his patriotism: “Upon the news that Cæsar was marching into Italy, Pompey was appointed general in chief of the republican forces: and the principal magistrates, together with those who were invested with proconsular power, were distributed into different cantons in Italy, in order to raise troops for the defence of the common cause. Cicero had his particular district assigned him among the rest; but, instead of executing this important commission with spirit and vigour, he remained altogether inactive at his several villas in that part of Italy. And this he signified to Cæsar, by means of their common friend Trebatius; who had written to him in Cæsar's name, in order to prevail with him to return to Rome: ‘I answered Trebatius that what he required of me was impracticable at this juncture: but that I lived in my own farms, and did not concern myself in the new levies of troops, or any public business.’ Ad Att. vii. 37. Pompey, in the mean time [a month after] was pressing Cicero to join him: but he excused himself by representing, that, while he was actually on the road for that purpose, he was informed that he could not proceed without the danger of being intercepted by Cæsar's troops. Epist. 2. Cic. ad Pomp. apud Epist. ad Att. viii. Cicero, however, is so ingenuous as to acknowledge in the same letter to Pompey, that, so long as there were

in the following letter to Cœlius, which is written with particular care.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



hopes that the negotiations for a peace would be attended with success, he thought it a justifiable piece of prudence not to be too active in forwarding the preparations that were carrying on against Cæsar, remembering, he says, how much he had formerly suffered from the resentment of the latter in the affair of his exile. This was explaining at once the true principle of his whole conduct: and he avows it more expressly in a letter to Atticus: ‘Then say you, why did you not go beyond seas with Pompey? I tell you it was out of my power to do it: and I refer you to the days and dates of our letters. At the same time I will frankly confess what I might have easily conceived; I was, perhaps, in the wrong in laying too great a stress upon a certain circumstance, in which I was deceived. I have flattered myself with the hopes of an accommodation: should that happen, I was unwilling to have Cæsar for my enemy, when he was reconciled with Pompey. I was sensible that they were still the same men: and it was this that occasioned my indecision.’ Ad Att. x. 8. Pompey, however, had no sooner set sail for Greece, than Cicero was struck with the consciousness of his having acted an unworthy part: ‘Hitherto I was vexed and uneasy, because unable to come to any resolution. But, now that Pompey and the consuls have left Italy, it is no longer vexation and grief; it is anguish and distraction.—I am not, believe me, in my senses, so overwhelmed am I with the infamy, I think, I have incurred.’ Ad Att. ix. 6. After several deliberations, therefore, he was determined, he tells Atticus, to follow Pompey, without waiting for the event of Cæsar’s arms in Spain. Ad Att. ix. 19. x. 8. This resolution, nevertheless, soon gave way to a second: for, having received some accounts which contradicted a former report that had been spread concerning the advantageous posture of Pompey’s affairs, Cicero renounced his intention of joining him, and now purposed to stand neuter. Ad Att. x. 9. But a new turn in favour of Pompey seems to have brought Cicero back to his former scheme. For, in a subsequent letter to Atticus, wherein he mentions some reasons to be-

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

CICERO TO MARCUS CÆLIUS.

Ep. Fam.

ii. 16.

Melm. vii.


14.

“ I should have been extremely affected by your letter, if reason had not banished from my heart all its disquietudes, and despair of seeing better days had not long since hardened it against every new impression of grief; yet,

lieve that Pompey's affairs went well in Spain, and takes notice, likewise, of some disgust, which the populace expressed towards Cæsar in the theatre; we find him resuming his design of openly uniting with Pompey. And, accordingly, he resolved to join those who were maintaining Pompey's cause in Sicily. Ad Att. x. 12. It does not appear, by any of his letters, upon what motive he afterwards exchanged his plan, for that of sailing directly to Pompey's camp in Greece: which, after various debates with himself, he, at length, executed. There is a passage, however, in Cæsar's Commentaries, which, perhaps, will render it probable, that the news which, about this time, was confidently spread at Rome, that Cæsar's army had been almost totally defeated in Spain, was the determining reason that sent Cicero to Pompey. The fact was, that Afranius and Petreius had gained some advantages over Cæsar: but, as they magnified them in their letters to Rome, much beyond the truth, several persons of note, who had hitherto been fluctuating in their resolutions, thought it was high time to declare themselves, and went off immediately to Pompey.” De Bell. Civ. i. 55. Cicero very well knew from the beginning, which was the most honourable part for a man of his political principles to act under his connections with the chiefs of the aristocracy, and his formal engagements to Pompey; but the prudential part was not so clear a point. He dreaded Cæsar's resentment, but he was still more afraid of the resentment of Pompey: “ I find I am either way in danger; from the one party by not doing my duty, and from the other by doing it; and so distracted are public affairs, that I can steer no course but what is full of perils.”

strong as I must acknowledge my despondency to be, I am not sensible, however, that I said any thing in my last, which could justly raise the suspicion you have conceived. What more did my letter contain than general expressions of dissatisfaction at the sad prospect of our affairs? A prospect, which cannot, surely, suggest to your own mind less gloomy apprehensions than it presents to mine. For I am too well persuaded of the force of your penetration to imagine that my judgment can discover consequences which lie concealed from yours. But I am surprised that you, who ought to know me perfectly well, should believe me capable of acting with so little policy as to abandon a rising fortune, for one in its decline, at least, if not utterly fallen; or so variable, as not only to destroy at once all the interest I have established with Cæsar, but to deviate even from myself, by engaging at last in a civil war, which it has hitherto been my determined maxim to avoid. Where then did you discover those unhappy resolutions you impute to me? Perhaps you collected them from what I said of secluding myself in some sequestered solitude. And indeed you are sensible how ill I can submit, I do not say to endure, but even to be a witness of the insolencies of the successful party: a sentiment, my friend, which once, I am sure, was yours no less than mine. But in vain would I retire, whilst I preserve the title with which I am at present distinguished [of imperator], and bear about this embarrassing parade of lictors.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.


403 Cons.

Were I eased of this troublesome honour, there is no part of Italy so obscure, in which I should not be well contented to hide myself. Yet these, my laurels, unwelcome as they are to myself, are the object both of the envy and the raillery of my malevolent enemies⁷. Nevertheless, under all these temptations of withdrawing from so disgusting a scene, I never once entertained a thought of leaving Italy without the previous approbation of yourself and some others. But you know the situation of my several villas: and as it is among these that I am obliged to divide my time, that I may not incommode my friends; the preference I give to those which stand on the sea-coast has raised a suspicion that I am meditating a flight into Greece. If peace, indeed, were to be found in that country, I should not perhaps be unwilling to undertake the voyage: but to enter upon it, in order to engage in a war, would be altogether inconsistent, surely, with my principles and character; especially, as it would be taking up arms not only against a man who I hope is perfectly well satisfied with my conduct, but in favour

⁷ Cicero, undoubtedly, gave upon this occasion but too much colour to the censure of his enemies: for it could not but have a very strange appearance, that he should preserve the thoughts of a triumph, at a time when his country was bleeding with a civil war. But as he was extremely ambitious of this honour, he was greatly unwilling to renounce it; still flattering himself, perhaps, that some accommodation between Cæsar and Pompey would afford him an opportunity of enjoying what he so strongly desired. Melmoth.

of one whom it is now impossible I should ever render so. In a word, as I made no secret to you when you met me at my Cuman villa, of the conversation which had passed between Ampius and myself, you could not be at a loss to guess my sentiments upon this head: and indeed you plainly saw how utterly averse I was to the scheme of Pompey's deserting Rome. Did I not then affirm, that there was nothing I would not suffer, rather than be reduced to follow the civil war beyond the limits of Italy? And has any event since happened, that could give me just reason of changing my sentiments? On the contrary, has not every circumstance concurred to fix me in them^s?

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



“ Be assured (and I am well persuaded 'tis what you already believe) that the single aim of my actions, in these our public calamities, has been to convince the world, that my great and earnest desire was to preserve the peace of

^s Notwithstanding Cicero's strong assertions, that he had no thoughts of joining Pompey, he had actually determined to do so a few days before he received the preceding letter from Cœlius; as appears by an epistle to Atticus, wherein he expressly tells him, that he was only waiting for a fair wind. But, before he wrote the present letter, he had received some news not altogether favourable to Pompey's party: in consequence of which, he renounced his former design, and was now determined (though he does not think proper to own it in this letter) to retire to Malta, as a neutral island. This resolution, however, he soon afterwards rejected, and resumed his first intentions of following Pompey into Greece. And this scheme he at length executed. Ad Att. x. 8, 9.

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

our country ; and, when this would no longer be hoped, that there was nothing I wished more than to avoid taking any part in the civil war. And I shall never, I trust, have reason to repent of firmly persevering in these sentiments. It was the frequent boast, I remember, of my friend Hortensius, that he had never taken up arms in any of our civil dissensions. But I may glory in the same honest neutrality, with a much better grace : as that of Hortensius was suspected to have arisen from the timidity of his temper ; whereas mine, I think, cannot be imputed to any motive of that unworthy kind. [Cicero seems to have been sensible that Cœlius intended to frighten him into a neutrality.] Nor am I in the least terrified by those considerations, with which you so faithfully and affectionately endeavour to alarm my fears. The truth of it is, there is no calamity so severe, to which we are not all of us, it should seem, in this universal anarchy and confusion, equally and unavoidably exposed. But if I could have averted this dreadful storm from the republic, at the expense of my own private and domestic enjoyments, even of those, my friend, which you so emphatically recommend to my care, I should most willingly have made the sacrifice. As to my son, (who I rejoice to find has a share in your concern) I shall leave him a sufficient patrimony in that honour with which my name will be remembered, so long as the republic shall subsist : and, if it be destroyed, I shall have the consolation at least to reflect, that he


will suffer nothing more than must be the common lot of every Roman. With regard to that dear and excellent young man, my son-in-law, whose welfare you entreat me to consider; can you once doubt, knowing, as you perfectly do, the tenderness I bear, not only for him, but for Tullia, that I am infinitely anxious upon his account? I am the more so indeed, as it was my single consolation amidst these general distractions, that they might possibly prove a means of protecting him from those inconveniencies in which his too generous spirit had involved him⁹. How much he suffered from them during the time he continued in Rome, as well as how little that circumstance was to my credit, are points which I choose to leave to your own inquiry.

“ Affairs in Spain, I doubt not, will terminate in the manner you mention. But I neither wait the event of them in order to de-

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

⁹ It should seem, by this passage, that Dolabella, who had contracted very considerable debts, was at this time under some difficulties from his creditors: from whom Cicero flattered himself that Cæsar's power would have protected him. Some commentators, however, instead of *liberalitate*, adopted in this translation, read *libertate*: and suppose that Cicero alludes to the prosecution in which Dolabella had been engaged against Appius. But whichever be the true word, the sentiment is observable. For, surely it was utterly unworthy of Cicero to find the least consolation amidst the calamities of his country, in the hope that they might prove a screen to Dolabella, either from the justice of his creditors, or the malice of his enemies.
—Melmoth.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



termine my conduct¹, nor am I acting in any other respect with the least artifice. If the republic should be preserved, I shall certainly hold my rank in it: but, if it should be subverted, you yourself, I dare say, will join me in my intended solitude. But this latter supposition is, perhaps, the vain and groundless surmise of a disturbed imagination; and affairs, after all, may take a happier turn than I am apt to presage. I remember the despondency which prevailed in my earliest days amongst our patriots of more advanced years²: possibly my present apprehensions may be of the same cast, and no other than the effect of a common weakness incident to old age. Heaven grant they may prove so! And yet you have heard, I suppose, that a robe of magistracy is in the looms for Oppius; and that Curtius has hopes of being invested with the double-dyed purple: but the principal workman, it seems, somewhat delays him. I throw in this little pleasantry, to let you see I can smile in the midst of my indignation.

¹ The contrary of this was the truth: for Cicero was at this time determined to wait the event of Cæsar's expedition against the lieutenants of Pompey in Spain. And for this purpose he had thoughts of retiring to Malta: *Melitam, opinor, capessamus* (says he to Atticus) *dum quid in Hispania.* Ad Att. x. 9. Melm.

² This alludes to the contentions between Sylla and Marius: which, notwithstanding the probability of their terminating in the total subversion of the constitution, the republic, however, survived. Melm.

“ Let me advise you to enter into the affair which I formerly mentioned concerning Dolabella, with the same warmth as if it were your own. I have only to add, that you may depend upon it I shall take no hasty or inconsiderate measures. But, to whatever part of the world I may direct my course, I entreat you to protect both me and mine, agreeably to your honour and to our mutual friendship. Farewell.”

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Cicero tarried about two months in Italy, after Cæsar's departure, under continual perplexities, whether to stay or to go; to wait the issue of the Spanish war, or to depart before it; whether to sail to Sicily first, or to Malta, or to Pompey's camp. He resolved, at last, to cross the sea to Pompey; yet, knowing all his motions to be narrowly watched, took pains to conceal his intention, especially from Antony, who resided at this time in his neighbourhood, and kept a strict eye upon him. He sent him word, therefore, by letter, that he had no design against Cæsar; that he remembered his friendship, and his son-in-law Dolabella; that, if he had other thoughts, he could easily have been with Pompey; that his chief reason for retiring was to avoid the uneasiness of appearing in public with the formality of his lictors. But Antony (who saw through his finesse) wrote him a surly answer; which Cicero calls a laconic mandate, and sent a copy of it to Atticus, to let him see, he says, how tyrannically it was drawn.—

Middl. p.
105.

Ad Att.
x. 10.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



“ How sincere is your way of acting? for he, who has a mind to stand neuter, stays at home; he, who goes abroad, seems to pass a judgment on the one side or the other. But it does not belong to me to determine, whether a man may go abroad or not. Cæsar has imposed this task upon me, not to suffer any man to go out of Italy. Wherefore it signifies nothing to me to approve your resolution, if I have no power to indulge you in it. I would have you write to Cæsar, and ask that favour of him: I do not doubt but you will obtain it, especially since you promise to retain a regard for our friendship.”

Ad Att. x.
12. 15.

Antony, after this letter, he tells us, never came to see him, but sent an excuse, that he was ashamed to do it, because he took him to be angry with him, giving him to understand, at the same time, by Trebatius, that he had special orders to observe his motions³. In

³ Cicero, in his letters to Atticus, vents his spleen against Antony. He thus describes his usual equipage in travelling about Italy: “ He carries with him in an open chaise the famed actress Cytheris; his wife follows in a second, with seven other close litters full of his whores and boys. See by what base hands we fall; and doubt, if you can, whether Cæsar, let him come vanquished or victorious, will not make cruel work among us at his return.” Among Antony’s other extravagances, he had the insolence to appear sometimes in public, with his mistress Cytheris, in a chariot drawn by lions. But Cicero tells his friend that, though the beasts were fierce, the master himself was very tame. Pliny gravely reflects on this frolic, and speaks of it as a designed insult on the Roman people, as if, by the emblem of lions, Antony intended to give them to understand, that the fiercest spirits of them would be forced to submit to

these circumstances, while he was preparing all things for his voyage, and waiting only for a fair wind, he removed from his Cuman to his Pompeian villa beyond Naples, which not being so commodious for an embarkment, would help to lessen the suspicion of his intended flight⁴. He at last stole away on the eleventh of June⁵, with his son, his brother,

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

the yoke. Plutarch also mentions it, but both of them place it after the battle of Pharsalia, though it is evident, from Cicero's letters, that it happened long before. Ad Att. x. 10. 13. Middl. p. 107.

⁴ Cicero, ad Att. x. 12. writes: "I often propose to myself the example of Cœlius Caldus." [A consular man of the Marian faction, who raised troops for Marius, when at war with Sylla, and was killed in the attempt to support him.] "Could I find an occasion of imitating him, I would not let it slip.—I perceive the legions, which Cæsar raised in Italy, are very ill affected to him. But he has not a greater foe than he is to himself. You rightly fear his abandoning himself to all excesses, which he certainly will, if he grows desperate. This is the reason why I ought to attempt something in the spirit of a Cœlius, but, I hope, with better success." And, in Ep. 15, he says: "The opportunity for executing my project of imitating Cœlius ripens every day: if a standard was erected, numbers would flock to it." Now, while he was at his Pompeian villa, his friend Ninnius brought him a message from the officers of the three cohorts, which were in garrison at Pompeii, to beg leave to wait upon him the day following, in order to deliver their troops and the town into his hands; but, instead of listening to the overture, he slipped away the next morning before day, to avoid seeing them. "I reflected," says he, "on the fate of Cœlius." Ep. 16. "I do not blame," says Abbé Mongault, "his circumspection; but why does he boast so much of his prowess?"

⁵ According to Usher's computation on the first of April, or thereabout, of the Julian year. Now, if Cicero set out so early in the year, it is not possible that he should have heard

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Ad Att. xi.
3, 13.

and nephew, and arrived safely at Dyrrachium⁶.

To make some amends for his past behaviour, and gain the greater authority with his party, he furnished Pompey, who was in great want of money, with a large sum out of his own stock, for the public service. But he met with nothing but disgust: he was reproached by some for coming so late; and Cato blamed

any thing of the affairs of Spain, as he certainly did; for it was about harvest-time, when Cæsar forced Pompey's lieutenants to capitulate; and he reduced them to this extremity in forty days, so that he had scarce got into Spain by the month of April of the Julian year. According to our calculation, he sailed about the fifteenth of May. In a letter dated the sixteenth of May of the Roman style, ad Att. x. 17, he writes: *Nunc quidem æquinoctium nos moratur, quod valde perturbatum erat.* Abbé Mongault and Mr. Guthrie, deceived by our learned primate, have translated these lines in this sense: "I wait for the equinox, the season of which is now in great confusion." But it is plain that the equinox was passed; *quod perturbatum erat*: "The equinox, which has been very tempestuous, stops me." In the next letter, dated the nineteenth of May, he says he is detained by the dead calms more than by the guards that watch him: *Memirifice tranquillitates adhuc tenuerunt.* This description of storms and subsequent calms agrees very well with the month of April, in which, according to our computation, these letters were written, one on the twenty-second, the other on the twenty-fifth.


⁶ We have no account of the manner and circumstances of his voyage, or by what course he steered towards Dyrrachium: for, after his leaving Italy, all his correspondence with it was in a great measure cut off, so that, from June, in which he sailed, we find an intermission of about nine months in the series of his letters, and not more than four of them written to Atticus during the continuance of the war. Ad Att. xi. 1, 2, 3, 4.

Middl. p.
114.

him for coming to them at all, and deserting that neutral post, which might have given him the better opportunity of bringing about an accommodation. Pompey gave him no employment; and his counsels were slighted as timorous and cowardly; so that he soon repented of having embarked in the war, contrary to the advice of his best friends. In this disagreeable situation he resumed his usual way of raillery, and, what he could not dissuade by his authority, endeavoured to make ridiculous by his jests. By this conduct he is said to have provoked Pompey so far, that he told him, "I wish you would go over to the other side, that you may begin to fear us:" and it gave occasion afterwards to Antony, in a speech to the senate, to censure the levity of his behaviour in the calamity of a civil war, and to reflect not only upon his fears, but the unseasonableness also of his jokes⁷. Having paid this attention to the greatest civil character of his time, let us return to Cæsar, whom we left in his progress to Rome.

Cæsar, so vigorous in action, so temperate

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



⁷ Some of Cicero's sayings on this occasion are preserved by different writers. When Pompey put him in mind of his coming so late to them: "How can I come late," said he, "when I find nothing in readiness among you?" And upon Pompey's asking him sarcastically, where his son-in-law Dolabella was; "He is with your father-in-law," replied he. To a person newly arrived from Italy, and informing them of a strong report at Rome, that Pompey was blocked up by Cæsar; "and you sailed hither therefore," said he, "that you might see it with your own eyes." Vid. Macrob. Sat. ii. 3. Plut. in Cic. Middl. p. 116.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Ad Att. ix.
1. 5. 12.

Ep. Fam.
viii. 16.

Dio, l. 12.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib. i.

in victory, was now become the object of public admiration all over Italy. The municipal towns in the southern parts, who, the year before, had put up prayers for Pompey's recovery, were now as earnest to shew their zeal for his rival; and he everywhere received congratulations on his success. The people flocked to Rome, not only those whom particular favours had attached to his person, but those also, who, guided by their interest, thought, with Cœlius, that in civil contentions, when it came to arms, the stronger side was the best, because the safest. Several also of the nobles, of the honest, were more complaisant than Cicero; and did not think it advisable to disregard Cæsar's solicitations: among these were Servius Sulpicius, Volcatius Tullus, and M. Lepidus. The city neither wanted a senate, nor its magistrates, except the consuls: the prætors administered justice as usual; and the ædiles were making preparations for the public games. M. Antony and Q. Cassius, two tribunes of the people, the most zealous in Cæsar's interest, convoked, on his arrival, the senate in the suburbs, that he might be present without the infringement of the laws.

In his harangue to the house, after complaining of the injuries of his enemies, he said, "that he had never affected extraordinary and illegal honours⁸, but waited patiently the time

⁸ Pompey had been habituated to them from his youth, and made haughty and insolent by them: he would bear no

prescribed by the laws to solicit for a second consulship. That the people, with the concurrence of the whole college of tribunes, had allowed him to stand candidate, though absent, and that even in the consulship of Pompey; who might have prevented the passing of the decree, if he had disapproved of it; and who could now have no good reason to oppose it. That he had given proof of his moderation, by having voluntarily proposed, that both parties should lay down their arms; a measure which would have divested him of his government and command. That the malice of his enemies was such, that they sought to impose terms upon him, to which they would not submit themselves; choosing rather to involve the state in a civil war, than to part with their armies and provinces. That he had been injured by having two of his legions taken away from him, and that the violation of the authority of the tribunes was oppressive and insolent. That he had frequently made offers of peace, and had often desired an interview; and that all his efforts for an accommodation and the public good had

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

equal, and Cæsar did not think himself obliged to acknowledge him for his superior :

*Nec quemquam jam ferre potest Cæsarve priorem,
Pompeiusve parem.*——

Lucan.

“ Sure then Cæsar comes nearer to the commonwealth’s man than Pompey. Pompey’s no equal has a visible tincture of offensive ambition; while Cæsar’s no superior, at most, aspires but to a share in commanding.” Cibber, p. 183.

Y. R. 704.
 Def. Chr.
 48.
 403 Cons.

been ineffectual." Upon all these accounts, he requested and conjured the senate to take the republic under their protection, and to assist him to govern it: and, if they declined, he said, through fear, this important charge, he would take it wholly upon himself. He then proposed to send deputies to Pompey to treat of an accommodation. "Nor was he moved," he told them, "by a reflection which Pompey had made lately in the house, that to send deputies was to acknowledge the superiority of him to whom they were sent, and a mark of timidity in the sender. This," he said, "was a low way of thinking; and, in the same manner as he had endeavoured at a superiority in action, he would also strive at a superiority in justice and equity." This proposal of a deputation was generally applauded; but no one was found who would undertake the office: and three days were spent in debates and excuses upon this point. For Pompey had declared, before his departure, that he should look upon those who staid behind in Rome equally guilty with those who were in Cæsar's camp⁹.

Ad Att. ix.
 7.

⁹ Cicero himself was not very forward to undertake the task of peace-making; and others might very well be backward: he writes thus to Atticus: "But, if Cæsar does not leave me at liberty to stand neuter, you advise me to declare myself publicly a mediator for an accommodation. No danger shall deter me from that: for, surrounded as I am with dangers, act how I will, why not expose myself to that which will do me the most honour? But I am afraid lest this should gall Pompey, and engage him to give me a very bad reception. For our friend affects strangely the domi-

Dio writes, that, having also assembled the people without the city, he harangued in the same strain, and promised to keep up plenty in Rome, by sending corn from Sicily and Sardinia, and to make a donative of three hundred sesterces to each of the poorer citizens; and that, in consequence of these pacific speeches, the Romans resumed the appearance of peace, which they had put off from the taking of Rimini; but were far from being easy. The great number of Cæsar's soldiers in the city; the little confidence to be put in a language which the circumstances of affairs might dictate; and the examples of Marius and Sylla, who had made as fair promises at first; all contributed to excite the anxiety and terror of the more deliberate and thoughtful.

Cæsar, finding that the senate was backward to take any resolution, and that his

nation of Sylla. I know what I say, and he has never made less a secret of any thing in his life, than he does of this. If such, say you, are his dispositions, would you follow him? Believe me, my friend, I follow him for the kindnesses he has done me, not as he is the head of a party. I befriend him as I did Milo, as I did —. Then, say you, you disapprove of his cause. No, it is an excellent one: but, remember what I say; he and his party will act scandalously. They will endeavour to starve Rome and Italy, then plunder and burn their country, and seize the properties of monied men.—If Pompey prevails, we will not leave in Italy one stone upon another.” And Ad Att. ix. 10. he says, “What threatnings against our free towns, against some of our patriots in particular, and against all those who staid behind! How frequent was that saying in Pompey's mouth, ‘Could Sylla do such a thing, and cannot I do it!’”

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

L. xli. p.
160.

About 2l.
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Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

enemies had engaged Metellus, one of the tribunes, to oppose his designs, was not willing to waste his time to no purpose; and he resolved not to commit the same error his enemies had been guilty of, in leaving behind them the public money. He therefore ordered the treasury to be broke open, and seized the money for his own use. Metellus had the boldness to attempt to obstruct him in this measure; and Cæsar is said to have treated him with unusual roughness; telling him that it was in vain to talk of laws in the midst of arms; and that he was master, not only of the money, but of the lives of all those whom he had conquered. The tribune, not being intimidated by these terrible words, and persisting in his opposition with the applause of some that were present, Cæsar threatened to kill him, adding: "Young man, consider it is harder for me to say it than to do it." Some people, says Plutarch, yet ventured to represent, that there was in the treasury a sacred fund, not to be employed but under the terror of a Gallic invasion: "I have entirely removed that scruple," replied Cæsar, "by subduing the Gauls." He found there, according to Pliny's computation, twenty-five thousand bars of gold, thirty-five thousand of silver, and forty millions of sesterces¹.

About
322,916l.

¹ Pliny has also related, l. xxxiii. 3, that Cæsar took out of the treasury fifteen hundred pounds of laser of Cyrene, a drug of great value among the ancients, and much esteemed by them, not only for medicinal use, but for sauce. This drug is, however, according to the opinion of

Cæsar left the city immediately after this necessary but unpopular step, and, as Curio told Cicero, much disturbed to see the people disgusted with it. He had resolved to speak to them before he set out, but he durst not venture upon it for fear of some affront: and hurried away much discomposed, having made a stay of only six or seven days.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

CHAP. IV.

*The reduction of Sardinia by Valerius, of Sicily by Curio,
and of Spain by Cæsar.*


CÆSAR, before he set out for Spain, committed the care of the city to the prætor L. Æmilius Lepidus, who was afterwards triumvir with Antony and Octavius: he appointed Antony to command the forces in Italy, named his brother C. Antonius to the government of Illyricum, and Licinius Crassus to that of Cisalpine Gaul. He also gave orders for the speedy fitting out of two fleets, the one to guard the coasts of the Adriatic, of which he made Dolabella admiral; the other, under the direction of Q. Hortensius², the son

an author much to be depended on in these matters, what we now call *assa foetida*, the taste and smell of which are scarce to be borne. The Orientals are to this day very fond of it. Crevier.

Geoffroi
Mat. Med.
t. ii. p. 606.

² Young Hortensius had been disinherited by his father, who left his great wealth to his wife Marcia. This lady had

Y. R. 704.
 Bef. Chr.
 48.
 403 Cons.



of the famous orator of that name, was to protect those of the Tuscan sea. He set at liberty, at the same time, the unfortunate Aristobulus, formerly king of the Jews, and sent him to Judea, to raise commotions there, and give disturbance to Scipio, who was gone to his province of Syria, to gather forces and money for Pompey.

Valerius and Curio had been appointed at Brundisium to pass over into Sardinia and Sicily ; and they now set out with Cæsar for the execution of his orders, in which they met with no opposition. The inhabitants of Calaris, now Cagliari, the principal town in Sardinia, no sooner heard of Valerius's commission, than they drove out Cotta ; who commanded there for Pompey, and who, finding the whole island in Cæsar's interest, fled precipitately into Africa.

Cato had been sent into Sicily by Pompey some weeks before he left Italy. On his ar-

been married before to Cato, by whom she had several children ; and was actually with child when he consented to let his friend have her. When she was a rich widow, Cato took her back again : which gave, says Plutarch, in Cat. an occasion to Cæsar to reproach him with covetousness and mercenary views. " For," said he, " if he wanted a wife, why did he part with her ? And, if he did not, why did he take her again ? Unless he gave her only as a bait to Hortensius ; and lent her when she was young, to have her again when she was rich." This behaviour of Cato did not inspire the young man with any zeal for his and Pompey's cause ; and though the father was a pillar of the aristocratical faction, it is no wonder to see the son employed on the popular side.

rival there, he applied himself with great diligence to gather forces for both the sea and land service. He refitted old ships and caused new ones to be built, and he ordered the several states of the island to furnish him with levies of horse and foot. He also sent his officers to raise troops in Lucania, and the country of the Brutii. But, perceiving that he was not to be supported by Pompey, and must trust entirely to his own strength, he did not think it expedient to defend his province: and, calling his officers together, he complained of Pompey, who, without any previous preparations, had involved the commonwealth in an unnecessary war; and who, when questioned by himself and others, in the senate, had assured them that he was in readiness to sustain it. Having declared, in this manner, his sentiments, he quitted the island on the approach of Curio. Cicero was much scandalized at this conduct, being persuaded that he might have held his possession without difficulty, and that all honest men would have flocked to him, especially when Pompey's fleet was so near to support him. "I wish," says he, "that Cotta may hold out Sardinia, as it is said he will; for, if so, how base will Cato's behaviour appear!" And he cites Curio, as being of this opinion, who, he says, confessed, that, if Pompey's fleet had appeared upon the coast and begun to act, he would himself have run away the first³.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib. i.

Ad Att. x.
4. 7. 16.

³ Plutarch in Cat. and Appian de Bell. Civ. l. ii. relate, that Asinius Pollio, having brought over some troops to

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

Cæs. de

Bell. Civ.

Com. lib. i.

Cæsar, on his arrival in Gaul, was informed that Pompey had sent Vibullius Rufus into Spain; who, not many days before, had been taken prisoner at Corfinium, and had been set at liberty; that L. Domitius, named by the senate to the government of Gaul, was expected at Marseilles; and that, to prepare the way for his reception, the Massilian deputies in Rome, young men of the first quality, had been sent home by Pompey, before he left the city; and had been exhorted by him to remain in their ancient attachment and fidelity to the senate, and not to suffer the memory of his past services to their country to be blotted out by those they had since received from Cæsar. The inhabitants of Marseilles, in consequence of these remonstrances, had determined to shut their gates against Cæsar, and called to their aid the Albici, a barbarous people, who had long been under their protection, and inhabited the adjoining mountains. They laid in stores of provisions, set up workshops for the making

Messana before Curio's arrival, Cato sent to him to inquire, by whose authority, whether of the senate or the people, he had landed in his province: that Pollio answered, it was by the authority of him who was master in Italy: that Cato, at the same time, being informed that Pompey had really sailed for Dyrrachium, said he could easily drive Pollio out of Sicily; but, as greater forces were coming to join him, he would not engage the island in a war; and after complaining, not of Pompey, as Cæsar relates, but of the gods, who gave Pompey success in every foolish and dishonest enterprise, and now abandoned him when he was defending his country, he advised the people of Syracuse to submit to Curio, and provide for their own safety.

of arms, refitted their navy, repaired their walls and gates, and neglected nothing to put their town in a state of defence.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

The government of the city was aristocratical, the whole power being in the hands of a senate consisting of six hundred nobles who held their places for life: but out of this number there was formed a council of fifteen for the execution of the laws and dispatch of business. Cæsar sent for these, and exhorted them to follow the example and authority of all Italy, which was now in his interest, rather than the will of one particular person and his adherents. The counsellors, returning into the city, assembled the senate on this important occasion, which sent back the following answer: "That they saw that the Romans were divided into two parties, and that it did not belong to them to decide the quarrel. That at the head of these parties were Pompey and Cæsar, both patrons of their city; the first having added to its dominion the country of the Volcæ-Arecomici and Helvii; the other that of the Salyæ; and that, as they were equally indebted to both, it did not become them to assist the one against the other; but to remain in a state of neutrality, and to grant to neither an admittance into their town or port."

Strabo, l. iv.
p. 179.

This answer had just been given, when Domitius arrived at Marseilles, with a fleet of seven gallies, which he had manned with the slaves, freedmen, and peasants, who belonged to his lands in Tuscany. He was received,

Y. P. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

however, into the town, was appointed its governor, and charged with the administration of the war; and by his order the Massilian fleet was sent out immediately to sail along the coast, that it might seize and bring in all the merchant-vessels it could find; in order that they might be made fit for service, or taken to pieces to repair others. Cæsar was incensed at these proceedings, and, being sensible of the consequence of leaving behind him in the interest of his enemies a city which was the key of Gaul, he resolved to lay siege to it directly both by sea and land. He appointed three legions for this purpose, and at the same time that he prepared towers and other works for the approaches by land, he had twelve gallies built at Arles; which, being completed and brought down the Rhone to Marseilles in thirty days, he gave the command of them to Decimus Brutus, and charged C. Trebonius with the conduct of the siege.

The employment Cæsar found so unexpectedly at Marseilles delayed not his Spanish expedition. While preparations were making for the siege, he sent C. Fabius, with three legions that were quartered near Narbonne, to take possession of the passes of the Pyrenees, which were guarded by a party of Afranius's troops: and this commander, having forced these, advanced by long marches towards the main army. Pompey had three lieutenants in Spain, Afranius, Petreius, and Varro: the first of these was at the head of three legions in the Nearer Spain: the other

two, reckoning their new levies, had each two legions. Petreius commanded from the Castilian forest to the Anas: Varro from the Anas quite through Lusitania and the territories of the Vettones. These lieutenants, upon the arrival of Vibullius Rufus, had consulted together, and agreed, that Petreius should join Afranius with his two legions, and that Varro should remain in Further Spain and secure that province. They raised with all diligence eighty cohorts among the Spaniards, and five thousand horse; and determined to make Ilerda the seat of the war, on account of its convenient situation, upon a rising ground, twenty miles from the Iberus, between the rivers Sicoris and Cinga.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.


Lerida.

Segre.

Cæsar sent after Fabius what other legions he had in Gaul not employed at the siege of Marseilles; which could not be more than two, unless he brought from Italy the three with which he had made himself master of it. To these legions he added six thousand auxiliary foot, and three thousand horse, who had served under him in all his former wars; and he was now furnished with as many more. For, having heard that Pompey was coming with his whole force through Mauritania into Spain⁴, he sent circular letters to all the Gallic states, inviting by name those of the

⁴ It was reported at this time in Italy, that Pompey, at the head of a great army, had passed through Illyria into Germany: and this news, says Cicero, is grounded upon indisputable authority. Ad Att. x. 9.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



most known and approved valour, and, in particular, a select body of mountaineers from Aquitania, where it borders upon the Roman province. And to assure himself the better of the fidelity of both officers and soldiers in his army, he borrowed sums of money of all his tribunes and centurions; which he distributed among the soldiers; by that means engaging his officers by their own interest, and the soldiers by his liberality. He soon followed himself, with nine hundred horse, which he had kept for a body-guard.

Fabius, before Cæsar's arrival, had left nothing unattempted for gaining the country round about to his party by his letters and ambassadors. He had already laid two bridges over the Sicoris, four miles distant from each other, for the convenience of foraging, having consumed all the pasture on his side of the river. Pompey's generals did the same, and with the same view; which occasioned frequent skirmishes between the horse. It happened, one day, that two of Fabius's legions, going out to guard the foragers, according to custom, had passed the river, and, the carriages and cavalry endeavouring to follow after, the bridge broke down on a sudden, and prevented them from joining the foot. This Afranius and Petreius perceiving, by the hurdles and other materials that came swimming down with the stream, immediately detached four legions, with all their cavalry, to attack the two legions. L. Plancus, who commanded the foraging guard, seized a

rising ground, and, forming his men in two divisions, posted them back to back, and so made a double front to prevent their being surrounded by the enemy's horse. By this disposition, though inferior in number, he was enabled to sustain the furious charge of the Pompeian legions and cavalry, till the colours of two legions, which Fabius sent over by the further bridge to the assistance of his party, were descried at a distance. Their approach put an end to the engagement, and both armies returned to their several camps.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Two days after this engagement, Cæsar arrived in the camp⁵: and he ordered the bridge that had broke down to be instantly repaired. The next day he took a view of the country, and, leaving six cohorts to guard the bridge and the camp, he marched with the rest of his forces in three lines to Ilerda and stopped near Afranius's camp, where he remained under arms, and offered him battle on an even ground. Afranius drew out his troops and formed them half-way down the hill. Cæsar, finding that he declined an engagement upon equal terms, resolved to encamp within four hundred paces of the foot of the mountain; and, to hinder his troops from being alarmed or interrupted in their works by sudden incursions from the enemy, he ordered the soldiers of the third line, while those

⁵ Cæsar arrived at Marseilles before the end of the month of April: (Ad Att. x. 10.) and he seems to have reached his army in Spain before the end of the month of May.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.


of the first and second continued in order of battle, to cut a ditch fifteen feet broad behind them, without throwing up a rampart, which would have been perceived by the enemy. Thus the front of his camp was secured by a ditch, before Afranius had the least suspicion of his design to encamp so near him. In the evening he made the legions file off by the two ends of the ditch, and brought them behind it, where he passed the whole night under arms. The day after, he carried his entrenchments quite round the camp: and, because materials for a rampart must have been fetched from a great distance, he contented himself for the present with a naked ditch; allotting a legion to each side of the camp, and keeping the rest of the troops under arms to cover those employed in the works. The Pompeian generals came down with their troops as far as the bottom of the mountain, and threatened to give battle. But Cæsar, trusting to the three legions under arms, and the defence of his ditch, did not call off his workmen; and Afranius, not venturing to come farther into the plain, after a short stay wheeled off with his men. The third day, Cæsar added a rampart to his fortifications, and sent orders to the cohorts he had left behind, to decamp, and come up to him.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib. i.

Between the city of Ilerda and the hill, where Petreius and Afranius were encamped, there was a plain of about three hundred paces; in the midst of which was a rising

ground: and Cæsar perceived, that, by the means of this post, it would be easy for him to deprive the enemy of the conveniency of their bridge, and their communication with the city, from whence they furnished themselves with all their subsistence. In order to get possession of it, he drew out three legions, and, having formed them in order of battle, commanded the foremost of them to run before and gain the place. Afranius, seeing his design, dispatched, by a nearer way, the cohorts that were upon guard to the same eminence. The fight was sharply maintained on both sides: but Afranius's men, who first got possession, obliged those of Cæsar to give ground; and, being reinforced by fresh supplies, put them at last to the rout, and forced them to fly for shelter to the legions. Cæsar ascribes the advantage which Afranius's troops had over his on this occasion to their manner of fighting. It was their method to come forward briskly against an enemy, and boldly possess themselves of some post; neither taking care to preserve their ranks, nor holding it necessary to fight in a close compact body; and, if they found themselves hard pressed, they thought it no dishonour to retire. In these particulars they followed the example of the Lusitani and the other barbarous nations of Spain. This manner of fighting, as it was new and unexpected, disordered Cæsar's men, who, seeing the enemy come forward without regard to order, were apprehensive of being surrounded, while they

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

43.

403 Cons.

were obliged to maintain their ranks, and not to abandon their ensigns.

Caesar, contrary to his expectation, finding the consternation like to spread through the whole army, encouraged his men, and, leading on himself the ninth legion to the assistance of those that fled, he soon put a stop to the vigorous and insulting pursuit of the enemy, obliged them in their turn to give way, and pursued them to the very walls of Ilerda. But the soldiers, elated with success, and eager to repair the loss they had sustained, followed the runaways with so much impetuosity, that they were drawn into a disadvantageous place, and found themselves directly under the hill where the town stood; whence, when they endeavoured to retire, the enemy, facing about, charged them vigorously from the higher ground. The hill was rough and steep on each side, and the spot, where they stood, was so narrow, that only three cohorts could be drawn up in front, which could be neither reinforced in flank nor protected by the cavalry. The enemy's forces increased every moment, fresh cohorts being sent from the camp through the town, to relieve those that were fatigued: and Caesar was obliged to detach also small parties to maintain the battle, and bring off the wounded.


The fight had lasted five hours, without intermission, when Caesar's men, pressed by the multitude of the enemy, and having spent their darts, attacked the cohorts on the hill.

sword in hand, and, bearing down a few, obliged the rest to betake themselves to flight. The pursuit was continued to the very walls of Ilerda, and, a part of the enemy taking shelter within the town, Cæsar's men had an opportunity of making good their retreat. At the same time the cavalry found means to gain the summit of the mountain, and, riding between both armies, hindered the enemy from harassing the rear. Thus the engagement was attended with various turns of fortune; and both sides, of consequence, laid claim to the victory: Cæsar's soldiers, because they had bravely maintained themselves for five hours in a disadvantageous post, and had, at last, driven the enemy into the town; and Afranius's soldiers, because they had kept possession of the hill which had occasioned the battle. The loss on both sides was but inconsiderable for so long and so fierce a contention. Cæsar lost the first centurion of the hastati of the fourteenth legion, with about seventy men: and above six hundred were wounded. On the other side were slain five centurions and above two hundred soldiers. Afranius, made sensible of the great importance of the disputed post, caused the place to be fortified, and placed in it a strong garrison for its defence.

This engagement was followed, two days after, by an accident, which brought Cæsar's whole army into the greatest distress and danger. A violent storm of rain, and the melted snow from the mountains, made the

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



Sicoris overflow its banks, and break down, in the same day, the two bridges which Fabius had erected over it. Thus Cæsar found himself shut up in a compass of thirty miles, between two rivers, neither of which was fordable. The states that had declared for him could supply him with no provisions: the troops sent beyond the river to forage could not return to the camp; and the convoys he expected from Gaul and Italy could not get to him. It was almost harvest-time, and for that reason corn was become very scarce, and the more so, as Afranius had carried great quantities of it into Ilerda, and the rest had been consumed by Cæsar's troops. The cattle, which were the next resource in the present want, had been removed to a distance by the neighbouring nations, upon the breaking out of the war. The parties sent out to get provisions in the country that lay behind the camp, were perpetually harassed by the Spanish infantry, who, being accustomed to pass the rivers on blown-up skins, pursued them every-where.

Cæsar endeavoured to repair his bridges, but to no purpose: the river was deep and rapid, and the enemy, stationed along the opposite bank, showered their darts upon the spot where the men attempted to work. While things were in this posture, a large convoy from Gaul arrived on the other bank of the river, at some distance above Cæsar's camp. It consisted of archers from the Rutheni, some Gallic horse, with many carts, and

much baggage, and about six thousand men of all sorts, with their domestics and slaves, who, being apprehensive of no danger, kept no order or discipline in their march. There were likewise along with it many young noblemen, senators' sons, and Roman knights, with the deputies from the states of Gaul, and some of Cæsar's lieutenants. Afranius, apprised of their arrival, set out in the night with three legions and all his cavalry; and, sending the horse before, attacked them, when they least expected it. The Gallic squadrons, forming themselves with great expedition, began the fight; and, though few in number, comparatively with the enemy, maintained their ground, and gave the rest of the convoy time to repair to the neighbouring mountains; whither they also retreated, as soon as they saw the legions advancing towards them. They lost only two hundred archers, a few troopers, and some servants and baggage.

This event served to enhance the price of provisions: a calamity inseparable from present scarcity, and the prospect of future want. Corn was sold at fifty denarii a bushel: the soldiers began to lose their strength, and, the evil increasing every moment, Cæsar dismissed all the useless mouths. Afranius, on the contrary, abounded in all things: he had large magazines of corn, was continually receiving fresh supplies, and had plenty of forage.

These circumstances were greatly exaggerated by Afranius and Petreius in their letters

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

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Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

to Rome, where most people concluding, that the war was almost at an end, made public congratulations to the relations of the two generals on their great success. Many also of the nobility left Italy in order to join Pompey; some to carry the first accounts of this grateful news, others that they might not be so late as to subject themselves to the reproach of having waited for the event of things. Among the rest, Servius Sulpicius and C. Marcellus probably put to sea on this occasion, and, perhaps, Cicero himself; for intelligence of the battle of Ilerda, and of Cæsar's distress, might very well have reached him before the eleventh of June.

The joy of Pompey's party was but short. Cæsar, seeing no possibility of repairing the bridges, gave orders for the building some of that sort of vessels, the use whereof he had learned in his British expedition. The keel and ribs of these boats were of light wood, and the rest of osier covered over with leather. When he had got a sufficient number, he sent them by night in waggons to a place twenty-two miles distant from his camp. There having embarked a good number of his soldiers, and carried them over the river, he took possession of a hill on the other side; threw up a fortification and posted a legion in it before the enemy thought of obstructing him: and here, in two days' time, he laid a bridge over the Sicoris, by which means he recovered his foragers, secured the convoy, and opened a passage for future supplies.

The change of fortune was sudden and great. Cæsar being much superior in cavalry, the enemy was now reduced to confine their foraging within the neighbourhood of their camp; and to detach parties for that purpose in the night. Six considerable states also⁶ declared themselves in his favour, and agreed to furnish him with provisions. A cohort composed from one of them, which served under Afranius, deserted to him upon hearing the resolution of their countrymen. The other provinces more distant, seeing the rumour industriously spread of Pompey's march through Mauritania quite extinguished, renounced also their engagements with Afranius, and besought Cæsar's friendship.

The bridge over the Sicoris was twenty-two miles from the camp, which obliged the cavalry to take this compass, when they went to forage: and Cæsar, to remedy this inconvenience, undertook to make the river fordable by turning its water into canals, thirty feet deep. When the work was almost completed, Petreius and Afranius, perceiving that they would be soon cut off from their provisions by a cavalry so superior to their own, took the resolution to carry the war into Celtiberia, a province where Pompey's fame was great, and where they expected to make new levies of horse and foot. They proposed by taking possession of some strong post to protract the war till winter.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

⁶ The Oscenses, Calagurritani, Tarraconenses, Jacetani, Ausetani, and Illurgavonenses.

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

In order to execute this plan, they got together all the boats they could on the Iberus, and carried them to Octogesa, a town upon that river, about twenty miles from their camp. There they caused a bridge of boats to be made; and, having sent two legions over the Sicoris to fortify a camp with a rampart of twelve feet, they prepared to follow with the rest of their army.

Cæsar, informed of this motion by his scouts, laboured day and night at his drains, and lowered the water in the Sicoris to that degree that the cavalry could pass without difficulty; but it still took the infantry up to the shoulders, a depth, which, joined to the rapidity of the stream, seemed to render it impassable to them. On the other side, Afranius, seeing Cæsar's works in such forwardness, and having notice that the bridge over the Iberus was perfected, lost no time, but, leaving two auxiliary cohorts in Ilerda, he crossed the Sicoris with all his forces, and joined the two legions he had sent before. Cæsar had no means of stopping their march, but by harassing them with his cavalry; for he could not send his foot soon enough over his bridge, the distance was so great.

He ordered therefore his horse to pass the river, and they soon came up with Afranius, who had decamped at midnight. At break of day their motions were easily descried from the hills near the camp. They pressed extremely the enemy's rear, disordered their ranks, and obliged them to halt: then the co-

horts facing about forced the cavalry to give ground; who, as soon as they began to march, renewed the attack. At this sight the legionary soldiers, running up and down the camp, loudly complained, that the enemy would escape, and that the war would be unnecessarily protracted: and they desired their officers to assure Cæsar, that they feared neither danger nor fatigue, and were ready to pass the river as the horse had done. Cæsar, moved by their alacrity, though he saw some danger in exposing his army in a deep and rapid stream, yet resolved to make a trial of the passage. Having first drawn from every company such as were weak of body, he left them with one legion to guard the camp. Then disposing a double line of cavalry above and below the ford, he carried over all his soldiers without the loss of one man. Those, who were borne down by the violence of the current, were saved by the horse below them. Cæsar began the pursuit without delay, marching in three lines; and such was the ardour of the soldiers, that, though they were forced to go six miles about, and had lost a great deal of time in passing the river, they came up with the enemy at three o'clock in the afternoon.

Afranius and Petreius, intimidated by an approach so sudden and unexpected, halted on an eminence, and put their troops in order of battle. Cæsar kept his in the plain, being unwilling to hazard an action till his army had recovered their fatigue. But, the moment that the two generals began again to move on, he

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

followed: and thus forced them to encamp much sooner than they intended. They took up their quarters in a range of mountains to avoid the insults of the cavalry; and, having placed parties in all the passes to stop Cæsar's progress, hoped by this means to get off safe to the Iberus. This, says Cæsar, was their great object, and what, above all things, they should have endeavoured to effect: but, being fatigued by a long march, and their continual skirmishes with the horse, they imprudently deferred it till the next day. Cæsar likewise encamped on a hill not far from them.

About midnight, however, Cæsar's cavalry, having picked up some soldiers of the enemy, who had ventured too far from the camp in quest of water, were informed by them that Pompey's lieutenants had altered their resolution, and were decamping in deep silence. Immediately he ordered the alarm to be sounded, and the signal given for marching: which engaged the enemy to delay their retreat, as they would have had greatly the disadvantage in a nocturnal march, both on account of their heavy baggage, and the superiority of Cæsar's cavalry. Next day, Petreius went out with a party of horse to take a view of the country: and Decidius Saxa⁷ was detached by Cæsar

⁷ This Decidius Saxa was afterwards advanced by Cæsar to be tribune of the people, at which Cicero was much scandalized. In his thirteenth Philippic he says, "How can I omit this Decidius Saxa, a man brought from the farthest end of the world; whom we see tribune of the people, before we ever saw him a citizen."


with a squadron for the same purpose. Both made the like report, in their several camps, that the country for five miles together was level and open, but after that rough and mountainous; and that whichever army first got possession of the defiles might easily prevent the other from approaching.

Afranius and Petreius called a council of war to debate whether they should depart that night, or wait till the morning. The greater number were for setting out in the dark, in hopes of reaching the defiles before Cæsar could have notice of their departure. Others argued against the possibility of decamping privately: they mentioned "the alarm given in Cæsar's camp the night before; and observed, that the enemy's cavalry were continually patrolling in the night, and had beset all the ways and passes; that a nocturnal engagement was to be avoided, because in a civil war the soldiers were more apt to listen to their fears, than to the obligations of the military oath; that shame, and the presence of the tribunes and centurions, the great instruments of obedience and military duty, could have their proper effect only in the light; and that therefore they should make their attempt by day; in which case, if they received a disaster, or small loss, yet the bulk of the army would escape, and be able to possess themselves of the post in question." These reasons prevailed, and it was resolved to set out the next morning by break of day.

But Cæsar got the start of them, and marched

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Y. R. 704.
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48.
403 Cons.




with his legions as soon as it was light, taking a considerable circuit, and following no particular route : for the direct way to the Iberus by Octogesa lay through the enemy's camp. He was obliged therefore to lead his men through deep valleys, and over steep rocks, which they could not climb, but by disencumbering themselves of their arms, and returning them afterwards to one another. The soldiers, however, in the hopes of putting speedily a period to their labours, went on joyfully. As in this march Cæsar's army seemed to turn their backs, and pursued at first an opposite course, Afranius's soldiers, elated with this appearance, came forth from their camp, and insulted them on their supposed flight, imagining that the want of provisions forced them to return to Ilerda. Their generals applauded themselves upon the resolution they had taken of not decamping in the night ; and were confirmed in the notion of Cæsar's retreat, when they saw that he had neither baggage nor carriages, which made them conclude that the scarcity must be exceeding great. But when they perceived his men soon after turn to the right, and that his advanced guard had already gained the ground beyond their camp, all immediately ran to arms, and, leaving a few cohorts to guard the baggage, they sallied out in a body, pursuing their way directly to the Iberus.

All depended now upon dispatch. The difficulty of the ways was a great hindrance to Cæsar's troops ; but his cavalry in return

greatly incommoded the soldiers of Afranius ; who, though he should succeed in getting first to the defiles, was yet certain of losing his baggage, and the cohorts which were left to guard it in the camp. But Cæsar outmarched him, such was the vigour and alacrity of his men ; and, having got into the plain beyond the rocks, formed his legions in order of battle. The two generals, perceiving the enemy's infantry in front, and being attacked by his cavalry in their rear, halted upon a rising ground, from whence they detached four Spanish cohorts to take possession of the highest mountain that appeared in sight ; thinking to open to themselves a way over the hills to Octogesa. The Spaniards, wheeling obliquely to take possession of the place, were perceived by Cæsar's cavalry, who, charging them furiously, broke them at the first onset, and surrounded and cut them to pieces in the view of both armies.

Cæsar had now a most favourable opportunity of giving his enemy a total overthrow ; and he was sensible they could make but a faint resistance under their present consternation, surrounded on all sides as they were by his cavalry, and obliged to fight on an open and even ground. His officers, gathering round him, earnestly begged that he would not delay the engagement : they represented, “ that the soldiers were eager for a battle, and that Afranius's army had given many marks of fear : for they had neither dared to support their own detachment, nor come down the

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

hill: and they had brought all their ensigns into one place, where they crowded confusedly round them, without observing rank or order." They added, "that, if he thought the enemy too advantageously posted, he would soon have an opportunity of attacking them in another place more favourable, the want of water laying them under a necessity of changing their camp." But Cæsar having cut them off from all provisions, was confident that he had it now in his power to reduce them without bloodshed: and he thought it better to gain the victory by his conduct, than by the force of arms. He therefore retired to a small distance, to give Afranius an opportunity to regain his camp: and then, placing troops in the mountains to guard all the passages to the Iberus, he lodged himself as near as he could to the enemy.


The next day, while Pompey's lieutenants were in council debating what measures they should follow, whether to return to Ilerda, or march to Tarraco, notice was given them, that Cæsar's cavalry had fallen upon the parties sent out in quest of water, and pressed them hard. Upon this intelligence, which called for all their attention, they immediately formed several corps of horse and foot intermixed with legionary cohorts, and began to throw up a rampart from the camp to the place where they watered. Afranius and Petreius divided this work between them, and went in person to direct it.

In the mean time, the soldiers of the two


armies had an opportunity of conferring together; and those who belonged to Afranius and Petreius thanked Cæsar's troops for the generosity they had shewed in sparing them the day before, and testified their concern at being obliged to fight with their countrymen and relations. They then inquired, if they could trust to Cæsar's clemency, and even promised to join him, if the lives of Petreius and Afranius were granted them: and they sent some of their principal officers to treat with Cæsar. These preliminaries being settled, the soldiers of both armies went to one another's tents, and a great number of centurions and military tribunes came to pay their court to Cæsar, and to beg his protection. The Spanish chiefs, who had been summoned to attend upon Afranius, and were detained in the camp as hostages, followed their example. Things were carried to such a length, that Afranius's son, a young man, treated with Cæsar, by the mediation of Sulpicius, for his own and his father's preservation. The joy was general; the Afranians thought themselves happy to have escaped such imminent danger; and the Cæsarians to have brought to a happy conclusion so important an enterprise without striking a blow. Cæsar, in the judgment of all, was upon the point of reaping the fruits of his clemency, and all unanimously applauded his late conduct.

Afranius, informed of what was transacting, quitted the work he was engaged in, and returned to the camp, not at all disturbed, and

Y. R. 704.
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48.
403 Cons.



Y. R. 704.
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


prepared for all events : but Petreius discovered a very different spirit. He armed his slaves, and, joining to them a prætorian cohort and some Spanish cavalry, he flew to the rampart, and broke off the conferences of the soldiers, drove Cæsar's men out of the camp, and put all of them he could find to the sword. Those of them who had an opportunity to rally, wrapping their cloaks round their left arms, drew their swords ; and, trusting to the nearness of their camp, defended themselves till they gradually retreated to the advanced guard, who screened them from any further pursuit.

Then Petreius went through the whole camp, begging the troops, with tears in his eyes, to have pity on him and on Pompey their general, and not to deliver them up to the cruel vengeance of their enemies. The soldiers followed him to the head-quarters ; and there he proposed to them to bind themselves by a new oath, not to abandon their commanders, nor to act separately, but with concert and unanimity for the public good. He himself took the oath first, then tendered it to Afranius, then to the military tribunes and centurions ; and, lastly, to all the companies of the army. At the same time an order was issued, that all who had any of Cæsar's troops in their tents should produce them, in order that they might be put to death in the sight of the whole army. A few obeyed ; but the greatest part, detesting this bloody decree, carefully concealed those who were under their protection, and procured them means to escape in the

night. However, the terror impressed upon them by their generals, the severity shewn in punishing, and the new oath they had been obliged to take, defeated, for the present, all hopes of a surrender, and reduced the war to its former state. Cæsar, on his side, ordered diligent search to be made after the Afranians who had remained in his camp, and carefully sent them back. Some officers chose to stay with him; and these he afterwards treated with great distinction, promoting them to higher ranks, and honouring such of them as were Roman knights with the office of military tribune.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



The army of Afranius had now no forage, and could not water but with much difficulty. The legionary soldiers, who had been ordered to take with them two and twenty days' provision, had some corn remaining: but the Spanish infantry and auxiliary troops had none: and, having no opportunity of supplying themselves, they deserted in great numbers to Cæsar. In this extremity, the expedient of returning to Ilerda appeared the safest, as they had still some provisions in that city; and there they proposed to consult concerning the future management of the war. Tarraco was at a greater distance, and they would of consequence be exposed to greater hazards in the way. This resolution being taken, they decamped; and Cæsar followed, sending his cavalry before, which perpetually harassed the rear of the enemy. The manner of fighting was thus: some light-armed cohorts formed

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Bef. Chr.

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
403 Cons.

the rear-guard of Afranius's army ; and these, where the ground was even, halted from time to time, and made head against the cavalry. When they fell in with an eminence, the very nature of the ground furnished them with the means of defending themselves ; because those who were foremost could protect those who followed. When they came, however, to a descent, the van could give no assistance to the rear, and the cavalry annoyed them with their darts. To avoid this inconveniency, the legions halted, and, driving back the cavalry a good way, ran down the hill precipitately, and traversed the valley until they came to the opposite eminence. Their cavalry, which should have been of great use in this retreat, and of which they had a considerable number, were so terrified by their ill success in former engagements, that they had been placed in the midst of the army, in order to be defended by the infantry ; and, if any of them dared to straggle out of this situation, they were immediately taken by Cæsar's horse.

During these perpetual skirmishes, in which the Afranians were often obliged to stop to disengage the rear, their march could not but be very slow. After advancing four miles, finding themselves hard pressed by the cavalry, they halted on an eminence, and drew a line before them, as if they meant to encamp ; but did not unload their baggage : and when they saw that Cæsar had marked out his camp, pitched his tents, and sent his cavalry to forage, they suddenly, towards noon, resumed

their march, hoping to be rid of the cavalry for some time. Cæsar, leaving a few cohorts to guard his baggage, followed with his legions, and sent orders for his cavalry to return with all speed. The cavalry observed his orders, and, coming up with the enemy before the close of day, fell upon their rear with such impetuosity that it was almost put to the rout. A great number of soldiers, and some centurions, lost their lives. At the same time Cæsar appearing with his whole army, the enemy were threatened with a total overthrow, as they could neither continue their march, nor look out for a proper place for a camp. They were forced to halt in a very disadvantageous ground, and at a distance from water. Cæsar, constant in his purpose, did not offer to attack them, but kept all his troops under arms to be in readiness to pursue, if they should attempt to escape either in the day or night. Pompey's lieutenants, sensible of the disadvantage of their situation, employed the whole night in throwing up intrenchments, and in disposing their camp with an opposite front to Cæsar's army. The next day they continued at their works, and laboured from sunrise to the evening. But the farther they extended their lines in order to better their position, the farther they removed from water: and thus, to avoid one inconveniency, they fell into a greater. Cæsar, who wanted to oblige them to capitulate, by reducing them to extreme necessity, drew lines round their camp; and by this method he offered an obstruction to

Y. R. 704.
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403 Cons.



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
403 Cons.

any sallies or eruptions which they might make. The scarcity of forage, and the view of performing their march with the greater expedition, soon induced them to kill all the beasts of burden which they could not feed: and two days were wasted in forming and executing this resolution. But, on the third, Afranius and Petreius, seeing Cæsar's works very much advanced, and being apprehensive of the consequences, drew all their forces out of the camp, and formed them in order of battle. Cæsar, aware of the hurt it might do his reputation, if, contrary to the inclination of his troops, and the general expectation, he still continued to decline an engagement, called in his workmen, assembled his cavalry, and put his army in a condition to receive them. He resolved, however, to remain upon the defensive; and the rather, because the distance between the two camps was so small, being only two thousand feet, that, should he put the enemy to the rout, he could not flatter himself with the hopes of a complete victory.

Afranius's troops were ranged in a double line, consisting of five legions: the Spanish cohorts, which used to be stationed in the wings, formed the body of reserve. Cæsar's legions were drawn up in three lines: the first consisted of twenty cohorts, four out of each of his legions; the second of fifteen cohorts, three out of each legion; and the third of the same number. The archers and slingers were disposed in the middle, and the cavalry in the two wings. The army being drawn up in

this manner, each general kept firm to his resolution; Cæsar, not to engage unless forced to it; and Afranius to prevent the progress of Cæsar's works. In this posture they continued till sun-set, when both armies returned to their several camps. The next day Cæsar proposed to finish his lines; and Pompey's lieutenants endeavoured to find a fordable place in the Sicoris; but Cæsar had taken his measures against this attempt, and had sent his light-armed Germans with part of his cavalry over the river, and posted bodies of troops along the banks at a small distance from one another.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



The two generals, having now no hope left, and being in want of wood, water, and corn, they demanded a parley, and begged that it might be in some place out of the sight of the soldiers. Cæsar consented to an interview, but the latter part of their request was denied them: and Afranius, having first given his son for an hostage, met Cæsar in the presence of both armies. He addressed them to this effect, with all possible marks of submission: "that it was no just matter of blame, either in him or his soldiers, to have preserved their fidelity to their general Pompey; but that they had now sufficiently acquitted themselves of their duty, and suffered enough in his cause by the want of all kinds of necessaries: that, like wild beasts caught in a toil, they were deprived of the most common enjoyments; having their bodies oppressed with want, and their minds overwhelmed with ignominy; and that there-

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.


48.

403 Cons.

fore they acknowledged themselves to be vanquished, and besought and conjured him not to make a rigorous use of his victory, but to spare the lives of his unhappy countrymen." Cæsar replied, " that Afranius, of all men, had the least reason to complain of his present unfortunate situation, and the least pretensions to any favour; for that every one else had performed their duty; he himself, in declining to attack his army, though favoured by the advantages of time and place, in order that the way might be open to an accommodation: his army, in returning unhurt the men that were in their power, after injuries received, and the massacre of their comrades: and even Afranius's own troops, in endeavouring to conclude a peace whereon the common safety depended. That thus, when all orders had shewn an inclination to treat, Afranius and Petreius alone had opposed the steps to an accommodation; refusing an interview, and barbarously murdering those whom the faith of a conference had inticed into their camp. That it had therefore happened to them, as it often happens to men of obstinacy and arrogance: and they were forced to have recourse to prayers, and earnestly to solicit the same terms which they had rejected with scorn. That he would not, however, take advantage of their present submission, or the favourable circumstances he was in, to insist upon any thing tending to the increase of his power: and that he only requested they would disband those troops which had been so long kept

on foot against him: for with what other view (he said) had six legions been sent into Spain; a seventh levied there; so many powerful navies equipped; and so many able and experienced officers sent over? That such mighty preparations could not be meant against Spain, or to supply the want of a province, which, having enjoyed a long peace, had no occasion for such extraordinary forces: that their real end was his destruction; to effect which, a new species of power had been introduced into the commonwealth; and that, on this account, the same man had been appointed to command in Italy at the gates of Rome, and to hold for so many years, though absent, the government of the two most potent provinces of the republic. That, for this reason alone, the magistrates had been stripped of their prerogatives, the consuls and prætors not being suffered, as had been always the custom, to take the different provinces at the expiration of their offices; and particular governors were appointed by the choice and management of a faction. That, for this reason alone, he had been denied that justice which had never been refused to any general before him; and was not allowed to disband his army, and to return home with honour; or, at least, without ignominy, after having successfully served the public. That all these injuries he had hitherto borne, and still resolved to bear with patience; that it was not now his design to take from Afranius his soldiers, and to enlist them in his own service, which it would be easy for

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



Y. R. 703.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.



him to do; and that he only meant to prevent their being employed against him. That, therefore, Afranius must quit Spain, and disband his forces; that this was his determined resolution: and that these were the only terms of peace he would grant."

These conditions were very agreeable to Afranius's soldiers; who, instead of being punished, as they feared, were, in some sort, rewarded by the discharge procured them. They plainly shewed their satisfaction: for, while the place and time of their dismissal were under debate between Cæsar and Afranius, they signified by their gestures and cries from the rampart, that they desired to be immediately disbanded. After some discussion, it was determined that those who had houses and possessions in Spain should be discharged upon the spot, and the rest, when they arrived at the Varus, a river between Gaul and Italy. And Cæsar declared, that no person should be injured or forced into his service: and that all those who had lost any thing during the war should be indemnified. He also engaged to furnish them with corn till they got to the Varus. By this generous behaviour, he acquired the confidence of Pompey's army to such a degree, that he became the arbiter of all their disputes, either among themselves, or with their commanders: and when they were ready to mutiny about their pay, which Petreius and Afranius affirmed not to be yet due, the matter was referred to him, and he determined it to the equal satisfaction of both

The Var.

parties. One third of the army was disbanded during the two days they continued in their camp: the rest set out for the Varus, two of Cæsar's legions marching before, and the others following after, and encamping near them. Q. Fuscus Calenus, one of Cæsar's lieutenants, presided over the march; and, when he arrived at the Varus, disbanded them; but the greatest part of them came over voluntarily to Cæsar: the two generals went to find out Pompey.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Thus did Cæsar, within forty days from his arrival in Spain, with five legions, and some auxiliary Gauls, reduce an army of five legions of veterans, eighty cohorts of Spaniards, and five thousand horse: and now many reasons called upon him to return into Italy; but he did not think it adviseable to leave Spain, till he had subjected the whole country to his obedience. M. Varro commanded two legions in Further Spain, to which he had added thirty auxiliary cohorts: and he had formed great magazines of corn, not only for his own use, but with a view also of supplying Mar-seilles, and the army under Afranius and Petreius. The Gaditani had been ordered to furnish him with ten ships of war, and more had been built at Hispalis. He had put all his provisions into Gades, and had conveyed thither all the money and ornaments which he had found in the temple of Hercules: and, to guard this town, he gave it a garrison of six cohorts, under the command of C. Gallonius, a Roman knight. This commander had

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib. i.

The people
of Cadiz.

Seville.

Cadiz.

Y. R. 704.
 Ref. Chr.
 48.
 403 Cons.

spoken upon every occasion with contempt of Cæsar's forces, and had frequently declared from his tribunal, that Cæsar had been worsted, and that his soldiers had gone over to Afranius. By these arts, he had struck such a terror into the Roman citizens who resided in his province, that he engaged them to promise him one hundred and ninety thousand sesterces, twenty thousand weight of silver, with one hundred and twenty thousand bushels of wheat. The states well affected to Cæsar he loaded with heavy impositions, and quartered soldiers upon them: he harassed private men whom he thought averse to his cause with arbitrary judgments: he confiscated the estates of many, whom he accused of having spoken against what he called the commonwealth: and he obliged the whole province to take an oath of fidelity to himself and Pompey. Cæsar, who seems to give an account of this general's behaviour with a particular resentment, tells us, that in the beginning of the civil war, while his affairs went on successfully in Italy, Varro^s had affected to speak of him with great regard, and in a most friendly manner, saying, "that indeed he was under particular obligations to Pompey, who had made him his lieutenant, but at the same time was greatly indebted to Cæsar: that he was not ignorant of the duty of an officer employed by his general in an office of trust; but that he likewise

^s He was probably the learned Varro, who had also served under Pompey in the war against the pirates.

knew his own weakness, and the attachment of the whole province to Cæsar." When he understood, however, that Cæsar was stopped by the siege of Marseilles; that Afranius and Petreius had executed the junction of their troops, which they had considerably increased; and that all Hither Spain had unanimously declared to support them; he changed his behaviour and speech. Varro, therefore, having committed so many acts of hostility, resolved to persist in his measures, and prepare for war: and, being sensible that the whole province was in Cæsar's interest, he determined to shut himself up in Gades, where all his provisions and shipping lay; hoping, by the strength of the town, which is an island surrounded by the sea, and with the help of his fleet, to draw out the war into length.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Cæsar sent against him Q. Cassius, tribune of the people, with two legions; and he himself set out by great journeys at the head of six hundred horse, for Corduba, whither he summoned the magistrates of the different states. All obeyed: every city sent its deputies, nor was there a Roman citizen of any note who did not repair to him. The senate of Corduba shut their gates against Varro, stationed guards and centinels along the walls, and detained two cohorts, called *Colonicæ*, which were accidentally marching that way, that they might serve to protect the town. At the same time, the people of Carmona drove out of their city, which is the most considerable in the whole province, three cohorts

Cordova.

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

- 403 Cons.

which Varro had left there, and shut their gates against them.

The apparent affection of the province for Cæsar determined Varro to make all possible dispatch to reach Gades before his march could be intercepted. But he had advanced but a little way, when he received letters, informing him, "That, as soon as Cæsar's edict was known, the principal men of the town had conspired with the tribunes of the garrison to drive out Gallonius, and deliver up the city and island to Cæsar; that, this agreement being made, they had warned Gallonius to retire of his own accord; threatening, if he refused to comply voluntarily, to force him to it: and that this commander, terrified by so general a revolt, had thought proper to leave Gades." Upon this intelligence, one of the legions, called Vernacula, took up their ensigns in Varro's presence, quitted the camp, and marched directly to Hispalis, where they sat down in the market-place, without committing the least act of violence; a circumstance which so wrought upon the Roman citizens residing in the town, that every one was desirous of accommodating them in their houses. Varro, astonished and confounded at these proceedings, turned back with design to reach Italica, but was informed that its gates were shut. At last, finding himself surrounded on all sides, and the ways everywhere beset, he wrote to Cæsar, that he was ready to resign the legion under his command to whomsoever he would appoint to receive it. Cæsar sent Sextus

Y. R. 704.
 Bef. Chr.
 48.
 403 Cons.

Cæsar to take the command : and Varro, having delivered up the legion accordingly, came to him at Corduba ; where, after giving an account of the state of the province, he faithfully resigned all the public money he had in his hands, and informed him of the quantity of corn and shipping he had prepared.

Cæsar, in the assembly of the states at Corduba, having returned thanks to all those who had declared in his favour, remitted the tribute imposed by Varro upon the Roman citizens ; restored their estates to those who had been deprived of them for speaking freely their thoughts ; distributed rewards to a great many in public and private ; gave all hopes to receive the like favours hereafter ; and, after a stay of two days, went to Gades ; where he restored to the temple of Hercules all the treasures and ornaments it had been spoiled of, and soon after procured this city the freedom of Rome. And, having committed the government of the province to Q. Cassius, with the command of four legions he embarked for Terraco, on board the fleet which Varro had obliged the Gaditani to equip. There he found the deputies of all Nether Spain ; and having, in like manner as at Corduba, thanked and rewarded them, both publicly and privately, he went by land to Narbonne, and so to the siege of Marseilles.

CHAP. V.

The siege of Marseilles. Caius Antonius and Dolabella, Cæsar's lieutenants, in Illyricum, are defeated by M. Octavius and Scribonius Libo. Curio's unfortunate expedition into Africa.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.


Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib. i.

WHILE Cæsar was employed in reducing Spain, C. Trebonius and D. Brutus had carried on the siege of Marseilles with great vigour; and the inhabitants had bravely defended themselves. The town of Marseilles was formerly washed by the sea on three sides; it could be approached by land only on the fourth; and the citadel, being very strong by nature, because of a deep valley that ran before it, required a long and difficult siege⁹. It was of great importance to the besieged to command the sea: and, to beat off Brutus's fleet, they equipped seventeen galleys. To these they added a great number of smaller vessels, filled with archers and the mountaineers whom they had engaged in their service; and, on board of which Domitius put also his own domestics whom he had brought with him from Italy. With this force they sailed out to give battle to Brutus, who lay at anchor at an island


⁹ From this description it appears, says M. D'Anville, that the town did not then stand upon the same extent of ground as now: it only covered a triangle formed on one side by the port, and on the other by the coast of the great sea: whereas now it is built round the port. Notice de l'Ancienne Gaul. p. 440.

over-against the town. His fleet was much inferior to that of the Massilians in the number of ships; but Cæsar had manned it with his best soldiers, chosen out of all the legions, and headed by centurions of distinguished bravery; and he had provided it with hooks and grappling irons, and offensive weapons of all sorts. Upon the first notice of the approach of the enemy, Brutus stood out to sea. The conflict was sharp and vigorous; for the mountaineers, a hardy race, habituated to arms, and trained up to war, yielded little in point of valour to the Romans. Domitius's vassals were animated with the hopes of liberty; and, fighting under the eye of their master, behaved gallantly. The townsmen confided in the nimbleness of their ships and the skill of their pilots, and employed all their art to elude the shock of Brutus's vessels, and to baffle all their attempts. The enemy extended their line of battle in order to surround his fleet, or attack his ships singly with a number of theirs, or in running alongside, to sweep away a range of oars. When they were compelled to come to a closer engagement, they relied wholly on the bravery of their mountaineers and the Italian peasants. Brutus's fleet was but indifferently provided with rowers and pilots, who had been hastily taken out of some merchant-ships, and knew not so much as the names of the tackle. They were incommoded too by the weight and lumpishness of their vessels, which, being built with too

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
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403 Cons.



Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



much expedition and of unseasoned timber, were not so ready at tacking about. When an opportunity however offered of coming to close fight, they would boldly get between two of the enemy's ships; and grappling them with their hooks, charge them on each side, board them, and cut to pieces the mountaineers and peasants who defended them. In this manner, they sunk part of the Massilian vessels, took some, with all the men on board, and drove the rest into the haven.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib. ii.

This loss was repaired with all possible expedition. The Massilians drew out of their docks, and rigged as many old ships as they had lost; they also prepared a number of fishing barks, which they filled with archers and engines; and thus they were in readiness to sail upon the first occasion. Pompey, who was sensible of what importance it was to keep Cæsar employed in these parts, sent L. Nasidius to the succour of Marseilles, with a fleet of sixteen ships, some of which were very strong, and armed with beaks of brass. This fleet passed the streights of Sicily unknown to Curio, and, in their way, put in at Messina, where their unexpected arrival caused so great a terror, that the town was deserted by the senate and the principal inhabitants: and Nasidius, entering the harbour without any opposition, drew out one of the galleys, which he joined to his fleet. The Massilians, informed of his arrival, sailed out a second time to try their fortune, and rendezvoused at

Messina.

Taurentum, a castle belonging to the town, where Nasidius lay with his whole squadron.

Y. R. 704.

Taurenti,
on the right
side of the
bay of Cio-
tat.

Brutus went to fight them with his fleet, which he had considerably increased by six ships which he had taken in the late action. The battle was maintained on both sides with determined courage. The Massilians had put on board their ships the choice of their youth, and the most considerable men of the city; who were all convinced, that on the issue of that day's engagement depended the safety and preservation of their country. But Nasidius was of no service to them: he left them during the engagement, and retired without hurt to the coast of Spain. Brutus obtained a second victory, having sunk five, and taken four of the enemy's ships.

These disasters at sea disheartened not the inhabitants of the town: they continued to defend themselves by land against Trebonius with great courage. This commander had attacked them in two places; on the side of the port where the docks were; and on the side towards the sea, near the mouth of the Rhone: and, having been furnished from all parts of the province with a great number of workmen and carriages, and with wood and other materials, he had greatly advanced his works. But so well was the town stored with all engines necessary for its defence, that no mantelets of ozier were sufficient to withstand their violence. Their balistæ shot wooden beams, twelve feet in length, and armed with iron, with such force, that, after they had

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Bef. Chr.

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
403 Cons.

pierced four rows of hurdles, they entered a considerable way into the earth. To resist the violence of these machines, the besiegers were obliged to roof their galleries with pieces of wood of a foot in thickness, strongly compacted together. Under this cover the materials necessary for raising the mount or terrass, which was to be opposed to the town wall, were conveyed; and a tortoise, sixty feet long, composed of strong beams, and every thing necessary to defend it against fire and stones, was carried before to level the ground. But, in spite of all endeavours, and the greatness of the works employed against them, the height of their wall and towers, and the multitude of their machines, retarded the approaches of the besiegers. Besides, the mountaineers made frequent sallies, which greatly annoyed the workmen.


The legionaries, who had the charge of the works on the right, perceived that a tower of brick, built at a little distance from the walls, would be of great service to shelter them from the frequent sallies of the enemy. At first they made it very low and small; and it served chiefly as a place of retreat, when they were repulsed. But they soon perceived that it would be of much more use if it were raised to a greater height. This they effected in the following manner: the tower was of a square form, thirty feet every way, allowing for the thickness of the walls, which was five feet. When it was raised to the height of one story, they laid a floor over it, the extremities

of whose beams were concealed in the thickness of the wall, that they might not, by appearing on the outside, be liable to be set on fire. Then the wall was continued directly upwards as far as their mantelets would permit: and two beams were laid across each other, the ends of which almost reached the angles of the wall. These were for supporting the floor, which was to serve as a roof to the tower. Over these beams they placed the joists of the roof, and covered them with planks. These joists projected a little beyond the wall, in order to suspend from them what might be necessary to shelter the workmen. This floor they paved with tiles and mortar, to render it proof against fire; and it had besides a covering of mattresses to break the force of the darts and stones which might be thrown against it by the enemy. At the same time, they hung from the beams of this roof, that projected beyond the wall, curtains, made of strong cables, woven to the depth of four feet, and which went round the three sides of the tower which were exposed to the engines; having formerly experienced, that this kind of cover was impenetrable to any dart or engine whatever. When the roof with its curtains was thus prepared, they removed the mantelets, and elevated the roof from the first story as far as the curtains would permit. Then, secure from all insult, they laboured at the brick wall: and, when they had raised it to the height of a second story, they again screwed up the roof; and under its defence,

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



and of the curtains hanging from it, they continued the work, and laid the interjacent floors. In this manner they proceeded till they had completed six stories, leaving always holes in convenient places from which they could play their engines.


When, by means of this tower, they thought they had sufficiently provided for the security of the works around it, they undertook to build a moveable gallery sixty feet long, of timber two feet in thickness, to extend from their brick tower to the walls of the town. The gallery they constructed in this manner: two beams of equal length were first laid upon the ground at the distance of four feet from one another: and upon these were erected pillars, five feet high, joined at the top by pieces of wood designed to support the roof of the gallery. Over these were placed rafters two feet square, fastened strongly with nails and plates of iron. The upper part of the roof was composed of square laths, four inches thick, to bear the weight of the tiles that were to be laid upon them; and a covering of hides was thrown over it to hinder the cement from being washed away by spouts of water. Over all were laid strong mattresses to screen the hides from fire and stones. This work was finished close by the brick fortress, under cover of four mantelets, and immediately carried forward upon rollers, till it unexpectedly reached the very tower of the enemy.

The besieged, astonished at so threatening and unlooked for a machine, pushed forward


with levers the largest stones they could find, and tumbled them upon it. But the strength of the wood resisted their weight and violence, so that they fell to the ground without doing any hurt. Observing this, they poured down barrels of burning pitch and other combustible matter. But these likewise rolled along the roof without damage, and falling to the ground, were thrust away from the works with forks and long poles. Meanwhile the soldiers, under the protection of this gallery, were endeavouring to undermine the enemy's fortress; the gallery itself was defended by the brick tower, whence the engines played without intermission, insomuch that the enemy, driven from their battlements, were at last obliged to abandon their defence. By degrees the tower being undermined, part of it fell down, and the rest was so shaken that it could not stand long.

The Massilians dismayed, and dreading the plunder and devastation of their city, came out in the habit of supplicants, and besought the compassion of the army and generals, earnestly requesting that all further operations should be suspended till Cæsar's arrival. They told them, "that, their tower being destroyed, they were sensible the city could hold out no longer; and therefore meant not to defend it. That in the mean time, no prejudice could arise to the besiegers from a short respite, because, if they refused to submit upon Cæsar's coming, he would have it in his power to treat

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.




them as he pleased." They added, "that, if the whole tower should be broken down, it would be impossible to hinder the soldiers from yielding to the desire of plunder, by breaking into and pillaging the town." Cæsar had earnestly recommended to Trebonius, by letter, to prevent, if possible, the city's being taken by storm, lest the soldiers, irritated by its obstinate resistance, should put all the youth to the sword, which they threatened to do. The request of the Massilians was therefore complied with, though the soldiers murmured at the delay of a conquest which they looked upon as easy and certain.

But the Massilians were insincere, and aimed at nothing in all this, but to find a time and opportunity to deceive the Romans, and put in practice the perfidious design they had formed. For, after a few days, they suddenly sallied from the town, and, the wind being favourable, they set fire to the enemy's works. The flame, in a moment, spread itself on all sides, and the terrass, the mantelets, the tortoise, and the tower, with its machines, were entirely consumed, before it was possible to discover whence the disaster arose. The Romans ran immediately to their arms, every one taking what came first to his hands; and flew from the camp to their works, where they attacked the enemy with great fierceness, but their ardour was checked by the arrows and darts poured in upon them from the town. The besieged, now secure under their walls,


destroyed without difficulty the brick tower, and the gallery connected with it. Next day, being favoured by the same wind, they attacked, with still greater assurance, another tower and terrass of the other attack. But Cæsar's lieutenant, grown wise by his late misfortune, had made all necessary preparations for their defence: so that the enemy, after losing many men, were obliged to retreat into the city without effecting their purpose.

Trebonius immediately resolved to repair his loss, and he was warmly seconded by his soldiers, who were greatly provoked to see their credulity had been abused, and that they were the jest of a perfidious enemy. All the wood in the neighbourhood of Marseilles had been already cut down: they were therefore obliged to raise a terrass of a new kind, and such as history nowhere mentions before that time. They erected two walls of brick, each six feet thick, and of the same distance from each other with those of the former terrass. Over these they laid a covering which was supported by beams laid across: and, to make it firm, they placed pillars underneath between the walls. Hurdles, with brick and earth intermixed, served to make it proof against fire. The soldiers, thus sheltered over head, on the right and left by the walls, and before by mantelets, brought without danger the necessary materials for carrying on the works: and, by the eagerness with

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib. ii.

which they laboured, soon completed them; leaving doors at convenient places, from which they might sally out upon occasion.

The townsmen seeing that the Romans had repaired in a few days what they imagined must have cost them the labour of many months; that there was no hope left either of deceiving them, or sallying out upon them with success; that all the approaches to the city by land might in like manner be shut up by a wall and towers, so as to render it impossible for them to appear upon their battlements; that they could neither discharge their javelins to any effect, nor make use of their engines, in which their principal hope lay; and that they were now reduced to the necessity of fighting upon equal terms; they were forced to have recourse again to the same conditions of truce they had so ill deserved before; and, on Cæsar's arrival, having no prospect of relief, they surrendered at discretion. Domitius, some days before, took the opportunity of a storm to sail out of the harbour with three vessels. They were chased by Brutus's ships, which kept constantly at anchor in the road, or before the port: and two of the three were obliged to return back, but that, which carried Domitius, made its escape. Cæsar spared the town, he says, more in regard to its antiquity and reputation, than to any real merit it could plead. He obliged the citizens, however, to deliver up their arms, machines, and ships of war, to

surrender all the money in their treasury, and to receive a garrison of two legions. The rest of his army he sent into Italy, and he himself set out for Rome¹.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Cæsar's arms were not equally successful when conducted by his lieutenants. "Fortune," says Florus, "ventured to do something in Illyricum and Africa, against the absent general: but it was as if she meant, by some dark shades of adversity, to heighten the splendour of his own exploits." We have but few particulars of what passed in Illyricum, Cæsar's account being lost. We may gather from the historians, particularly Florus, that Dolabella and Antonius were suddenly surrounded by a superior number of men from Pompey's fleets, commanded by M. Octavius and Scribonius Libo: and that C. Antonius was obliged, for want of provisions, to surrender himself prisoner, with fifteen cohorts, in the island of Corcyra, off the coast of Dalmatia. An expression of Cæsar informs us, that the loss of the army was occasioned by the perfidy of Pulcio, one of his officers. Some of the troops attempted to escape in small flat-bottomed boats; but were stopped by a contrivance of the Cilician marines in Pompey's fleet. These had formed nets made of twisted ropes and chains, and extended them from rock to rock under water. How-

¹ Pompey and the senate in his camp, to reward, in some manner, the fidelity of the town of Marseilles, gave the rights and privileges of a free city to Phocæa in Ionia, which was the mother-town of Marseilles. Dio.

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

Oderzo.

ever, of three boats, two got off by the working of the sea, but the third, filled with soldiers from a town beyond the Po, called Opitergium, could not be disengaged. It was surrounded on all sides: and the soldiers, after having defended themselves for a whole day, chose, in the night, at the instigation of one of their officers, to turn their swords against one another, and mutually kill themselves to the last man, rather than surrender to the enemy.

The cause of Cæsar's loss in Africa was the rashness of Curio. This commander, who had conceived the highest contempt for the troops headed by Attius Varus, sailed from Sicily into Africa, with only two of the four legions, which had been put under his command by Cæsar, and five hundred horse. Varus, after the loss of his cohorts at Auximum, had fled into Africa; which he had governed some years before, after the expiration of his prætorship. There, by his knowledge of the people and country, he levied two legions, and took the command of the province with the consent of the natives. Tubero, who had been named by the Pompeians to this command, arriving some time after with his fleet before Utica, was forbid the town and harbour: nor could he even obtain leave for his son to land, who was sick on board his fleet: and he was obliged to weigh anchor and return to Pompey. Curio, after two days and three nights' sailing, landed at a place called Aquilaria, twenty-two miles distant from Clu-

pea; where L. Cæsar, the son, was waiting for him with ten gallies, which Varus had repaired at Utica and put under his command. But L. Cæsar, terrified at the number of ships Curio brought with him, stood in for the coast; where, running his galley on shore, he left her, and went by land to Adrumetum, a town possessed by C. Considius Longus, with a garrison of one legion. To this place likewise the rest of his fleet repaired. M. Rufus, the quæstor, who commanded for Curio twelve ships, towed the galley off the strand, and returned with the fleet to Curio.

Y. R. 704;
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Curio ordered him to sail directly for Utica; whither he followed with his land-army. After a march of two days, he arrived at the river Bagradas, where he left C. Caninius Rebilus with the legions, and advanced before with the cavalry to take a view of the spot called the Cornelian camp, because the first Scipio Africanus had encamped there. The situation was judged to be very advantageous. It was a high rock jutting out into the sea, steep and rough on both sides, but with an easy descent where it fronts Utica. It lay little more than a mile from that town, in a direct line: but as there was a fountain about half-way, which overflowed the plain and formed a morass, it was necessary to take a compass of six miles in marching to Utica. When he had taken a view of this post, he went and examined Varus's camp.

It was covered by the town of Utica itself on one side, and on the other by a kind of

Y. R. 704.
 Bef. Chr. 48.
 403 Cons.

theatre that stood without the walls: and, the works round this theatre taking up a great extent of ground, they rendered the approach to the camp extremely difficult. While he was taking his survey, he saw all the roads crowded with people, who were carrying their valuable effects into the city: and he detached his cavalry to plunder them. At the same time Varus ordered six hundred Numidian horse, with four hundred foot, to their assistance. The Numidians, unable to stand the first shock, retreated immediately to their camp with the loss of one hundred and twenty men. Meanwhile the port of Utica was deserted by all the merchant ships that were there to the number of two hundred, in obedience to a proclamation Curio had published, in which he threatened to treat them as enemies, if they did not instantly repair to the Cornelian camp. By this means the army was at once plentifully supplied with every commodity: and Curiō, upon his return to the camp at Bagradas, was saluted imperator by the joint acclamations of the soldiers.

Next day, he led his army towards Utica, and encamped not far from the town: but, before he had made his intrenchments, he was informed by some parties of horse stationed near the camp, that a powerful body of infantry and cavalry had been sent by Juba, king of Mauritania, to its succour, and were marching towards it. At the same time was seen a cloud of dust, and soon after the enemy's van was in view. This king inherited

from his father an affection for Pompey, and he personally hated Curio, who, during his tribuneship, had proposed a law to deprive him of his kingdom. Curio immediately sent the cavalry to sustain their first charge and keep them in play: and he hastened to form the legions in order of battle. The horse engaged according to his orders, and with such success, that, before the legions could be drawn up, the whole body of the king's troops, which marched without order or apprehension of danger, falling into confusion, betook themselves to flight. The cavalry, wheeling nimbly along the shore, found means to escape with little loss into the town: but great numbers of the infantry were cut to pieces.

The night following two centurions of the nation of the Marsi, with twenty-two soldiers, deserted from Curio, and went over to Attius Varus. These men assured him, that the whole army was extremely averse to Curio, and would infallibly revolt, if he would but shew himself, and come to a conference with them. Varus accordingly drew out his legions the next day: Curio did the same: and both armies stood facing one another in order of battle, with a small valley between them. Sextus Quinctilius Varus, who had been made prisoner at Corfinium, where he performed the office of quæstor to Domitius, and had been dismissed by Cæsar, was now in Attius's camp: and Curio had brought over the very same legions which had revolted from him and his general. He took occasion, from this cir-

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.



Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

cumstance, to try to debauch Curio's army, "and began with putting the soldiers in mind of their former oath to Domitius and to himself: he exhorted them not to bear arms against the old companions of their fortune, who had shared with them all the hazards of the same siege; nor fight in defence of a party which could not call them but by the ignominious name of deserters." To these considerations he added offers of a liberal recompence, if they would follow his fortune, and that of Attius. Curio's soldiers returned no answer, nor made any declaration of their sentiments: but an uncommon panic spread itself suddenly among them, and the reflections, which they communicated to one another, served only to increase it.

Curio summoned a council of war to deliberate on the proper remedies for this evil. Some of the officers proposed to attack at all hazards Varus's camp, and deemed this the best expedient to free the soldiers of their alarms. "It was better," they said, "to trust to valour, and try the fortune of a battle, than to see themselves abandoned by their men, and delivered up to the barbarity of the enemy." Others were for retiring during the night to the Cornelian camp, where they might at leisure cure the minds of the soldiers: and whence, in case of a disaster, they could with more safety and ease retire into Sicily by the means and under the protection of their fleet. Curio was averse to both these measures; the one, he thought, argued cowardice; the other

an unjustifiable temerity. "With what hope," said he, "can we attack a camp forfeited by nature and art, and what advantage can we draw from an attempt whence we shall be obliged to retire with loss? Does not success always secure to a general the affection of his troops, whereas ill fortune is always followed with contempt and hatred? To change our camp would have the appearance of an ignominious flight, and might alienate from us the minds of the army: the dutiful ought not to know that we distrust them; nor the disaffected that we fear them, because our apprehensions would only augment the presumption of the one, and abate the zeal of the other. But if what is reported of the discontent of the army be true, which I am yet unwilling to believe, we ought, for that reason, rather to hide and dissemble our fears, than, by an unseasonable discovery of them, to add strength to the evil, and give courage to the enemy. It is proposed to march away at midnight; this would only furnish a fairer occasion to the ill-affected to execute their purpose. For fear and shame are powerful restraints by day, but night entirely divests them of their force. In fine, I own that I am not so daring as to attack a camp without hopes of success; nor so blinded by fear as to be at a loss what measures to pursue. It is my opinion that we ought to try every thing, rather than follow either of these schemes; and I doubt not but, by your counsel, to fall

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.


403 Cons.

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.



upon some safe and honourable expedient, that will be attended with success."

Then, assembling the soldiers, he reminded them of the great obligations Cæsar had to them: "It was you that gave the example of submission at Corfinium, and all the municipal towns followed it; it was you that obliged Pompey to quit Italy, without being forced to it by the loss of a battle. Can you therefore make any doubt but that he hates you, or that Cæsar ranks you among his best friends; particularly, when you see he has committed my safety to your care, and entrusted you with the protection of Sicily and Africa, without which he cannot hold Italy? You are now in the presence of those who exhort you to abandon us: and indeed what can be more desirable to them, than at the same time to circumvent us, and fix upon you the stain of an infamous crime? What worse opinion could an enraged enemy conceive of you, than to suppose you capable of betraying those who own themselves indebted to you for all their success; and of throwing yourselves into the power of a party, who consider you as the authors of all their misfortunes? Are you strangers to Cæsar's exploits in Spain? He has defeated two armies, overcome two generals, and brought two provinces under subjection: and all this within forty days after he came in sight of the enemy. Is it likely that those, who with forces unbroken could not stand their ground, will be able to resist,

now that they have received such considerable losses? And will you, who followed Cæsar before fortune declared in his favour, now return to the vanquished, and lose the reward of your services? They charge you with having abandoned and betrayed them, contrary to the faith of oaths: but did you desert Domitius, or Domitius his soldiers? Were you not ready to have endured the last extremities, whilst he privately endeavoured to escape? Were you not betrayed by him, and saved by Cæsar's mercy? And how can the oath any longer oblige you, when he to whom you swore, laying down the ensigns of his office and authority, became a private person, and surrendered himself a captive to another? But perhaps, though you approve of Cæsar's cause, you dislike your general. I shall not insist on the obligations you have to me: they are much inferior to my own desire and your deserts: but you are not ignorant that the rewards of military service come not till after the conclusion of the war, and, I believe, you little doubt what will be the issue of the present one. Yet why should I decline taking notice of the diligence I have used, the progress I have already made, and the good fortune that has hitherto attended me? Have I not landed my army safe in Africa without the loss of a single ship; dispersed the enemy's fleet; worsted their cavalry; forced two hundred of their merchant-ships to quit the port of Utica and join me; and reduced them to a situation where it is impossible for them to receive any

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.


403 Cons.

supplies either by land or sea? - Can you think of deserting a cause headed by such leaders, and attended with such success, to return to those who ignominiously delivered up Corfinium, fled from Italy, surrendered Spain, and have already suffered such losses in this African war? For my part, I desired no greater name than Cæsar's soldier; you have thought fit to give me that of imperator; which I am ready this moment to resign, if you repent of having done me that honour. Give me again my former name, that it may not be said, that I was honoured, to be covered afterwards with greater ignominy."

This speech had its proper effect: the soldiers often interrupted him to express their grief at his suspecting their fidelity: and, when he retired, they all gathered round him, begging him to lead them to battle, and make a trial of their zeal and bravery. This behaviour of the troops entirely satisfied the officers, and, with the consent of them all, Curio determined to take the first occasion to engage the enemy. Accordingly, he drew out his men the next day, and Attius Varus did the same. The valley between the two armies, though not very large, was of difficult ascent: and each army waited till the other should venture to pass it, that they might engage with the greater advantage. At length all the cavalry of Varus's left wing, together with the light-armed foot, descended into it. Upon this, Curio immediately detached his horse with two cohorts, to engage them: and

the enemy, unable to sustain the first onset, returned with full speed to their main body; leaving the light-armed foot behind, who were surrounded and cut to pieces in sight of Varus's whole army. In that instant Caninius Rebilus (one of Cæsar's lieutenants, who had distinguished himself in the Gallic war, and whom Curio had chosen for his counsellor on account of his military capacity) cried out to his general: "Why do you delay seizing the favourable moment? You see the enemy is struck with terror." Curio made no answer; only he desired his soldiers to remember what they had promised the day before: and, advancing himself before the rest, commanded them to follow him. The ascent on the other side of the valley was so steep, that the foremost could not get up but with the assistance of those that came after. The enemy, however, were so frightened with the rout and slaughter of their men, that they made no resistance: and, before a dart was thrown, the whole army turned their backs, and fled to their camp, imagining themselves already surrounded by the victorious cavalry. Of Varus's army, about six hundred were killed; and a thousand were wounded at the gates of the camp, where the throng was so great, that many were crushed to death. Curio lost but one man, by name Fabius Pelignus, a centurion of the lowest rank in his army: as this man was pursuing the runaways, he called with a loud voice to Varus, who, hearing himself named several times, and taking him to be an

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.




Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons. officer of his own army, turned, and stood still, demanding who he was, and what he wanted. Fabius then aimed a blow at his shoulder, which was uncovered, and would have certainly killed him, if he had not been immediately surrounded and put to death.

Varus, seeing his army under the greatest consternation, and that many of the men had deserted the camp to take refuge in the town, brought all the rest at midnight within the walls: and Curio the next day began a line of circumvallation, resolving to lay siege to the place. Utica was filled with a great number of inhabitants, whom a long peace had rendered quite unfit for war, and, having formerly received many favours from Cæsar, stood well-affected to his cause. The magistrates were so terrified with the bad success they had met with, that they talked openly of surrendering; and begged of Varus not to ruin them with his obstinacy. But messengers from king Juba came while this affair was in agitation, who made them alter their resolution. They brought the news that the king was himself coming to their assistance, at the head of a numerous army, and would soon appear. Curio received the same intelligence: but for some time, through too great a confidence in his good fortune, would give no credit to it. The news of Cæsar's success in Spain being now publicly known in Africa, he could not be persuaded that Juba would dare to attempt any thing against him. But, being at last convinced by repeated accounts, that the king

with all his forces was already arrived within twenty-five miles of Utica, he quitted his works, and retired to the Cornelian camp. It was conveniently placed near the sea, was well fortified by art and nature, was plentifully stored with water and salt, and the country around was covered with trees, and abounded with corn: here, therefore, he resolved to wait the arrival of the forces which he had left in Sicily.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



Curio, however, did not long abide by this prudent resolution: some deserters bringing him an account that Juba had been obliged to return home to defend the borders of his kingdom, and compose the broils among the Leptitani, and had only sent forward Sabura with a few troops; he too hastily gave credit to this report: and, hurried away by his natural impetuosity, determined to march towards the enemy. He sent, in the beginning of the night, all his cavalry towards their camp, which was upon the river Bagradas: and he himself marched with the rest of the forces about three in the morning, leaving only five cohorts to guard his baggage. After a march of six miles he was met by his cavalry, who, having travelled all the night, had surprised Sabura's camp, killed a great number of his men, and made some prisoners. Curio asked these, who commanded at Bagradas? They answered, Sabura. Upon this, without making any further inquiries, he turned to the soldiers next to him, and said: "Do you not see that the report of the prisoners corresponds

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons:

exactly with the intelligence given by the deserters? Juba is not with the army. It must consist but of a few troops, since they were not able to withstand the charge of a small body of horse. Let us hasten then to obtain victory, booty, and glory." The ardour of the army was equal to that of their general. On they marched precipitately, that they might come as soon as possible upon a frightened enemy. The horse were ordered to follow, but fatigued with their late march, they halted, some in one place and some in another. Juba was only six miles behind Sabura, and, having notice of the last night's engagement, he detached to his assistance two thousand Spanish and Gallic horse, of his ordinary guard, with that part of the infantry on which he chiefly relied. He followed leisurely with the rest of the troops, and about forty elephants; suspecting that Curio had sent his cavalry before, and was not far off with his army. Sabura, having drawn up his horse and foot, ordered them to give ground upon the enemy's attack. Curio, deceived by this behaviour, and not doubting but the enemy were preparing to fly, drew his army down into the plain from the higher ground. At length, having advanced a considerable way, he halted to give his men breath, who had now marched upwards of sixteen miles. That moment Sabura sounded the charge, led on his men in order of battle, and went from rank to rank to animate them; but he suffered the cavalry only to come to blows, keeping

the infantry at a small distance, but in good order. Curio was not wanting on his part; he exhorted his men to place all their hopes in their valour: nor did the foot, though wearied with their march, or the cavalry, though few in number, and exhausted with the duty they had already done, betray any symptoms of fear. Of the latter there were only two hundred, the rest having halted by the way; yet, wherever they charged, they obliged the enemy to give ground: but their horses were so tired that they could not pursue them far. On the other side the Numidian cavalry began to surround the Roman army, and to gall them in the rear. Whenever the cohorts issued out to charge them, the Numidians, being fresh, avoided the attack by their nimbleness, and, immediately returning, got behind the Romans, and cut them off from the army. Thus it was equally dangerous for them to keep their ground, or to advance to battle. Sabura's forces increased continually by the reinforcements sent by Juba: Curio's, disabled by fatigue, and surrounded on all sides, had no place of safety to which they could retire or carry their wounded. Sensible of their extreme distress, they began to give themselves up to despair. Curio, perceiving the soldiers were in so great a consternation, as neither to give ear to his commands nor entreaties, gave orders, as the last resource, that they should endeavour to gain the neighbouring hills: but these were already possessed by Sabura's cavalry. Some of the Romans, attempting to

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.


403 Cons.

escape by flight, were killed by the enemy's horse : others, seeing it useless to make any efforts to save their lives, threw themselves upon the ground. While affairs were in this desperate condition, Cn. Domitius, commander of the cavalry, having only a few of his followers left, advised Curio to save himself by retreating to the camp, and promised not to forsake him. But Curio could not think of surviving the loss of his army ; and continued fighting bravely till he was killed : a few of the cavalry escaped : and those of them who had staid behind to refresh themselves, perceiving at a distance the rout of the army, retired with precipitation to the camp. Every man of the infantry was cut to pieces.

When the total overthrow and destruction of the army was known in the camp, M. Rufus, the quæstor who commanded there, intreated his men not to lose their courage. They insisted, however, to be transported to Sicily : and he ordered the masters of the ships to have them in readiness at night along the shore. But such was the general consternation, that some cried out that Juba was arrived with his troops : others that Varus approached with his legions, the dust of whose march they pretended to discern : and many declared that the enemy's fleet would be upon them in an instant. Confounded by their fears, they consulted every man his own preservation. Those who had embarked hoisted sail immediately, and their flight drew the transports after them. A few only of the boats would obey Rufus's

orders: but the strand was so crouded, and every one so eager to get on board before the rest, that some of these vessels were sunk, and others were afraid to come nearer the shore. It thus happened that a small number of soldiers only got safe to Sicily. Those who remained, having sent their centurions that night as deputies to Varus, surrendered. These Juba claimed as his property the next day, commanded the greatest part to be put to the sword, and sent the rest into Numidia. In vain did Varus intercede for them, and complain of this breach of faith: he durst not make any resistance. The haughty king made his entrance into the city attended by a great number of senators: and, after regulating every thing according to his pleasure, returned triumphant with all his forces into his own kingdom.

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.



CHAP. VI.

Cæsar is created dictator: he returns to Rome, where he holds the assembly for the election of magistrates, and settles the affairs of the city. He follows Pompey into Greece. The disturbances raised by Cælius and Milo are quieted. The famous campaign between Cæsar and Pompey before Dyrrhachium and in Thessaly. The battle of Pharsalia. Pompey's flight and death. The dispersion of his followers.

M. ÆMILIUS LEPIDUS, to whose care, as prætor, Cæsar had committed the government of the city in his absence, obtained, after the reduction of Pompey's army in Spain, an ordinance of the people for creating a dictator;

Y. R. 704.

Bef. Chr.

48.

403 Cons.

Suet. in

Cæs.

Dio.

and, pursuant to it, he named Cæsar to that office ². Cæsar received the news of his election on his arrival at Marseilles, but did not immediately set out for Rome. He spent the remainder of the year in Gaul and in the north of Italy, to strengthen his army, and give directions for the security of the provinces which he was about to leave. It was in this interval that the ninth legion mutinied at Placentia, and demanded its dismissal. This was the first event of the kind that had ever befallen him. They said that they were worn out by labour, and deserved to have at last some rest: but their discontent proceeded from Cæsar's conduct since the commencement of the civil war, and particularly at the siege of Marseilles, where, notwithstanding the perfidious behaviour of the inhabitants, and the many provocations they had given him, he would not suffer them to be plundered. He brought this legion back to its duty, not by any mean compliance, but by his authority and resolution. After reproaching them with their ingratitude and folly, he told them, "that he had no occasion for their service, and that he should never want soldiers to share his prosperity and triumphs: and that, before he disbanded them, he would punish their crime, and order them to be decimated." These words broke the spirit of the mutineers: they threw themselves at his feet, and begged for

² Some nations, as the Syro-Macedonians, reckoned from this epocha the years of the Cæsars, or Roman emperors. See Usher's Annals, ad an. 3956.

pardon: and all their officers interceded for them. Cæsar was for some time inexorable; but at last, abating of his severity, he ordered them to deliver up to him an hundred and twenty of the most guilty; of these twenty were appointed by lot for execution; and the officers managed it so that the lots fell on the most insolent. After this execution the soldiers were obliged to renew their intreaties for leave to continue in his service.

On his arrival at Rome, he held the comitia for the election of magistrates, and was himself appointed consul with P. Servilius Isauricus. Of the prætors, the most remarkable were C. Trebonius, whom Cæsar appointed prætor of the city, and M. Cœlius, who had the department of foreign affairs. It was the universal belief, and the wish of many in Cæsar's party, that there would be a general abolition of all debts. In consequence of this, the public credit was at a stand over all Italy, every one refusing to pay what he owed. But Cæsar put an end to this uncertainty, by decreeing that arbiters should be appointed to make an estimate of the possessions of all debtors, and to convey them in payment to their creditors, at the price they bore before the war. Suetonius adds, that he allowed the debtors to deduct from the principal what they had paid for interest. Dio Cassius says, that the creditors lost by this regulation a fourth of their due: and that, as many were suspected of concealing great sums of money, an ordinance was published, forbidding any

Y. R. 704.
Bef. Chr.
48.
403 Cons.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib. i.
Dio.
Suet. in
Cæs.

Y. R. 704.

484L.

body to keep above sixty thousand sesterces. This extraordinary ordinance has no other voucher besides Dio.

Many of those who had been tried and condemned for bribery, while Pompey kept his legions in the city, resorted to him in the beginning of the war; and, that he might not be charged with ingratitude towards these men, nor accused of invading the prerogatives of the people, he now caused them to be restored in a legal manner by a law propounded to the people by the prætors and tribunes. The pretext was, that they had been condemned at a time when Pompey had influenced the judges. Milo, alone, seems to have been excepted from this general amnesty: he had made, perhaps, no advances to gain Cæsar's favour; who might have, besides, many other reasons to be dissatisfied with the enemy and murderer of his friend Clodius: he restored, at the same time, the sons of the proscribed to the rights of Roman citizens, from which they had been hitherto excluded by the cruelty of Sylla, and the injustice of the aristocratic faction. Having made these regulations, and celebrated the Latin festivals, he abdicated the dictatorship, after holding it but eleven days, and immediately set out for Brundisium, where he arrived before the end of December: and, on the first of January³, he entered upon his office of consul in that city.

³ The eleventh of October, according to Usher; but, really, the twenty-fifth of November.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR, II.

P. SERVILIUS VATIA ISAURICUS,


} Consuls.

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.



Pompey, having had a whole year to make his preparations, undisturbed by wars, and free from the interruption of an enemy, had gathered a mighty fleet from Asia, the Cyclades, Corcyra, Athens, Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phœnicia, and Egypt: to all which places he had sent orders for the building of ships upon the first breaking out of the civil war; being persuaded, that he who was master of the sea, would certainly be superior also at land⁴; and he had exacted great sums of money from the people of Asia and Syria, from the kings, tetrarchs, dynasties, and free states of Achaia, and from all the corporations of the provinces subject to his command. He had got together nine legions of Roman citizens; five he had brought with him from Italy; one had been sent him from Sicily, consisting wholly of veterans, and called Gemella, because composed of two; another, partly from Crete, and partly from Macedonia, of veteran soldiers likewise; who having been disbanded by former generals, had settled in those parts; and two more from Asia, levied there by Lentulus. Besides all these, he had troops from Thessaly, Bœotia, Achaia, and Epirus: which, together with the soldiers of C. Antonius, who

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib.
iii.

⁴ Pompeii omne consilium Themistocleum est. Existimat enim, qui mare teneat, eum necesse rerum potiri. Ad Att. x. 8.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

had been obliged to surrender in Illyricum, he distributed among the legions by way of recruits. He expected also two legions which Scipio commanded in Syria. He had three thousand archers from Crete, Lacedæmon, Pontus, and other provinces; six cohorts of slingers, and two of mercenaries. His cavalry amounted to seven thousand; six hundred of which came to him from Galatia, under Dejotarus; five hundred from Cappadocia, under Ariobarzanes; the like number from Thrace, sent by Cotus, under the command of his son Sadalis; two hundred from Macedonia, under Rascipolis, an officer of distinction; five hundred from Alexandria, consisting of Gauls and Germans, left there by Gabinius to serve as a guard to king Ptolemy, and now brought over by young Pompey in his fleet, together with eight hundred of his own domestics: Castor and Donilaus furnished him with three hundred; the first of these came himself in person, the second sent his son; and two hundred, most of them archers, were sent by Antiochus Comagenus, who lay under the greatest obligations to Pompey. He had likewise a great number of Dardanians and Bessians, with others from Macedonia, Thessaly, and the adjoining states, who completed his cavalry, and were partly volunteers, and partly mercenaries. To subsist this mighty army, he had taken care to amass vast quantities of corn from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt, Crete, Cyrene, and other countries; and he resolved to quarter his troops during the winter at Dyr-

rhachium, Apollonia, and the other maritime towns, to prevent Cæsar's passing the sea; for which reason, he ordered also his fleet to cruise perpetually along the coasts. Young Pompey commanded the Egyptian squadron; D. Lælius and C. Triarius, the Asiatic; C. Cassius, the Syrian; C. Marcellus and C. Coponius, the Rhodian; and Scribonius Libo and M. Octavius, the Liburnian and Achaian: but the chief authority was given to M. Bibulus, who was high-admiral. Plutarch tells us, that Pompey had at first destined Cato to this important command, and had even made him a promise of it: but that he afterwards changed his mind, lest that rigid republican, vested with so much power, should become troublesome to him after the defeat of Cæsar, and compel him to disband his soldiers, in order to restore the liberty of the commonwealth.


Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

In Cat.

Before the end of the year, while Cæsar was holding the assemblies of the people in Rome for the election of magistrates, the consuls assembled at Thessalonica all the senators who had followed Pompey, to the number of two hundred. There, after consecrating a place with augural ceremonies, they declared themselves the true Roman senate; and enacted, that all those who were then consuls, prætors, and quæstors, should retain their authority, and continue in the exercise of their several offices, under the names of proconsuls, pro-prætors, and proquæstors. Pompey they declared generalissimo of the republic: and

Plut. in
Pomp.
Dio.
Lucan. l. v.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.



honours and thanks were decreed to the kings and nations who favoured their cause; and, in particular, young Ptolemy, king of Egypt, was confirmed in the possession of his crown, in exclusion of his sister, the famous Cleopatra, though she had an undoubted title by the will of Ptolemy Auletes, their common father, who had left the succession to his eldest son and eldest daughter jointly.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib.
iii.

Cæsar found at Brundusium twelve legions, and all his cavalry: but his legions were far from being complete. They had been considerably weakened by the Gallic war, by their long march from Spain, and by a general sickness, which had lately prevailed among them, during the autumn in the unhealthy climate of Apulia. Yet, the want of ships alone hindered him, he says, from putting a speedy end to the war. For, notwithstanding his orders to build and assemble as many ships as possible, he had scarcely a sufficient number to embark twenty thousand men; who, in the present state of his army, formed seven legions and six hundred horse. On his arrival at Brundusium, he harangued his troops, and told them, “that, as they were now upon the point of seeing an end of all their toils and dangers, they should make no difficulty to leave their servants and baggage in Italy, in order that they might embark with less confusion, and in greater numbers; placing all their hopes in victory, and in the generosity of their general.” The whole army having loudly testified their assent, he embarked with seven legions on the

fourth of January, and arrived the next day at the Ceraunian mountains, on the coast of Epirus; where, having found a tolerable harbour, he landed his troops at a place called Pharsalus. Lucretius Vespillo and Minutius Rufus were then at Oricum, with eighteen Asiatic ships; and Bibulus had one hundred and ten at Corcyra: but the first durst not hazard an engagement, though Cæsar had for his convoy no more than ten gallies, only four of which had decks; and Bibulus had not time to assemble his men and get his ships in order. For no account of Cæsar's approach had reached these parts, till his fleet was seen from the continent. Cæsar sent the fleet back the same night to Brundisium to bring over the rest of his forces. Fusius Calenus had the charge of this expedition, with orders to use the utmost dispatch; but, setting sail too late, he lost the benefit of the wind, and fell in with the enemy. For Bibulus, hearing at Corcyra of Cæsar's arrival, forthwith put to sea, in hopes of intercepting some of the transports: and, meeting the fleet as it returned empty, took about thirty ships, which he burnt, with all that were on board. He imagined, by this example, to deter the rest of the troops from attempting the passage⁵. He then stationed his fleet

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

⁵ Plutarch in Pomp. tells us, that in a council of war, in which Cato presided, a decree was passed, that no Roman citizen should be put to death but in battle, and that they should not plunder any city which was subject to the Roman empire: and that such moderation gained the affections of all people to Pompey's cause. Cæsar followed this rule,

Y. R. 505.
 Bef. Chr.
 47.
 404 Cons.

along the coast from Salona to Oricum, and remained himself on board, notwithstanding the rigour of the season; declining no fatigue nor danger, so that he might intercept Cæsar's supplies.

Cæsar, following the plan he had at first adopted, sent Vibullius Rufus (the same he had made prisoner at Corfinium, and afterwards in Spain) to Pompey to treat of peace. He thought this man the properest person he could employ, as he had been twice indebted to him for his life, and was also much esteemed by Pompey, whom he had served with great zeal and fidelity in the quality of chief engineer. He was commissioned to represent to Pompey, "that it was now time to put an end to their quarrel, and not obstinately expose themselves any more to the precarious events of fortune: that the losses they had already sustained ought to fill them with just apprehensions of the future: that Pompey had been forced to abandon Italy, had lost Sicily and Sardinia, the two Spains, with about an hundred and thirty cohorts of Roman citizens. That he himself had been a considerable sufferer by the death of Curio, the destruction of the African army, and the surrender of his forces under C. Antonius at Corcyra. That it was therefore incumbent on them to shew some regard to the sinking state of the com-

notwithstanding the greatest provocations; but, on Pompey's side, Cato's decree was very little regarded, and I doubt whether it was ever made.

monwealth, and that the present moment was the most favourable; because, not having yet tried one another's strength, and considering themselves as equals, there was the more likelihood of their coming to an agreement, upon moderate terms: whereas, if one of them once got the least advantage, he would exact every thing from the other, and give up nothing himself. That, as hitherto they had been unable to settle the conditions of peace, they ought to refer them to the senate and people of Rome; and, in the mean time, both swear to disband their armies in three days' time. That a proposition of this nature should be equally agreeable to all; since the two commanders, divested of their strength, would find themselves under a necessity of submitting to the decree of the senate and people. In fine, that to give Pompey a proof of his readiness to perform these proposals, he would give immediate orders for the discharge of all his forces, both in garrison and in the field." Vibullius, having received these instructions, hastened to Pompey's camp with all diligence, frequently changing horses, and posting day and night; but he was more solicitous to give him early notice of Cæsar's arrival, and the condition of his army, than to execute the commission he was charged with. Pompey was in Candavia, on his way through Macedonia, to his winter-quarters at Apollonia and Dyrrhachium: and, surprised and disturbed at news so unexpected, he hastened his march,

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.



Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

40½ Cons.


Cæs. de
 Bell. Civ.
 Com. lib.
 iii.

that he might prevent the loss of the sea coasts.

Cæsar, the very day he landed, brought his troops before Oricum, where L. Torquatus attempted to defend himself with a garrison of Greeks, called Parthinians; but they refusing to fight against the consul of Rome, and the inhabitants being entirely in the same sentiments, he surrendered. Thence Cæsar marched to Apollonia, whose citizens being also well affected towards him, L. Staberius, who commanded for Pompey, privately left the place: and the inhabitants sent their deputies to him, and received him into the town. The Bullidenses, Amantiani, with the neighbouring nations, and all Epirus, followed their example, and sent ambassadors to Cæsar to receive his commands. This rapid progress made Pompey march day and night to reach Dyrrhachium: and, when he drew near to that place, a false report, that Cæsar was not far off, threw the whole army into such consternation, that many abandoned their colours and arms, and the march in general was continued in so disorderly a manner, that it had all the appearance of a precipitate flight. They had not even recovered their consternation when they had reached Dyrrhachium, and were about to intrench themselves under its walls: which Labienus perceiving, he advanced, in the sight of all the soldiers, and solemnly swore never to abandon his general, but to share whatever fortune should befall him. All

the other officers, and the whole army, took the same oath. Cæsar, finding that he was prevented in his design upon Dyrrhachium, pursued his march more leisurely, and encamped on the river Apsus, in the territory of the Apollonians, that he might be able to protect the possessions of a state, which had declared warmly in his favour. Here he resolved to wait the arrival of the rest of his troops. Pompey did the like; and, having encamped on the other side of the same river, assembled there all his legions and auxiliaries.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.



Salona, a town in Dalmatia, where Spalatro now stands, sustained a memorable siege about this time against M. Octavius, admiral of the Liburnian and Achaian fleets under Bibulus. It was built upon a hill, and advantageously situated for defence; but, as the fortifications were very inconsiderable, the Roman citizens residing there immediately surrounded the place with wooden towers; and, finding themselves too few to resist the attacks of the enemy, after many of them had been killed or disabled, they, in their last extremity, gave arms and liberty to their slaves, and the women gave their hair to make cords for the engines. Octavius, to conquer their obstinacy, blocked up the town on all sides with five different camps, resolving to harass them with continual attacks. The brave Salonians dreaded nothing but the want of corn; and, on Cæsar's arrival on the coast of Epirus, they sent to him to beg a supply. The siege had continued for some time; and, the besiegers

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

not keeping a strict watch, they all sallied out at mid-day, leaving, for a show, their wives and children on the walls, and attacked the nearest quarters of Octavius. Having forced these, they ran to the next, and so successively to all the five camps; and, driving the enemy with great slaughter from every post, they compelled them to take refuge in their ships. Octavius, as winter approached, and his loss had been considerable, retired to Dyrrhachium, and joined Pompey.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib.
iii.


Calenus was charged, as we have related above, to bring over to Brundisium the rest of the forces; and, having embarked according to his instructions, he put to sea: but he had not sailed very far, when he met with an advice-boat from Cæsar, informing him, that every part of the coast was guarded, and he returned back into the harbour. One ship, which was not under his command, continued its route, and fell in at Oricum with the fleet of Bibulus, who put all on board to death, not sparing even the freedmen, children, or slaves. The troops under Calenus, had it not been for Cæsar's dispatches, would have met with the same fate. If Bibulus thus deprived Cæsar of all supplies by sea, he was in like manner greatly incommoded by Cæsar at land: who, having disposed parties all along the coast, hindered him from getting either water or wood, or any thing else, except from the island of Corcyra; and, by this means, he was sometimes reduced to great difficulties. Notwithstanding therefore his high spirit, he con-

descended to let Libo enter upon parley with two of Cæsar's lieutenants, M. Acilius and Staius Murcus, who guarded Oricum, and the sea-coasts: and these, believing the proposals made to them to be serious, did not scruple to grant a truce.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

Cæsar was then at Buthrotum, a town over against Corcyra, whither he had gone with one legion to reduce some of the more distant states, and to get a supply of corn. Upon the first information of this transaction, he hastened back to Oricum, and invited Libo and Bibulus to a conference. Libo appeared, and made the following apology and declaration on the part of Bibulus; "that, being naturally hasty, and bearing a personal grudge to Cæsar, contracted during the time of his quæstorship and ædileship, he had declined the interview, lest his presence might be an obstacle to the success of so desirable a design. That Pompey was and ever had been inclined to lay down his arms, and terminate their differences by an accommodation; but, as yet, had not sent him sufficient powers to treat; which, however, he doubted not soon to receive, as the council or senate had intrusted him with the whole administration of the war. That if Cæsar, therefore, would make known his demands, they would be sent to Pompey, who would soon come to a resolution upon the matter: and, in the mean time, he desired that the truce might continue, and both parties abstain from acts of hostility, till an answer could be obtained. Cæsar, on his side, de-

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.



manded leave to send ambassadors to Pompey, and required that Libo and Bibulus would answer for their return, or undertake to convey them in safety. With regard to the truce, he said, that such were the present circumstances of the war, that their fleet kept back his supplies and transports, and his forces deprived them of all access to the shore and other conveniencies. That, if they expected any abatement on his part, they must likewise abate in their constant guard at sea along the coast; and that, while they persisted in their vigilance, he would not remit his attention and watchfulness. He added, however, that though they could not agree on this point, the treaty might still proceed." Libo declined receiving Cæsar's ambassadors, or answering for their safe return, and chose to refer the whole matter to Pompey; yet insisted on the truce, which Cæsar constantly rejected; perceiving, that his only aim was to extricate the fleet from its present distress. Bibulus soon after died on ship-board: he had contracted a dangerous illness by cold and perpetual fatigue; and, as he could not have proper assistance at sea, and would not be prevailed upon to quit his post, he sunk under the violence of his distemper. Nobody succeeded him as admiral: each squadron was governed independently of the rest by its particular commander, under the general direction of Pompey.

Vibullius at last thought proper to deliver to Pompey, in the presence of Libo, L. Luc-

ceius, and Theophanes, his most intimate counsellors, the commission he had from Cæsar. But scarce had he begun to speak, when Pompey interrupted him, and ordered him to proceed no farther: "What," said he, "is my life and country to me, if I shall seem to be beholden for them to Cæsar? And will it be believed that I am not indebted to him for them, if he by an accommodation restores me to Italy?" Cæsar affirms that this speech of Pompey was reported to him after the conclusion of the war by those that were present. He assures us also, that notwithstanding Vibullius brought him no answer back to his message, and Libo refused to conduct his ambassadors to Pompey, yet he tried every other method to obtain peace. As the two camps were separated only by the river Apsus, the soldiers had frequent discourse among themselves, and committed no acts of hostility on these occasions. Cæsar laid hold on this circumstance, and ordered Vatinius to address himself to the officers and soldiers, and demand publicly and frequently, in the most serious and earnest manner, "whether it might not be permitted to citizens to send deputies to their fellow-citizens to treat about peace: that this was never denied even to fugitives and robbers, and ought much less to be opposed, when the design was to prevent a civil war, and the effusion of Roman blood." He was heard with great silence by both armies, and received this answer: "That Varro would next day appear at an interview; whither


Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.




Cæsar's deputies might come in perfect security, and make known their demands." The hour of meeting was likewise settled; and multitudes flocked to the place, elated with the highest expectations. Labienus, advancing from the crowd, began in a low voice to confer with Vatinius, as if to adjust the articles of the treaty: but their discourse was soon interrupted by a flight of darts which came pouring in upon all sides. Vatinius escaped unhurt, by means of the soldiers, who ran to cover him with their shields; but Cornelius Balbus, M. Photius, L. Tiburtus, centurions, and some private men, were wounded. The brutal Labienus, then raising his voice, cried out aloud: "Leave off prating any more of peace: for none you shall have, till you have brought us Cæsar's head." This declaration, so extraordinary, is of a piece with the whole behaviour of that deserter, and corresponds also very well with the haughty and cruel conduct of the whole party.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. iii.

While the two rival generals lay during the winter on each side of the river Apsus, great commotions were raised in Rome and in some parts of Italy by M. Coelius and the famous Milo. The first, who was prætor at Rome for foreign affairs, having met with some disappointments; or disobliged because Cæsar had given the more important charge of the city to his colleague C. Trebonius; or not relishing the law Cæsar had made in regard to the debtors, which might not answer his views; he engaged in the most rash and un-

justifiable attempts. He had the boldness to undertake the cause of the debtors, and, on his entrance into office, ordered his tribunal to be fixed near that of Trebonius, declaring that he would receive the complaints of such as should appeal to him, in regard to the estimation of estates, and payments made in consequence of Cæsar's late regulation. But the law itself was so just, and Trebonius's judgments so moderate, that no pretence of appeal could be found. This magistrate admitted of every reasonable plea, taking into consideration the poverty of the debtors, their personal losses, the hardness of the times, and the difficulty of bringing their effects to sale: and no one was so divested of honesty and shame, as to own themselves in debt, and yet pretend to keep their estates entire. Thus this first attempt of Cœlius proved unsuccessful. His whole severity, therefore, was pointed now against those to whom the inheritances of the debtors were adjudged: and, having once embarked in the affair, that he might not seem to have engaged himself to no purpose in an unjustifiable cause, he proposed a law by which he allowed the debtors six years for the discharge of their debts, which they were to clear at equal payments without interest⁶.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.




⁶ This place in Cæsar is corrupted, and the commentators can make nothing of it. The sense above is according to Manutius's interpretation. Others say that Cœlius's law gave the debtors three years to acquit themselves, in six payments, one every six months: others, that it allowed but eighteen months, or one year and six months.

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.



But the consul Servilius and the rest of the magistrates opposed unanimously the project; nor was it received by the people with the favour he expected: and he dropped the affair. This disappointment only served to render him more furious: and now, determined to keep no measures, he proposed two other laws, which he foresaw would more effectually inflame the people; the one “to exempt all the tenants of Rome from paying rent;” the other, “for a general abolition of debts.” These laws took with the multitude; and Cœlius at their head attacked Trebonius in his tribunal, drove him thence, and wounded some persons about him. The consul Servilius complained to the senate of his riotous behaviour, and Cœlius, by a decree of the house, was interdicted the functions of his charge. In virtue of this decree the bills of his laws were torn down, admittance was refused him into the senate, his chair of office was broke, and he himself was driven from his tribunal, whence he was going to harangue the people. It was doubtless in these circumstances that he wrote the following letter to Cicero, which I insert, because it clearly indicates the character of the man.

M. CÆLIUS TO CICERO.

Ep. Fam.

viii. 17.


Melm. vi.

7. l. viii.

“Was it for this that I followed Cæsar into Spain? Why was I not rather at Formiæ, that I might have accompanied you to Pompey? But I was infatuated: and it was my

aversion to Appius, together with my friendship for Curio, that gradually drew me into this cursed cause. Nor were you entirely unaccessory to my error : for, when I called upon you that night I set out for Ariminum, why did you forget the friend, when you were gloriously acting the patriot ; and not dissuade me from the purpose of my journey, at the same time that you commissioned me to urge Cæsar to pacific measures ? Not that I have the least doubt of his success ; but, believe me, perdition itself were preferable to being a witness of the insufferable behaviour of these his partisans. They have rendered themselves so generally odious, that we should long since have been driven out of Rome, were it not for the apprehension which people have conceived of the cruelty of your party. There is not at this juncture any order of citizens, or even a single man in Rome, except a few rascally usurers, who does not wish well to Pompey ; and I have brought over to your cause, not only those among the plebeian families who were in the interest of Cæsar, but the whole populace in general. But you will ask, perhaps, what can this avail us now ? Wait the event, my friend ; I will render you victorious in spite of yourselves *. For surely a profound lethargy has locked up all the senses of your party : as they do not yet seem sensible how open we lie to an attack, and how

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.



* Irritavi in me Catonem.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

little capable we are of making any considerable opposition. It is by no means from an interested motive that I offer my assistance, but merely in resentment of the unworthy usage I have received; and resentment is a passion which usually carries me, you know, the greatest lengths:—But what are you doing on the other side the water? Are you imprudently waiting to give the enemy battle? What Pompey's forces may be, I know not: but Cæsar's, I am sure, are accustomed to action, and enured to all the hardships of the most severe campaigns. Farewell."

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib.
iii.

Cœlius had privately written to his old friend Milo, to engage him to come into Italy, and join him with the remains of the gladiators, which he had bought for his public shows, and to make war on his enemy Clodius. Milo, exasperated by the treatment he had met with from Cæsar, who had not restored him with the other exiles, instantly obeyed the summons, and began to gather troops all over Italy. For that purpose he dispatched letters to all the colonies and free towns, intimating, that what he did was in consequence of Pompey's authority, who had sent him his orders by Bibulus. He also endeavoured to draw to him the debtors, whose favour Cœlius had gained by his project for a general abolition of debts. But he met with no success, and all he could accomplish was to set some slaves at liberty. With these, and his gladi-

ators, he had the hardiness to lay siege to Cosa⁷; in the territory of Thurium; where Q. Pædius commanded with a garrison of one legion; and there he was killed by a stone from a machine on the walls. Cœlius, when he understood that Milo was in the country of Thurium, set out from Rome, under the pretence of carrying his complaints to Cæsar, but with a view of putting himself at the head of a number of partisans he had in the south of Italy. At Casilinum, he heard that his ensigns and arms were seized at Capua; that his partisans were discovered at Naples; and that he was looked upon as a public enemy. Finding, therefore, that his project was defeated, and apprehensive of his safety, he gave out, on leaving Casilinum, that he was gone to Cæsar; but, turning from the high road, he went privately across the country to Thurium: where, notwithstanding the unhappy end of Milo, he endeavoured to debauch the inhabitants, and corrupt, by promises of money, some Spanish and Gallic horse, who had been left to garrison the place. These were deaf to his solicitations, and slew him⁸. Thus, says

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

⁷ Velleius Paterculus calls the place Compsa:—*Comp-sam in Hirpinis oppugnans, ictusque lapide, tum P. Clodio, tum patriæ, quam armis petebat pœnas dedit; vir inquires, et ultra sortem temerarius.* Lib. ii. c. 68.

⁸ The reader is perfectly acquainted with the characters of these two men, from what has been related of their behaviour: we have in Seneca this anecdote concerning the temper of Cœlius: *Cœlium oratorem fuisse iracundissimum constat; cum quo, ut aiunt, cœnabat in cubiculo lectæ patientiæ cliens: sed difficile erat illi in copulam coniecto, rixam ejus*

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.



Cæsar, these dangerous beginnings, which, by reason of the multiplicity of affairs wherewith the magistrates were distracted, and the ticklish situation of the times, threatened great revolutions, and alarmed all Italy, were brought to a safe and speedy issue.


Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib.
iii.

The armies of Pompey and Cæsar were still in the same situation. The great object of the two generals was the army left at Brundisium: which Cæsar now expected with great impatience; and whose passage Pompey was greatly interested to prevent. He ordered Libo, with the fleet under his command, consisting of fifty ships, to sail to Brundisium, and possess himself of an island that lay before the harbour, judging it of more importance to secure a post, by which the enemy's transports must necessarily pass, than to guard all the havens and ports on the other side. As his arrival was unexpected, he surprised and burnt some transports, and carried off a vessel laden with corn: and the consternation was so great upon the coast, that, having landed some foot, with a party of archers in the night, he drove before him the cavalry that were upon guard. Elated with this, he sent word to Pompey, that he might draw the rest of the navy on shore, and or-

cum quo hærebat, effugere. Optimum judicavit quicquid dixisset sequi, et secundas agere. Non tulit Cælius assentientem, sed exclamavit: dic aliquid contra, ut duo simus. Velleius Paterculus, ii. 68, gives him the preference to Curio, both in eloquence and courage: M. Cælius vir eloquio animoque Curioni simillimus, sed in utroque perfectior.—

der them to be careened: for that he alone, with his squadron, would undertake to cut off Cæsar's supplies. But Antony, who commanded in Brundusium, soon found means to dislodge him. He ordered sixty boats belonging to the fleet to be covered with hurdles and galleries; and having filled them with chosen soldiers, disposed them along the shore. To allure the enemy, he sent two three-benched gallies to the mouth of the harbour, as if with no other view than to exercise the rowers; and Libo, seeing them advance boldly, and hoping he might be able to intercept them, detached five four-banked gallies for that purpose. At their approach, Antony's gallies rowed back, and were inconsiderately pursued too far by the Pompeians: for now the boats, stationed along the coast, on a signal given, came pouring upon them from all parts; and, on the first charge, took one of the four-benched gallies, and forced the rest to save themselves by flight. Antony, also, by posting the cavalry all along the coast, effectually prevented the enemy from watering; and thus Libo was put to the shameful necessity of quitting the blockade.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404, Cons.



Several months had now past, and the winter was almost over; yet the passage of Cæsar's troops was not effected, and was every day more hazardous. Pompey was continually reproaching his admirals for their neglect in relation to Cæsar's first passage, and exhorting them to make amends for it, by pre-

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.



venting the supplies from coming over. His sea-officers exerted themselves therefore, and were ever on the watch. Cæsar, on his side, could not but think that Antony and Calenus had lost some opportunities, the wind having stood often fair for them: and he sent them peremptory orders to sail with the first wind that offered for the coast of Apollonia; which, having few havens, was not so closely beset by the enemy.

All the historians, Suetonius, Plutarch, Appian, Florus, and Dio, tell us, that such was Cæsar's impatience at this time, that he resolved to go and fetch his troops himself; and, in the disguise of a slave, went on board a fisherman's bark at the mouth of the river Apsus, with a design to cross over to Brundisium. The master of the boat rowed off, it is said, with his men, but the wind rising made the water so very rough, that it seemed impossible to him to get out to sea, and he ordered his men to return back. Upon this, Lucan. l. v. Cæsar discovered himself: "Fear nothing," said he, "thou carriest Cæsar and his fortune." The mariners, encouraged and awed by his presence, made fresh endeavours, and got out to sea; but the waves ran so high, and the danger was so imminent, that he permitted them to return to land.


Cæsar's soldiers, informed of what had past, ran to meet him in great multitudes, and told him, with much tenderness and affection, that he had greatly reflected upon their courage

by going in quest of new forces, when they were sure to conquer alone, as long as they acted under his direction.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

The pressing orders he had sent for his soldiers, who were sufficiently eager of themselves to cross the sea, determined Antony and Calenus to sail with a south wind, which was not the most favourable for their passage. They made for the coast of Apollonia, but were driven before Dyrrhachium: whence, being descried by Coponius, he chased them with sixteen Rhodian gallies, and, the wind abating, the fleet had almost fallen into his hands. A brisk gale, however, arising, they made their way, and put into the port of Nymphæum, about three miles beyond Lissus. There they would have been in the greatest danger from the south wind, which had continued two days without intermission; but they were scarcely entered the port, when the wind changed to south-west. To this favourable circumstance they owed their safety. The fleet of Coponius was driven by the violence of the storm against the shore, and dashed to pieces. The greatest part of the soldiers and mariners perished among the rocks; a few only were taken up by Antony's soldiers; and these were afterwards sent by Cæsar to their several homes. There were two, however, of the transports, which, unable to keep up with the rest, were overtaken by the night, and, not knowing where the fleet had put in, cast anchor over against Lissus. Otacilius Crassus, who commanded in that


Y. R. 705.
Ref. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.



place, sent out some boats and small vessels to attack them, and to promise them quarter, if they submitted. One of these vessels carried two hundred and twenty new-raised soldiers; the other less than two hundred veterans: and, on this occasion, appeared, says Cæsar, what resource there is in valour, in the most imminent dangers. The new levies, frightened at the number of their enemies, and fatigued with sea-sickness, surrendered on promise of their lives; but were cruelly slain, as soon as they came before Otacilius. The veterans, on the contrary, though they had both the storm and the leaky vessel to struggle with, abated nothing of their wonted bravery; they spun out the time till night, under the pretence of treating, and then obliged their pilot to run the vessel on shore; where they found an advantageous post. At day-break, Otacilius sent against them about four hundred horse; but they defended themselves with great bravery; and, having slain some of the enemy, rejoined without loss the rest of the troops. The Roman citizens inhabiting Lissus, to whom Cæsar had formerly made a grant of the town, after having fortified it with great care, were entirely in their patron's interest; and Otacilius, who well knew it, and dreaded the consequences of a revolt, quitted the place at this time, and fled to Pompey. As soon as he was gone, the inhabitants opened their gates to Antony, and furnished him with every thing he stood in need of. Antony, after landing his troops, which con-

sisted of three veteran legions, one new-raised, and eight hundred horse, sent the most of the transports back again to Brundisium, to bring over the rest of the foot and cavalry, and retained only a few of Gallic structure, that, if Pompey, imagining Italy to be destitute of troops, should attempt to return thither, as was commonly rumoured, Cæsar might be able, in some measure, to follow him.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.



On the first news of Antony's landing, which the two generals received about the same time, they both set out from their camps on the Apsus; Cæsar to join him as soon as possible; Pompey to hinder the junction, and, if possible, to draw Antony into an ambuscade. Cæsar, who had the river to cross, was obliged to fetch a compass, that he might reach a ford. But Pompey, having nothing to obstruct his march, advanced by great journeys against Antony: and, understanding that he was not far off, he posted his troops on an advantageous ground, ordering them to keep within their camp, and light no fires, that his approach might not be perceived. Antony, however, was apprised of it by the people of the country, and kept close for one day within his intrenchments; the next he was joined by Cæsar; and then Pompey retired to Asparagium, a town belonging to the Dyrrhachians. Cæsar followed him, and, after a march of three days, during which he made himself master of the capital town of the Parthinians, he came in sight of the enemy's

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

40½ Cons.

camp, and pitched his own at a small distance from it.

The next day he drew out all his forces and offered Pompey battle. But Pompey stirred not, and from that moment Cæsar perceived that he must take other measures.

The day after Cæsar set out for Dyrrhachium, taking a long circuit, and through narrow and difficult ways, hoping thereby either to oblige Pompey to follow him thither, or to cut off his communication with the town, where he had laid up his provisions and magazines of war. In this last design he succeeded. For Pompey, seeing him set out another way, imagined he had been obliged to remove for want of provisions, and did not raise his camp till the next day, when he was informed by his scouts whither Cæsar directed his course. He, however, hoped to reach Dyrrhachium before him, by taking a nearer way: and though Cæsar gave his soldiers but little rest, and made them march with the greatest celerity, yet, when he arrived in the morning at Dyrrhachium, Pompey's van began to appear at a distance. Cæsar intrenched himself without delay: and Pompey seized a hill called Petra, where there was a tolerable harbour, sheltered from some winds. Here he ordered a part of his fleet to attend him, and provisions to be brought to him from Asia and the other provinces subject to his command. And Cæsar, apprehending, on his side, that the war would run into length,

sent his officers into Epirus and all the adjoining countries, where provisions could be picked up.

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.

In this situation of the two armies, Cæsar formed a project, which the nature of the country suggested. All round Pompey's camp, at a small distance from each other, were high and steep hills. He took possession of these, and built forts upon them; resolving, as the nature of the ground would allow, to draw lines of communication from one fort to another, and thus inclose Pompey within a circumvallation. By this means Pompey's cavalry, which was very strong, would no longer be troublesome to his convoys; they themselves would be distressed for forage; and Pompey's reputation would greatly suffer, when it was reported everywhere, that he had suffered himself to be imprisoned by Cæsar's works, and durst not hazard a battle to set himself at liberty. Pompey, who was determined neither to quit Dyrrhachium and the sea, nor to give battle, contented himself with obstructing Cæsar's works, and giving his men as much trouble as he possibly could. For this end he extended his army, taking in a great many hills, and a large circuit of country. He raised twenty-four forts, and, in imitation of Cæsar, drew lines between them, which took in a circumference of fifteen miles, in which were arable and pasture lands to feed his horses and beasts of burden; and his works were perfected before Cæsar's, as he had more hands to employ,

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.

and a narrower circuit to inclose. When Cæsar endeavoured to gain any place near his works, he failed not to detach parties of archers and slingers, who galled his men in such a manner, that they were obliged to furnish themselves with tunics made of sackcloth or wool, or thick leather. Both parties disputed every post with the greatest obstinacy. Cæsar's purpose was to inclose Pompey in as narrow a compass as possible; and Pompey's business was to extend himself in order to weaken his enemy by dividing his forces. In one engagement Cæsar's ninth legion was in such imminent danger, that Pompey ventured to declare publicly, "that he consented to be accounted no general, if Cæsar's men got off without considerable loss." This legion had taken possession of a hill, which they began to fortify: and Pompey seized on that which was opposite to it, and from thence sent his archers and slingers with a strong detachment of light-armed troops to attack them. He played, at the same time, his engines upon them. Cæsar soon perceived it to be impossible to make any fortification there, while he was so briskly attacked, and resolved to draw off the legion; but, as he was to make his retreat by the steep part of the hill, it proved a business very nice and dangerous. For the Pompeians, as soon as they observed Cæsar's men to retire, pressed on the more fiercely, not doubting but their retreat was the effect of the terror they had impressed upon them. Cæsar therefore ordered his men to stand their


ground, and he formed a pallisado with hurdles on the ridge of the hill, and dug a ditch behind it. Then he made the legionaries file off, while some light-armed troops, posted on their flanks, protected them, and repulsed the enemy, with flights of darts and stones. But they had no sooner got behind the ditch, than the Pompeians, coming up to the hurdles, threw them into the ditch in such heaps, at convenient distances, as to make to themselves so many bridges; and, with great outcries and fierce menaces, they went pouring down the hill upon their enemies. Cæsar, sensible both of the dangerous situation of his men, and of the dishonour attending a retreat, which had all the appearance of a flight, ordered Antony, who commanded that legion, to encourage his men, and bravely fall upon the pursuers; which they did in such close order and so briskly, that notwithstanding the disadvantage of the ground, they routed the Pompeians; who, while they endeavoured to escape, were not a little incommoded by the ditch and hurdles which had been designed to prevent their pursuit. Cæsar, seeing there was nothing now to fear from the enemy's return, having killed a great number of them, and lost only five of his own men, retired leisurely, and, after inclosing some other hills, completed his circumvallation. It was a very extraordinary attempt for a general with an inferior army, which wanted bread, and was obliged to make use of a root called chara, pounded and kneaded with milk, to un-

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.



Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

dertake the surrounding of an army much superior in number, and which abounded in every kind of provision and ammunition. Nothing certainly could shew so much the superiority of both the general and the army, than that they could dare to form such a plan, and had the industry and courage to go through with it. Such indeed was the spirit of this army, that, when their enemies reproached them with the famine they endured, they answered their insults in no other manner than by throwing among them their black loaves; glorying in their want, and declaring that they would eat the bark of trees sooner than suffer them to escape; a behaviour which struck Pompey with astonishment, and made him order the loaves of chara to be carefully picked up, and concealed as much as possible from his soldiery; saying, he never thought to have had to do with wild beasts.

Plut. in
Pomp.

This event had fully the effect which Cæsar had intended; it raised his credit all over the empire, and diminished that of his rival. Nobody doubted but that Pompey would draw off his troops into his ships, and remove the war to some distant place; and, upon this, Dolabella wrote the following letter to Cicero, who was in Pompey's camp.

DOLABELLA TO CICERO.

Ep. Fam.
ii. 9.
Melm.
vij. 19.

“ I shall rejoice to hear you are well; as I have the satisfaction to inform you, that both Tullia and myself are perfectly so. Terentia,

indeed, has been somewhat indisposed ; but is now, I am assured, perfectly recovered. As to the rest of the family, they are all of them in the state you wish.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

“ It would be doing me great injustice to suspect, that I have at any time advised you to join with me in the cause of Cæsar, or at least to stand neuter, more with a view to the advantage of my own party than of your interest. But, now that fortune has declared on our side, it is impossible I should be supposed to recommend this alternative for any other reason, but because the duty I owe you will not suffer me to be silent. Whether my advice therefore shall meet with your approbation, or not, you will at least be so just as to believe, that it proceeds, my dear Cicero, from an honest intention, and from an heart most sincerely desirous of your welfare.

“ You see that neither the name of Pompey the Great, nor the credit of his former illustrious actions, nor the advantages he so frequently boasted of having kings and nations in the number of his clients, have any thing availed him. On the contrary, he has suffered a disgrace which never, perhaps, attended any other Roman general. For, after having been driven out of Italy, and having lost both the Spains, together with a veteran army, he is now invested on all sides in such a manner, that he cannot execute what generals of the lowest capacity have often performed : he cannot even make an honourable retreat. You will consider well, agreeably to

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.

your usual prudence, what hopes can possibly remain either to him or to yourself: and the result will evidently point out the measures which are the most expedient for you to pursue. If Pompey extricates himself from this danger, in which he is involved, and takes refuge in his fleet, I intreat you to consult your own interest in preference to that of any other man. You have fully satisfied your duty, your friendship, and your engagements to that party, which you espoused in the republic. What then remains for us but to sit down quietly under the republic as it now subsists, rather than, by vainly contending for the old constitution, to be absolutely deprived of both? If Pompey, therefore, should be driven from his present post, and obliged to retreat still farther; I conjure you, my dear Cicero, to withdraw to Athens, or to any other city unconcerned in the war. If you should comply with this advice, I beg you would give me notice, that I may fly to embrace you, if by any means it should be in my power. Such is our general's natural generosity, that you will find it easy to obtain from him any honourable conditions you shall demand: and I am persuaded that my solicitations will have no inconsiderable weight for this purpose⁹."

⁹ Velleius Paterculus informs us, that Cæsar still continued to solicit the chiefs of Pompey's party, and that Cornelius Balbus, at the peril of his life, entered privately Pompey's camp, several times, to gain the late consul Lentulus, his benefactor, who was wavering in his mind:

But the war soon after took a very different turn, and Pompey, instead of making his escape, forced Cæsar, by an unexpected defeat, to retire towards Macedonia. Pompey, inclosed as he was, began soon to suffer great inconveniences from the want of water and forage. For Cæsar had not only turned the course of all the rivers and brooks which ran into the sea, but he had also taken the precaution to turn the current of the waters which, after a storm of rain, would fall from the mountains. This obliged the enemy to sink wells in the low and marshy grounds, which, lying at a considerable distance from some parts of the army, and being soon dried up by the heat, greatly increased the daily labour of the soldiers. As for forage, after consuming what was within the lines, they could have none, but by sea, which not coming in sufficient quantities, the horses and cattle died in great numbers. It was therefore time for Pompey to make the most vigorous efforts to force Cæsar's lines and set himself at liberty; and he made use of every stratagem to distress and fatigue his enemies. In the night he sent his archers wherever it appeared, by the fires, that their guards were, who, after pouring a flight of arrows upon them, retired instantly to their lines; so that Cæsar's men were obliged to

Y. R. 705.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib.
iii.

Tum Balbus Cornelius, excedente humanam fidem temeritate, ingressus castra hostium sæpiusque cum Lentulo collocutus, consule dubitante quanti se venderet, illis incrementis fecit. viam, quibus Hispanus in triumphum et pontificatum assurgeret, fieretque ex privato consularis. L. ii. c. 51.

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.

have fires in one place, and keep guard in another. After several particular assaults, the two armies were engaged in six different actions at once; in three near Dyrrhachium, and in three about the lines. We have lost the particulars of these several engagements, Cæsar's Commentaries being imperfect in this place. We gather from him, however, that the principal attack was at a fort garrisoned by a single cohort, commanded by the brave Scæva, who kept his ground for several hours against four legions, till P. Sylla brought to his assistance, by Cæsar's orders, two legions from the camp. The Pompeians were then repulsed; but they found it no easy matter to make good their retreat. Having advanced to the summit of a hill, they had reason to fear Cæsar's men would charge them in their descent; and Pompey, to sustain them, immediately took possession of an eminence out of the reach of the engines of the fort, where he threw up an entrenchment and brought more forces. But Sylla, who was intrusted with the care of the camp, satisfied to have disengaged his own men, had no intention to hazard a general battle, which might have been attended with ill consequences, and would have looked like arrogating the part of a general; and, checking the ardour of his soldiers, he brought them off from the pursuit. It was, however, generally believed, that, if he had pursued the enemy briskly, that day might have put an end to the war. "But his conduct," says Cæsar, "cannot justly be censured: for there


is a wide difference between a lieutenant and a general: the one is bound to act according to instructions; the other, free from restraint, is at liberty to lay hold of all advantages." In these six engagements Cæsar lost no more than twenty men, whereas Pompey had above two thousand of his legionaries killed, and several volunteers and centurions. In the fort, however, not a soldier came off without a wound, and four centurions lost their eyes. It appeared that thirty thousand arrows had been shot into it; and Scæva shewed two-and-thirty holes in his buckler. Cæsar, to reward such heroism, presented him with two hundred thousand asses, and advanced him from the eighth rank of captains to the first. He also distributed military rewards to the officers and soldiers of the whole cohort, and assigned them, besides, double pay and a double allowance of corn. Pompey laboured all night at his fortifications, raised redoubts the following days, and, having carried his works fifteen feet high, covered all that part of his camp with mantelets. He staid there five days, and, taking advantage of a very dark night, he walled up the gates of this new camp, rendered all the avenues impracticable, and, drawing out all his troops in great silence, at midnight, returned to his former works.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

About 645l.

Cæsar, after this success, drew up his army every day to insult Pompey, offering him battle; and, to provoke him to accept it, he advanced so near to his camp, that his van was within engine-shot of the ramparts. Pompey


Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. iii.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.


also drew out his legions, but posted them in such a manner that his third line touched the rampart, and the whole army lay under cover of the weapons discharged from thence: and in this situation Cæsar did not think proper to attack him. Pompey, induced by the scarcity of forage, had sent his horse to Dyrrhachium; but there Cæsar soon laid them under the same constraint as in the camp: for, by drawing a line with forts round the town, he also effectually blocked it up. They therefore returned again by sea to the camp, where, having no forage but what was imported from Corcyra and Acarnania, the horses were often fed with leaves of trees and the roots of green reeds bruised. At last, all expedients for their subsistence failing, Pompey resolved to set himself at liberty, if possible: and, in the execution of his design, he was greatly assisted by the counsels of two officers in Cæsar's cavalry, named Roscillus and Ægus, who, at this time, deserted to him. They were Allobrogians, the sons of Abducillus, who had long held the chief sway in his state, and, being men of singular bravery, who had done Cæsar eminent service in the wars of Gaul, he had greatly distinguished them, by raising them to the highest offices in their own country, and to a state of great wealth. These men, presuming on Cæsar's friendship, used their troopers ill, defrauded them of their pay, giving false musters, and secreted all the plunder for their own use; a behaviour which alienated from them not only the minds of the Gallic cavalry, but of

the whole army, with whom they had been in high esteem: and a general complaint was made against them. Cæsar, not thinking it a proper time for animadversion, and regarding them greatly on account of their valour, declined all public notice of the affair, and only reprimanded them in private; admonishing them to expect every thing from his friendship, and to ground their future hopes on the experience of what he had already done for them. This rebuke, however, disgusted them greatly: and shame, a consciousness of guilt, and the fear, perhaps, of having entirely lost Cæsar's favour, made them resolve to try their fortune elsewhere, and to look out for new friendships. Having imparted their design to a few of their clients, whom they judged to be fit instruments for the execution of it, they first attempted to murder C. Volusenus, general of the cavalry, that, by so signal a piece of service, they might the more effectually recommend themselves to Pompey. But, finding that design attended with great hazard, and that no favourable opportunity offered for putting it in execution, they borrowed all the money they could, under pretence of reimbursing the troops and making restitution, and, having bought up a great number of horses, went over to Pompey, with those they had made privy to their counsels. As they were persons of noble birth, liberally educated, came with a great train of horses and servants, had been highly honoured by Cæsar, and were universally esteemed on account of their bra-

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.



Y. R. 705.

Ref. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.

very, Pompey received them with great distinction, and ostentatiously carried them over all his camp, triumphing in this new and unexpected acquisition. For till then neither trooper nor foot-soldier had deserted to him, whereas scarce a day passed without some deserting from his army, especially among the levies in Epirus and Greece. The two brothers being well acquainted with the condition of Cæsar's camp and fortifications, where the defects of the lines lay, the particular times for every service, distances of places, strength and vigilance of the guards, with the temper and character of the officers who commanded in every post, made an exact report of all to Pompey.

Upon this intelligence, having already formed the design of forcing Cæsar's lines, he ordered the soldiers to make coverings of osier for their helmets, and provide themselves with fascines for filling up the trenches. This done, he embarked by night in boats a great number of light-armed troops and archers, with the fascines; and, having drawn together sixty cohorts from the greater camp and the forts, he led them towards that part of the enemy's line which lay nearest the sea, and was the farthest distant from their head-quarters. The boats and all the gallies that lay at Dyrrhachium, filled with men and fascines, were ordered to the same spot. The place, which Pompey designed to attack, was commanded by Lentulus Marcellinus, quæstor, whose health being infirm, Fulvius Posthumus was to assist

him; and it was defended by a ditch fifteen feet broad, with a rampart towards Pompey's lines, ten feet high and of equal thickness. Behind this, at the distance of six hundred feet, was another rampart, somewhat lower than the former, and fronting the contrary way, designed as a defence against an attack from the sea. But the line that was to join the two ramparts and run along the sea shore, was not yet completed: and this, Pompey being informed of, it was of fatal consequence to Cæsar. Pompey's sixty cohorts approached at break of day towards Cæsar's line, and, by their sudden appearance, greatly surprised the cohort of the ninth legion upon guard. They planted their scaling-ladders against the inward rampart, and, plying those who defended it with darts and engines, spread a general terror over all that part of the works, which was still increased by the multitude of archers that poured flights of arrows on all sides. In this extremity, the only refuge of Cæsar's men was to ply the enemy with stones; but these were prevented from doing much execution by the osiers with which the Pompeians had bound their helmets. At the same time the troops that came by sea assailed the exterior rampart, and soon discovering the defect in the lines, landed their men between the two ramparts, where the line of communication towards the sea remained unfinished; and thus, attacking in the rear the soldiers that defended them, they obliged them to withdraw from both.

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.

Y. R. 705.

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47.

404 Cons.

Marcellinus, apprised of this disorder, detached some cohorts to sustain the flying troops: but, as the route was become general, they could neither persuade them to rally, nor were able themselves to withstand the enemy's charge. The more supplies he sent, the greater confusion was created, and the means of escape became more difficult. In this action the eagle-bearer of the ninth legion, finding himself dangerously wounded, and that his strength began to fail, called to some troopers who passed by, and said: "I have carefully preserved, to the last moment of my life, this eagle, with which I have been entrusted; and, now that I am dying, I return it to Cæsar with the same fidelity: carry it to him, I beseech you, nor suffer his arms to experience, in losing it, an ignominy with which they have been hitherto unacquainted." Thus the eagle was preserved, but all the centurions, except one, of the first cohort were killed. The Pompeians, now bearing down all before them, approached the quarters of Marcellinus, when M. Antony, who commanded in the nearest forts, was seen descending, with twelve cohorts, from the higher grounds. His arrival put a stop to the enemy's progress: and soon after Cæsar came up in person with more troops, being informed of the attack by the smoke of the forts, the usual signal on these occasions. He perceived that Pompey had forced the lines, and had lodged himself on a spot from whence he could freely forage, and which allowed him a com-

munication with the sea, and, altering intirely the project he had formed of inclosing him, he encamped as near to him as he could.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

An eagerness to repair this loss was like to be the cause of his total ruin. No sooner were the intrenchments of his new camp finished, than he was informed by his scouts, that a certain number of the enemy's cohorts, which appeared to them to be a complete legion, were retired behind a wood, and seemed to be on their march to an old camp, which had been successively occupied and abandoned by Cæsar and Pompey. This camp bordered upon a wood, and was about four hundred paces from the sea: it had been formed by Cæsar's ninth legion, when they were sent to oppose a body of Pompey's troops. Upon their removing to a greater distance, Pompey had taken possession of it, and, intending to lodge in it several legions, surrounded it with more extensive intrenchments, inclosing a small camp within one of a larger circumference. He likewise carried an intrenchment from the left angle of his camp to the river through the space of about four hundred paces, which enabled him to water freely and without danger; but all these works he had thought proper to abandon. Hither the scouts reported they saw the standard of a legion carried, which was also confirmed by those who were stationed in the higher forts. The place was about five hundred paces from Pompey's new camp, and Cæsar hoped, that, if he could get to the old camp, unperceived by Pompey, he would be able to surprise the le-

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. iii.

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.



gion and cut it off. He set out therefore as privately as possible with thirty-three cohorts, in which number was the ninth legion, that had lately lost so many of its centurions and soldiers: and, taking a circuit, arrived before Pompey had notice of his design. Though the intrenchments were strong, yet charging the enemy briskly with his left wing, where he commanded in person, he quickly drove them from the rampart: but they continued some time to defend the gates, which were secured by a barricade; and here T. Pulcio, formerly an officer in Cæsar's army, and who had betrayed C. Antonius, gave signal proofs of his valour. At length Cæsar's men prevailed, cut down the barricade, broke into the greater camp, and pursued the legion into the inward and lesser one. But fortune, says Cæsar, which often effects mighty changes from trifling causes, and whose influence is never greater than in war, shewed its power on this occasion. For the cohorts of Cæsar's right wing, unacquainted with the situation of the camp, and mistaking the rampart which led to the river for one of its sides, marched on that way in quest of a gate; but, perceiving their error, they got over the rampart and were followed by all the cavalry. This delay saved the enemy: for Pompey, having notice of what passed, brought up a legion and a large body of horse to sustain his party; which, being seen advancing by both sides, quickly changed the face of affairs. Pompey's legion, encouraged by his succour, bravely defended them-

selves, and stood their ground: on the other hand Cæsar's cavalry, who had entered by a narrow breach in the rampart, foreseeing that a retreat would be extremely difficult, made off immediately. The right wing, which had no communication with the left, observing the consternation of the cavalry, and fearing they should be overpowered within the camp, retired the same way they had entered; and many, to avoid being engaged in the narrow passes, threw themselves into the ditch; where, the first ranks being trodden to death, their bodies afforded an easy passage for those that followed. The left wing, who, from the rampart whence they had driven the enemy, saw Pompey advancing against them, and their own men flying, fearing to be entangled in the defiles, as they had the enemy upon them both within and without the camp, began also to retreat. Nothing was to be seen but consternation and disorder; and all Cæsar's efforts to rally his men were fruitless. If he seized any of them, they struggled till they got away: if he laid hold of their colours, they left them in his hands: not a man could be prevailed upon to face about. In this calamity, what saved the army, says Cæsar, from entire destruction was, that Pompey, apprehending an ambuscade (probably because the success was beyond his hopes, as a little before he had seen his men worsted and put to flight) durst not for some time approach the intrenchments, and that his cavalry were retarded in the pursuit by the narrowness of the ways and the

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

Y. R. 705.
 Bef. Chr.
 47.
 404 Cons.

difficulty of passing the forts which Cæsar's soldiers were masters of. In these two actions Cæsar lost nine hundred and sixty soldiers, thirty officers, and several knights of note : most of whom died without wounds, being trodden to death in the ditch, or on the banks of the river. He lost also thirty-three colours. The prisoners were delivered up to Labienus, at his request ; and this deserter, brutal and cruel as usual, diverted himself with insulting them in their calamity ; and, after asking them sarcastically, whether it was common for prisoners to run away, he caused them all to be put to death.

Pompey was saluted imperator upon this occasion ; a title which he bore ever after ; but neither in his letters nor his consular ensigns did he think proper to assume the laurel. His party was so elated with this success, that they thought the war at an end, and proclaimed every where their victory with great exaggerations¹. Cæsar, seeing all his projects

¹ Cicero does not appear to have been in the same humour. We have a letter from him to Atticus, written at this time from Dyrrhachium, which is as follows : " You complain of not hearing from me, but I have nothing to send you that is worth your notice : for I absolutely disapprove of every thing that is done, and every thing that happens here. I wish I had rather conferred with you, at a certain time, than corresponded by letters. I defend you here with our party as well as I am able, and so does Celer. I have hitherto declined all employment, and the rather, because I saw none in which I could act consistently with my character and situation.

" You ask me what news : you may know from Isidorus what has lately happened : what remains to be done doth

disconcerted, called his troops from the several forts into his camp, where, having assembled them, he said, "that they ought not to be any wise discouraged at what had happened, but should put, in the balance with their present loss, their many successful engagements; and should consider how fortune had hitherto befriended them in the reduction of Italy, which they had effected without bloodshed; in the conquest of the two Spains, though defended by warlike troops under the conduct of skilful and experienced leaders; in the subjection of Epirus and the neighbouring provinces, whence they had been supplied with provisions; and in their passing safe over the sea when the enemy covered it with their fleets, and were possessed of all the havens and coasts. If they were not successful in every thing, they must endeavour," he said, "by prudence, to overcome the disappointments of fortune; and attribute their late disaster to the caprice of that goddess, rather than to any fault on their side: for that he had led them on successfully, and had forced the enemy's camp; and, if some sudden consternation, the mistaking their way, or any other mishap, had snatched a certain victory out of their hands, they ought to exert their utmost endeavours

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.

not seem more difficult.—My anxieties prey upon me so much, that I am reduced to a very low state of health: when I am somewhat recovered, I shall join our general, who is now very sanguine in his hopes. Our friend Brutus acts in this cause with great spirit. This is, all I can say to you consistently with prudence. Adieu." Ad Att. xi. 4.

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.

to repair the disgrace : which would turn their misfortunes to a benefit, as it had happened at Gergovia, where those, who had been seized with a dread of the enemy, soon after earnestly urged him to lead them to battle." This artful speech was followed by the disgrace of some standard-bearers, who were reduced to the rank of private soldiers : but there was little occasion for severity ; for the whole army was so grieved at their loss, and so desirous of expunging the stain their glory had received, that it was scarcely requisite for the officers to remind them of their duty. They begged with one voice to be led to the enemy, and some of the more considerable commanders entreated Cæsar to venture a battle ; but he did not think it prudent to expose in the field, against an enemy elated with success, troops that had been just worsted, and in whom deep impressions might remain of their late fright. He therefore resolved to change his camp, and the whole plan of the war, and to give them time to recover themselves. As soon as night approached, he sent all the sick and wounded, with the baggage to Apollonia, under the guard of one legion, ordering them not to stop till they had reached the place : and at three in the morning he made all his forces, except two legions, file out of the several gates of the camp, and follow the same route that the baggage had taken. Soon after, that his march might not have the appearance of a flight, and be known to the enemy as late as possible, he ordered the usual signal of decamping to be

given, and, setting out with the rest of the troops, lost sight of the camp in a moment. Pompey, informed of his retreat, prepared to follow him without delay, and sent his cavalry to harass and retard his rear-guard: but Cæsar, having no baggage, marched with such expedition, that they did not come up with him till he had reached the river Genusus. He sent his horse with some light-armed troops against them, who charged with such vigour, that they turned their backs and returned to Pompey, leaving a considerable number of their men dead upon the field. Cæsar, having crossed the Genusus and made a day's march, took up his quarters in his old camp at Asparagium; where he gave strict orders to the soldiers not to stroll without the rampart, and charged the cavalry, which he sent out, as it were to forage, to return without delay by the Décuman gate, which was the most remote from the enemy. Pompey also took up his quarters in the camp he had formerly made, where the works being entire, and the soldiers having nothing to do, some made long excursions in quest of wood and forage, and others, who had come almost without any baggage, having set out on a sudden, enticed by the nearness of their former camp, laid down their arms in their tents, and went to fetch what they had left behind. This dispersion rendered them unable to continue the pursuit, as Cæsar had foreseen; and about noon he gave the signal for decamping, and, by doubling that day's march, gained eight

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
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404 Cons.



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


miles upon Pompey. The following days he set out at three every morning, and Pompey, after attempting for three days to overtake him, gave over the pursuit on the fourth, and began to think of other measures.


Both generals had at this time armies in Macedonia. Cæsar, when he was joined by M. Antony with the troops from Italy, received a deputation from Thessaly and Ætolia, with assurances of submission from all the states in those parts, on condition that he would send troops to defend them. He had accordingly dispatched L. Cassius Longinus into Thessaly with a legion of new levies and two hundred horse; and C. Calvisius Sabinus into Ætolia with five cohorts: desiring them, as these provinces lay nearest his camp, to provide him with corn. The latter was well received by the Ætolians, and, having driven out the enemy's garrison from Calydon and Naupactum, possessed himself of the whole country. In Thessaly, there were two factions: Egeresetus, a man of years and of established credit, favoured Pompey: Petreius, a young nobleman, exerted his whole influence in behalf of Cæsar. About the same time, Cn. Domitius Calvinus was ordered into Macedonia, with the eleventh and twelfth legions and five hundred horse: whither he had been also invited by Menedemus, a principal man of the country, who assured him of the general affection of the inhabitants. Pompey, on his side, sent messengers to Scipio in Syria, to hasten his march, and come and join him with

the legions under his command. Cæsar gives us a strange account of this proconsul's behaviour in his province, which corresponds, however, very well with the rest of his life. He tells us, that, after receiving some affronts and checks from the barbarous people of mount Amanus, he assumed the title of imperator; that he exacted great sums of money from the neighbouring states and princes; obliged the farmers of the revenue to pay the two years' taxes which lay in their hands, and advance a third by way of loan; and sent orders to the whole province for levying cavalry. In his progress through Asia Minor, he found the natives in the greatest terror on account of the Parthians; and his soldiers declared, that, though they were ready to serve against a public enemy, they were not disposed to act against the council and their fellow-citizens. But, to stifle their discontents, he not only made them considerable presents, but quartered them in Pergamus, and other rich towns, and gave up the whole country to their discretion. Heavy exactions, nevertheless, were made upon the province, and various new pretences devised to serve as a ground for them. Freedmen and slaves were subjected to a capitation tax: imposts were laid on pillars and doors of houses: corn, soldiers, mariners, arms, engines, carriages, in a word, every thing that had a name, furnished a sufficient handle for extorting money: governors were appointed not only over towns, but over villages and castles; and he that acted with the greatest

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.



Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.



rigour and cruelty was accounted the worthiest man, and the best citizen. The province swarmed with lictors, overseers, and collectors, who, besides the sums imposed by public authority, exacted money likewise on their own account; colouring their iniquitous demands with a pretence that they had been expelled their country and native homes, and were in want of every thing. Add to all these calamities immoderate usury, an evil inseparable from such exorbitant exactions; for, when sums are called for beyond what a country is able to furnish, they are obliged to apply for a delay, which, at any interest, is still accounted a favour. Thus the debts of the province increased immensely these two years. Scipio had given orders to seize all the treasure of the temple of Diana at Ephesus, with all the statues of that goddess, when he received letters from Pompey, to lay aside all other concerns, and advance to him. Josephus relates, that, while he was in Syria, he beheaded Alexander, prince of the Jews, under the frivolous pretext of his having formerly occasioned some disturbances in Judæa; but in truth, because he favoured Cæsar's cause, like his unfortunate father, Aristobulus, who had been poisoned a little before by Pompey's partisans, for the same reason.

Jos. Ant.
xiv. 13 &
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
On Scipio's arrival in Macedonia, he found there Domitius, and advanced towards him by great marches; but, being come within twenty miles of him, he suddenly changed his route, and, leaving M. Favonius at the river Haliac-

mon, which separates Macedonia from Thessaly, with eight cohorts to guard the baggage, and there to raise a fort, he turned off in quest of Cassius Longinus, and marched so expeditiously that he was actually arrived before Crassus had notice of his approach. At the same time king Catus's cavalry came pouring upon Cassius's camp, who, knowing that Scipio was not far distant, believed the cavalry to be his, and retired, in a fright, to the mountains that begirt Thessaly, and thence directed his course towards Ambracia. Scipio, when he was preparing to follow him, was called back by Favonius, who informed him that Domitius was marching towards him, and that it would be impossible for him to defend his post. Marching, therefore, day and night without intermission, he arrived so opportunely, that his advanced guards and the dust of Domitius's army were descried at the same time. Thus Domitius's care preserved Cassius, and Scipio's diligence Favonius. These two generals kept one another in play, during the blockade of Dyrrhachium, without coming to any decisive engagement. During which time, also, Calenus, taking the command of Cassius's and Calvisius's troops, penetrated into Achaia, where Delphos, Thebes, and Orchomenus submitted to him: but he was stopped in his conquest by a lieutenant of Pompey, Rutilius Lupus, who kept him out of the Peloponnesus.

Cæsar, from Apollonia, where he staid but to provide for his wounded, pay his army, and

Y. R. 705.
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 47.
 40½ Cons.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.



garrison the towns in his interest, set out to join Domitius Calvinus. He perceived, that, if Pompey followed him, he must leave the sea and the ammunition and provision he had treasured up at Dyrrhachium, and be reduced to engage him on equal terms; and, if Pompey passed into Italy, he purposed to join Domitius and march to its defence, by the coast of Illyricum: in fine, if Pompey should fall upon Apollonia and Oricum, and endeavour to exclude him from the sea-coast, he intended to attack Scipio, and thereby force Pompey to come to his assistance. Cæsar, therefore, had dispatched couriers to Calvinus to acquaint him with his designs, and with orders how to act; and, having left four cohorts at Apollonia, one at Lissus, and three at Oricum, marched through Epirus and Acarnania. Pompey, on his side, penetrating into Cæsar's views, made what haste he could to join Scipio, that, if Cæsar should march that way, he might prevent his being overpowered: but should he still keep near the sea, because of the legions and cavalry he expected from Italy, in that event he purposed to fall upon Calvinus with all his forces. Both generals, therefore, marched with the greatest expedition, as well to afford timely relief to their friends, as not to miss the opportunity of distressing their enemies. Cæsar, however, had been forced to turn off to Apollonia, and Pompey, taking the direct way through Candavia, arrived first in Macedonia: and fortune had almost thrown Domitius into his hands. For Cæsar's late

defeat, which the Pompeians greatly exaggerated in their letters, having induced several states to throw off their allegiance, his couriers to Domitius were intercepted; and this general, having consumed all the provisions near his camp, had quitted it at this time, and was upon his march to Heraclea Sentica, a town of the Candavians. What saved him was, that his scouts met accidentally with some Allobrogians, servants of Ægus and Roscillus, who, either from ancient familiarity or from a motive of vain glory, informed them of all that had passed, and of Pompey's approach: which news being immediately carried to Calvinus, who was not above four hours' march from the enemy, he instantly turned off, and joined Cæsar at Æginium, a town on the borders of Thessaly.

From Æginium Cæsar marched with all his forces to Gomphi, the first town of Thessaly on the side of Epirus. A few months before, the inhabitants of their own accord had sent him a deputation, to petition for a garrison, and make him an offer of what their country produced: but now Androsthenes, prætor of Thessaly, chusing rather to be the companion of Pompey's good fortune, than a partner with Cæsar in his adversity, ordered all the people, whether free or slaves, to assemble in the town, and, having shut the gates against Cæsar, sent letters to Scipio and Pompey to come to his assistance, intimating, that the town was strong enough to hold out if they used dispatch, but was by no means in a condition to sustain a


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40½ Cons.

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47.
404 Cons.



long siege. Scipio was then at Larissa, and Pompey had not yet entered Thessaly. Cæsar, after fortifying his camp and preparing every thing for a sudden attack, called his soldiers together, and represented to them, “of what consequence it was to make themselves masters of an opulent city, abounding in all sorts of commodities, and, by the terror of whose punishment, other states would be awed into submission : and this must be done before any succours could arrive.” His soldiers having shewed an uncommon ardour, he led them on to the assault at three in the afternoon, and was master of it before sun-set. After giving it up to be plundered by his soldiers, he marched on to Metropolis, where he arrived before the inhabitants were apprised of the disaster of their neighbours. The Metropolitans proposed at first to stand upon their defence, but, being made acquainted with the fate of Gomphi, they opened their gates, and Cæsar suffered no harm to be done them. The other states of Thessaly, observing the different fates of these two cities, readily submitted ; except Larissa, which was awed by Scipio’s legions. Cæsar now resolved to encamp, and wait for Pompey. For this purpose he pitched upon a convenient spot near a town called Pharsalus : and the adjacent country being good, and covered with corn, which was now almost ripe ², he thought

² This circumstance determines nearly the time of the Julian year when Cæsar sat down in Thessaly, and that of

it a proper situation for the theatre of war, and for determining his quarrel with his rival.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

Pompey came soon into Thessaly, and, joining Scipio's legions with his own in one camp, he first thanked his own men for their late important services, and then exhorted Scipio's troops to claim their share of the booty to which his late victory had intitled them. He divided all the honours of command with Scipio, ordering a prætorian tent to be prepared for him, and the trumpets to attend him. This increase of strength, by the union of two powerful armies, raised to such a height the presumption of his followers, and their assurance of victory, that now all delays were considered in no other light than as an odious hindrance of their return into Italy: insomuch that, if Pompey on any occasion acted with slowness and circumspection, they complained, "that he industriously protracted the war, which could easily be brought to a conclusion in one

the battle of Pharsalia, which was about a month after; and as we know the day of the Roman year when this said battle was fought, it serves to determine the relation of the Roman with the Julian year. In a discourse of M. de la Nauze, printed in the twenty-sixth volume of the *Memoires de Literature*, of the Royal Academy of Paris, we find the following note: "*M. l'Abbé Belley a depuis communiqué, à l'auteur de ce memoire, l'extrait suivant d'une lettre écrite à M. Pellerin par M. de Clairambault, consul de France a Salonique, en date du 4 Janvier, 1755: Suivant les informations que j'ai demandées en Thessalie, & suivant ce que m'en on rapporte ici les gens de ce pays-la, la moisson s'y fait dans le mois de Juin; & du côté de Larissa & de Tricala, c'est dès les premiers jours de Juin; & du côté de Jannina & des environs, ce n'est que du 15 au 20 du même mois.*"

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.



day, in the view of gratifying his ambition for command, and keeping in his dependence such a number of consular and prætorian senators.”

They began to contend with one another about the dignities and priesthoods of the state, and disposed of the consulship for several years. They even sued for the houses and estates of those who followed Cæsar's party : and a warm debate arose in council, whether L. Hirrus, whom Pompey had sent ambassador to the Parthians, should be allowed, in the next election for prætors, to stand a candidate for that office in his absence. His friends implored Pompey to make good the promise he had made him at his departure, and not suffer him to be deceived by depending on his honour ; while such as aspired to this office complained publicly that no promise should be made to any one candidate, when all were embarked in the same cause, and shared the like dangers. Great was the competition, and not without personal abuse between Lentulus Spinther, L. Domitius, and Scipio, about the high-priesthood, with which Cæsar was invested ; the first pleading his age, the second his dignity and interest in the city, the third his alliance with Pompey. Attius Rufus impeached Afranius before his general, charging him with being the cause of the loss of the army in Spain. L. Domitius moved in council, that, after Cæsar's destruction, a commission of the senators in Pompey's camp should be empowered to pronounce judgment upon those who had either staid in Italy, or, after removing to

countries under Pompey's command, had taken no share in the war; and that three billets should be given to these judges, one for acquittal, one for condemnation, and a third for a pecuniary fine. Thus every one's thoughts were employed on the honours and profit he was to share, or the vengeance he hoped to inflict upon his enemies: but no one considered by what methods the victory was to be obtained, looking now upon Cæsar as a certain and easy conquest. This account of the behaviour of the Pompeian chiefs is not only given by Cæsar, but by all the other historians; and well might Cicero conceive the greatest disgust for the company he was engaged with³. There is one circumstance suggested to us by Cicero which had the greatest influence in determining Pompey's con-

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

³ We have Cicero's account of things in a letter to M. Marius, written in the year 707: "I resolved to sacrifice all considerations of personal safety to the dictates of my honour: and accordingly I joined Pompey in Greece. But I no sooner arrived in his army, than I had occasion to repent of my resolution; not so much from the danger to which I was myself exposed, as from the many capital faults I discovered among them: in the first place, Pompey's forces were neither very considerable in point of numbers," [at the battle of Pharsalia, they were more than double of those of Cæsar] "nor by any means composed of warlike troops; and, in the next place, excepting Pompey himself, and a few others of the principal leaders, they carried on the war with such a spirit of rapaciousness, and breathed such principles of cruelty in their conversation, that I could not think even upon our success without horror. To this I must add, that some of our most dignified men were deeply involved in debt; and, in short, there was nothing good among them but their cause. Thus, despairing of success,

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.



duct at this time, his superstitious regard to omens, and the admonitions of diviners; to which his nature was strongly addicted. The Haruspices were all on his side, and flattered him with every thing that was prosperous; and, besides those in his own camp, the whole fraternity of them at Rome were sending him perpetual accounts of the fortunate and auspicious significations which they had observed in the entrails of their victims⁴.

I advised (what indeed I had always recommended) that proposals of accommodation should be offered to Cæsar; and, when I found Pompey utterly averse to all measures of that kind, I endeavoured to persuade him at least to avoid a general battle. This last advice he seemed sometimes inclined to follow; and, probably would have followed, if a certain engagement, in which his troops behaved bravely, and he gained the victory, had not given him too great a confidence in them. From that moment, all the skill and conduct of this great man seem to have forsaken him: and he acted so little like a general, that, with a raw and unexperienced army," [he had at Pharsalia eleven legions of Roman citizens, of which eight were made up of veterans] "he imprudently gave battle to the most brave and martial legions. The consequence was, that he suffered a most shameful defeat; and, abandoning his camp to Cæsar, he was obliged to run away unaccompanied even with a single attendant." Ad Fam. vii. 3. Melm. viii. 1. It is certain, therefore, that Pompey was not driven, as Dr. Middleton puts it, by a sense of shame, and against his judgment, to the experiment of a decisive action: *Pompeius, longe diversa aliis suadentibus (quorum plerique hortabantur, ut in Italiam transmitteret: alii, ut bellum traheret, quod dignatione partium in dies ipsis magis prosperum fieret) usus impetu suo hostem secutus est.* Vell. Pat. l. ii. c. 52.

⁴ Hoc civili bello, Dii immortales!—quæ nobis in Græciam Roma responsa Haruspicum missa sunt? quæ dicta Pompeio?—etenim ille admodum extis et ostentis movebatur. De Div. ii. 24.

The two armies were now in sight of each other; and Cæsar, having provided for the subsistence of his troops, and given them some days' rest, thought it time to make a trial how Pompey stood affected to a general engagement. Accordingly, he drew out all his forces in order of battle, but first near his camp, and at a good distance from Pompey's; and each day he drew nearer and nearer to him; inspiring his men by this conduct with fresh courage, and a contempt of an army that dared not to leave the heights where they were encamped. His cavalry being much inferior in number to those of the enemy, he followed a method he had formerly put in practice with success to strengthen them. He singled out the stoutest and nimblest of his foot soldiers, and accustomed them to fight within the ranks of the horse; who were thereby so much emboldened, that, though but a thousand in number, they would upon occasion sustain the charge of Pompey's seven thousand; and in one skirmish they had actually the advantage, and killed Ægus, one of the Allobrogian brothers.


Y. R. 705.



Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib.
iii.

Pompey, who was come to Pharsalia with a firm resolution to give battle, drew up his army at the foot of the mountain, upon which his camp stood; presuming, that such was Cæsar's eagerness and temerity, that he would venture to fight him in that disadvantageous situation. This Cæsar would in no manner consent to; and, despairing to draw his adversary to battle on equal terms, he determined

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
40½ Cons.



to move his camp, and to be always upon the march; in hopes, that, by frequently shifting his ground, he might the better be supplied with provisions, harass his enemy less used to fatigue, and find an opportunity of forcing them to a general action. But just as the order for marching was given, Cæsar perceived that Pompey had quitted his intrenchments, and advanced farther than usual with his army in array, on a spot where he could engage them without disadvantage: and, turning to his soldiers, "Let us no longer," said he, "think of marching; now is the time for fighting, so long wished for; let us, therefore, arm ourselves with courage, and not miss so favourable an opportunity." Upon this, he immediately drew out his forces. Pompey's real design was to draw on a battle: he had taken his resolution, and, in a council of war held two days before, he had declared, "that Cæsar's army would be defeated before the infantry came to engage." And when some expressed their surprise at this speech: "I know," said he, "that what I promise appears almost incredible; but hear the reasons on which I ground my confidence, that you may advance to battle with the greater assurance. I have engaged the cavalry to promise, that, as soon as the armies draw near, they shall fall upon Cæsar's right wing; and, taking it in flank and rear, force it to recoil in confusion upon the main body, and thus throw the whole army into disorder before we have launched a dart. In this manner we shall obtain a complete

victory without exposing the legions to any peril; nor can there be any difficulty in the design, since we are so much superior to them in cavalry." He warned them at the same time "to be in readiness for battle; and that, since permission to fight the enemy, which they had so often demanded, was now granted them, to answer by their valour the expectation every one had conceived of them." Labienus highly applauded this scheme; and, expressing the greatest contempt for Cæsar's army, which he assured them was almost intirely made up of new levies, raised in Cisalpine Gaul, and especially in the colonies beyond the Po, he took an oath, which he proffered to all those that were present, never to return again to their camp, unless victorious. After these solemn engagements, they separated, full of joy and expectation; assuring themselves of victory; and relying intirely on the ability of their general, who, in an affair of that importance, would promise nothing, they were confident, without a certainty of success.

The two armies were drawn up in the following manner: Pompey, placed in his left wing, where he designed to command in person, the two legions taken from Cæsar in the beginning of the quarrel by a decree of the senate. Scipio was in the centre, with the legions he had brought out of Syria; and the Cilician legion, joined to the Spanish cohorts brought over by Afranius, formed the right wing. These Pompey esteemed his best

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.


404 Cons.

troops. The rest of his forces he distributed between the wings and the main body. He had in all forty-five thousand men, besides two cohorts of volunteers who had served under him in his former wars; and who, out of affection to their old general, though their legal time was expired, flocked to his standard on this occasion, and were dispersed by him in different quarters of his army. His other seven cohorts were left to guard the camp and the adjoining forts. The Enipeus covered his right wing; and, on that account, he placed all the horse with the archers and slingers in the left. Cæsar, observing his ancient custom, placed the tenth legion in the right, and the ninth in the left wing; and, as this last was considerably weakened by the several actions at Dyrrhachium, he joined the eighth to it in such a manner, that they formed as it were but one legion, and had orders mutually to succour each other. His whole army amounted to fourscore cohorts, making in all twenty-two thousand men; besides two cohorts left to guard the camp. Domitius Calvinus was in the centre, M. Antony in the left wing, and P. Sylla in the right. Cæsar himself took his post opposite to Pompey, at the head of the tenth legion; and, as he had observed that the disposition of the enemy was contrived to out-flank his right wing, to obviate that inconvenience, he made a draught of six cohorts from his rear line, formed them into a separate body, and opposed them to Pompey's horse, instructing them in the part they were to act,

and admonishing them, that the success of that day would depend chiefly on their courage. At the same time he charged the whole army, and particularly the third line, not to advance to battle without orders, which when he saw it proper he would give by making the usual signal. In his harangue to them before the battle, after reminding them of the many favours received at his hands, he chiefly insisted "on the injustice and obstinacy of his enemies, who had forced him to enter upon this war, and to prosecute it against his will. They themselves, he told them, had been witnesses of his earnest endeavours after peace, and that he had left nothing unattempted to avoid wasting the blood of his soldiers, and to spare the commonwealth the loss of her armies." After this speech, observing the ardour of his soldiers for the fight, he ordered the trumpets to sound the charge. Among the soldiers in Cæsar's army was one Crastinus, a man of distinguished courage, who, the year before, had been first centurion of the tenth legion. This brave officer, as soon as the signal was given, called out to those next him, "Follow me, you that were formerly under my command, and acquit yourselves of the duty you owe to your general. This one battle will restore him to his proper dignity, and us to the enjoyment of our freedom." At the same time, turning to Cæsar, "General," says he, "this day you shall be satisfied with my behaviour; and, whether I live or die, I will deserve your commendations." So saying, he marched up

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.



to the enemy, and began the attack with an hundred and twenty select men who followed him.

Between the two armies there was space enough for them to move forwards upon one another, and form a shock, as is usual : but Pompey had given his troops orders to keep their ground, that Cæsar's troops might have all the way to make. In this, he is said to have been directed by the advice of Triarius, that the enemy's ranks might be disordered, and the soldiers put out of breath, by having so far to run. It was also thought, that the enemy's javelins would have less effect upon his troops at rest, than if they sprung forward to meet them. " But herein," says Cæsar, " he seems to have acted contrary to reason ; because there is a certain alacrity and ardour of mind naturally planted in every man, which is inflamed by the desire of fighting, and which an able general, far from repressing, will, by all the methods he can devise, foment and cherish ; nor was it a vain institution of our ancestors, that the trumpets should sound on every side ; and that the whole army should raise a shout, in order to animate the courage of their own men, and strike a terror into the enemy." However, Cæsar's soldiers entirely defeated Pompey's hopes by their good discipline and experience : for, perceiving the enemy did not stir, they halted of their own accord, in the midst of their career ; and, having taken a moment's breath, put themselves a second time in motion, marched up in good

order, flung their javelins, and then, as Cæsar had ordered, betook themselves to their swords. Nor did Pompey's men act with less presence of mind; for they bravely sustained their attack; and, having launched their javelins, immediately had also recourse to their swords. At this instant, Pompey's horse, supported by the archers and slingers, attacked Cæsar's; and, having compelled them to give ground, began to extend themselves in order to flank the infantry. Whereupon Cæsar gave the signal to the six cohorts, who fell on Pompey's cavalry with such fury, that they not only drove them from the field of battle, but even forced them to take refuge in the mountains. It is reported by some historians, that Cæsar ordered his soldiers to aim at the faces of the enemy; and that this contrivance served much to disorder the nice and effeminate knights, who could not bear the thoughts of being disfigured. He himself, however, has not mentioned this stratagem. The archers and slingers, deprived of the protection of the horse, were soon cut to pieces. The same cohorts, having thus driven the cavalry entirely out of the field, turned upon the enemy's left wing, and began to charge it in the rear. Cæsar at the same time brought up his third line, which had not been engaged. The left wing of the enemy, thus attacked in front by fresh troops, and in the rear by the victorious cohorts, made but a faint resistance, and fled to their camp. Pompey, upon seeing that part of his army, on which he chiefly

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

Florus, lib.
iv. c. 2.

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.

depended, put into disorder, despaired of being able to restore the battle, had retired from the field to wait the event in his tent. Cæsar, though the battle lasted till noon, and the weather was excessively hot, yet, encouraging his soldiers, led them on, notwithstanding their fatigue, to attack the intrenchments of the vanquished. The camp was bravely defended by the cohorts left for its guard, and particularly by a body of Thracians and other barbarians. The soldiers who had fled from the battle were in too great a consternation to think of any thing but of making their escape. These fresh troops were overpowered however, driven from the rampart, and forced to fly to the neighbouring mountains.

Pompey, perceiving that all was lost, and that his intrenchments were forced, quitting his military dress for a habit more suitable to his ill fortune, mounted his horse, and, withdrawing by the Decuman gate, rode full speed to Larissa. He would not enter the town, though invited by the citizens, that he might not expose them to the resentment of Cæsar: but, having called for what he wanted, he advised them to submit to the conqueror. Thence, continuing his flight day and night, without intermission, he arrived on the sea-side with thirty horse, and went on board a ship of burden; often complaining "that he had been so far deceived in his opinion of his followers, as to see those very men, from whom he expected victory, the first to fly, and betray him to his enemies." His camp

Dio.

shewed how little he and his followers dreamed of the issue of that day. The tents of the grandees were adorned with branches of myrtle, and shaded with ivy; the tables were found covered, the side-boards loaded with plate; and, in a word, every thing gave proofs of the highest luxury, and the greatest assurance of victory.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

Cæsar, not thinking his victory yet complete, earnestly entreated his soldiers to form a line of circumvallation round the mountain, whither a part of the conquered army had retired. But the Pompeians quickly abandoned a post which for want of water was not tenable, and endeavoured to reach the city of Larissa: whereupon Cæsar, dividing his army, left one part to guard Pompey's camp, sent back another to his own, and, with four legions, taking a nearer road than that by which the enemy passed, he found means to intercept them; and after six miles' march drew up in order of battle. However, the vanquished troops once more found protection from a mountain, at the foot of which ran a rivulet. Though Cæsar's men were greatly fatigued by fighting the whole day, yet before night they flung up some works which were sufficient to prevent the enemy from having any communication with the rivulet: who, by this step, being cut off from all hopes of relief, or of making good their retreat, sent deputies to treat of a surrendry. Affairs continued in this situation all that night, and some senators took the occasion to make their escape. At

Y. R. 705.
 Bef. Chr.
 47.
 404 Cons.

break of day they came down into the plain, and delivered up their arms; humbly imploring Cæsar's goodness, and suing for mercy. He not only granted them readily their lives, but spoke to them with the greatest humanity, and gave strict orders that nothing should be taken from them. He then sent for the legions that had passed the night in the camp, to relieve those he had employed in the pursuit: and, being determined to follow Pompey, he began his march, and arrived the same day at Larissa. Thus Cæsar, by his admirable skill, and the indefatigable industry of his soldiers, obtained the most complete and important victory. According to his own account, he lost but two hundred men⁵, with thirty centurions. To the body of Crastinus, who had been killed in the beginning of the engagement, he ordered particular honours to be paid. On Pompey's side there fell fifteen thousand; of whom the greatest number were servants, and those who guarded the tents; only six thousand soldiers were killed, ten senators and forty knights. Upwards of twenty-four thousand were made prisoners; for the cohorts that garrisoned the forts surrendered to Sylla. One hundred and eighty colours and nine eagles were taken. L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, that mortal enemy to Cæsar, was overtaken in his flight, and put to death⁶. Dio relates, that Cæsar caused all

Plut. in
 Pomp.

⁵ Plutarch and Appian say twelve hundred.

⁶ Cicero, Philip. ii. c. 29. accuses Antony of having killed Domitius, and some others whom Cæsar probably would

those to be slain, who, having been once pardoned, had a second time carried arms against him. But this circumstance may well be doubted, since all the historians are unanimous in extolling his clemency both in the battle, and after it⁷. As soon as he saw his enemies defeated, he cried to his soldiers to spare the blood of their fellow-citizens. Upon viewing the field of battle, he said with a sigh: "They have forced me to this sad necessity. Cæsar must have sought the assistance of his soldiers, or must have perished." He generously pardoned all those he had made prisoners: and Pliny and Seneca have observed that, having found in Pompey's tent a great many letters from several great men, in which, undoubtedly, they had expressed in the warmest manner their zeal for his party, he instantly gave orders to burn them. "Although," says the last of these writers, "he was perfectly moderate in his anger, yet he rather chose to put it out of his power to resent such injuries, and

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

Suet. in
Cæs.

Pliny, l.
vii. c. 25.
Sen. de
Ira, ii. 23.

have spared: *Fueras in acie Pharsalica antesignanus: L. Domitium, nobilissimum et clarissimum virum, occideras: multos, qui de prælio effugerant, quos Cæsar, ut nonnullos, fortasse servasset, crudelissime persecutus trucidaras.* He commanded, probably, the forces sent after the runaways.

⁷ Illud notandum est: ut primum C. Cæsar inclinatam vidit Pompeianorum aciem: neque prius, neque antiquius quidquam habuit, quam omnes partes (militari et verbo et consuetudine utar) dimitteret. Proh Dii immortales, quod hujus voluntatis erga Brutum suæ postea vir tam mitis pretium tulit! Nihil illa victoria mirabilius, magnificentius, clarius fuit; quando neminem, nisi acie consumptum, civem patria desideravit. Vell. Pat. l. ii. c. 52.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

thought that the most obliging manner of pardoning was to be ignorant of the nature of the offence." Dio himself tells us, that he pardoned all the kings and states who had assisted Pompey, and demanded nothing more of them than a sum of money; and, considering, adds the historian, that he himself was little known to them, and that they were under many and great obligations to Pompey, he had more regard for those who had appeared in arms, than for the others who had deserted their benefactor. To the Athenians, who sent deputies to him to solicit their pardon, he granted it, with this reproach: "How long, having merited death by your degeneracy, will you owe your safety to the glory of your ancestors?"

This famous battle was fought on the ninth of August⁸, as appears by an inscription pro-

⁸ The ninth of August of the Roman year, according to primate Usher, corresponded with the sixth of June of the Julian; but the battle, I should think, was fought later in the year. Cæsar encamped in the plains of Pharsalia, when the corn was almost ripe, *quæ prope jam matura erat*: it was therefore in the end of May, or beginning of June, of the Julian year. Pompey followed him a few days after, *pau-cis post diebus*, but was in no haste to give him battle. Cæsar had time to exercise his troops, to teach his light-armed soldiers to fight among the cavalry, and to raise the spirit and courage of his men, by sending them daily to offer battle to the enemy, *continentibus diebus*. There were several skirmishes between parties detached from the two armies. Appian and Lucan both tell us, that, before the battle, Cæsar's troops had been sent out to gather corn: and, in fine, Cæsar despairing to draw Pompey to an engagement, was preparing to march to another place; and

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib.
iii.

duced by the learned Muratori; a circumstance unknown in Lucan's time.

The news of Pompey's defeat was brought to Dyrrhachium by Labienus, who escaped thither with the Gallic and German horse. Cato had been left governor of the town with fifteen cohorts, and with him were Cicero, the learned Varro, and some other senators. They all, immediately, in the greatest consternation, got on board the ships in the port with their troops, and repaired to the island of Corcyra, which was the general rendezvous of Pompey's followers. D. Lælius brought there his fleet from before Brundisium, where he was attempting to block up the port: C. Cassius who had just burned two of Cæsar's fleets, one of thirty-five sail at Messana, commanded by M. Pomponius, and another at Vibo, under the orders of P. Sulpitius, consisting of five gallies, arrived there with the Syrian, Phœnician and Cilician squadrons from Sicily; and

one of his reasons was, the better to supply his army with provisions. So that we cannot allow less than a month between Cæsar's arrival in Thessaly and the battle. Now, the harvest in that country, as has been remarked above, does not come on before the beginning of June at Larissa, and the fifteenth or twentieth at Jannina. The ninth of August, of the Roman year, must therefore, have corresponded with the end, or twenty-ninth of June of the Julian year: and thus the battle was given a few days after the harvest; which agrees with Plutarch, who tells us that it was fought in the greatest heat of summer; and with Suetonius; who says, that Cæsar besieged Pompey four months at Dyrrhachium, which he did not begin to do till the end of winter, when Antony brought him the remainder of his army.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

Inscrip.
tom. i. p.
150 and
305.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib.
iii.

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

40½ Cons.

Plut. in

Cat. et Cic.

thither also Octavius brought the ships under his command. Young Pompey and Coponius had been deserted by their forces, and arrived without them. Here a general council was held, and we are told by Plutarch, that Cato offered the command of his cohorts to Cicero, as the superior in dignity; and that, upon his refusal and declaration, that he would join no longer in the war, young Pompey was so enraged, that he drew his sword, and would have killed him, if Cato had not interposed⁹. There was no scheme agreed upon, and all dispersed themselves severally, as their hopes and inclinations led them. Cicero went straight to Brundisium, committing himself to the mercy of the conqueror. Many retired into Achaia, to wait there the farther issue of things, and take such methods as fortune offered. M. Marcellus went to Mitylene: Cæcilius Bassus, a Roman knight, who acted a considerable part after Cæsar's death, and Libo, hid themselves in Tyre.

⁹ It appears, that Cicero had at this time great reason to complain of his party. "I cannot," says he to Atticus, "without the deepest sorrow, inform you what bitter, what heavy, what extraordinary motives have forced me to yield rather to a sudden impulse of passion than the counsel of my reason: these motives are such, that they have induced me to act as you see." *Ad Att.* x. 5. In a letter to Terentia, he makes the same complaint. *Ep. Fam.* xiv. 12. *Melm.* vii. 23. "May the joy you express at my safe arrival in Italy be never interrupted! but my mind was so much discomposed by those atrocious injuries I had received, that I have taken a step, I fear, which may be attended with great difficulties."

Scipio, Labienus, and many others who had acted more violently against Cæsar, resolved at all events to renew the war, and sailed for Africa, to join Varus and king Juba. Octavius sailed with the Liburnian fleet to Illyricum, where he made war, as shall be related hereafter, with various fortune. Young Pompey and Cato followed the unfortunate general. C. Cassius sailed to Cilicia, where he waited Cæsar's arrival in a bay at the mouth of the river Cydnus, and there delivered up his fleet.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

Cicero, Philip. ii. 11. tells us, that he lay there in wait for Cæsar, with a resolution to destroy him; which he would have effected, if Cæsar had not landed on the opposite shore, where he was not expected, and had not determined to land. This, however, it is thought, is a weak apology for Cassius; and the real motives of his conduct at this time are explained to us in a letter of Cicero to him, written in the year 706. Ep. Fam. xv. 15. Melm. vii. 36. "It was the hope, that peace would be restored to our country; and the abhorrence of spilling the blood of our fellow-citizens, that equally induced both you and myself to decline an obstinate perseverance in the civil war. But, though these sentiments were common to us both, yet, as I am considered as having been the first to inspire you with them, it is more my part, perhaps, to render you satisfied with having adopted them, than it is yours to perform the same friendly office towards me. But, to say the truth, (and it is a circumstance upon which I frequently reflect) we mutually convinced each other, in the free conversations we held upon this subject, that a single battle, if it should not wholly determine our cause, ought to be the limits however of our particular opposition. And these sentiments have never seriously been condemned by any, but by those alone who think it more eligible that our constitution should be totally destroyed, than in any degree impaired. But my opinion was far otherwise: for I had no views to gratify by its extinction, and had much to hope from its remains. As

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.

Plutarch tells us, that M. Brutus, seeing Pompey's camp forced, stole out of one of the

to the consequences which have since ensued, they lay far beyond the reach of human discernment; and the wonder is, not so much how they escaped our penetration, as how it was possible they should have happened. I must confess, my own opinion always was, that the battle of Pharsalia would be decisive: and I imagined that the victors would act with regard to the common preservation of all, and the vanquished to their own. But both the one and the other, I was well aware, depended on the expedition with which conquerors would pursue their success. And, had they pursued immediately, those who have since carried the war into Africa, would have experienced (and experienced too, if I do not flatter myself, by my intercession*) the same clemency with which the rest of our party have been treated, who retired into Asia and Achaia. But the critical opportunity (that season so important in all transactions, and especially in a civil war) was unhappily lost: and, a whole year intervening, it raised the spirits of some of our party to hope they might recover the victory; and rendered others so desperate as not to dread the reverse. Fortune, however, must be answerable for the whole train of evils which this delay has produced. For who could have imagined, either that the Alexandrine war could have been drawn out to so great a length, or that the paltry Pharnaces could have struck such a terror throughout Asia. But, though we both acted by the same measures, our present situations, however, are extremely different. The scheme which you thought proper to execute has given you admission into Cæsar's councils, and opened a prospect to you of his future purposes:" [this scheme must be the desertion of the Pompeian party, and the surrendry of the fleet to Cæsar] "an advantage, most certainly, that must spare you all the uneasiness which attends a state of doubt and suspense. Whereas for myself, as I imagined that Cæsar

* It appears, by this flow of spirits, that this letter was written after Cicero had been comforted by Cæsar, and his terrors dispelled by the assurance of his pardon, in the kindest terms: and what follows shews it to have been penned before Cæsar's return into Italy.

gates; and hid himself in a morass covered with reeds; from whence, having got safe in the night to Larissa, he wrote immediately to Cæsar, who not only forgave him, but treated him with the greatest affection. Even before the battle Cæsar had given particular orders, not to kill him on any account; and to make him prisoner, in case he was willing to surrender: but, if he refused, to let him go.

Y. P. 705.
1 e. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

Pompey sailed first to Amphipolis, where he issued a clamour, enjoining all the youth of the province, whether Greeks or Romans, to join him in arms: this he did, either with a design to keep footing in Macedonia, or to conceal his real intention of retreating much further. He lay one night at anchor, sending to his friends in the town, and raising all the money he possibly could: but;

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. I. iii.

would, immediately after the battle of Pharsalia, have returned into Italy, I hastened thither, in order to encourage and improve that pacific disposition which he had discovered, by his generosity to so many of his illustrious enemies: by which means, I have ever since been separated from him by an immense distance. Here, in truth, I sit, the sad witness of those complaints that are poured forth in Rome, and throughout all Italy: complaints which both you and I, according to our respective powers, might contribute somewhat to remove, if Cæsar were present to support us. I intreat you, then, to communicate to me, agreeably to your wonted friendship, all you observe and think concerning the present state of affairs: in a word, that you would inform me what we are to expect, and how you would advise me to act. Be assured I shall lay great stress upon your sentiments: and, had I wisely followed those you gave me in your first letter from Luceria, I might, without difficulty, have still preserved my dignities."

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

being informed of Cæsar's approach, he departed, and sailed for Mitylene, where he had left his wife Cornelia². Here he was detained two days by the badness of the weather, and, having increased his fleet with a few gallies, he sailed to Cilicia³ and thence to Cyprus. In this island he had intelligence that the people of Antioch and the Roman citizens, who traded there, had, with joint consent, seized the castle, and sent deputies to such of his followers as had taken refuge in the neighbouring places, not to approach that town; L. Lentulus, the late consul, P. Lentulus Spinther, and some of the other principal

² Plutarch in Pomp. is very diffuse in describing this lady's disappointment and inexpressible grief: she bitterly complained of her ill destiny, which allied her to Crassus first, and afterwards to Pompey, only to cause the ruin of two illustrious families. The same writer tells us, that the stoic philosopher Cratippus came to pay his compliments in Mitylene to Pompey, and that Pompey could not refrain from complaining to him of the dispensations of Providence. The philosopher declined, through politeness and humanity, to enter upon the subject: but he might have answered, says Plutarch, "that the disturbed state of Rome required now an absolute monarchy, as a necessary remedy to the public disorders." And he might have added, "By what proof may we be induced to believe, that, if the victory had been yours, you would have made a better use of it than Cæsar?"

³ Plutarch in Pomp. says, that it was deliberated among his followers, since no province of the empire could afford them protection, to what foreign power it was most expedient to repair: that Pompey was strongly inclined to take refuge in Parthia; that others advised him to put himself under the protection of Juba; but that Theophanes determined him to go to Egypt. See Lucan, l. viii.

men of his party, had been refused admittance into the island of Rhodes, and had been ordered to withdraw immediately. These accounts made him lay aside his design of going into Syria; and seizing the money in the public bank, and borrowing as much more as he could of his friends; providing great quantities of brass for military uses, and raising two thousand soldiers; he set sail for Pelusium, to implore the assistance of Ptolemy, king of Egypt. This prince, yet in his minority, was there at the head of a considerable army, making war against his sister Cleopatra, whom he had expelled the throne, to which by her father's will she had an equal right with him. Pompey sent to demand his protection, and a safe retreat in Alexandria, in consideration of the friendship that had subsisted between him and his father. The messengers, after discharging their commission, began to converse freely with the king's troops, many of whom had served formerly under Pompey, and had been left in Egypt by Gabinius; and they exhorted them not to despise their old general in his adverse fortune. The king's ministers, who, during his minority, had the administration in their hands, either out of fear, as they afterwards pretended, that Pompey should debauch the army, and thereby make himself master of Alexandria and all Egypt, or despising his low condition, gave a favourable reception to the deputies in public, and invited Pompey to court; but dispatched, at the same time, Achillas, captain of the

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

Y. R. 705.
 Bef. Chr.
 47.
 404 Cons.

Plut. in
 Pomp.
 Appian.
 Dio.

king's guards, and Septimius, a military tribune, with secret orders to murder him before he came into the king's presence⁴. They put off from the shore in a small bark, with a few guards, and made towards Pompey's ship. When on board, they accosted him with an air of frankness, and invited him into the boat. Pompey, after taking leave of Cornelia, ordered two centurions, one of his freedmen named Philip, and a slave, to enter the boat with him : and, as Achilles gave him his hand to assist him in coming out of the ship, he turned to his wife, and repeated two verses of Sophocles, signifying, that whoever goes to the court of a king, becomes a slave from that moment. During the passage from the ship to land, nobody spoke to him a single word, or shewed the least mark of friendship or respect ; Pompey broke the silence, and looking Septimius in the face, "methinks," said he, "I remember you to have formerly served under me." Septimius gave only a nod with

⁴ Plutarch in Pomp. tells us, that one Theodotus, preceptor to the king, seeing the council divided in their opinions concerning the reception it was proper to give Pompey, some advising to receive him with honour, others to order him away immediately, he maintained, "that both proposals were equally dangerous : that to admit Pompey was making him their master, and drawing upon themselves the resentment of Cæsar : and, by not receiving him, they offended the one without obliging the other. That therefore the only expedient left was to let him land, and then kill him, which would be doing Cæsar a good service, and ridding themselves of all apprehensions on Pompey's account ; 'because,' said he, 'dead dogs do not bite.'"

his head, without uttering a word, or denoting the least civility. Whereupon Pompey took out a speech which he had prepared in Greek for the Egyptian king, and began to read it. In this manner they came near the land; and, when Pompey rose to go out, Septimius stabbed him in the back, and was immediately seconded by Achilles. Pompey, without making any resistance, or saying a word, covered his head with his robe, and resigned to fate. At this sad sight, Cornelia and her attendants weighed anchor and made off to sea. His murderers cut off his head, leaving the body on the shore. His freedman Philip stayed by it, and, while he was gathering up some pieces of a broken boat for a pile, he was thus accosted by an old soldier, who had served under Pompey: "Who art thou, that art making these sad preparations for the funeral of Pompey the Great?" Philip answered him, "one of his freedmen." "Thou shalt not," replied he, "have all this honour to thyself: let me partake in an action so just and sacred. It will please me, amidst the miseries of my exile, to have touched the body, and assisted at the funeral of the greatest and noblest soldier Rome ever produced." In this manner were the last rites performed to Pompey⁵.

⁵ This is Plutarch's story: who does not tell us what became of the two centurions and the slave Pompey took into the boat with him. Lucan relates that the body was flung over-board into the sea, and dragged out from thence in the night, and burnt by one Cordus, who had been Pompey's quæstor in Cyprus. Aurelius Victor de Vir. Illustr. calls him Servius Codrus.

Y. R. 705.
 Bef. Chr.
 47.
 404 Cens.

His ashes, according to Plutarch, were carefully collected, and carried to Cornelia, who deposited them in a vault in his Alban villa⁶. The Egyptians, however, afterwards raised a monument to him on the place, and adorned it with figures of brass, which, having been

“ Now ’gan the glitt’ring stars to fade away,
 Before the rosy promise of the day,
 When the pale youth th’ unfinish’d rites forsook,
 And to the covert of his cave betook.
 Ah ! why thus rashly would thy fears disclaim
 That only deed which must record thy name ?”
 Lucan, b. viii. v. 1065.

Aurelius Victor and Lucan say, that upon his tomb was inscribed : *Hic situs est Magnus Pompeius*. And Appian has given us a Greek inscription to this purpose : “ How poor a tomb covers the man who had so many temples erected to his honour !”

⁶ Every circumstance relating to the end of this great man is uncertain, except what we have in Cæsar’s brief account. Lucan supposes that Pompey’s ashes remained in Egypt :

“ And thou, oh Rome ! by whose forgetful hand
 Altars and temples rear’d to tyrants stand,
 Canst thou neglect to call thy hero home,
 And leave his ghost in banishment to roam ?
 What though the victor’s frown, and thy base fear
 Bade thee, at first, the pious task forbear ;
 Yet now, at least, oh ! let him now return,
 And rest with honour in a Roman urn.
 Nor let mistaken superstition dread,
 On such occasions, to disturb the dead :
 Oh ! would commanding Rome my hand employ,
 This impious task should be perform’d with joy.
 How would I fly to tear him from that tomb,
 And bear his ashes in my bosom home !”

B. viii. l. 1140.

defaced by time, and buried almost in sand and rubbish, was sought out and restored by the emperor Adrian.

Y. R. 705,
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

Such was the end of Pompey the Great, on the twenty-eighth of April, in the fifty-eighth year of his age. It did not surprise Cicero, as we find by the short reflection that he makes upon it. "As to Pompey's end," says he, "I never had any doubt about it: for the lost and desperate state of his affairs had so possessed the minds of all the kings and states abroad, that, whithersoever he went, I took it for granted that this would be his fate⁷." How

Middl. p.
132.
Ad Att.
xi. 6.

⁷ Cicero adds, "I cannot, however, help grieving at it; for I knew him to be an honest, grave, and worthy man: *Hominem enim integrum, et castum, et gravem cognovi.*" "This," says Dr. Middleton, "was the short and true character of the man from one who perfectly knew him; not heightened as we sometimes find it by the shining colours of his eloquence, nor depressed by the darker strokes of his resentment." Yet the same ingenious writer has thought proper to draw more at large the character of a man who was Cicero's god upon earth, and indeed the above short and true character is but a scanty panegyric for one in Pompey's high station: and, as this history includes a sort of critical examination of the life of Cicero, we will not scruple to present the reader with it, together with some short observations:

"Pompey had early acquired the surname of Great, by that sort of merit, which, from the constitution of the republic, necessarily made him great: a fame and success in war superior to what Rome had ever known in the most celebrated of her generals." [The surname of Great, according to Plutarch, was a compliment of Sylla, after the good services Pompey had done him in Italy, Sicily, and Africa. Though young Pompey had been bred to war in the camp of his father, a man of great military capacity, and had shewn his talents in the support of Sylla's party, he had

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.

happy had it been for him to have died in that sickness, when all Italy was putting up vows

not yet properly acquired or merited that surname by a success in war, superior to what Rome had ever known. Livy or his abbreviator, says, that this surname was given him after his victories in Asia.] “He had triumphed at three several times over the three different parts of the known world, Europe, Asia, Africa; and, by his victories, had almost doubled the extent, as well as the revenues of the Roman dominion; for, as he declared to the people, on his return from the Mithridatic war, he had found the Lesser Asia the boundary, but left it the middle of their empire.” [If Pompey made this declaration, he was guilty of an unpardonable gasconade, for he added to the Roman empire only Pontus, Bithynia, and Syria: but, if he did not double the revenues of the commonwealth, he greatly multiplied his own; for he received every month from Ariobarzanes, king of Cappadocia, alone, above 6393*l*. which was almost all that poor king could raise. See *Ad Att. vi. 1.*] “He was six years older than Cæsar; and, while Cæsar, immersed in pleasures, oppressed with debts, and suspected by all honest men, was hardly able to shew his head, Pompey was flourishing in the height of power and glory, and by the consent of all parties placed at the head of the republic.” [This is not a fair representation of the fortunes of these two men: Pompey was raised to all his power and wealth against the will of the senate; who was ever envious and jealous of him: and Cæsar not only dared to shew his head, but was ever so much the darling of the city, that he carried every thing he stood for, by almost the unanimous votes of the people, notwithstanding the opposition of the same senate.] “This was the post that his ambition seemed to aim at, to be the first man in Rome; the leader, not the tyrant of his country: for he more than once had it in his power to have made himself the master of it without any risk, if his virtue, or his phlegm, at least, had not restrained him.” [This is a groundless assertion. Pompey, after the Sertorian war, kept his army in Italy; and so did Crassus to check him; till they both disbanded their troops by agreement: neither of them dared then to act the tyrant.

and prayers for his safety ! Or, if he had fallen by the chance of war on the plains of Pharsalia,

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

After the Mithridatic war, the opposition Cæsar and Metellus, who openly courted Pompey, met with, plainly shewed how jealous the city was of Pompey's power : and that same jealousy prevailed after his arrival, notwithstanding all the favour and credit his victories had procured him. He could not depend upon his army in an enterprise against his country, when he had no motive of revenge to stimulate them with, nor indeed any other that he could avow with common decency. Cæsar and Crassus were willing to associate with him against the aristocracy, but not to become his servants.] “ But he lived in a perpetual expectation of receiving, from the gift of the people, what he did not care to seize by force, and, by fomenting the disorders of the city, hoped to drive them to the necessity of creating him dictator. It is an observation of all the historians, that while Cæsar made no difference of power, whether it was conferred or usurped ; whether over those who loved, or those who feared him ; Pompey seemed to value none but what was offered ; nor to have any desire to govern, but with the good-will of the governed.” [Velleius, ii. 29, says indeed of Pompey, *Potentia quæ honoris causa ad eum deferretur, non ut ab eo occuparetur, cupidissimus* : but I do not see any difference between Pompey and Cæsar in this respect. As long as power was offered to Pompey, he did not undertake to seize it by an armed force ; neither did Cæsar ; but no sooner did Pompey foresee that Cæsar would become his equal, than he armed, illegally, the whole empire, to preserve his own superior power : and this is allowed by the same historian : *Civis in toga, nisi uti vereretur, ne quem haberet parem, modestissimus*. A power, maintained all along by the most open and scandalous bribery, cannot be deemed a power offered by the good-will of the governed : and a man who employs such means, in defiance of the laws, cannot, with any propriety, be called a man of integrity, *Virum integrum cognovi*.] “ What leisure he found from his wars, he employed in the study of polite letters, and especially of eloquence, in which he would have acquired great fame, if his genius had not drawn him to the


Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.

in the defence of his country's liberty, he had died still glorious, though unfortunate; but,



more dazzling glory of arms. Yet he pleaded several causes with applause, in the defence of his friends and clients; and some of them in conjunction with Cicero. His language was copious and elevated; his sentiments just; his voice sweet; his action noble and full of dignity. But his talents were better formed for arms than the gown; for though in both he observed the same discipline; a perpetual modesty, temperance, and gravity of outward behaviour; yet, in the licence of camps, the example was more rare and striking. His person was extremely graceful and imprinting respect; yet with an air of reserve and haughtiness, which became the general better than the citizen. His parts were plausible rather than great; specious rather than penetrating; and his views of politics but narrow; for his chief instrument of governing was dissimulation; yet he had not always the art to conceal his real sentiments. As he was a better soldier than a statesman, so what he gained in the camp he usually lost in the city; and, though adored when abroad, was often affronted and mortified at home; till the imprudent opposition of the senate drove him to that alliance with Crassus and Cæsar, which proved fatal both to himself and to the republic. He took in these two not as the partners, but the ministers rather of his power;" [They had more interest in the city than he, and he could not compass his ends without their assistance: they were therefore necessary allies, not ministers of his power.] "That, by giving them some share with him, he might make his own authority uncontrollable: he had no reason to apprehend that they could ever prove his rivals: since neither of them had any credit or character of that kind, which alone could raise them above the laws; a superior fame and experience in war, with the militia of the empire at their devotion: all this was purely his own; till, by cherishing Cæsar, and throwing into his hands the only things which he wanted, arms and military command, he made him at last too strong for himself, and never began to fear him till it was too late:" [That Pompey helped Cæsar, during the triumvirate, will be easily granted, but that he owed all to Pompey is

as if he had been reserved for an example of the instability of human greatness, he, who

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

not true: and Pompey was at least as much indebted to Cæsar, as Cæsar to him. Would Pompey have condescended to marry the daughter of the man whom he suspected to have debauched his wife Mucia, the mother of Cnæus and Sextus Pompey, and whom for this reason, during the civil war, he used to call Ægisthus, if his alliance had not been deemed absolutely necessary to support his credit: and indeed he could never have supported himself in that long reign of his during the Gallic war without Cæsar's interest. This is evident from the whole history of the times.] "Cicero warmly dissuaded both his union and his breach with Cæsar;" [So Cicero says in his second Philippic; but his letters shew that he greatly approved of the breach between Cæsar and Pompey, till the prospect was darkened, and the civil war was ready to break out with great advantage on Cæsar's side. If Cicero did not approve of their union at first, he cemented it afterwards, and was very subservient to the confederate chiefs.] "And, after the rupture, as warmly still, the thought of giving him battle: if any of these counsels had been followed, Pompey had preserved his life and honour, and the republic its liberty." [*Pace opus est: ex victoria cum multa mala, tum certe tyrannus existet. Ad Att. vii. 5. Depugna inquis, potius, quam servias: Ut quid? Si victus eris, proscribere? Si viceris, tamen servias? Ad Att. vii. 7. Hoc Cnæus noster cum antea nunquam, tum in hac causa minime cogitavit; beata et honesta civitas ut esset. Dominatio quæsitæ ab utroque est.—Genus illud Sullani regni jampridem appetitur, [a Pompeio] multis, qui una sunt, cupientibus. Ad Att. viii. 11.* It appears then that Cicero was not of Dr. Middleton's opinion. He thought also that Pompey's victory would have been a very cruel one: *Tanta erat in illis crudelitas, ut non nominatim, sed generatim proscriptio esset informata; ut jam omnium judicio constitutum esset, omnium vestrum bonæ prædam esse illius victoriæ; vestrum plane dico: nunquam enim de te ipso, nisi crudelissime, cogitatum est. Ad Att. xi. 6.*] "But he was urged to his fate by a natural supersti-

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.

a few days before commanded kings and consuls, and all the noblest of Rome, was sentenced to die by a council of slaves; murdered by a base deserter; cast out naked and headless on the Egyptian strand; and, when the whole earth, as Velleius says, had scarce been sufficient for his victories, could not find a spot upon it for a grave⁸.

tion, and attention to those vain auguries with which he was flattered by all the Haruspices: he had seen the same temper in Marius and Sylla, and observed the happy effects of it: but they assumed it only out of policy, he out of principle. They used to animate their soldiers, when they had found a probable opportunity of fighting: but he, against all prudence and probability, was encouraged by it to fight to his own ruin." [I should think that Pompey was not altogether so credulous as Dr. Middleton makes him. Cicero, in his Letters, and Cæsar, in his Commentaries, assign other reasons for Pompey's confidence, as we have seen above: and these reasons influenced not only Pompey, but Labienus and all the generals in his army, whom we cannot suppose to have been all addicted, in a great degree, to superstition.]

⁸ Qui si ante biennium quam ad arma itum est, perfectis muneribus theatri et aliorum operum quæ ei circumdedit gravissima tentatus valetudine decessisset in Campania (quo quidem tempore universa Italia vota pro salute ejus, primo omnium civium suscepit) defuisset fortunæ destruendi ejus locus; et quam apud superos habuerat magnitudinem, illibatam detulisset ad inferos. Vell. Pat. ii. 48. Princeps Romani nominis, imperio arbitrioque Ægyptii mancipii, jugulatus est. Hic post tres consulatus et totidem triumphos, domitumque terrarum orbem, sanctissimi ac præstantissimi viri, in id evecti super quod adscendi non potest, duodecagesimum annum agentis, pridie natalem ipsius, vitæ fuit exitus: in tantum in illo viro a se discordante fortuna, ut cui modo ad victoriam terra defuerat, deesset ad sepulturam. Id. ii. 53.

Lentulus, the late consul, landed in Egypt a few days after his general, and was immediately seized and put to death. Plutarch, or the author whom he copied, to make his story more interesting, supposes that Lentulus landed just upon the spot where the body of Pompey had been burned the day before; and, seeing a little pile which yet smoked, broke out into these words, "Who is the wretch to whom are paid these last offices? Perhaps, alas! it is you, great Pompey!" Lentulus Spinther is said to have found in Egypt the same fate.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

Cato, conjecturing that Pompey had retired to Egypt or Libya, took that way. He first sailed from Corcyra to Patræ, where he picked up Faustus Sylla, Petreius, and some other fugitives. Then, doubling the cape of Malea, and coasting the isle of Crete, he came to Palinurus, a promontory of the Cyrenaïca: whence he marched to Cyrene, which opened its gates to him. Here he was met by Cornelia and Sextus Pompeius, Pompey's youngest son: who had first fled to Cyprus, but, finding themselves too near Egypt, and fearing lest they should meet with Cæsar, steered towards the west, and put in at the same place to which Cato had brought the fleet. The news of Pompey's death occasioned a fresh division among his fugitive friends: many who were attached personally to him, and had held out in hopes of seeing him again at their head, determined to have recourse to the conqueror's

Dio, l. 42.

Liv. i. 12.

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.

clemency. Cornelia returned to Italy, well knowing that she had nothing to apprehend from Cæsar. Cato, with Pompey's two sons, remained in Africa and marched by land to join Varus and Juba: and we shall see immediately how they renewed the war, and exposed the conqueror to new fatigues and dangers.

CHAP. VII.

Cæsar follows Pompey into Egypt. The Alexandrian war. The war against Pharnaces. Illyricum saved by Vatinius. Cæsar returns to Italy. Cicero's disquietudes at Brundisium during Cæsar's absence. Cæsar puts an end to the disturbances raised by Dolabella in the city: he quells a mutiny in his army, and sets out for Africa.

CÆSAR, sensible that all the hopes of the vanquished party were lodged in the person of Pompey, pursued him with the utmost diligence at the head of his cavalry, having first given orders to one of his legions to follow. He heard at Amphipolis, that Pompey had left Greece; but, having no ships, he was under the necessity of marching by land to the streights of the Hellespont, that he might only have that short passage by sea into Asia. Here, while he was crossing in a small vessel after his troops, he fell in with a squadron of the Pompeian fleet, commanded by Cassius, consisting, according to Suetonius, of ten ships

of war⁹, and which was sailing to the Bosphorus. Cæsar, making up to him, ordered him to surrender ; he obeyed ; and, coming on board the little boat, threw himself at Cæsar's feet. Cæsar, with these ships, and those he found on the coast of Asia, continued his route by sea. At Ephesus, he saved a second time the treasure of Diana's temple, which J. Ampius was going to plunder for Pompey. After a short stay in Asia, hearing that Pompey had been at Cyprus, and thence conjecturing that he had gone for Egypt, on account of the interest he had in that kingdom, and the advantage it could afford him ; he sailed first to Rhodes, where, having joined to his fleet the Rhodian gallies, he set out for Egypt with two legions, one of which he had ordered to follow him from Thessaly ; the other he had detached from Fusius Calenus in Achaia. These two legions did not make up above three thousand two hundred foot, and eight hundred horse : but Cæsar depended on the reputation of his exploits, and the terror of his name.

Y. R. 705.

Suet. in
Cæs. 63.
Dio. l. xlii.
App. 482.

Cæsar, on his arrival at Alexandria, was informed of Pompey's death : and, according to some authors, was presented by the king's order with the head and ring of his rival¹.

Livy, 112.
Plut. in
Cæs.
Dio. l. xlii.

⁹ Appian says seventy. It may be observed, that authors have distinguished this Cassius from the Cassius who was one of the conspirators against Cæsar.

¹ Plutarch in Pomp. tells us, that Theodotus, a Greek rhetorician, one of the king's counsellors, who had determined the council to kill Pompey, was charged to carry Cæsar this present, and to compliment him on the success

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

Appian.
448.

Cæsar de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib.
iii.

These sad remains of so great a man, with whom he had lived so long in the strictest friendship, as the husband of his beloved Julia, and his partner in power, very naturally drew tears from him². He caused the head to be burned with the most costly perfumes, and placed the ashes in a small temple, which he dedicated to Nemesis, the avenging power of cruel and inhuman deeds. He took up his quarters in the royal palace, where he kept a strict guard : for upon his landing he had been received in a clamorous manner by the garrison, and he observed that the mob appeared dissatisfied to see the fasces carried before him, which they interpreted as a degradation of the royal authority. During several days disturbances and tumults happened, and many Roman soldiers were murdered in different parts of the city. The Etesian winds, which blew at that time, were contrary to any passage by sea from Alexandria³ : and Cæsar thinking it belonged to him, as chief of the Roman empire, to take cognizance of the quarrel between

of his arms ; and that Brutus, after Cæsar's death, caused him to be executed for it with the most cruel torments. Aurelius Victor, de Vir. Illustr. c. 77, says it was presented by Achillas. Lucan says,

Dira satelles

Colla gerit Magni, Phario velamine tecta. l. ix.

² Dio is positive, that these tears were counterfeit ; and Lucan takes occasion from them to rail bitterly at Cæsar. See the end of the ninth book.

³ The Etesian winds are northerly winds, which begin to blow about the summer solstice, and do not cease till about the end of August.

Ptolemy and his sister Cleopatra, which had broken out into an open war; he began to interfere in this dispute, not foreseeing the many difficulties and hazards in which this conduct was to involve him.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

Ptolemy Auletes, who died in the year 702, left four children: two sons, who were both called Ptolemy; and two daughters, the famous Cleopatra and Arsinoë. According to the established custom in the Ptolemean family, he had ordered that his eldest son should marry his eldest daughter, and reign with her. For the more certain execution of this his will, he implored the protection of the Roman people; and sent a copy of it by ambassadors to Rome to be deposited in the public treasury: which, however, in the confusion of the times, had been left with Pompey. The original was kept at Alexandria. The brother and sister did not live long in harmony: Cleopatra was seventeen years old, and her brother only thirteen; and she claimed a right to govern her young consort. On the other hand, the guardians of the young prince, the chief of whom was the eunuch Pothinus, were ambitious to govern under his name and authority. This division had not yet produced an open rupture, when Pompey's eldest son came to Alexandria to demand succours for his father. Cleopatra even then is said to have prostituted her person to this young Roman to gain Pompey's interest: but Pothinus succeeded better, and obtained at the senate held at Thessalonica a determination in favour of Ptolemy. Cleo-

Plut. in
Ant.

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.



patra was banished Egypt, and forced to retire with her sister Arsinoë into Syria, where she assembled an army, and advanced as far as Pelusium. Ptolemy marched with his troops to oppose her, and the two armies were in sight of each other near mount Casius, on the borders of Egypt, when Pompey came there to meet his unhappy fate. Things remained in the same situation till Cæsar's arrival; and he admonished the contending parties, that it was their duty to remit their respective pretensions to his determination. They both immediately repaired to him; and Cleopatra seems to have dismissed her army, for we hear no more mention made of it. We are told by some historians that, in order to get into Alexandria, which was in the possession of her enemies, she went on board a small vessel, and, landing in the evening near the palace, was wrapt up in a bundle of clothes, and thus carried by one of her attendants into Cæsar's bedchamber. The day after Cæsar sent for the king, who, being strangely surprised to see his sister with the consul of Rome, fled from the palace to the market-place, crying out that he was betrayed; and, in the excess of his grief and passion, tore the diadem from his head. He was seized by the Roman soldiers, and brought back: but this occasioned a great alarm in the city, and, the people having assembled tumultuously about the palace, Cæsar signified to them that his intention was no other than to execute the late king's will, and to declare the brother and sister

Plut. in

Cæs.

Flor. l. iv.

c. 2.

Lucan, b. x.

Dio, l. xlii.

king and queen of Egypt. Dio adds, that he promised also to give the isle of Cyprus, an ancient appendage of the kingdom of Egypt, to the younger Ptolemy and Arsinoë, his sister: but this circumstance is very improbable: and the authority of this historian is not much to be depended on, when unsupported by other testimonies.

Pothinus, governor and chief minister to the king, Cleopatra's declared enemy, complained bitterly to his friends, that the king should be treated in this manner; and, finding them disposed to support him, he privately sent for the army at Pelusium, and gave the command of it to Achilles, the same who murdered Pompey, and was then captain of the king's guards. This army was numerous and formidable, and Cæsar's forces were insufficient to keep the field against it. The only course therefore left for him was to secure the most convenient ports of the town, till he was informed of the designs of the Egyptian general. He admonished the king to send some persons of weight to forbid his approach. Dioscorides and Serapion, accordingly, who had both been ambassadors at Rome, and in great credit with Ptolemy the father, were deputed to him: but no sooner did they come into his presence, than, without giving them a hearing, or inquiring after their message, he ordered them to be seized and put to death. One was killed upon the spot, and the other, having received a dangerous wound, was carried off for dead by his attendants. Such an enormous beha-

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. iii.

Y. R. 705.

Bef. Chr.

47.

404 Cons.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib.
iii.

viour was a warning to Cæsar. He took care to secure the king's person, whose name would authorize his proceedings, and make Achillas and his associates pass among the people for rebels to their prince.

Achillas's army consisted of eighteen thousand foot and two thousand horse, all brave and experienced soldiers. Many of them were Romans, who had been brought into the country by Gabinius, when he came to settle Auletes on the throne; and who, having married and settled at Alexandria, were devoted to the Ptolemean interest: the others were mercenary troops from Syria and Cilicia, and fugitive slaves, who found protection in Egypt by entering into the service. These troops were accustomed to give the law to their sovereign: Cæsar tells us, that they had often taken upon them to put to death the king's ministers, plunder the rich, invest the royal palace, banish some and send for others home, with other liberties of the like nature. This description of the Alexandrian militia accounts for the continual changes remarkable in the government of that city. Such will always be the fate of princes, who chuse to rely upon a mercenary soldiery rather than the affections of their subjects. Achillas, trusting to the valour of this army, and despising the handful of men Cæsar had brought with him, quickly made himself master of Alexandria, the palace only excepted, where Cæsar had fortified himself, and which the Egyptian general attacked briskly, though without success. The greatest

efforts were made on the side of the harbour: had Achillas got possession of it and the shipping, he might have cut Cæsar off from all communication with the sea, and consequently from all hopes of receiving supplies either of victuals or forces. This made both the Egyptians and the Romans exert themselves with incredible vigour. At length Cæsar carried his point, and not only burnt all the vessels in the harbour, which amounted to fifty-five galleys, with twenty-two guard-ships, but also those that were in the arsenals: in all one hundred and ten. The flames unfortunately extended themselves to the Alexandrian library: and that valuable monument of the magnificence of the Ptolemys, and of their taste for learning, was almost wholly consumed⁴.

Y. R. 705.
Ref. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

Cæsar, during the action, transported a body of troops into the isle of Pharos, so called from a tower of prodigious height and wonderful workmanship, built by Ptolemy Philadelphus. This island lay over against Alexandria, and both formed and commanded the port, the entrance on each side of it being very narrow. A mole or causey, nine hundred paces long, ran through the middle of the port: at the two ends of this mole were two bridges, through the arches of which vessels could pass from one side of the port to the other. Many Egyptian sea-faring

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. lib.
iii.

⁴ According to Livy, cited by Seneca de tranq. anim. c. 9. there were in this library four hundred thousand volumes. According to Aulus Gellius, vi. 17. and Ammianus Marcellinus, xxiv. 17. seven hundred thousand.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

men had built houses in the Pharos, and lived chiefly by pillaging the ships that were thrown in upon their coast. By getting possession of this place, Cæsar secured the reception of the supplies he had sent for from all sides. In other quarters of the town the fight was maintained till night with equal advantage, and little loss, neither party losing ground. Cæsar's next care was to make fortifications round the king's palace and the theatre adjoining to it, of which he made a kind of citadel: and he thus put it out of the power of the Alexandrians to force him to a battle against his will. He then employed himself in inclosing the narrowest part of the town, which lay between the port and a lake towards the south: by which means he could have provision of water and forage. On the other side the Alexandrians were extremely active and industrious in making all sort of preparations proper for their own defence, and for forcing Cæsar's quarters.

Cæs. de
Bell. Civ.
Com. l. iii.

While these works were carrying on, Cæsar ordered Pothinus to be put to death, having discovered a secret correspondence between him and Achillas, whom he encouraged to a vigorous prosecution of his enterprise. According to Plutarch, he had formed a design of killing Cæsar at table; and the conspiracy was discovered by a slave, whose exceeding timidity prompting him to be continually upon the watch, and to listen at every door, he had overheard Pothinus and his associates. About the same time Arsinoë, the youngest sister,

found means to escape from the palace to Achilles's camp, under the conduct of Ganymed, her governor; hoping, in such confusion, to get into the throne herself, in the place of Cleopatra. But she soon disagreed with Achilles, and they endeavoured to supplant one another, and to gain by bribes and promises, the affection of the mercenary soldiers. At length Arsinoë prevailed, and caused Achilles to be slain: and Ganymed, under the name and authority of Arsinoë, was vested with the supreme power, and proved not less bold and enterprising than his predecessor.

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

Alexandria was supplied with water from the Nile; but, this water being generally muddy, and unwholesome, every house was provided with a cistern, where it remained till it became fit to be drunk. Ganymed being master of that part of the town where the river lay, and consequently of all the conduits, he undertook to taint all the cisterns in Cæsar's quarter, by pouring into the aqueducts a great quantity of seawater, raised by the help of machines: and, at the same time, to preserve his own untainted, the aqueducts on his side were stopped up. The cisterns in the nearest houses soon began to taste salter than usual, while no change could be observed in those that were more remote. However, the saltness soon became general, and the water was every where unfit for use. The Roman army, greatly discouraged at this unexpected event, began to complain against Cæsar for not abandoning the place; but he soon found

Y. R. 705.
Bef. Chr.
47.
404 Cons.

means to remove the inconveniency that so much alarmed them, by sinking a great number of wells; and, with little difficulty, obstructed the laborious attempts of the Alexandrians.

Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR, Dictator II.
M. ANTONIUS, Mag. Eq.

Hirtius de
Bell. Alex.

During these transactions the thirty-seventh legion, composed of Pompey's veterans, who had surrendered to Cæsar after the battle of Pharsalia, were driven upon the coast of Africa, a little above Alexandria: where, being detained for several days by an easterly wind, and being pressed for want of water, they sent to inform him of their arrival and situation. Cæsar, upon this intelligence, immediately went on board one of the ships in the harbour, and ordered the whole fleet to follow, leaving the land forces to defend the works. Being arrived at a port of the coast called Chersonesus, he sent some mariners on shore to fetch water. These venturing too far into the country, for the sake of plunder, were intercepted by the enemy's horse, and from them the Egyptians heard that Cæsar himself was on board without any soldiers. Upon this information, they thought that fortune had thrown a fair opportunity in their way of attempting something with success. They got together all the ships that were in a condition to sail, and met Cæsar on his return at four in the afternoon. The Roman general was very desirous to avoid an


engagement so late in the day, which probably would be continued in the dark, when the Alexandrians would have the advantage by the knowledge they had of the coast; and he would not be able to encourage his men, and be witness of their behaviour, a circumstance upon which he always greatly relied. He therefore drew all his ships as near the shore as possible, where he imagined the enemy would not venture to follow him. But, contrary to his inclination, he was engaged to fight by the temerity of a Rhodian galley of the right wing, which stood out at a considerable distance from the rest, and was immediately attacked by four gallies and several open barks. Cæsar, not to suffer the disgrace of seeing her sunk before his eyes, was obliged to advance to her relief. The Rhodians, distinguished at all times by their valour and experience in naval engagements, exerted themselves on this occasion to the utmost, and gained a complete victory. One four-benched galley was taken, another was sunk, a third was disabled, and the whole fleet would have been destroyed if night had not put a stop to the chace. Cæsar, after giving this defeat to the enemy, took his transports in tow, and returned to Alexandria.

The Alexandrians were much disheartened at this bad success, and at finding themselves so much outdone by the Rhodian mariners. But Ganymed raised their dejected spirits by the strongest assurances of his being able to fit out, in a very short time, a fleet much superior to that which had been lately defeated.

Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.

Hirt. de
Bell. Alex.

Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.



Having gathered all the ships stationed at the mouth of the Nile, for receiving the customs, he opposed again to the Romans twenty-two four-benched gallies and five quinqueremes, with a great number of open barks. Cæsar's fleet consisted in all of nine Rhodian gallies, (for, of the ten he had brought with him, one had been shipwrecked on the coast of Egypt) eight from Pontus, five from Lycia, and twelve from Asia. Of these, however, only ten were quadriremes, and five quinqueremes: the rest were of an inferior bulk, and for the most part without decks. Cæsar, notwithstanding this inferiority of his fleet in number and strength, resolved to give the enemy battle; and, sailing round the Pharos into that part of the port which the Alexandrians were masters of, he drew up his ships in the following order. His nine Rhodian gallies he placed in his right wing: the eight of Pontus in the left; leaving between them a space of four hundred paces to serve for the extending and working the vessels: and the rest of the fleet he destined as a reserve, and disposed them behind the two wings in such a manner that every ship followed that to which she was appointed to give succour. The Alexandrians, who came forth with great confidence, had placed their twenty-two quadriremes in front: their other ships were arranged behind in a second line: and they had a number of smaller vessels which carried fire and burning weapons, by which they meant to strike a terror into the Romans. This regular disposition did not hold long. Be-

tween the two fleets, there were certain flats; and each side hesitated which should first pass them: because, in case of any misfortune, they would be a great obstruction to a retreat; and it was difficult to draw up in order of battle beyond them in the presence of an enemy. Euphranor, the Rhodian admiral, a man of distinguished courage and experience, perceiving Cæsar's perplexity, addressed him to this effect: "Great general! it appears you are apprehensive lest by passing these shallows first, you should be forced to engage, before your whole fleet is drawn up: we beg of you to put your confidence in us, and we promise to maintain the fight till the whole fleet gets clear of the shallows. It is greatly dishonourable and afflicting, that the enemy should so long continue in our sight with that air of triumph." Cæsar encouraging him in his design⁵, gave the signal of battle: and four Rhodian ships, having passed the flats, were immediately assailed on all sides by the Alexandrians, but the Rhodians worked their vessels with so much skill, and disengaged themselves with so much address, that they never suffered any of the enemy's ships either to strike their flanks with their beaks, or to run alongside of them in order to sweep away or break

Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.


⁵ This brave admiral was soon after sent out to cruise off Canopus; an expedition in which he perished. He had begun an engagement with some Alexandrian ships, and had sunk the first he attacked; but, pursuing another too far, and not being sustained by the rest of the fleet, his galley was surrounded and shattered to pieces. Hirt. de Bell. Alex.

Y. R. 706.

Bef. Chr.

46.

405 Cons.



their oars : they always found means to oppose beak to beak. Thus they maintained the fight till the rest of the fleet came up : and, art now becoming useless, the whole success depended upon valour. Both sides fought in sight of their friends at land ; who, laying aside their work, and all thoughts of attack or defence, gave their whole attention to what was going forward at sea. The Romans risked more than the Alexandrians by this battle : a defeat would have deprived them of all resource either by sea or land, and victory would not much better their condition : the Alexandrians, on the contrary, if success attended them, gained every thing, and, though defeated, could still maintain the war. On the side of the Romans, every thing depended on the bravery of a few : this Cæsar had often before the battle represented to his officers and soldiers, and they now repeated it to one another. They were animated by the difficulty and importance of their situation, and fought with such determined resolution, that neither the art nor efforts of the Alexandrians, nor the multitude of their ships and boats, could any ways avail them. In this action the Romans sustained not the loss of one vessel : but two Alexandrian gallies, one of five benches of oars, and another of two, with all the soldiers and mariners on board, were taken, and three others were sunk. The rest fled towards the town, and took shelter under the mole and forts, whither the Romans could not pursue them.

Cæsar, to deprive the enemy of this resource, resolved to make himself master once more of the mole and the island, which had been retaken by the Egyptians, while he was employed in the more necessary works within the town. For the execution of this design, he put into boats and small vessels ten cohorts, a select body of light-armed infantry, and such of the Gallic cavalry as he thought most proper for his purpose, and sent them against the island. He himself, at the same time, to cause a diversion, attacked it on the other side with his fleet. The attack was brisk, and the Pharians defended themselves at first with vigour. They annoyed the Romans from the tops of their houses, and gallantly maintained their ground along the shore; which was in most parts steep and craggy, and which, in the places of easier access, was skilfully defended by small boats properly stationed for the purpose. But when, after examining the approaches and shallows, a few of the Romans had found means to land, they were followed with so much expedition by others, that the Pharians, abandoning their ships and coast, fled into the town. There they might easily have defended themselves; for the buildings were very high, and joined together so as to form a strong wall, and the Romans had neither ladders, nor any other instruments for assault: but such was their consternation, that they dared not to engage from a height of thirty feet; and, throwing themselves from the mole into the sea, they endeavoured to gain Alex-


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405 Cons.

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
405 Cons.



andria, though above eight hundred paces distant. Many were slain, and six hundred were made prisoners in this fight. Cæsar gave the plunder of the place to the soldiers, and demolished all the houses. The castle, however, at the end of the bridge next the island, he fortified, and placed a garrison in it. The other castle, which was next the town, was much the strongest, and was still held by the Alexandrians. This he attacked the next day; because, by getting possession of both forts, he would be entirely master of the port, and would be able to prevent any sudden incursions. By means of the arrows and darts launched from his engines, he quickly forced the garrison to abandon the place and retire into the town; and, having landed upon the mole three cohorts, which was all that the spot could well contain, he disposed the rest of his troops in his ships to sustain them. Things being in this forwardness, he ordered the arch of the bridge that joined the mole to the town, and through which the Alexandrians used to send their fire-boats against his vessels, to be entirely stopped up; and, at the same time, he began to raise a fortification upon the bridge. The Alexandrians, however, brought all the troops they could out of the town before this fortification could be finished, and posted them in an open area before it; and, having placed also a number of transports all along the mole, they began to attack the Romans by launching their javelins. While Cæsar, attentive to what passed, was exhorting and direct-

ing his troops, a number of rowers and mariners of his fleet, quitting their ships, threw themselves upon the mole, partly out of curiosity, and partly to have some share in the action. At first, with their slings, they forced the enemy's ships from the mole, and seemed to do great service; but, soon after, when a few of the Alexandrians, having ventured out upon the mole, attacked them in flank, they fled with precipitation. The Alexandrians, encouraged by this success, landed in greater numbers, and vigorously pushed the Romans, who were now in great confusion. Those that were in the gallies, perceiving this, removed the ladders, and put off from the mole to prevent the enemy's boarding them. The three cohorts, who were fortifying and defending the bridge at the head of the mole, where they had much business upon their hands, hearing a clamour behind them, and seeing the general rout of their friends, immediately interrupted their work: and, fearing to be surrounded, and precluded from a retreat, ran with all speed towards the gallies. Some, getting on board the nearest vessels, overloaded and sunk them; others making head against the enemy, and uncertain what course to take, were cut to pieces: a few, throwing their bucklers over their shoulders, swam to the ships which were at the smallest distance from them. Cæsar endeavoured to stop his men, and bring them back to the defence of the works; but, finding them giving ground universally, he retreated to his own galley; whither such a multitude

Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.



Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.

followed and crowded after him, that it was impossible to work her. Foreseeing, therefore, what must happen, he flung himself into the sea, and swam to a ship that lay at some distance⁶. Hence, dispatching boats to succour his men, he preserved a few. His own galley perished, with all that was on board; and he lost in this action four hundred legionary soldiers, and somewhat above that number of rowers and sailors. The Alexandrians secured the fort by strong works, and a great number of engines: and having cleared away the stones with which Cæsar had filled up the arch of the bridge, they had, thereby, a free passage into that part of the port where Cæsar's fleet lay.

⁶ Some ancient writers have finely embellished this story, and M. Crevier has extracted from them what is most curious in their several tales: "It is remarkable, that, having stripped off his coat of mail (his general's cloak), which would have been an incumbrance to him in swimming, he drew it after him with his teeth, to prevent its falling into the enemy's hands; and, as he had some papers in his left hand, he constantly held it above water, at the same time swimming with the right, by which means the papers were not wetted. However, his coat of armour got from him, which proved of service to him: for, being purple, and distinguishable by the brightness of its colour, it sustained all the fury of the enemy's shot, at the same time that Cæsar saved himself without being observed or known. The Alexandrians took it, and made it the principal ornament in the trophy they erected on the place of the engagement." The authorities for these particulars are Suetonius, Florus, Plutarch, Appian, and Dio. But no authorities can make one believe, that Cæsar carried his papers upon the mole of Alexandria, or in plunging into the sea did not wet them. The other circumstances are equally absurd.

This misfortune, far from discouraging the Romans, served only the more to exasperate them; and they made their enemies sensible of the spirit and fury that transported them, by pushing on their attacks with greater vigour; insomuch that their general was more employed in restraining their ardour than in inciting them to action.

The Alexandrians, who now began to think it would be of great service to them to have their king at their head, sent deputies to Cæsar, beseeching him to restore him to them, and representing it as the only means to bring about an accommodation. Cæsar, perfectly well acquainted with the false and perfidious character of the Alexandrians, was not to be imposed upon by this plausible pretext. He determined, however, to comply with their demands, being sensible that the whole hazard was to them and their king; for, as to what concerned himself, if, at first, he thought it might be of service to him to detain the young prince, in order to prevent a rebellion; now that it was not only broken out, but had been obstinately maintained for several months, such a prisoner created him more trouble than real advantage; and he perceived, that it would be more for his honour to make war with the king himself, than with Arsinoë, and her eunuch Ganymed. He therefore, having exhorted Ptolemy to put an end to the misfortunes of his country, and to save from total ruin its metropolis, took him by the hand to conduct him out of the palace. The young

Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.

Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.



prince, who was already an adept in the art of dissimulation, entreated Cæsar with tears not to send him back ; for that he took more pleasure in his company than in the possession of his crown. Cæsar told him, that if such were his real sentiments, they should quickly see one another again. Ptolemy took his leave, and had no sooner regained his liberty, than he carried on the war with so much fierceness, that the tears he shed at parting appeared to be tears of joy. Cæsar's officers and soldiers were highly diverted with the event : imagining, that, through his easiness of temper, he had let himself be duped by a boy.

Hirt. de
Bell. Alex.

Cæsar, in the beginning of this Alexandrian war, had sent Mithridates of Pergamus⁷, to raise troops in Syria and Cilicia. This general, having acquitted himself of the commission with great fidelity and expedition, was now upon the borders of Egypt with a numerous army ; in which were three thousand Jews, commanded by Antipater, father of Herod, and minister of Hircan, king of Judea. Mithridates took Pelusium by storm the day he arrived before it, notwithstanding Achilles had placed a strong garrison in it, as it was the key of Egypt on the Syrian side. The shortest way from Pelusium to Alexandria was to keep a parallel line with the sea ; but all the country

⁷ This Mithridates was probably the son of Mithridates, king of Pontus. His mother, though married, was one of the mistresses of that monarch. The king of Pontus shewed a singular affection for him, gave him a royal education, and for many years kept him at his court, and in his army.

is so traversed by the Nile and its canals, that Mithridates found the march equally fatiguing and hazardous. This obliged him to march up the river as far as the head or point of the Delta, a province of Egypt, so called from its similitude to the Greek letter of that name. There the Nile divides itself into two great branches. The young king, understanding that Mithridates approached this place, and knowing he must pass the river, sent a considerable body of troops against him to crush him, if possible, before his junction with Cæsar, at least to oppose his march. Part of this detachment, which formed the van, made what haste they could to engage him, that they alone might have all the honour of the victory; but Mithridates had intrenched himself with great care; and, after keeping some time upon the defensive, he sallied out upon them from all parts, put a great number of them to the sword, and dispersed the rest. Cæsar and the king of Egypt had both information of this event, and set out at the same time to the assistance of their friends: the king, having a shorter cut, and the advantage of the river, got there first, but was not able to attempt any thing before Cæsar's arrival, who found no difficulty in joining Mithridates. The Roman general, seeing himself now at the head of a powerful army, resolved to put an end to the war by an assault upon the enemy's camp.

Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.

The king had intrenched himself in a place well fortified by nature: it was a rising ground, surrounded by a plain; and three of its sides

Hirt. de
Bell. Alex.

Y. R. 706.

Ref. Chr.

46.

405 Cons.

were secured by different fences ; one adjoined to the Nile, the other was steep, and of very difficult access, and the third was defended by a morass. About seven miles from it ran a narrow river, but with very high banks, which discharged itself into the Nile : and as it lay between the two armies, Ptolemy sent all his cavalry and a select body of light-armed troops to prevent Cæsar from passing it. The legionary troops, however, found means to get over by throwing across from bank to bank a number of large trees, and some German cavalry ventured to pass it by swimming where the banks were lowest. These attacked the detachment from Ptolemy's camp, and with such fury, that very few escaped to the king, with the news of his enemy's approach. Cæsar, willing to strike a terror into the Alexandrians, encamped as near to them as possible ; and the next day he attacked a fort which lay at a small distance, and which Ptolemy had joined to his camp by a line of communication. He employed his whole army in this attack, with a design of falling immediately upon the camp itself, during the consternation and disorder which the loss of the fort would occasion. The Romans accordingly pursued the garrison of the fort to the works of the camp ; and these they attempted to force by the two only approaches by which it seemed possible to attack them ; the one by the plain, the other by a narrow pass between the camp and the Nile : but the former was bravely defended by a numerous body of their

best troops; and the latter was not only protected from the rampart, but from the river, where a great number of archers and slingers made a continual discharge from the ships stationed there. Cæsar observing that, though his troops fought with the greatest ardour, yet they made no progress, he ordered a few cohorts, under the command of Carsulenus, a brave officer, to wheel round the camp, and to climb up the steepest side of it, which he perceived to be unguarded; the whole army having crowded to the attacks, or giving their whole attention to them. Carsulenus, having executed his general's orders, soon put an end to the fight, by falling down upon the rear of the enemy. The Alexandrians fled on all sides in the greatest consternation, and, endeavouring to escape to the ships on the Nile, threw themselves over the rampart on that side. The king, during the confusion, got on shipboard, but the vessel was overloaded and sunk by the multitudes which followed him. Such was the end of this perfidious prince. His body was afterwards found, covered with mud, and known by the golden cuirass, which it was customary for the Ptolemys to wear in battle.

Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.

Flor. iv. 2.
Oros. vi. 16.

Cæsar marched immediately to Alexandria, at the head of his cavalry, by the shortest way, confident that the inhabitants and troops, left in the town, would not dare to make any resistance. On his approach the whole city came out to meet him in the habit of suppliants, preceded by all their priests with the sacred symbols of their religion. The victorious general

Hirt. de
Bell. Alex.

Y. R. 706.

Bef. Chr.

46.

405 Cons.

received their submission with his wonted humanity, and rode triumphant through the enemy's works into his own quarters⁸. Thus, Cæsar, in a few months, extricated himself from a war, in which all manner of difficulties seem to have been combined to put his prudence, courage, vigilance, and activity to the test. In the midst of winter, and absolutely unprepared and in want of every thing, he maintained himself at land and sea, within the very walls and port of an artful enemy, supplied with every commodity, and who brought against him a disciplined and warlike army, four times as numerous as that with which he had been forced to begin the war.

He now banished Arsinoë the kingdom, and settled the crown, in conformity to Auletes's will, upon the only surviving son and Cleopatra: and he left with them the greatest part of his troops, to support their authority over subjects, who, upon his account, were greatly disaffected to them. It seemed also for the honour and interest of the people of Rome, that the Roman forces should remain there to protect them, while they continued faithful; and to check them, if they should fall off from their allegiance. Suetonius tells us, that what deterred Cæsar from reducing Egypt, at this

⁸ It appears by an old marble calendar, cited by Gruterus, Inscript. t. i. p. 133, that Cæsar entered Alexandria, vi. cal. Ap. or twenty-seventh of March; which, according to Usher, was the fourteenth of January of the Julian year; but rather about the middle of February; Suetonius in Cæs. 35, says the war was carried on in winter, *hyeme anni*.

time, into a province of the empire, was, that he was apprehensive, lest an ambitious governor, master of a country so opulent, and of such difficult access, should be tempted to revolt. Others ascribe it to his love for Cleopatra, who, not long after his departure, was delivered of a son to him, whom she named Cæsario, and whom Cæsar is said to have owned⁹. But, whatever passion he may be supposed to have had for Cleopatra, it certainly engaged him in no act of injustice, and never drew his attention from concerns of greater importance. As soon as affairs were settled in Egypt, and the season was open for military operations, he set out by land for Syria, with the sixth legion, in his way to Pontus, where Pharnaces, king of the Bosphorus, during the Alexandrian war, had made a great progress, and was likely to give him much uneasiness¹.

Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.

⁹ So Antony gave out after Cæsar's death: though Opius, it may be observed, thought it worth his while to write a book to confute his testimony, and to prove that Cæsario was not Cæsar's child.

¹ "Cleopatra's charms," says M. Crevier, "must have been very bewitching, since they had the power to retard Cæsar's activity. After having confined himself nine months in Alexandria, during which time the whole business of Rome and Italy was at a stand, and whereby the vanquished party found means to get strength, and become formidable in Africa, Cæsar, instead of quitting Egypt, with all expedition, to go where honour and the affairs of state required his presence, abandoned himself to pleasure, and passed whole nights in feasts and other debaucheries with Cleopatra: and at last set out with her to make a tour round the country. They went on board a ship richly ornamented, and took their course up the Nile, attended by four hundred vessels. Cæsar's design was to have gone to Ethiopia, but

Y. R. 706.

Hirt. de
Bell. Alex.

This prince, at the breaking out of the civil war, thought he had a fair opportunity, while all was in such confusion, and the Romans employed in their mutual destruction, to reconquer the dominions of his ancestors. He began by taking Phanegoria, which Pompey had declared free : he next subdued Colchis ; then, entering Pontus, he made himself master of Sinope, the ancient residence of its kings. Elated by this success, he had seized upon the lesser Armenia, which belonged to Dejotarus, and carried his arms into Cappadocia, the kingdom of Ariobarzanes. Dejotarus found affairs in this situation, on his return from Pharsalia ; and had recourse to Domitius Calvinus, whom Cæsar had appointed commander in those parts. Domitius was very sensible that the republic was not less interested in this war than Dejotarus and Ariobarzanes, and that it was dishonourable to the Roman people, to Cæsar, and to himself, to suffer the dominions of their friends and allies to be invaded by a foreign prince : he therefore sent ambassadors to Pharnaces, and required of him, “to withdraw immediately out of Armenia and Cappadocia, and no longer to insult the majesty of the Roman republic.” At the same time, to give more weight to his embassy, he assembled what troops he could, and ordered them to rendezvous at Comana. Of the three

he was prevented by his army, who began to dislike his proceedings.” Suetonius, Appian and Dio are cited to confirm these particulars ; but one has occasion for a very small share of penetration to perceive their improbability.

legions which Cæsar had left with him, he had sent two to Egypt, one by sea, the other with Mithridates: the thirty-sixth alone remained with him. He received, however, two legions from Dejotarus, and one had been lately raised in Pontus. These four legions, and some Cilician recruits, and two hundred horse, made up his whole army. Pharnaces made answer, "that he had quitted Cappadocia, and that the lesser Armenia was his own by the right of inheritance; but that he would submit to the decision of Cæsar." Domitius, who understood that he had left Cappadocia for no other reason than because, Armenia lying contiguous to his kingdom, he could more easily defend it, sent him word, that he had no better right to Armenia than to Cappadocia, and that he must renounce acquisitions to which his sword alone had intitled him. Pharnaces endeavoured in vain to amuse him with a negotiation, and by sending deputies after deputies with presents. The Roman general advanced to Nicopolis, and a battle ensued. In this battle Dejotarus's two legions gave ground on the first onset, the legion raised in Pontus was cut to pieces, and the legion alone of Pompey's veterans, after sustaining the whole shock of the action, retreated in good order with the loss of only two hundred and fifty men. Domitius, assembling his scattered soldiers as well as he could, retired as far as Asia; while the king entered Pontus as conqueror, and committed all kinds of enormities. Affairs were in this situation, when Cæsar left Egypt.

Y. R. 706.

Bef. Chr.

46.

405 Cons.


Y. R. 706.

Hirt. de
Bell. Alex.

On his arrival at Syria, he received advice from all hands, that every thing was in confusion at Rome; that the contests of the tribunes produced daily seditions; that the officers kept up no discipline among the soldiers; and that his presence was necessary to give the laws their proper authority. However, he thought it necessary first to regulate the affairs of the eastern provinces, and take vengeance on Pharnaces. The kings and petty princes in and about Syria came from every side to wait on him, and were graciously received. He confirmed Hircan in the high-priesthood of the Jews, notwithstanding the solicitations of Antigonus, son to Aristobulus; and gave him leave to build the walls of Jerusalem, which Pompey had ordered to be pulled down: he likewise supported Antipater in the command he had for a long time exercised in Judæa, under Hircan's name; which greatly strengthened the authority of that prince. From Syria, where he left the command in the hands of Sextus Cæsar, a young relation, he sailed for Cilicia: and, having convened the states of that province in Tarsus, and settled its affairs, he set out with the greatest expedition towards Pontus. At Comana he conferred the priesthood of Bellona on Lycomedes of Bithynia, who claimed it in right of his ancestors, and, according to Appian, dispossessed Archelaus, the son of him whom Pompey had invested with that dignity. On his approaching the frontiers of Gallo-græcia, he was met by Dejotarus, who had not only divested him-

self of all marks of royalty, but had taken that of a suppliant “to beg forgiveness for having assisted Pompey, at a time when Cæsar could give him no protection : urging that it was his business to obey the governors who were present, without pretending to judge of the disputes of the Roman people.” Cæsar, who was well acquainted with what zeal and spirit he had served against him, after some reproaches, and refuting his excuses, restored him his royal habit, and commanded him to join him with all his cavalry and troops.

Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.



Pharnaces observed the same conduct with Cæsar as with Domitius : he pretended to sue for peace, but was fully resolved to push the war. Cæsar saw through his design : and, though his army was very inconsiderable, both as to the number and the quality of his troops, consisting only of the sixth legion (now reduced to one thousand men) and the remains of Domitius's army, he resolved to give battle. He advanced therefore within five miles of the enemy. The country where the king was encamped was filled with hills, separated from each other by deep vallies : and, opposite to that eminence where Pharnaces had intrenched himself, was another at the distance only of one mile, and there Cæsar intended to pitch his camp. With this design, having ordered his men to prepare every thing necessary for throwing up a rampart, he set out in the night to take possession of it. Pharnaces was greatly surprised to see him there, at sun-rising, employed in making his fortifications, and im-

Y. R. 706.


Bef. Chr.

46.

405 Cons.

mediately took the resolution to attack him. The approach was so very difficult and dangerous, that Cæsar concluded the king's intention was no other than to retard his works by keeping a great number of his men under arms: and, shewing therefore his first line in order of battle, he commanded the rest of the army to go on with the works. But the king, encouraged by favourable omens, and by reflecting that in this very place Triarius had been overcome by his father Mithridates, and having conceived an utter contempt for so small an army, made up, for the most part, of troops he had already defeated in the field, had determined upon a battle, and to that end began to cross the valley. Cæsar laughed at his foolish attempt in crowding his army into so narrow a place, where no general in his right senses would have entered; and did not think of calling his soldiers from their work. But, seeing him push on and ascend the hill, he found himself obliged, to his great astonishment, to post his army in order to receive him. An attack so sudden and unexpected caused some disorder at first, which was increased by the chariots armed with scythes, which, sent before the enemy's first line, fell in with Cæsar's ranks before they were quite formed: but the multitude of darts, which were launched against them, soon put a stop to their career. The army, which followed them close, began the battle by a shout; and the engagement was sharp and long. At last the Romans, by the advantage of their situation, repulsed the assailants:

Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.



the victory began in the right wing, where the veterans of the sixth legion were posted; and, the troops in the centre and in the left wing gaining soon a like superiority, the whole army of Pharnaces was driven precipitately down the hill. In the flight great numbers were slain and crushed by their own troops, and those who escaped were obliged to throw away their arms, so that, having crossed the valley, and got to the opposite ascent, they could not face about, nor derive any benefit from the advantage of the ground. The Romans pursued them, and without allowing them to rally, attacked and took their camp. It was during this attack that Pharnaces made his escape. Almost his whole army was destroyed or made prisoners. It is reported by Appian, that Cæsar, astonished at the ease with which he gained this victory, cried out: "Happy Pompey! such then are the enemies by whose defeat you acquired the surname of Great:" and in a letter to one of his friends at Rome, giving an account of this action, he described the rapidity of his conquest in these three words, *Veni, vidi, vici*; "I came, I saw, I conquered²." And, when he triumphed afterwards on this occasion, he caused a tablet to be carried in the

² Rex Pharnaces magis discordiæ nostræ fiducia, quam virtutis suæ, infesto in Cappadociam agmine ruebat: sed hunc Cæsar aggressus, uno, et, ut sic dixerim, non toto prælio, obtrivit; more fulminis, quod uno eodemque momento venit, percussit, abscessit. Nec vana de se prædicatione est Cæsaris, ante victum hostem esse, quam visum. Flor. l. iv. c. 2.

Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.


procession, with these very words inscribed in capitals. Hirtius tells us, that no victory ever gave him more joy, as he, at one blow, in so critical a conjuncture, put an end to a dangerous war, which he was afraid would detain him a long time from Rome, where his presence was necessary. Pharnaces, having retired to Sinope, was pursued thither by Domitius, who forced him to leave the country. In the Bosphorus, Asander, whom he had left regent of his kingdom, had revolted and set up for himself, during the expedition into Pontus; so that, when the fugitive king returned home, he found a rebel in a condition to dispute with him the possession. A battle ensued, in which Pharnaces lost his life. Such was the end of this parricide son of the great Mithridates.

Hirt. de
Bell. Alex.


During the war in Egypt and in Pontus, Greece and Illyricum had been pacified by Calenus and Vatinius. The first made himself master of all Peloponnesus without much difficulty. In Illyricum the struggle was greater. Cæsar, upon his expedition against Pompey, had left Q. Cornificius to command in that province with two legions, and this lieutenant had kept the barbarians in subjection. After the battle of Pharsalia, Cæsar, being informed that many of the vanquished party had fled that way, and that Octavius had brought the fleet which he commanded upon the coast, he sent orders to Gabinius, who was then in Italy, to march with the new raised legions to the succour of Cornificius. Gabinius, imagining that the province was better stocked with pro-

visions than it really was, and depending on the terror impressed upon the inhabitants by Cæsar's late victory, marched into Illyricum in the middle of winter, and, not finding sufficient subsistence in a province already exhausted, and partly ill-affected, he was obliged to make war upon the inhabitants for provisions, and to besiege them in their strong-holds; and, receiving, on these occasions, many checks, he was brought into such contempt, that the people of the country ventured to attack him upon his march to Salona, and killed two thousand of his soldiers, thirty-eight centurions, and four tribunes. He escaped with the remainder to Salona, and died there of a disorder, which the toil of a winter campaign and grief had occasioned. Octavius entered immediately into an alliance with the barbarians, and would soon have reduced the whole country, if Vatinius had not flown to its assistance with the same spirit he had fought Cæsar's battles in Rome at the head of the mob. Neither the sickness he then laboured under, nor the hardships of the season, stopped him. He sent to Calenus for a squadron of gallies, but, these not coming with that dispatch the affairs of Illyricum required, he fastened beaks to all the vessels he found in the port of Brundisium, and, putting on board the veterans whom Cæsar had left sick in those parts, and who had since recovered, he sailed with this stout fleet in quest of Octavius. He found him before Epidaurus, which he was besieging both by sea and land. Octavius

Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.



Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.



immediately raised the siege, and retired to Tauris, whither Vatinius, having joined to his army the garrison of the place, followed him. The Pompeian admiral, informed of the condition of the enemy's fleet, resolved to give battle, and, upon their approach, sailed out of the harbour. Vatinius, though part of his ships had been dispersed by a tempest, and the enemy was superior both in number and strength of vessels, gave the signal for battle, and began it himself by driving his quinquereme upon Octavius's four-benched galley, which it shocked with such violence, that it lost its beak. The battle raged with great fury among the rest of the ships, but chiefly round the two admirals. As the ships on each side advanced to sustain those that had engaged, a close conflict ensued in a very narrow sea. Nothing could have happened more favourably for Vatinius; for his veterans leaped into the enemy's vessels, and, forcing them to an equal combat, soon mastered them by their superior valour. Octavius's galley was sunk; and many others had the same fate, or were taken. Octavius himself got into a boat, which sinking under the multitude that crowded after him, he swam to a neighbouring ship; where, being taken up, and night coming on, he spread all his sails and fled towards Greece. He thence continued his route for Africa, followed by a few that escaped out of the battle. Vatinius entered the town, whence Octavius had sailed to fight him, without the loss of one vessel, and, having refitted both his own ships and

those taken from the enemy, he sailed to the island of Issa; whither he was informed Octavius had retired. Here he was certified of Octavius's motions, and thus, having restored peace to Illyricum, he returned triumphant with his army and fleet to Brundisium.

Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.

Cæsar, after his victory over Pharnaces, was at liberty to return to Rome: and, the day after he had obtained it, he set out with a guard of light horse, having sent home Dejotarus's troops, and ordered the sixth legion to follow him into Italy, there to receive the recompence due to their services. He took his way through Gallo-græcia and Bithynia into Asia, giving judgments, as he passed, in all controversies of moment, and settling the limits and jurisdictions of the several kings, tetrarchs, and states. Mithridates of Pergamus was appointed to succeed Pharnaces in the kingdom of the Bosphorus, and the tetrarchate of Gallo-græcia was added to it, claimed now by Mithridates, in right of inheritance, though it had been possessed for some years by Dejotarus. Cicero tells us that Cæsar had a particular hatred to this prince, that he also exacted large sums of money from him, and deprived him of Armenia, bestowing it on Ariobarzanes. Nor is it difficult to account for his severity to Dejotarus. This prince had been remarkable for his zeal for Pompey, and by this means had obtained several unjust grants from the senate. Cæsar staid no where longer than the necessity of his affairs required, and, making the greatest dispatch, arrived in Italy

Hirt. de
Bell. Alex.

Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.


in the month of September, much sooner than was expected.

Cicero, who had been, in a manner, a prisoner at Brundisium, ever since the battle of Pharsalia, and lived there in perpetual uneasiness³, upon the first notice of his landing at

Middl. p.
127.

³ “ Cicero no sooner returned to Italy than he began to reflect, that he had been too hasty in coming home before the war was determined, and without any invitation from the conqueror ; and, in a time of that general licence, had reason to apprehend some insult from the soldiers, if he ventured to appear in public with his fasces and laurel ; and yet to drop them would be a diminution of that honour which he had received from the Roman people, and the acknowledgment of a power superior to the laws : he condemned himself, therefore, for not continuing abroad, in some convenient place of retirement, till he had been sent for, or things were better settled. (Ad Att. xi. 6. and 9.) What gave him the greater reason to repent of this step, was a message that he received from Antony, who governed all in Cæsar’s absence ; and with the same churlish spirit, with which he would have held him before in Italy against his will, seemed now disposed to drive him out of it ; for he sent him the copy of a letter from Cæsar, in which Cæsar signified, that he had heard that Cato and Metellus were at Rome, and appeared openly there, which might occasion some disturbance ; wherefore he strictly enjoined, that none should be suffered to come to Italy without a special licence from himself. Antony, therefore, desired Cicero to excuse him, since he could not help obeying Cæsar’s commands : but Cicero sent L. Lamia to assure him, that Cæsar had ordered Dolabella to write to him to come to Italy as soon as he pleased ; and that he came upon the authority of Dolabella’s letter. So that Antony, in the edict which he published to exclude the Pompeians from Italy, excepted Cicero by name : which added still to his mortification ; since all his desire was to be connived at only, or tacitly permitted, without being personally distinguished from the rest of his party. (Ad Att. xi. 7.)

Tarentum, set out on foot to meet him. Cæsar no sooner saw him than he alighted, ran

Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.


“He had several other grievances of a domestic kind, which concurred also to make him unhappy: his brother Quintus, with his son, after their escape from Pharsalia, followed Cæsar into Asia, to obtain their pardon from him in person: and Quintus, in order to make his own peace the more easily, resolved to throw all the blame upon his brother; and, for that purpose, made it the subject of all his letters and speeches to Cæsar’s friends, to rail at him in a manner the most inhuman. Cicero was informed of this from all quarters, and that young Quintus, who was sent before towards Cæsar, had read an oration to his friends, which he had prepared to speak to him against his uncle.” (Ad Att. xi. 8, 9, 10.) Middl. p. 128.

“But what gave him the greatest uneasiness was to be held still in suspense, in what touched him the most nearly, the case of his own safety, and of Cæsar’s disposition towards him; for, though all Cæsar’s friends assured him not only of pardon, but of all kind of favour; yet he had received no intimation of kindness from Cæsar himself. To ease his mind in this respect, some of his friends at Rome contrived to send him a letter in Cæsar’s name, dated the ninth of February, from Alexandria, encouraging him to lay aside all gloomy apprehensions, and expect every thing that was kind and friendly from him: but it gave him little satisfaction, as he suspected what he afterwards found to be true, that it was forged by Balbus and Oppius on purpose to raise his spirits, and administer some little comfort to him. All his accounts, however, confirmed to him the report of Cæsar’s clemency and moderation, and his granting pardon without exception to all who asked it; and with regard to himself, Cæsar sent Quintus’s virulent letters to Balbus, with orders to shew them to him, as a proof of his kindness, and dislike of Quintus’s perfidy. But Cicero’s present despondency, which interpreted every thing by his fears, made him suspect Cæsar the more, for refusing grace to none; as if such a clemency must needs be affected, and his revenge deferred only to a season more convenient; and, as to his brother’s letters, he fancied that Cæsar did not send

Middl. p.
137.

Ibid. p.
142.

Y. R. 706.

Bef. Chr.

46.

405 Cons.

Dio, l. 42.

to embrace him, and walked with him alone, conversing very familiarly for several furlongs.

On his arrival at Rome, he found the city in the greatest ferment. He had been created dictator, after the battle of Pharsalia, for the following year; and Antony, as his master of horse, had governed in his absence. Dolabella had got into the tribunate, which he was no sooner invested with than he revived the laws

them to Italy, because he condemned them, but to make his present misery and abject condition the more notorious and despicable to every body." (Ad Att. xi. 16, 17, 20, 22.)


Middl. p.
140.

"He had fears also from another quarter: Cæsar's enemies had greatly strengthened themselves in Africa, and it was reported, that they would bring into Italy a powerful army before Cæsar could return from Alexandria; Cicero, in this case, was sure to be treated as a deserter: for while Cæsar looked upon all men as friends, who did not act against him, and pardoned even enemies, who submitted to his power: it was a declared law, on the other side, to consider all as enemies who were not actually in their camp; so that Cicero had nothing now to wish, either for himself, or the republic, but, in the first place, a peace, of which he had still some hopes; or else that Cæsar might conquer; whose victory was like to prove the more temperate of the two." (Ad Att. xi. 6, 12, 19.)

"After a long series of perpetual mortifications, he was refreshed at last by a very obliging letter from Cæsar, who confirmed to him the full enjoyment of his state and dignity, and bade him resume his fasces and style of emperor as before. Cæsar's mind," adds Dr. Middleton, "was too great to listen to the tales of the brother and nephew," [which, however, contained a great deal of truth] "and, instead of approving their treachery, seems to have granted them their pardon on Cicero's account, rather than their own: so that Quintus, upon the trial of Cæsar's inclination, began presently to change his note, and to congratulate with his brother on Cæsar's affection and esteem for him." (Ep. Fam. xiv. 23. Pro Ligar. iii. Ad Att. xi. 23.) Middl. p. 142.

proposed the year before by Cœlius for an abolition of debts, and to exempt tenants from paying, in the present confusion, any rent to their landlords. We are told, that at first he was favoured by Antony, who found this project very suitable to his own circumstances; but, having discovered an intrigue between his wife Antonia and the young tribune, he put her away, and from that moment sided with the senate and two of the tribunes in opposing Dolabella. The multitude favoured the scheme; the tribune was obstinate in the pursuit of it; and, in the absence of Antony, who was obliged to make a tour to appease the mutiny of the veteran legions, the disorder became extreme. The creditors on one side, and the debtors on the other, formed two camps in the city, and alternately attacked each other with fire and sword. We are told that the vestals, not thinking themselves safe in their temple, removed from thence with the sacred relics. Antony upon his return was charged by the senate to take care the republic received no detriment. Dolabella grew desperate; and, having fixed a day for the passing of his laws, he barricaded the avenues to the forum, erected wooden turrets to prevent the approach of any person against his will, and made such dispositions as are usual, where a siege is to be maintained. Antony, on his side, brought a number of troops to the capitol, forced the barriers, broke to pieces the tables on which the laws were inscribed, and, having taken some of the ringleaders of

Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.



Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.

Suet. in
Cæs. 42.

Dio, l. xlii.

About 167.

this sedition, he threw them down the Tarpeian rock. Notwithstanding this exertion of dictatorial and despotic power, the troubles continued till Cæsar's arrival. He did not think fit to take notice of any thing done in his absence by his friends; but, being desirous to gain the affection of the several parties, regulated affairs as much as possible to every one's satisfaction. He refused to listen to the clamours of the people, who demanded the abolition proposed by their tribune, telling them, that he was as much incumbered with debts as any one, yet had no design of defrauding his creditors. However, besides the mitigation already granted by him, he farther indulged the debtors by a discharge of all arrears since the commencement of the civil war: and, with regard to the tenants, he eased the poor citizens by an order, importing, that all, not renting above two thousand sesterces annually in Rome, should be exempted from payment of a year's rent, and of a quarter's only in the other parts of Italy.

Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.

Q. FUFIVS CALENUS, } Consuls for the three
P. VATINIUS, } last months of the year.

Having thus settled the affairs of the city, and made Vatinius and Fufius Calenus consuls for the remaining months of the year, he caused himself to be created consul, and continued in the dictatorship for the year following; taking, for his colleague in the consulship, and his master of the horse, M. Le-

pidus; and he applied himself to raise the money necessary for the expedition to Africa, where the progress of the Pompeians called for his presence. Dio tells us, that as it had been customary to present crowns of gold and erect statues to victorious generals, Cæsar received under this pretence great sums from the corporations in Italy, and at the same time borrowed of them still greater. But the sale of the estates of the contrary faction was probably his chief resource. Pompey's estate, houses and goods, were sold at this time, and purchased by Antony: and it was undoubtedly one way of recompensing a great number of his followers to make over to them the effects of the vanquished at an under rate. P. Sylla, as well as Antony, was one of the most forward and eager purchasers.

Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.
Dio, l. xlii.

When every thing for his expedition to Africa was ready, a violent sedition broke out among his old legions. They had been very mutinous ever since their return to Italy, being disappointed in not receiving immediately the rewards that had been promised them, and which they had so highly merited; and, when they perceived that Cæsar meant to employ them again in a dangerous war, they grew furious. Before Cæsar's return, the twelfth legion had treated their officers with contempt, and pelted with stones such of them as had dared to remind them of their duty: and now the tenth, so favoured by their general, and so much attached hitherto to his person, gave the signal of revolt, and was fol-

Suet. in
Cæs.
Appian.
Dio, l. xlii.

Y. R. 706.

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405 Cons.




Above 32L.

lowed by the others in Campania. Cæsar sent to them Sallust, whom he had lately appointed prætor, and to whom he destined the government of Africa, with instructions to let them know, that, as soon as he had put an end to the African war, besides the distributions of land and money already due to them, he would add a thousand denarii to each man as a recompense for this last campaign. These offers, so wide of the soldiers' expectations, greatly exasperated them. Sallust was obliged to save himself by flight; and, in the extremity of their resentment, they marched to Rome, plundering all in their way, and killed several people of distinction. Cæsar, under apprehensions for the city, ordered the gates to be shut, and sent to its defence what troops he had about him: but when he heard of their arrival, and that they had sat down in the Campus Martius, the intreaties of his friends, concerned for his safety, could not prevail with him to defer a moment going in person to speak with them. He boldly mounted his tribunal, and, with a menacing tone of voice, asked the soldiers, "What had brought them thither, and what they wanted?" This intrepid and imperious behaviour began to disconcert them: they were ashamed to reproach him with having delayed their promised rewards, but represented that, being worn out by fatigue, and weakened by the wounds they had received in his service, they were in hopes that he would have given them their discharge. "I give it you," replied

Cæsar; and, after a short silence, added, “and, when I shall have triumphed with other troops, I nevertheless will fulfil my engagements with you.” They were thunderstruck with these words: and the dictator was about to retire, when he was stopped by the officers attending him; who conjured him to treat the companions of his victories with less coldness and severity. He consented to speak to them once more, and began by addressing them with the word *quirites*, citizens. This expression, instead of that of *commilitones*, or comrades, which he commonly used, quite overcame them, and brought them back effectually to their duty. They interrupted him, and insisted that they were still his soldiers, and begged he would consider them as such, offering to follow him into Africa, and every-where else⁴. He pardoned them, but soon after took the first occasion to punish the licentious behaviour and the rapines of

Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.



⁴ This event has been embellished with many circumstances which cannot be true. We are told, that the soldiers desired to be decimated, and that Cæsar refused them that honour, telling them, that he would treat them according to their deserts, and break them: that he continued inflexible towards the tenth legion: who, not being able to obtain their pardon, followed him of their own accord and without orders into Africa; where Cæsar made indeed use of them, but employed them always in hazardous enterprises in order to get rid of them: and that after the war, when returned to Italy, he deprived the few that remained of one third of their reward in punishment of their mutiny. Dio, l. xlii. But we see that in the battle of Thapsus, and afterwards at Munda, they had the place of honour as usual, in the first line of the right wing. Suët. in Cæs. 70.

Y. R. 706.
 Bef. Chr.
 46.
 405 Cons.

some of the officers. C. Avienus, a military tribune of the tenth legion, when he set out from Sicily, having filled a ship entirely with his own equipage and servants, Cæsar summoned all the military tribunes and centurions to appear before his tribunal the next day, and addressed them in these words: "I could have wished that those, whose insolence and licentious carriage have given me cause of complaint, had been capable of amendment, and of making a good use of my clemency. But, since they know not how to keep within bounds, I shall make an example of them according to the law of arms, that others may be taught a better conduct. You, C. Avienus, when you was in Italy, instigated the Roman soldiers to mutiny against the republic; you have been guilty of rapine in the municipal towns: and you have never been of any real service, either to the commonwealth, or to your general; lastly, in place of soldiers, you have crowded the transports with your slaves and baggage: so that, through your fault, the republic fails in troops, which at this time are not only useful, but necessary. For all these reasons I break you with ignominy, and order you to leave Africa this very day. In like manner I break you, A. Fonteius, because you have behaved yourself as a seditious officer, and as a bad citizen. You, T. Salienus, M. Tiro, C. Clusinas, have attained the rank of centurions, through my indulgence, and not through your own merit; and, since you have been raised

to that rank, have neither shewn bravery in war, nor good conduct in peace. Instead of behaving according to the rules of modesty, your whole study has been to stir up the soldiers against your general. I therefore think you unworthy of continuing centurions in my army : I break you, and order you to quit Africa as soon as possible." Having concluded this speech, he delivered them over to some centurions, with orders to confine them separately on board a ship, allowing each of them but one single slave : and this seems to have been the only punishment he inflicted on those seditious troops.

Y. R. 706.
Béf. Chr.
46.
405 Cons.

CHAP. VIII.

The war of Cæsar in Africa against Scipio, Cato, and Juba.

CÆSAR set out from Rome towards the beginning of December ; and, passing the streights at Rhegium, arrived on the seventeenth at Lilybæum, the farthest point of Sicily. It was his design to embark immediately, though he had but one legion of new levies, and not quite six hundred horse ; and he ordered his tent to be pitched so near the sea-side, that the waves flowed quite up to it. This he did to take away all hopes of delay, and keep his men in readiness at an hour's warning : and, the wind proving contrary, he nevertheless suffered none of the

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Bef. Chr.

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
405 Cons.

soldiers or mariners to come on shore, that he might lose no opportunity of sailing. His view was to land and intrench himself on the coast of Africa before his enemies were apprised of his approach, or could assemble their army⁵: and he meant also to shew an utter contempt of their forces, which were greatly exaggerated both in Italy and Sicily. While the wind remained contrary, his gallies and transports increased daily; and, before the twenty-fifth, he had got together six legions, and two thousand horse, with the greatest part of which he set sail, giving strict orders to Alienus the prætor, whom he left to command in Sicily, to embark with the utmost expedition the remainder of his troops. The wind being favourable, he himself, with a few gallies, arrived the fourth day within sight of Africa: but most of his transports had not kept up with him, nor had he appointed them any place of rendezvous, knowing of no part that was clear of the enemy's forces, and resolving to land where occasion offered. He coasted some time along the shore, running southward, and leaving Clypea and Neapolis behind him; and when he came before

⁵ We are told, that this reason prevailed with him more than the will of the gods, declared by the auspices: *Cum immolanti aufugisset hostia, protectionem adversus Scipionem et Jubam non distulit.* Suet. in Cæs. c. 59. *Quid? Ipse Cæsar cum a summo haruspice moneretur, ne in Africam ante brumam transmitteret, nonne transmisit? Quod ni fecisset, uno in loco omnes adversariorum copie convenissent.* Cic. de Divinat. l. ii. c. 24.

Adrumetum, where the enemy had a garrison commanded by C. Considius, Cn. Piso appeared upon the shore with the cavalry and about two thousand Moors. Here, notwithstanding this show of opposition, he landed the troops he had with him, which did not exceed three thousand foot and a hundred and fifty horse, and encamped before the town, keeping his soldiers within their intrenchments, and not suffering them to commit any hostilities. L. Plancus, one of his lieutenants, dispatched a messenger into the town with a letter, exhorting Considius to surrender: but Considius ordered him to be slain in his presence, and sent the letter unopened to Scipio, saying, he knew no other general of the Romans. Cæsar, finding himself unable to storm the town, after staying before it one night and a day, broke up his camp. As he was drawing off his troops, the garrison which consisted of two legions made a sally, and a body of Juba's horse, whom he had sent to receive their pay, happening just then to come up, they jointly took possession of the abandoned camp, and began to harass his rear. The legionaries immediately halted, and the cavalry, though few in number, boldly charged the great multitude of the enemy: thirty Gallic horse are said, on this occasion, to have repulsed two thousand Moors, and driven them quite within the town. Cæsar reached Ruspina the same day, which was the first of January⁶.

Y. R. 706.
Bef. Chr.
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405 Cons.



⁶ According to Usher, the thirteenth of October; but, more probably, the fifth of November of the Julian year.

Y. R. 707.

Bef. Chr.

45.

406 Cons.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR, Dictator III.

M. ÆMILIUS LEPIDUS, Mag. Eq.

From Ruspina, Cæsar marched towards Lep-
tis, a free town, and governed by its own laws.
The inhabitants of this place had formerly as-
sisted his enemies, but now they thought pro-
per to send deputies to him, to make offer of
their submission and services ; and, having
placed a guard at its gates, to prevent the sol-
diers from entering it and committing disorders,
he encamped with his army at a small distance.
Here he was joined by a part of his fleet, by
whom he was informed that the rest, uncertain
what course to take, had steered towards Utica.
Cæsar instantly dispatched ten gallies after
them, and the next day, having left six cohorts
at Leptis, he returned with the rest of his army
to Ruspina ; where he went on board with some
of his best troops in the evening, to the great
astonishment and dismay of his army. They
saw themselves but few in number, mostly new
levies, exposed upon a foreign coast to the
mighty forces of a crafty nation, which had an
innumerable cavalry ; nor had they the least
expectation of safety from their own conduct,
but derived all their hopes from the alacrity
and cheerfulness which appeared in the counte-
nance of their general : for at no time had he
shewed a greater confidence. They soon, how-
ever, understood with what view he intended


to put to sea, when, the next day, they saw him return with the rest of the troops, which his fleet had luckily brought him before he set sail. He was greatly apprehensive lest they should fall in with the enemy's fleet, and had resolved to go out to assist and direct them.

Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.

This junction of his forces was very necessary: for Labienus was in full march towards him with a considerable army of horse and foot. Cæsar, after forming his camp, having advanced only three miles into the country with thirty cohorts to forage, was informed by his scouts, and some advanced parties of horse, that the enemy was in view. Upon this intelligence, he ordered his horse, and a small number of archers which attended them, to advance, and his cohorts to follow and prepare for battle. Labienus drew up with a very extended front, consisting mostly of horse, with whom he intermixed light-armed Numidians and archers, and formed them in such close order, that Cæsar's army at a distance mistook them all for infantry; his right and left were strengthened with a numerous cavalry. Cæsar was forced to draw up his army also in one line, on account of the smallness of its number; ranging his bowmen in front, and his cavalry in the wings; and he gave them particular instructions not to suffer themselves to be surrounded. Both armies stood some time expecting the signal: at length, the enemy began to extend themselves, and to spread out upon the hills with a view to surround Cæsar's cavalry. The

Hirt. de
Bell. Afr.


Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.



main bodies advancing then to engage, the enemy's horse intermixed with the light-armed Numidians, suddenly sprung forward from among the legionaries, and threw their darts. Upon this, they retreated with all speed, leaving the legionaries to sustain the attack of Cæsar's troops, and soon after returned to the charge with fresh vigour. Cæsar, perceiving that his ranks were in danger of being broken by this new way of fighting, which enticed his men to pursue the horse, gave express orders that no soldiers should advance above four feet beyond the ensigns. But he soon found himself surrounded on all sides, his cavalry being altogether unable to resist those of the enemy; and, in this perplexity, he formed his whole army into an orb. Labienus, to encourage his men, advanced on horseback to the front of the battle, and, addressing Cæsar's legions, upbraided them with their inexperience in war, and their infatuation in following him to their certain destruction. One of the soldiers answered, "that he was no new soldier, but a veteran of the tenth legion." "Where then is your standard?" said Labienus. "You shall know me presently," answered the soldier: then, pulling off his helmet to discover himself, he launched his dart with all his strength against Labienus. The dart wounded his horse in the breast, and the veteran called out, "Learn, Labienus, to respect a warrior of the tenth legion." However, the whole army, particularly the new levies, be-

gan to be terrified; and, casting their eyes on Cæsar, expected their deliverance from his experience. Cæsar, to disengage himself, directed the cohorts of the right and left wings to extend themselves as much as possible, and push forward alternately; by which means he broke the enemy's circle at both his wings; and, attacking one part of it now separated from the other, with almost all his forces, easily put it to flight; and, with the same success, having repulsed the other part, he immediately gave orders for the retreat. But M. Petreius and Cn. Piso brought up in this moment eleven hundred select Numidian horse, and a considerable body of foot; and, this succour recovering the enemy from their terror, they fell again on the rear of the legions. Cæsar was forced to order his men to wheel about, and renew the battle; but, perceiving that the enemy still pursued their former plan, and avoided a close engagement, and, considering that his horses, fatigued with their late voyage at sea and the business of the day, were unfit for a vigorous and long pursuit, which the approach of night rendered also impossible, he ordered both horse and foot to fall at once briskly upon the enemy, and follow them beyond the next hill, and not to stop till they had taken possession of it. This scheme was immediately executed; and Cæsar, having kept that post for some time, retired slowly in order of battle to his camp. The enemy thought proper to do the same, having been rudely handled in this last

Y. R. 707.
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406 Cons.



Y. R. 707.
 Bef. Chr.
 45.
 406 Cons.



attack, in which Petreius was also dangerously wounded, and obliged to quit the field. The battle lasted from eleven till sun-set. Cæsar made a great many prisoners, and many deserters flocked to him after the action, by whom he was informed that Labienus brought against him sixteen hundred Gallic and German horse, who had served under Pompey, with eleven hundred Numidian troopers commanded by Petreius, eight thousand Numidian foot, and four times that number of light-armed soldiers, with a multitude of archers and slingers; and that he had designed to have astonished Cæsar's raw levies, and few legionaries, with the new and uncommon manner of fighting of his troops; and, after surrounding them with his cavalry, to have cut them to pieces, as Saburra did Curio's army. He had said in council, that he would lead such a numerous body of men against Cæsar's legions, as should fatigue them with the very slaughter, and defeat them even in the very bosom of victory. This is Hirtius's account. The Greek historians tell us, that Cæsar had the worst of it in this day's battle; and it appears from a passage in Valerius Maximus, that Labienus and Scipio rewarded their soldiers for their bravery; and they also probably gave out, that the victory was on their side, since Cæsar retreated to his camp ⁷.


Plut. App.
 Dio.

Val. Max.
 vii. 14.

⁷ Appian's account is as follows: Cæsar, upon his landing in Africa, being informed that Scipio was gone to meet king Juba, took the opportunity of his absence, and drew

Cæsar was also informed, that within three days Scipio was expected with his forces, which consisted of eight legions and three thousand horse. He therefore fortified his camp and the forts about it with the greatest care, and threw up two intrenchments; one from Ruspina quite to the sea, and the other from his camp to the sea likewise, in order to secure the communication, and receive his supplies without danger. He took out of his fleet a great number of the mariners, Gauls, Rhodians, and others, of whom he formed companies of light-armed troops to fight, after the example of the enemy, among the cavalry. Having thus strengthened his army, he stationed his fleet along the coasts and islands for the security of his convoys, wrote to Sicily and Sardinia to press for supplies of all kinds, and sent Sallust to seize Cercinna, an island upon the coast, where Scipio had a magazine of provisions. But, notwithstanding what was brought from thence, he found himself soon in very great scarcity, and particularly of forage. He was not master of six miles in Africa, and was obliged to keep within his

Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.



up his army before the enemy's camp. Labienus and Petreius, Scipio's lieutenants, accepted his defiance, and vigorously beat back Cæsar's men, driving them before them with contempt, till, Labienus's horse, wounded in the belly, having thrown him, he was obliged to quit the fight. Petreius, who took the command, contenting himself with having tried the courage of his soldiers, caused the retreat to be sounded, saying to those about him, "We must not deprive Scipio, our general, of the honour of beating Cæsar."

Y. R. 707.

Bef. Chr.

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406 Cons.

intrenchments: it was the winter season, and navigation was very dangerous; and his ships of burden were often taken by the enemy's fleets: the veteran soldiers, however, and cavalry, who had been accustomed to hardships of every kind, were nowise dismayed; and with sea-weed, washed in fresh water, they subsisted the horses and cattle of the army.

Cn. Pompey set out about this time upon a particular expedition. Cato, who commanded in Utica, never ceased exhorting and urging the youth in words to this effect: "Your father, when he was arrived at your age, and saw the commonwealth oppressed by wicked and daring men; and the honest party either slain, or driven by banishment from their country and relations; instigated by magnanimity and the love of glory, though then only a private man, had yet the courage to rally the remains of his father's army, and to deliver Italy and Rome from the yoke of slavery and tyranny under which they groaned. He recovered, with amazing dispatch, Sicily, Africa, Numidia, Mauritania, and by that means gained an illustrious and extensive reputation among all nations, and triumphed at three-and-twenty, while but a Roman knight. Nor did he enter into the world with those advantages which you enjoy; the exploits and dignity of his father reflected on him no considerable lustre. Do you, dignified by your descent, bestir yourself and call together your friends, and vindicate your own liberty, that of the commonwealth, and

of every good and honest man." Roused by the remonstrances of a man of such gravity, young Pompey collected about thirty sail of ships, of which a few were gallies, and, sailing from Utica to Mauritania, invaded the kingdom of Bogud, who was in alliance with Cæsar; but he had little success in this attempt. With an army of two thousand men, composed of freedmen and slaves, of whom some were armed and some not, he approached the city of Ascurum, in which the king had a garrison. The inhabitants suffered him to advance to the very walls and gates, and then, sallying out of a sudden, they drove him quite back to his ships. This defeat determined him to leave that coast, and he steered directly to the Balearian islands, and Spain, whither he was invited by a party which had declared for him; and there he raised a force sufficient to appear against Cæsar the following year, and to dispute with him the Roman empire.

Scipio, having left a strong garrison in Utica, under the command of Cato, had marched to Adrumetum, and, a few days after, joined Petreius and Labienus, whose camp was but three miles distant from Cæsar's. Juba also was advancing at the head of a great body of horse and foot, when news was brought him that P. Silius^s and king Bogud had united their forces,

^s P. Silius was a Roman knight, who, having made himself obnoxious to the laws, had been obliged to leave Italy, and retired into Africa. There he got about him a

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
entered Numidia, and taken Cirta, the most opulent city of the country, by storm, with two other towns of the Getulians, and put all the inhabitants to the sword. He therefore marched immediately back to hinder the further devastation of his territories, leaving only thirty elephants behind him; but as soon as he had put his kingdom in a better posture of defence, ordering Saburra to make head against Sitius, he returned again to Scipio with three legions, eight hundred horse, a body of Numidian cavalry, thirty elephants more, and a great number of light-armed infantry. Both armies for four months were continually observing each other's motions; during which time there happened frequent engagements between detachments from the two camps; in which Cæsar had commonly the advantage. Scipio, on his arrival, had appeared very desirous of coming to a general battle, and brought out his troops every day; but Cæsar had not collected all his forces, and he was sensible from the last encounter, in which he had so much difficulty to bring off his men, that, having to do with an army so superior in number, and commanded by experienced officers, it was necessary to use

great number of Italians and Spaniards, of whom he formed a small army, and, in the wars between the petty princes in Africa, he let himself out to the best bidder: and, it being remarked, that the side he espoused always came off victorious, he gained great reputation, and was much courted. He was in alliance with Bogud, who favoured Cæsar.

the greatest caution. He therefore kept within his intrenchments, and applied himself to gain over to his interest the people of the country, and to encourage desertion in the enemy's camp. He succeeded in his intentions; and the Africans, in particular, came to him in crowds when they understood that he was related to C. Marius, for whose name they had the greatest respect. The Pompeians, at the same time, were diligent in disciplining their elephants; and Cato was daily inlisting freedmen, Africans, slaves, and all that were of age to bear arms, and sending them to Scipio's camp.

When Cæsar, however, saw all his forces drawn together, and had taught them how to fight with elephants, and with troops who never stood their ground, but, after a fierce attack, retreated to return again, he was as desirous to give battle, as he had been formerly averse to it. But Scipio, in his turn, had changed his scheme, and resolved very prudently to protract the war. On the fourteenth of April, Cæsar, to force him to an engagement, decamping at midnight, marched to Thapsus, a seaport town of the utmost importance to the enemy, and where Vergilius commanded with a strong garrison. The very first day after his arrival he began the circumvallation, and soon raised all the forts necessary both for his own security, and to prevent any succours from entering the town. Scipio and Juba, to avoid the disgrace of abandoning Vergilius and the Thapsitani, who had all along remained firm to their

Y. R. 707.
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406 Cons.



Y. R. 707.
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 406 Cons.

party, followed Cæsar without delay, and posted themselves in two camps eight miles from Thapsus. They attempted first to throw troops into the place, but, finding that to be impossible, they resolved to give battle⁹. For this purpose Scipio approached with his army, and began to intrench himself about fifteen hundred paces from the sea. Cæsar immediately, leaving two legions to guard his camp, marched all the rest of his forces with the utmost expedition to the place where the enemy was posted. At the same time, he ordered part of his fleet to make as near the shore as possible towards the enemy's rear, and observe the signal he should give them; upon which they were to raise a sudden shout, that the enemy, alarmed and disturbed by the noise behind them, might be forced to face about. He found Scipio's army in order of battle before the intrenchments, which were not yet

⁹ Plutarch in Cat. tells us, that Cato opposed this resolution with the greatest earnestness, and insisted upon protracting the war. But that Scipio rejected his advice with disdain; and, in a letter he sent him, taxed him with cowardice, and told him that he ought to be satisfied with being safe in a good city, behind strong walls; and that it was taking too much upon him to dissuade others from following the dictates of their courage. Cato, nettled at the reproach, replied, that, if he would give him back the troops he had brought, he was ready to march at the head of them into Italy, and that it was more for their interest so to do, than to risk all in Africa. Plutarch adds, that he then sorely repented the having given up the command to a man who was incapable of a prudent conduct in the war, or of any moderation in victory: and indeed Hirtius has given us several instances of his cruel disposition.

perfected, and the elephants were ranged in the two wings. Upon this he drew up his army in three lines : he placed the second and tenth legions in the right wing, the eighth and ninth in the left, and five legions in the centre : he covered his flanks with five cohorts posted opposite to the elephants, and disposed the archers and slingers in the two wings, and the light-armed troops, which he intermingled with his cavalry. He himself, on foot, went from rank to rank to rouse the courage of the veterans, putting them in mind of their great reputation for bravery ; and to exhort the new levies to emulate the valour of the veterans, and attain the same degree of glory. As he spoke to his soldiers, he observed the enemy to be very uneasy, hurrying from place to place ; one while retiring behind the rampart, then coming out again in great tumult and confusion ; and his officers, making the same observation, begged that he would give the signal for battle. While he hesitated whether he should restrain the eagerness of his troops, a trumpeter in the right wing sounded, of a sudden, the charge, and all the cohorts rushed forwards. The centurions strove in vain to keep them back, and Cæsar, perceiving that their ardour could not be checked, spurred on his horse and charged the enemy in the centre. On the right wing the archers and slingers poured such a volley of arrows and stones upon the elephants, that these animals, which were not perfectly disciplined, turning upon their own men, trod them down, and

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
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rushed into the camp through the gates, which were but half finished. The Mauritanian horse followed them ; upon which the legions pushed on to the intrenchments, which they soon carried ; and the greatest part of the troops that defended them fled to the camp which they had quitted the preceding day. Thither they were followed, and finding neither general to command them, nor any security, they made towards Juba's quarters. This being likewise forced by the victorious troops, they retired to a hill ; where, seeing their case desperate, they endeavoured to soften their enemies, saluting them with the name of brethren : but the veterans, transported with rage, were not only deaf to their cries, but even killed and wounded some persons of distinction of their own army, whom they suspected to wish well to the contrary party. Ten thousand of the enemy were slain upon the spot ; the rest were dispersed, and their three camps carried sword in hand with the loss of only fifty men killed, and a few wounded.

The garrison of Thapsus, during the battle, had sallied out of the town with a view either to assist Scipio, or to make their escape ; but had been beat back by the servants and followers of the camp. Cæsar, in his return from the battle, stopped before the town, and ranged the sixty elephants he had taken, with their trappings and castles, in full view of the place. He was in hopes, by this evidence of his success, to induce Vergilius to a surrendry ; and he farther invited him to it by

reminding him of his experienced clemency. No answer, however, being given, he retired from before the town; but, next day, after returning thanks to the gods, he assembled his army before it, and, in the sight of the inhabitants, praised his soldiers from his tribunal, and rewarded them according to their deserts. Then leaving C. Rebellius, one of his lieutenants, with three legions, to continue the siege, he sent Cn. Domitius, with two, to invest Tisdra, where Considius now commanded, and marched himself towards Utica.

Y. R. 707.
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45.
406 Cons.



Scipio's cavalry had taken the same road in their flight, and arriving at Parada, were refused admittance, the inhabitants being already apprised of Cæsar's victory. They thereupon forced the gates, and, lighting a great fire in the market-place, threw all the inhabitants they could seize into it, without distinction of age or sex, with all their effects: and thence they marched directly to Utica. Cato, who commanded there, knowing the common people to be well affected towards Cæsar, who had formerly procured them great privileges, had turned them out of the town, and obliged them to encamp without the walls, under the protection of a slight intrenchment, round which he had placed guards. The cavalry attacked first this camp, but the people animated with the news of Cæsar's victory, and enraged at the ill usage they had met with, repulsed them, though they had no other arms than clubs. Disappointed in this attempt, they entered the town, and began to sack it. Cato, unable

Y. R. 707.

Bef. Chr.

45.

406 Cons.

to prevail with them to abstain from rapine and undertake the defence of the place, gave each of them an hundred sesterces, and Faustus Sylla gave them as many more, to retire in peace: and he marched them into the territories of Juba. Many of the other fugitives had by this time arrived at Utica, and Cato, having assembled them with the three hundred Roman merchants settled in the town, and of whom he had formed a council, he exhorted them to set their slaves free, and join with him in the necessary measures for defence; but, finding them averse to this resolution, he furnished them with ships to make their escape. He himself, having settled all his affairs with the utmost care, and recommended his children to L. Cæsar, his quæstor, without the least indication, which might give cause of suspicion, or any change in his countenance and behaviour, privately carried a sword into his chamber, when he went to sleep, and stabbed himself with it. The wound, however, not proving mortal, and the noise of his fall creating a suspicion, a physician, with some of his friends, broke into his chamber, and endeavoured to bind it up; which he no sooner was sensible of, than, tearing it open again with his own hands, he expired with undaunted resolution and presence of mind. The Uticans, though they hated his party, yet, in consideration of his singular integrity, his behaviour, so different from that of the other chiefs, and the wonderful fortifications he had erected to defend their town, interred him honourably.

This is the account we find of Cato's conduct and death in the Memoirs concerning the African war, and it contains the substance of Plutarch's longer narrative. As the Greek historian's circumstantial relation, however, has passed hitherto for authentic, and is the groundwork of all the panegyric which has been written upon Cato, it might look like partiality, if we should omit it. It is as follows :

Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.

The news of the battle of Thapsus, and the utter ruin of Scipio's and Juba's armies, caused the greatest consternation in Utica. Cato applied himself first to quiet the minds of the people, by representing to them, that the reports were greatly exaggerated ; and, as he went from street to street, his presence appeased for a time their apprehensions. His next care was to assemble the three hundred Roman merchants or bankers, with whom he used to consult, and who had been very serviceable to his cause : and, after bestowing due praises upon their past fidelity and services, he exhorted them above all to a strict union, as the only means by which they could support themselves, or make themselves considered by the conqueror. He then told them to consult together what was proper to be done, and that, if they thought fit to submit to fortune, he would ascribe their resolution to necessity ; but that, if they resolved to persist in the defence of their liberty, he would be their leader in such a glorious cause. " Rome," he said, " had often emerged out of greater difficulties ; the conqueror was perplexed in many difficult

Plut. in
Cat.

Y. R. 707.

Bef. Chr.


45.

406 Cons.

affairs: Spain had revolted to Pompey's sons: and the Romans would unanimously throw off a yoke which they wore with indignation." His speech had the desired effect: all appeared zealous for the prosecution of the war, and promised to arm themselves: but a little reflection soon cooled their ardour. "Who are we?" said they, "and to whom do we refuse submission? Is not Cæsar vested with the whole authority of the Roman empire? Does he not command its forces? Shall we dispute the possession of Utica with him to whom Pompey and all his adherents were forced to abandon Italy? And, when the whole earth submits to his yoke, shall we undertake the defence of the Roman liberty?" They made a declaration of these sentiments to Cato, and many of them even formed a design of seizing the Roman senators, and delivering them up to Cæsar, the better to ingratiate themselves with him. Cato, sensible that it was impossible to keep Utica, gave notice of it to Scipio and Juba; the first had escaped to his fleet at sea, and then lay concealed behind a promontory not far from the city; and the other was hid in the neighbouring woods, and had sent messengers to him. The arrival of Scipio's cavalry gave Cato fresh hopes, and he went out to meet them, attended by all the Roman senators except M. Rubrius, whom he left to watch the motions of the three hundred during his absence. He addressed the commanders of this body of cavalry, and entreated them not to give themselves up to a

foreign prince, but to prefer Cato to Juba, representing to them the dishonour of such a conduct, and that, by affording a protection to him and the senators with him, they would provide for their own safety in a town so well furnished with provisions and every thing necessary to hold out a siege. The officers replied, they would consult their troopers, and Cato sat down on an eminence waiting their answer. Here Rubrius came to him, complaining of the audaciousness of the three hundred, who had revolted, and raised a commotion in the city. Cato sent him back to beseech them to wait his return. The answer of the cavalry added to his perplexity. They sent him word "that they had no inclination to serve under Juba; nor any apprehensions of Cæsar when under Cato's command: but that they would not put their trust in the inhabitants of Utica, whom, therefore, he must consent to murder, or expel the city, if he would make use of their assistance¹." Cato's answer was, "that he would consult with the three hundred." Upon his return into the town, he found that these men were come to a resolution of having recourse to Cæsar's mercy, and explained themselves pretty clearly on their design of delivering up the senators;

Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.



¹ We are told by Plutarch, that Juba had proposed, in the beginning of the war, to destroy the city and exterminate the inhabitants, and that Scipio had consented to this massacre; but that Cato opposed it with so much vehemence and indignation, that the barbarous project was not carried into execution.

Y. R. 707.

Bef. Chr.


45.

406 Cons.


and, at the same time, notice was given him that the cavalry were making off. Cato, fearing lest the three hundred should immediately execute their threats, when they saw themselves delivered from the cavalry, called for a horse and rode after them, and by his entreaties, which he accompanied with tears, he with much difficulty prevailed upon them to halt one day ; and, having brought them back, posted them at the gates of the city, and put them in possession of the citadel. The three hundred, alarmed at this proceeding, assembled, and invited Cato to their meeting. The senators were very earnest to dissuade him from putting himself into their hands, but he knew that he had nothing to fear from them. They began by making their acknowledgments for the confidence he reposed in them, and gave him the strongest assurances of their respect and of their attachment to his person ; but told him, that they were not Catos, and could not attain to his exalted sentiments. They added that they had come to a resolution to send deputies to Cæsar to implore his clemency ; but that the first and principal object of their solicitation should be Cato's safety, which if they could not obtain, they would fight in his defence to the last moment of their lives. Cato thanked them for their good-will towards him, approved of their design of submitting to Cæsar, and advised them to lose no time, but desired them to make no solicitation in his favour. " It is proper," said he, " for the vanquished to have recourse to

prayers, and for those who have committed faults to sue for pardon. As for me, I have been invincible during the whole course of my life, and even now I am victorious, and triumph over Cæsar by the superiority of justice and equity. It is he that is conquered: this day is he attainted and convicted by undeniable evidence, notwithstanding what he has said to the contrary, of plotting against his country." Cato, as he came out from this conference, was informed, that Cæsar was on his march with the greatest part of his forces to besiege Utica. "Alas!" says he, "he pays us a compliment we do not deserve: he takes us for men." Another message was brought him presently after from M. Octavius, who sent to let him know that he was near Utica with two legions, and was ready to join him, but it was necessary first to settle who should have the command in chief. Cato returned no answer to the message, but, addressing himself to his friends, "Well," says he, "ought we to be surprised that our affairs have not succeeded, since, when upon the brink of ruin, we are contending for the vain honour of command." His only care now was to hasten the departure of the Roman senators before the cavalry retired; and, having ordered all the gates of the town to be shut, except that which led to the port, he appointed ships, and furnished every thing requisite to those who were to sail. The cavalry, now looking upon Utica as a town of their enemies, had begun to plunder it; but Cato, interposing, wrested, out of

Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.




Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.



the hands of those he met first, the spoils they were carrying off, and the rest threw away of their own accord what they had seized, and departed in silence, ashamed of what they had done. He then called together the citizens of Utica, and recommended it to them to act in concert with the three hundred, and seek their common safety together with them. Having done this, he went to the port and took leave of the senators who were about to embark. His son, however, remained with him, and Statilius, a young man remarkable for his hatred to Cæsar. He did not insist upon his son's departing, but endeavoured to persuade the other to go with the rest: and, upon his refusing to do it, he turned to Apollonides and Demetrius, two philosophers who constantly attended him: "It is your business," said he, "to bend that stubborn spirit, and give it a more useful turn." Cato then returned to his affairs, and dispatched business all that night and the greatest part of the following day. L. Cæsar, being appointed deputy for the three hundred, begged of Cato, that he would assist him in drawing up the speech for the occasion; and declared, at the same time, that he would be also mediator for him, and would throw himself at the dictator's feet, and embrace his knees to obtain his pardon. "By no means," replied Cato; "were I disposed to owe my life to Cæsar, I should myself go to him, but I will not be beholden to the tyrant for any act of his injustice: for it is unjust in him to pretend, as a master, to pardon those

over whom he has no lawful power. But, if you please, let us consider what it is proper to say in behalf of the three hundred." They then conferred together on this subject, and Cato at parting recommended to him his son and the rest of his friends. These being assembled at his house, among other discourse, he forbade his son to take any share in the administration of public affairs; "for to act as became him was now impossible, and to do otherwise was dishonourable." Towards evening he went into the bath, and, there calling to mind Statilius, he inquired of Apollonides whether he had succeeded with him; "And is he gone," said he, "without taking leave of us?" "No," replied the philosopher; "I have discoursed much with him, but to no purpose: he is resolute, and declares that he will stay and follow your example." Cato smiled, and answered, "of that we shall soon judge." After bathing he supped with his friends and the magistrates of the city. They sat late at table, and the conversation was lively: the discourse falling upon this maxim of the Stoics, that the wise man alone is free, and that the vicious are slaves, which Demetrius, who was a Peripatetic, undertook to confute from the principles of his school, Cato, in answer, treated the matter very amply, and with so much earnestness and vehemence of voice, that he betrayed himself, and confirmed the suspicions which his friends had already conceived of his design to kill himself. When he had done speaking, a melancholy silence ensued; and

Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.



Y. R. 707.

Bef. Chr.


45.

406 Cons.


Cato, perceiving it, turned the discourse to the present situation of affairs, expressing his concern for those who had been obliged to put to sea, as well as for those who, having determined to make their escape by land, had a dry and sandy desert to pass. After supper, the company being dismissed, he walked for some time with a few friends, and gave his orders to the officers of the guard; and, going into his chamber, he embraced his son and his friends with more than usual tenderness, which farther confirmed the suspicions of the resolution he had taken. Then, laying himself down on his bed, he took up Plato's Dialogue on the Immortality of the Soul. Having read for some time, he looked up, and, missing his sword, which his son had removed while he was at supper, he called a slave, and asked who had taken it away; and, receiving no pertinent answer, he resumed his reading. Some time after he asked again for his sword, and, without shewing any impatience, ordered it to be brought to him: but, having read out the book, and finding nobody had brought him his sword, he called for all his servants, fell into a rage, and struck one of them with so much violence on the mouth, that he very much hurt his own hand, crying out in a passionate manner, "What? do my own son and family conspire to betray me, and deliver me up naked and unarmed to the enemy?" Immediately his son and friends rushed into the room, and began to lament, and to beseech him to change his resolution. Cato, raising

himself, and looking fiercely at them, "How long is it," said he, "since I have lost my senses, and since my son has become my keeper? Brave and generous son, why do you not bind your father's hands, that, when Cæsar comes, he may find me unable to defend myself? Do you imagine, that without a sword I cannot end my life? Cannot I destroy myself by holding my breath for some moments, or by striking my head against the wall?" His son answered with his tears, and retired. Apollonides and Demetrius remained with him, and to them he addressed himself in the following words: "Is it to watch over me that you sit silent here? Do you pretend to force a man of my years to live? Or can you bring any reason to prove, that it is not base and unworthy of Cato to beg his safety of an enemy? Or why do you not persuade me to unlearn what I have been taught, that, rejecting all the opinions I have hitherto defended, I may now by Cæsar's means grow wiser, and be yet more obliged to him than for life alone? Not that I have determined any thing concerning myself, but I would have it in my power to perform what I shall think fit to resolve upon: and I shall not fail to ask your counsel, when I shall have occasion to act up to the principles which your philosophy teaches. Go, tell my son that he should not compel his father to what he cannot persuade him." They withdrew, and the sword was brought by a young slave: Cato drew it, and finding the point to be sharp, "Now," said he, "I am

Y. R. 707.
 Ref. Chr.
 45.
 406 Cons.



Y. R. 707.
 Bef. Chr.
 45.
 406 Cons.



my own master:" and laying it down, he took up his book again, which, it is reported, he read twice over. After this he slept so soundly, that he was heard to snore by those who were near him ². About midnight he called two of his freedmen, Cleanthes, his physician, and Butas, whom he chiefly employed in the management of his affairs. The last he sent to the port to see whether all the Romans were gone: to the physician he gave his hand to be dressed, which was swelled by the blow he had given his slave. This, being an intimation that he intended to live, gave great joy to his family. Butas soon returned and brought word, that they were all gone except Crassus, who had staid upon some business, but was just ready to depart. He added, that the wind was high and the sea rough. These words drew a sigh from Cato. He sent Butas again to the port to know whether there might not be some one, who, in the hurry of the embarkation, had forgot some necessary provisions, and had been obliged to put back to Utica. It was now break of day, and Cato slept yet a little more, till Butas returned to tell him, that

² There are doubtless several circumstances in this story which have the appearance of a forgery. It is not probable that a man in such a heat of passion, and taken up with the thoughts of putting an end to his life, would sleep so soundly. And it is still more strange that he should read twice over Plato's *Phædo*, to confirm himself in his desperate resolution: for there is not a passage in it to encourage self-murder, and many against it: indeed the whole is so, and no one, who admires the death of Socrates, can ever die like Cato.

all was perfectly quiet. He then ordered him to shut his door, and he flung himself upon his bed, as if he meant to finish his night's rest. But, immediately, he took his sword, and stabbed himself a little below his chest; yet, not being able to use his hand so well by reason of the swelling, the blow did not kill him. It threw him into a convulsion, in which he fell from his bed, and overturned a table near it. The noise gave the alarm, and his son, and the rest of the family, entered the room, where they found him weltering in his blood, and his bowels half out of his body. The surgeon upon examination found that his intestines were not cut, and was preparing to replace them and bind up the wound, when Cato, recovering his senses, thrust the surgeon from him, and, tearing out his bowels, immediately expired.

Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.

Thus died, according to his admirers, the famous Cato, in the forty-eighth year of his age. "If we consider his character without prejudice," says a celebrated writer, "he was certainly a great and worthy man; a friend to truth, virtue, liberty: yet, falsely measuring all duty by the absurd rigour of the stoical rule, he was generally disappointed of the end which he sought by it, the happiness both of his public and private life³. In his private

Middl.
p. 162.

³ What this stoical rule was, we are told in another place, p. 564. "The Stoics were the bigots or enthusiasts in philosophy; who held none to be truly wise and good but themselves; placed perfect happiness in virtue, though stript of every other good; affirmed all sins to be equal; all devia-

Y. R. 707.

Bef. Chr.

45.

406 Cons.

conduct he was severe, morose, inexorable : banishing all the softer affections, as natural enemies to justice, and as suggesting false motives of acting, from favour, clemency, and compassion : in public affairs he was the same⁴ ;

tions from right equally wicked ; to kill a dunghill cock, without reason, the same crime as to kill a parent ; that a wise man could never forgive ; never be moved by anger, favour, or pity ; never be deceived ; never repent ; never change his mind. With these principles Cato entered into public life." These, certainly, were never the practical principles of any man ; and, if to live a wise man, or to be a true Stoic, is to live up to them, Cato had no pretensions to that character. He was often deceived ; sometimes he changed his mind, was very subject to envy and anger, and sometimes was moved by favour. There are many examples of his frailties in the foregoing pages. The account of this pretended rule, by which Cato measured all duty, is taken from the oration of Cicero *pro Murena* ; in which the orator ridicules the Stoics, and banters Cato, who was the accuser. Cato was so far from acknowledging the rule to be his, that he cried out, " What a merry consul we have got !" Cicero was consul when he spoke this oration.

⁴ This made him obstinate, rather than constant, morose instead of being grave, and sour when he would be most sincere. His humour was not only always overcast, but sometimes broke out upon his best friends in indecent passions : his temper was rather stiff than steady ; for he was as inflexible in the wrong as in the right ; he withstood compassion as resolutely as bribery, and avoided common decency as much as flattery ; he would come into the forum with nothing but his under garment on, and that loose ; his bosom and feet bare ; and in this condition sit upon the bench when he was prætor, and pass sentence upon those of the first quality. Ptolemy, king of Egypt, being at Rome, and desiring to speak with him, he sent word, as he was upon the close-stool, that he might come to him, if he had any thing to say to him. See his behaviour on his return from the Cyprian expedition, and after his losing the consulate. This gives a suspicion of his setting too great a value upon

had but one rule of policy, to adhere to what was right, without regard to times and circumstances, or even to a force that could controul him: for instead of managing the power of the great, so as to mitigate the ill, or extract any good from it, he was urging it always to acts of violence by a perpetual defiance; so that, with the best intentions in the world, he often did great harm to the republic. This was his general behaviour; yet from some particular facts, it appears that his strength of mind was not always impregnable, but had its weak places of pride, ambition, and party zeal; which, when managed and flattered to a certain point, would betray him sometimes into measures contrary to his ordinary rule of right and truth. The last act of his life was agreeable to his nature and philosophy: when he could no longer be what he had been; or when the ills of life overbalanced the good; which, by the principles of his sect, was a just cause

Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.

his actions, and being liable to something of vain-glory.
Adams.

^s Nothing is right that is not so, taking in the consideration of all circumstances of time, place, and persons. But, besides, did Cato make right the rule of his conduct, when he opposed salutary laws, because proposed by Cæsar; when in punishing Catiline's accomplices, he extended against the fundamental laws of the state, the prerogative of the senate; and when he refused to allow Cæsar what had been granted him by a law of the people, and a decree of the senate? Have we not seen him a riotous magistrate, violating the privilege of the tribuneship in the person of one of his colleagues, and, from personal hatred to Cæsar, approving of bribery and corruption at the elections for magistracy?

Y. R. 707.

Bef. Chr.

45.

406 Cons.

for dying ; he put an end to his life with a spirit and resolution which would make one imagine that he was glad to have found an occasion of dying in his proper character. On the whole, his life was rather admirable than amiable ; fit to be praised rather than imitated⁶.”

⁶ It is said in another place, p. 564, that “ after a perpetual course of disappointments and repulses, finding himself unable to pursue his old way any farther : instead of taking a new one, he was driven by his philosophy to put an end to his life.” We have seen above, a king of Cyprus, a friend and ally of the Roman people, accused of no practices, nor suspected of any designs, against the republic, yet deprived of his kingdom and estate by an iniquitous law preferred by P. Clodius ; and that our stoic philosopher Cato took upon him to execute this unparalleled act of injustice, and valued himself upon this his Cyprian expedition. Ptolemy, unable to resist the Roman power, and too proud to take up with a private station after he had reigned so long, was driven by his royal philosophy to put an end to his life by poison. In what is the stoic philosophy of Cato preferable to the royal philosophy of the Cyprian monarch ? What can be alleged to excuse the one, which does not equally excuse the other ? Ptolemy, I should imagine, was driven to that extremity by injuries much more evidently unjust and more affecting than were those which Cato complained of. But we are told by Cicero, that it was becoming and proper in Cato to die in this way ; and that otherwise he would not have kept up the decorum of life, which consists in maintaining a certain likeness in all our actions, a certain equality of behaviour : and this, he adds, is grounded upon universal and particular nature. “ The difference of particular nature,” says he, “ which forms the several characters of men, is of that force, that one sometimes ought to kill himself, and yet another in the same circumstances ought not ; for was not Cato’s case the very same with that of those who surrendered themselves to Cæsar in Africa ? And yet, perhaps, it would have been blameable in them to have killed themselves, because their manners were gentler and easier :

L. Cæsar, to procure some advantages by Cato's death, assembled the people, and in an harangue exhorted them to throw themselves upon Cæsar's clemency, from which they had the greatest reason to hope the best.

Cæsar from Thapsus had marched to Usceta, where Scipio had laid up a great store of corn

Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.

Hirt. de
Bell. Afric.

but, as nature had given Cato an incredible bravery, and he had confirmed this by a perpetual constancy, and had always remained immoveable in what he had once resolved and undertaken, it became him rather to die than see the face of the tyrant." But is not this a justification of the same desperate behaviour in every wrong-headed, obstinate, and perverse man?

The public good, in his own sense of it, required of Cato, I should think, to remain in life, and pursue the ruin of the tyrant. In his speech to the three hundred, after the battle of Thapsus, did he not tell them, "that if they continued firm against Cæsar, they would thereby avoid his contempt; and that Rome had fallen lower, and emerged from yet greater dangers?" This was as true in regard to him as to them; and, though they had not spirit enough to follow his counsel, he should, however, have done himself what he exhorted others to do. He might certainly have done good service to his party in Spain: and, after Cæsar's death, a great field of action would have opened to him.


Some authors have imputed Cato's death to his hatred to Cæsar: and indeed no persons in the world were more contrary in their humours and manners. The opposition of temper between two persons engaged in the same place, about the same affairs, very naturally gives rise to enmity; and this, in the present case, was increased by family injuries. Cæsar's intimacy with Servilia, Cato's sister, was once the talk of all Rome. Cato accordingly seems to have opposed Cæsar furiously in every thing, right or wrong: and there is no absurdity in supposing that the last act of his life was directed by that principle, which so powerfully influenced him in other parts of his conduct. I do not say but that Cato died in character, but I think that his death is far from reflecting any lustre on his life.

Y. R. 707.

Def. Chr.

45.

406 Cons.




Plut. in Cat.

and ammunition, and which immediately surrendered: he entered also Adrumetum without opposition, where he found Q. Ligarius and C. Considius the son, whom he pardoned. In his way to Utica, he was met by L. Cæsar, who threw himself at his feet, and begged for nothing more than that he would grant him his life. He obtained this favour, and it was extended likewise to Cæcina, C. Ateius, P. Atrius, L. Cella, father and son; M. Eppius, M. Aquinius, to Cato's son, and the children of Damasippus. Being informed of Cato's death, Cæsar is reported to have broke out into this exclamation: "O Cato! I envy thee the glory of thy death, since thou hast envied me that of saving thy life." On his entering the town, he summoned an assembly of the people, and thanked them for the affection they had shewn to his cause. At the same time he censured severely and enlarged upon the crime of the three hundred merchants, who had furnished Scipio and Varus with money; but concluded with telling them, that they might shew themselves without fear, as he was determined to grant them their lives, and content himself with exposing their effects to sale; and that he would give them notice when their goods were to be sold, and allow them the liberty of redeeming them upon payment of a certain fine. The three hundred who had served his enemies with zeal, and dreaded Cæsar's resentment, were very well pleased with these conditions, and begged that he would impose a certain sum in gross upon them all,

and he accordingly amerced them in two hundred millions of sesterces⁷, to be paid to the republic at six different payments within the space of three years.

Y. R. 707.



 1,614,583*l*
 Hirt. de
 Bell. Afric.

Juba had fled with Petreius towards Zama, his place of residence, which he had strongly fortified in the beginning of the war; but the inhabitants, who were disaffected towards him⁸, could not be prevailed upon, either by threats or intreaties, to open their gates, or even to deliver to him his wives and children. They sent ambassadors to Cæsar, to signify to him this their intention, and to desire that he would prevent by a speedy succour any attempt the king might make upon their town. At the same time Tisdra was abandoned by Considius, and Virgilius surrendered Thapsus; and the fame of his clemency brought over to Cæsar, on his march, all the Numidian officers that remained. Juba, seeing himself deserted on all sides, and that there was no longer any hope of safety, proposed to Petreius an engagement in which they should mutually kill each other. Petreius fell first, and the king immediately endeavoured to dispatch himself, but was obliged

⁷ Appian writes, that Cæsar put to death all he could find of the three hundred who had formed Cato's senate. This author must have invented a number of facts and circumstances of facts, which, certainly, no memoirs, how partial soever, could have transmitted to him.

⁸ And they had very good reason, if, as Hirtius tells us, before he set out against Cæsar he had raised a mighty pile of wood in the market-place, and declared a resolution, in case he did not conquer, to massacre all the citizens, and destroy their bodies and effects in one general conflagration.

Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.



to have recourse to one of his slaves, on whom he prevailed to perform that last office. P. Silius, in the mean time, having defeated the army of Saburra, and slain the general, was marching through Mauritania to join Cæsar, and chanced to fall in with Faustus and Afranius, who had put themselves at the head of the party that had plundered Utica, and were making their way to Spain. This commander, having notice of their approach, placed himself during the night in an ambuscade, and attacking them upon their march by break of day, he either killed or made them all prisoners, except a few that escaped from the van. Afranius and Faustus were among the prisoners, with their wives and children: and our author says, that they were slain a few days after, together with L. Cæsar, in a mutiny of the soldiers. Dio and Florus report, that they were killed by Cæsar's order, or at his instigation; and Suetonius has observed, that this was the general belief. And perhaps they had no pretensions to his mercy. L. Cæsar had shewn himself his implacable enemy on all occasions, had treated several of his domestics with more than ordinary cruelty, and had ordered the beasts to be killed which the conqueror had destined for his games in Rome: and Afranius and Faustus were taken in their flight to his enemies in Spain. But since Cæsar had laid it down to himself as a general law, not to put any citizen to death in cold blood, it is not probable that he made an exception to this rule in the case of these two and his re-

lation L. Cæsar. Cicero bestows this encomium on his clemency, "that the citizens which the republic lost were carried off by the common chance of war, and not through any resentment of the conqueror⁹." To Pompeia, the wife of Faustus, and her children, he not only granted a pardon, but permitted them the free enjoyment of all their effects. Nor had Scipio better success in his flight: he had got together twelve gallies, with a design to make for the coast of Spain, but was obliged by stress of weather to put in at Hippo, where Sitius's fleet chanced to be at that time. Scipio's vessels were most of them sunk; and, when he saw that there was no hope of escaping, he stabbed himself, and in his last moments behaved with magnanimity; for when one of Sitius's soldiers, who had boarded his ship, enquired what was become of the general? He answered himself, "the general is safe."

Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.

Florus, iv.

From Utica, Cæsar marched to Zama, where he exposed to sale the goods of king Juba, confiscated the estates of the Roman citizens settled there, who had joined in the war against him, and converted the kingdom into a Roman province. Sitius, who had done him such signal service, was put in possession of Cirta, formerly the royal city of Masinissa and of Syphax; and which, from the name of its new inhabitants, was afterwards called the colony of the Sitians. When he returned to Utica, he, in the like manner, confiscated and sold


⁹ Quos amisimus cives, eos martis vis perculit, non ira victoriæ. Cicero pro Marcello.

Y. R. 707.

Bef. Chr.

45.

406 Ccns.



the effects of all who had the rank of centurions under Petreius and Juba; and he fined the several towns that had served his enemies in proportion to their revenue, but suffered none to be plundered by his soldiers. The only distinction he made between the Romans who readily submitted after the battle of Pharsalia, and those whose obstinacy forced him to conquer them a second time in Africa, was, that the first were immediately restored to all their former privileges, and the last remained in exile till after the Spanish war, when he granted a general pardon. Dio tells us, that he gave the same instance of his moderation after the battle of Thapsus, which had done him so much honour after that of Pharsalia, in burning all the papers of Scipio without reading them. Sallust, the historian, was left to govern the new Roman province of Numidia, where he amassed great wealth, which enabled him, on his return to Rome, to purchase the famous Sallustian gardens in the city, with several villas in the country, in which he spent the remainder of his life in a learned and splendid retreat from all public business¹.


Bell. Cat.

Ascon. in
Cic. Mil.

¹ As this is the last time we shall have occasion to mention Sallust, it may not be improper to subjoin a few particulars concerning him. It appears by all his writings, as well as by the favour shewn him by Cæsar, that he was of the popular party. In his early youth, as he tells us himself, he was carried away by ambition, and sought preferment. At what time he was made quæstor is uncertain; but he was tribune of the people in 701, when Pompey was sole consul; and at first acted vigorously against Milo, though he afterwards became more tractable. In 703, he was turned out

of the senate by the aristocratic censor Appius, for his immoral life, and notorious debauchery; and if we believe the anonymous author of an invective against him, he left Rome to join Cæsar. As soon as the civil war broke out, he wrote an epistle to Cæsar, upon the regulation of the commonwealth; where he vents his spleen against Pompey and the faction of the nobles, and was, in the year 704, named quæstor a second time, and thus recovered his seat in the senate. He seems to have written his second epistle to Cæsar in the year 706, while the dictator was yet in Asia, who caused him to be named prætor for the following year. Cæsar then employed him in the African war, and recompensed his services with the grant of the government of the province. In this government he is accused by Dio of having exercised the most flagrant oppressions; and Cæsar, it is said by this author, gave him express orders to plunder the people, rather than to protect them. This testimony of Dio is supported by the authority of an old grammarian, and of the author of the above-mentioned invective, who tells us, that, on his return to Rome, he divided his spoils with Cæsar, who screened him from all prosecution. The riches he had acquired enabled him to pass the remainder of his days in a learned retreat; and it was then that he wrote the history of the conspiracy of Catiline, of the war against Jugurtha, of the attempts of Lepidus, and the war against Sertorius in Spain; which last history he carried backwards twelve years to the commencement of the Social or Marsic war. In regard to the private life and character of this historian, it must be remarked, that as he had reviled the vices of the nobility with great vehemence, and had thereby created to himself many enemies, injurious aspersions would be thrown out against him. We are informed by Suetonius, that Lenæus, a freedman of Pompey, wrote a violent invective against him, because, in speaking of his patron Pompey, he had said, that, with a modest exterior, he had a shameless soul: *Oris probi, animo inverecondo fuisse*. Eusebius in Chron. says, he died in the year 718, four years before the rupture between Antony and Octavius.

Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.



CHAP. IX.

Cæsar returns to Rome; the honours decreed him: his four triumphs; his civil administration and clemency.

Y. P. 707.

Bef. Chr.

45.

406 Cons.

Hirt. de

Bell. Afric.

CÆSAR left Utica on the thirteenth of June, having put an end to a war of great importance, and attended with extreme difficulty, in little more than five months. He took his way by Sardinia, from whence he sent part of his fleet and legions into Spain, under the command of C. Didius, his admiral, and his lieutenants Q. Fabius, and Q. Pædus, with orders to observe the motions of the sons of Pompey. After a short stay in that island, he put to sea on the twenty-ninth; but, meeting with foul weather in his passage, he did not get to Rome before the end of July.

Dio. l. xliii.

The uncertain event of the African war had kept the senate under some reserve; but they now began to push their flattery beyond all bounds of decency, and decreed more extravagant honours to Cæsar than were ever given before to any mortal. It was decreed, that there should be feasts and rejoicings for forty days, to celebrate his late victory; that, when he triumphed, his chariot should be drawn by four white horses, as those of Jupiter and of the Sun; and that, besides the ordinary number of lictors belonging to his offices, he should be preceded by all those of his former dicta-

torships. He was created dictator for ten years, and inspector of morals for three; his statue was placed in the capitol opposite to that of Jupiter, with the globe of the earth under his feet, and with this inscription, "To Cæsar the demi-god."

Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.

Ever since the commencement of the civil war, he had found no leisure for celebrating the triumphs which he had so justly deserved. He thought therefore the present time the most convenient for this purpose; and, in one month, he enjoyed four triumphs, which were conducted with a magnificence answerable to the wealth of the empire he was master of. His first triumph was over the Gauls; the next over Ptolemy and Egypt; the third over Pharnaces and Pontus; and the fourth over king Juba. We are told that the apparatus of each of these triumphs (by which is meant probably the pedestals and frames for the statues, pictures, and other representations) was different; that citron-wood was made use of in the first, tortoise-shell in the second, acanthus in the third, and ivory in the fourth. In that over the Gauls, which was the most splendid of the four, were carried the Rhine and the Rhone, and the captive ocean represented in gold. Dio adds a most improbable circumstance, that a multitude of prisoners preceded his chariot, among whom was distinguished Vercingetorix, the unfortunate chief of confederate Gaul, who had been reserved upwards of six years, to grace his conqueror's march to the capitol, and was afterwards thrown into a dungeon, and

Suet. 37.

Y. R. 707.
 Bef. Chr.
 45.
 406 Cons.

put to death with other captives. But Cæsar never acted with this barbarity against his enemies, when in the actual pursuit of conquest; and much less would he now be guilty of it towards a nation from which he had lately received so many signal proofs of their attachment to his cause and person. The axletree of the triumphal chariot broke in the way, and he did not arrive at the capitol till night, which he ascended by the light of lustres and flambeaux carried by forty elephants ranged on the right and left: and the Greek historian, just now mentioned, tells us, that notwithstanding the divine honours decreed him, he, in a very humble and supplicating posture, and upon his knees, climbed up the steps of the capitol. In the triumph over Egypt was represented the river Nile, and the Pharos on fire; and the death of Achillas and Pothinus in two different pictures. Dio says that Arsinoë, Cleopatra's sister, appeared there as a captive, and was afterwards set at liberty. This circumstance, however, is to be found in no other author, and Hirtius has informed us, that Cæsar banished her the kingdom of Egypt before he left Alexandria. The triumph over Pharnaces had nothing more remarkable than the inscription *Veni, vidi, vici*, engraved in capitals on a tablet. In the fourth marched Juba's son, a child; who afterwards gained great reputation by his learning, and was restored to the kingdom of Mauritania². Ap-

² Appian relates, that in these triumphs were to be seen representations of all the memorable events of the civil war;

pian says, that the money carried in these processions as the fruits of his victories, amounted to sixty-five thousand talents, besides two thousand eight hundred and twenty-two crowns of gold, weighing together twenty thousand four hundred and fourteen Roman pounds.

These triumphs were followed by rewards to his soldiers, and largesses to the citizens: to the first, besides land and settlements according to their services, he gave each veteran twenty thousand sesterces, double of that sum to every centurion, and four times as much to

Y. R. 707.

Bef. Chr.
45.

406. Cons.

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Suet. in
Cæs. 38.

Above 1617.

and portraits of all the Romans of distinction, who had lost their lives in it, Pompey only excepted; of Metellus Scipio, for example, falling on his own sword, and of Cato tearing out his bowels. But it is certain, that Cæsar imitated Sylla upon this occasion, and gave no offence by shewing the wounds of his country, and insulting over the misfortunes of his fellow-citizens; for Cicero, who in his eighth Philippic mentions the spectators' concern when they saw the city of Marseilles carried in triumph, would not have omitted those other affecting circumstances. The soldiers, on festivals of this kind, were allowed the liberty, during the procession, of singing verses, which sometimes contained the victor's praises, but were much oftener satires on him. Suetonius tells us, that they now reproached their general with his debauchery, and revived the suspicion which he had formerly lain under during his stay at the court of Nicomedes, king of Bithynia; a suspicion which gave him great offence, but which he could never get clear of, notwithstanding his oath to the contrary. Suet. in Cæs. xlix. 57. Pliny says that, dissatisfied with the rewards bestowed on them, they reproached him with the bad food that they had lived upon at Dyrrhachium. Plin. xix. 8. And Dio writes that they all told him with one voice, "If you act the honest part (by resigning your usurped power) you will be punished; but, if you continue to be unjust, you may continue to reign over us." Dio, l. xliii.

Y. R. 707.

Bef. Chr.

45.

406 Cons.

Above 31.

the tribunes. One hundred and fifty thousand citizens received from his bounty each ten bushels of corn, ten pounds of oil, and four hundred sesterces in money ; and, at the same time, the whole body of the people was treated with the greatest profusion at twenty-two thousand tables placed in the streets. To these expenses Cæsar further added public spectacles of all sorts. For the Circensian games, the circus was enlarged on each side, and a canal sunk round it ; and several young men of the greatest families ran the races in chariots drawn, some by four, some by two horses, and some on a single horse. The Trojan game was acted by two companies of lesser and larger boys, children of the nobility. The hunting of wild beasts was represented for five days together ; and at last a battle was fought by five hundred foot, twenty elephants, and thirty horse on each side ; to make room for which the gaols were taken away, and in their room two camps pitched opposite to one another. Wrestlers too performed for three days together in a stadium provided for the purpose in the field of Mars. A lake was sunk in the lesser Codeta, in which the people were entertained with the representation of Egyptian and Tyrian gallies of two, three, and four benches of oars, and a sea-fight. He also dedicated this year his temple to Venus Genitrix ; opened his new forum ; and celebrated the funeral obsequies of his daughter Julia, Pompey's wife.

Many Roman knights, to make their court

to the dictator, and please the populace, debased themselves so far as to enter the lists of gladiators. Furius Leptimus, a man of a prætorian family, and Q. Calpenus, who had been a senator, fought a prize in the forum. Decimus Laberius a Roman knight acted a mimic piece of his own composition, in compliance with Cæsar's will; and, being immediately presented with five hundred thousand sesterces and a gold ring, he went from the stage, through the orchestra, into the seats assigned for the equestrian order³.

Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.

Sue. in
Cæs. 39.

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When these festivals and rejoicings were over, Cæsar turned his attention towards matters of state and the administration of justice. He filled up the vacancies in the senate, advanced several commoners to the dignity of patricians, and enlarged the number of prætors, ædiles, quæstors, and inferior magistrates,

Suet. in
Cæs. 41.

³ Laberius, to get to his place, was obliged to pass over the benches of the senators; and Cicero, as he came by him, said to him, "I would make room for you on our benches, if we were not already too much crowded:" meaning to ridicule Laberius, and at the same time to reflect on the number of new senators. The poet made him this smart answer; "You surprise me; for you were wont to sit on two stools at once;" a proverbial expression to signify a trimmer. It appears that the knights were greatly disgusted to see one of their body upon the stage, and that Laberius had consented to appear there against his will. We are told, that, to make some amends, and to shew a spirit more suitable to his rank, he inserted some lines, which gave offence to Cæsar, and engaged him to award the prize to Publius Syrus, Laberius's competitor: "Romans, we are losing our liberty. He, who is feared by many, has many to fear." *Necesse est multos timeat, quem multi timent.* Macrob. Sat. xi. 3.

Y. R. 707.

Bef. Chr.

45.

406 Cons.

restoring such as had been disgraced by the censors, or condemned for bribery in elections. He admitted to the offices of the republic the sons of those who had been proscribed by Sylla. He introduced Gauls and other foreigners, who had enriched themselves in his service, into the senate; and, on this account, he has been greatly censured⁴. Dio and Macrobius tell us, that he increased the number of senators to nine hundred, whereas the house formerly did not consist of above six hundred; and such an augmentation, we may observe, is greatly recommended in a letter to Cæsar, attributed to Sallust, the historian, concerning the regulation of the state. But we have no mention of this matter in any of Cicero's letters, or in any authentic writing; nor of the augmentation of magistrates mentioned by Suetonius; though the increase of the senate, if true, implied that of the magistrates, that there might be quæstors enough to fill up the annual vacancies of the senate without any particular creation of senators. We are told, that from this time there were fourteen prætors, and forty quæstors.

⁴ Suetonius, c. lxxx. says that, on this occasion, the following advertisement was stuck up in different parts of the city: *Bonum factum. Ne quis senatori novo curiam monstrare velit*: "This is to give notice, that persons are desired not to shew any of the new senators the way to the senate-house." And, according to Macrobius, the great increase of senators occasioned a joke of Cicero; who, being applied to by one of his friends for his interest to get his son-in-law made a senator in one of the municipal towns: "At Rome," said he, "the thing is easy: at Pompeii it is more difficult."

The choice of the magistrates he so divided with the people, that, excepting only the competitors for the consulship, they chose one half of them, and he the other half: and his way was to recommend such as he had pitched upon, by billets dispersed through the several tribes to this effect: "Cæsar, the dictator, to such a tribe: I recommend to you such and such persons, that, by the favour of your votes, they may attain to the respective honours they sue for." We do not, however, find any division of magistracies between Cæsar and the people in Cicero's letters: it appears, on the contrary, that the consuls, prætors, ædiles, tribunes and quæstors were all elected according to the usual forms.

Y. R. 707.

Suet. in
Cæs. 41.

He restrained the trial of causes to two ranks of judges, those of the equestrian and senatorian orders, laying aside the commissioners of the treasury, who had before made a third class.

Dio, l. 43.

Suet. in
Cæs. 41.

In the quality of master of manners, he surveyed the people, but not in the usual method or place. He made the census in the several streets by those called *domini insularum*; and he reduced the number of those who received corn from the public, from three hundred and twenty thousand to one hundred and fifty thousand. And, to prevent all riots for the future upon account of the survey, he ordered, that, every year, a choice should be made by lot, by the prætor, in the room of such as died, out of those who had not been enrolled for the

Ibid.

Y. R. 707.

Suet. in
Cæs. 42.

receipt of corn. He reduced the number of the poor citizens, by sending fourscore thousand into colonies beyond seas. He enacted, that no freeman of the city above twenty, and under forty, should be allowed to absent himself three years together from Italy; that no senator's son should go into foreign parts, unless in the retinue of some governor; and that those who had pasture ground should have no less than a third part of their shepherds free-born. He made all such as practised physic in Rome, and all masters of liberal arts, free of the city, in order to fix them in it, and invite others to the place. To many, who had shewed themselves zealous in his cause, he communicated the like favour: and we have a proof from one of Cicero's letters, that, in bestowing this privilege, he acted with discretion. For, having found that some of his friends had abused his confidence by exposing this privilege to sale, he made a general revocation of such grants, and examined anew the grounds upon which they had been given. He encouraged marriages at the same time, and decreed rewards to those who had a numerous offspring.

Ep. Fam.
xiii. 36.
Melm. vii.
45.

Dio, l. 43.

Suet. in
Cæs. 42.

He disappointed the expectation of many in his regulation concerning debts. Several of his followers were in hopes that these would be wholly cancelled; a thing, as we have seen, that was frequently moved for; but he ordered that the debtors should satisfy their creditors, deducting only what interest had been paid.

since the commencement of the civil war, by virtue of which order, Suetonius says, a fourth part of the debt was lost.

Y. R. 707.
Ref. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.

He abolished all companies of artificers but such as were of ancient establishment: for the corporations of later institution had been chiefly erected by turbulent magistrates, such as Clodius, with a view to have in the city so many companies to vote, or regiments to fight for them.

Suet. in
Cæs. 42.

Luxury being carried to great excess in dress, furniture, building, eating, and sepulchral monuments, he revived the sumptuary laws, and was very desirous to carry them into execution. He laid duties on the importation of foreign commodities; and the use of coaches, jewels, and scarlet cloth was allowed only to certain persons. We are told that he appointed commissioners to inspect the markets, and seize upon all the victuals which were exposed to sale contrary to law; and that he sent officers into private houses, to take off the tables the prohibited rarities, when he heard of any prevarications in this particular. All this care, however, was to no purpose: luxury still continued to prevail.

He was indefatigable and very strict in the administration of justice^s. He enforced the laws against crimes by more severe punishments: and; because the rich were easily induced to transgress, by reason of their being only punished with banishment, he stripped parricides or murderers of their whole estates,

Ad Att.
xiii. 7.

Suet. in
Cæs. 43.

^s Jus laboriosissimè ac severissimè dixit. Suet. 43.

Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.

and other offenders of one half. He turned such as were convicted of bribery out of the senate; and he dissolved the marriage of a senator of prætorian rank, who had married a woman two days after her divorce from a former husband, though there was no suspicion of any former unlawful commerce betwixt them.

Dio, 43.
Phil. i. 8.

One of the most considerable as well as most useful of his laws was, that no prætor should hold any province more than one year, or a consul more than two. This was a regulation that had been often wished for, as Cicero says, in the best times; and what one of the ablest dictators of the old republic had declared to be its chief security, not to suffer great and arbitrary commands to be of long duration; but to limit them at least in time, if it was not convenient to limit them in power⁶. Cæsar knew by experience that the prolongation of these extraordinary commands, and the habit of ruling kingdoms, was the readiest way not only to inspire contempt of the laws, but to give a man the power to subvert them. He secured by this law his own possession and power from the attempts of all future invaders; and, after him, it was the most proper to secure the liberties of the state, by preventing any other man from doing what Pompey and he himself had done.

⁶ Mamercus Æmilius.—Maximam autem, ait, ejus custodiam esse, si magna imperia diuturna non essent; et temporis modus imponeretur, quibus juris imponi non posset. Liv. iv. 24.

It was at this time also, that he set himself to reform the calendar; a work of general benefit to mankind. The Roman year, from the old institution of Numa, was lunar; borrowed from the Greeks: among whom it consisted of three hundred and fifty-four days. Numa added one more to them, to make the whole number odd, which was thought the most fortunate; and, to fill up the deficiency of his year to the measure of the solar course, inserted likewise, or intercalated, after the manner of the Greeks, an extraordinary month of twenty-two days, every second year, and twenty-three every fourth, between the twenty-third and twenty-fourth day of February. If Numa had stuck to the lunar year of three hundred and fifty-four days, by this intercalation his year would have been as regular as that of Cæsar, but, by adding his odd day, each year deviated from the solar one whole day too much: which irregularity he might easily have corrected, by striking out of the intercalary month, eight days every eighth year. This, however, was not done, and there appears to have been a progression of all the months in the year, relatively to the seasons: and we find, that the consuls and other magistrates entered upon their offices in different ages of the republic, in January, in December, in October, in July, and in March; though the commencement of their magistracies must have been always in the winter-season. Numa committed the care of these intercalations to the college of priests; who,

Y. R. 707.
 Bef. Chr.
 45.
 406 Cons.

Y. R. 707.
 Bef. Chr.
 45.
 406 Cons.

it is commonly asserted, partly by a negligent, partly by a superstitious, but chiefly by an arbitrary abuse of their power, used either to drop or to insert them, as it was found most convenient to themselves or their friends, to make the current year longer or shorter. But, when the last intercalation was made in the year 701, Pompey being sole consul, the first of January of the following year was very near the winter solstice, and therefore in its right place; and the great confusion, in the year 707, proceeded from the omission of the intercalary months, during six successive years. Cæsar resolved to put an end to this disorder for the future, as well as for the present, by abolishing the source of it, the use of intercalations; and, instead of the lunar, to establish the solar year, adjusted to the exact measure of the sun's revolution in the zodiac, or to that period of time in which it returns to the point from which it set out: and as this, according to the astronomers of that age, was supposed to be three hundred and sixty-five days and six hours, so he divided the days into twelve artificial months, and to supply the deficiency of six hours, by which they fell short of the sun's complete course, he ordered a day to be intercalated every fourth year, between the twenty-third and twenty-fourth of February⁷. But, to make

⁷ This day was called Bissextus from its being a repetition or duplicate of the sixth of the calends of March, which fell always on the twenty-fourth; and hence our intercalary, or leap-year, is still called Bissextile. See Middl. p. 170.

this year begin and end regularly, he was forced to insert into the current year, two extraordinary months between November and December; the one of thirty-three, the other of thirty-four days; besides (add Suetonius and Censorinus) the ordinary intercalary month of twenty-three days which fell into it of course. But Dio is positive, that he added no more than sixty-seven days: and though his authority is not decisive, yet as he seems to have examined this point, and there is no probability of there having been any intercalation since the beginning of the civil war, sixty-seven days were sufficient to replace the months in their proper seasons; which sixty-seven days were lost since 701, by the omission of three intercalations. All this was effected by the care and skill of Sosigenes, a celebrated astronomer of Alexandria, whom Cæsar had brought to Rome for that purpose: and a new calendar was formed upon it by Flavius, a scribe, digested according to the order of the Roman festivals, and the old manner of computing their days by calends, ides, and nones; which was published and authorized by the dictator's edict not long after his return from Africa. This year, therefore, was the longest that Rome had ever known, consisting of fourteen months, or four hundred and twenty-two days; and is called the last of the confusion, because it introduced the Julian or solar year, with the commencement of the ensuing January; which continues in use to this day in all Christian countries,

Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.

Pliny, Hist.
Nat. xviii.
25.

Macrob.
Sat. i. 3.

Dio, 227.

Y. R. 707.

Bef. Chr.

45.

406 Cons.

without any other variation than that of the old and new style ⁸.

All the regulations mentioned above were not enacted merely by Cæsar's dictatorial authority: they were confirmed either by decrees of the senate, or orders of the people, according to their nature. Indeed grants to foreign princes were often made in the name of the senate, though the affair had not been referred to the house; but this had been practised before Cæsar's reign, and these jobs had been esteemed the perquisites of the consuls ⁹.

⁸ This difference of the old and new style was occasioned by a regulation made by pope Gregory, A. D. 1582; for it having been observed, that the computation of the vernal equinox was fallen back ten days from the time of the council of Nice, when it was found to be on the twenty-first of March; according to which all the festivals of the church were then solemnly settled; pope Gregory, by the advice of astronomers, caused ten days to be entirely sunk and thrown out of the current year, between the fourth and fifteenth of October.

⁹ Ep. Fam. ix. 15. Middl. p. 152. "While I am still at Rome, and attend the forum," says Cicero, in a letter to Papirius Pætus, "the senate's decrees are all drawn at our friend's house; and, whenever it comes into his head, my name is set down as if present at drawing them; so that I hear from Armenia and Syria of decrees said to be made at my motion, of which I had never heard a syllable at home. Do not take me to be in jest, for I assure you, that I have received letters from kings from the remotest parts of the earth, to thank me for giving them the title of king: when, so far from knowing that any such title had been decreed to them, I knew not even that there were any such men in being. What is then to be done? Why, as long as our master of manners continues here, I will follow your advice; but, as soon as he is gone, will run away to join you over a plate of mushrooms." Was it not


The dictator distinguished himself also, during his stay at Rome, by the greatest acts of clemency and generosity to his most avowed enemies. M. Marcellus, who, when consul, began the attack upon Cæsar, and prosecuted it for three years by his relations, whom he got successively into the first dignity of the state, retired, after the battle of Pharsalia, to Mitylene, where he lived in ease without making any advances to Cæsar, and it was with difficulty he consented that his friends should sue for his pardon. In an assembly of the senate, Piso, Cæsar's father-in-law, undertook to broach the affair, and immediately C. Marcellus, brother to Marcus, threw himself at Cæsar's feet; upon which the whole senate, rising from their seats, seconded the request. Cæsar complained of the moroseness of Marcellus, and made a parallel of his behaviour with that of others towards him, and particularly with that of S. Sulpicius, his colleague in the consulate; but presently declared, contrary to all their expectations, that whatever offence he had received from the man, he could refuse nothing to the intercession of the senate, though he knew that he had many enemies who had designs upon his life¹. And it was upon this occasion that Cicero

Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.

a great grievance that Cæsar should grant favours, without the privacy of the senate, to men so insignificant that Cicero had never heard of them?

¹ The whole history of this transaction is related by Cicero, in a letter to Sulpicius, Ep. Fam. iv. 4. Melm. ix. 17.

Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.



delivered that ingenious and eloquent panegyric on Cæsar, in which he justifies the dictator's conduct in the civil war, and professes a personal affection for him, and zeal for the preservation of his life, insomuch that he declares himself ready to put himself between a pointed dagger and his body². Marcellus,

Guthrie,
Vol. i. p.
167—171.
Middl. p.
167.

² “ Now proceed I to your heavy charge and gloomy suspicions, (says Cicero to Cæsar, in his speech for Marcellus) all which ought to be guarded against not more by you than by every Roman, especially by us whom you have preserved: and, though I hope they are groundless, yet never shall I endeavour, by my expressions, to extenuate them; for your circumspection is our safety; and, were I to err on any extreme, it should be that of too much caution, rather than too little prudence. But who can be such a madman? Is he of your friends? Who can be more so than they whom, contrary to their own expectations, you brought from ruin? Is he of those who followed you to the field? Where is the wretch so frantic, as not to prefer, even to his own life, the life of the man, under whose command he has risen to all that ambition could wish! But, if your friends enter into no conspiracy, may not your foes? Where are these to be found? For all, who formerly were so, either owed their death to their own stubbornness, or their life to your mercy. Thus no man who ever was your foe is now alive, or, if alive, he is now your determined friend.

“ Yet, as the mind of man is so dark and so impenetrable, we ought to increase your distrust, and, at the same time, your circumspection. For, shew me the man so new to the affairs of life, such a novice in this state, so unheeding either his own or the common safety, as not to be sensible, that in your preservation his own is included, and upon your life depends the life of every Roman? For my part, when I meditate night and day on the accidents of life, the uncertain enjoyment of health, and the frailty to which nature is subjected; I tremble, I grieve, that this state, which ought to be eternal, should exist in the breath of one mortal. But

however, did not live to enjoy the benefit of his pardon. He had left Mitylene in the


Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.

if, with human accidents and doubtful events depending on the natural constitution, treason and villany shall co-operate, to me it appears, that a god, were he willing, must be unable to save this country.

“ By you, alone, O Cæsar ! every thing, which you see overthrown and overturned by the unavoidable calamities of war, is to be replaced : public justice must be restored, public credit must be retrieved : the lusts of mankind suppressed, the race of mankind propagated, and every drooping branch of the constitution, that now hangs its head, is to be reared and supported by the wholesome severity of laws. There is no denying that, in so fierce a civil war, amidst such a combustion of arms and opinions; in every event the state must receive a shock, by the beating down some of her most graceful ornaments and primest bulwarks. For the head of each party, in the storm of war, was forced on many measures which he would have disapproved of in the calm of peace. You alone are the physician to bind up these bleeding wounds of your country, and every application from any other hand must prove ineffectual.

“ With reluctance, therefore, did I hear from your mouth that saying, which discovers at once the hero and the philosopher : that you had lived long enough either for nature or for glory. Enough, if you will, for nature ; nay, I will add for glory too : but surely not for the chief purpose of life, your country ! Give over, therefore, I conjure you, that philosophical contempt of death. Do not be a sage at the expense of your country : for it has often reached my ears, that it is commonly in your mouth, that you have lived long enough for yourself. True ! if I could suppose that you lived for yourself, and was born for yourself alone. But now that your courage and conduct are connected with the safety of Romans, and the constitution of Rome ; so far are you from having completed, that you have not yet laid the foundations of those great designs you meditate. Thus you limit your life, not by the good of your country, but the intentions of your equity : yet even

Y. R. 707.
 Bef. Chr.
 45.
 406 Cons.



beginning of the following year, and was come as far as Piræus on his way towards

that is not enough for the purposes of glory ; which, wise as you are, you must own to be the ruling passion of your soul.


“ ‘ Shall I then,’ say you, ‘ leave behind me but a scanty portion of glory ? ’ Yes : to others it would be sufficient : but to Cæsar it is but scanty. For what considered by itself is great, may prove but little when compared with the degrees to which it may be extended. If this was to be the end of your immortal acts, that, after conquering all your enemies, you should leave the republic in the condition in which it is now ; consider, I beseech you, whether your divine virtue would not excite an admiration of you rather than any real glory : for glory is the illustrious fame of many and great services either to our friends, our country, or to the whole race of mankind.

“ This part, therefore, still remains ; there is one act more to be performed by you ; to establish the republic again, that you may reap the benefit of it yourself in peace and prosperity. When you have paid this debt to your country, and fulfilled the ends of your nature by a satiety of living, you may then tell us, if you please, that you have lived long enough : yet what is it, after all, that we can really call long, of which there is an end ? For, when that end is once come, all past pleasure is to be reckoned as nothing, since no more of it is to be expected. Though your mind, I know, was never content with these narrow bounds of life which nature has assigned to us, but inflamed always with an ardent love of immortality.

“ Nor indeed is this to be considered as your life, which is comprised in this body and breath ; but that, that, I say, is your life, which is to flourish in the memory of all ages : which posterity will cherish, and eternity itself propagate. It is to this that you must attend ; to this that you must form yourself : which has many things already to admire, yet wants something still, that it may praise in you. Posterity will be amazed to hear and read of your commands, provinces ; the Rhine, the Ocean, the Nile ; your innumerable battles, incredible victories, infinite mo-

Rome; where he was killed by P. Magius Cilo, his friend and companion; who, though

Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.



numents, splendid triumphs: but, unless this city be established again by your wisdom and counsels, your name indeed will wander far and wide, yet will have no certain seat or place at last, where to fix itself. There will be also, among those who are yet unborn, the same controversy that has been among us; when some will extol your actions to the skies; others, perhaps, will find something defective in them; and that one thing above all, if you should not extinguish this flame of civil war, by restoring liberty to your country: for the one may be looked upon as the effect of fate, but the other is the certain act of wisdom.

“ Pay a reverence, therefore, to those judges who will pass judgment upon you in ages to come; and with less partiality perhaps than we, since they will neither be biassed by affection or party, nor prejudiced by hatred or envy to you; and though this, as some falsely imagine, should then have no relation to you, yet it concerns you, certainly, at the present, to act in such a manner, that no oblivion may ever obscure the lustre of your praises.

“ Various were the inclinations of the citizens, and their opinions wholly divided: nor did we differ only in sentiments and wishes, but in arms also and camps: the merits of the cause were dubious, and the contention between two celebrated leaders: many doubted what was the best; many what was convenient; many what was decent; some also what was lawful: the commonwealth, at length, got over this ruinous, this destructive war: victory favoured the man whose resentment was not inflamed by conquest, but softened by clemency; the man who did not condemn to exile, or death, the enemy against whom he was exasperated. Some quitted their arms; they were forced from others. That citizen is unjust and odious, who, when hostilities are laid aside in the field, retains them in his bosom; much more justifiable is he who lays down his life in the field of battle, and seals with his blood the cause he has embraced.

“ But since all civil discord is now subdued by the arms, or extinguished by the clemency of the victor, let us all

Y. R. 707.

Bef. Chr.

45.

406 Cons.

Middl.

p. 194.

Id. p. 198.

he had been quæstor, and was of a family which had borne some of the public offices, had attached himself to the fortunes of Marcellus, and followed him through the wars, and in his exile. After having given him two wounds, the one in his stomach, the other in his head near the ear, he stabbed himself with the same poniard. As soon as the news reached Rome, it raised a general consternation: and, from the suspicious nature of the times, all people's thoughts were presently turned upon Cæsar, as if he were privately the contriver of it; and, from the wretched fate of so illustrious a citizen, every man began to think himself in danger. Cicero was greatly shocked at it, and seemed to consider it as the prelude of some greater evil to ensue; and Atticus, signifying his concern upon it, advises him to take a more particular care of himself, as being the only consular senator left, who stood exposed to any envy. But

think and act with unanimity. It is, O Cæsar, only by your remaining safe and fixed in the same principles which you have heretofore, but more particularly this day, expressed, that we can be preserved. Therefore all of us who wish the prosperity of our country beg and intreat, that you would provide for your life and safety; and all of us, (I speak for others what I myself feel) as you suspect some reason to be cautious, promise not only to guard you by day, and watch you by night, but to form, with our own bodies and our own breasts, the wall of your defence."

Though all this was mere compliment in Cicero, it might have been spoken with great truth and sincerity: for certain it is, that at this time no power less than that of a dictator, as Cæsar was, could remedy the disorders of the state.

Cæsar's friends soon cleared him of all suspicion; as indeed the fact itself did, when the circumstances came to be known, and fixed the whole guilt of it on the fury of Magius. It was Cicero's conjecture that Magius, oppressed with debts, and apprehending some trouble on that score, at his return to Rome, had been urging Marcellus, who was his sponsor for some part of them, to furnish him with money to pay the whole; and, by receiving a denial, was provoked to the madness of killing his patron. Others assign a different reason, as the rage of jealousy, and the impatience of seeing others more favoured by Marcellus than himself³.

Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.


Ad Att.
xiii. 10.

Val. Max.
ix. 11.

Soon after the affair of Marcellus, Cicero had another occasion of trying both his eloquence and interest with Cæsar in the cause of Ligarius; who was now in exile, on account of having been in arms against Cæsar in the African war, in which he had borne a considerable command. His two brothers, however, had been on Cæsar's side; and, being recommended by Pansa; and warmly supported by Cicero, had almost prevailed for his pardon; when Q. Tubero, who had an old quarrel with him, being desirous to obstruct it, and knowing Cæsar to be particu-

Ep. Fam.
vi. 14.

³ S. Sulpicius, who, in a letter to Cicero, gives the account above, tells him, that the Athenians refused to grant a place of burial for him within the city, saying, that it was forbidden by their religion, and had never been indulged to any man. He was therefore buried without the city in the Academy. Middl. p. 172. Ep. Fam. iv. 12.

Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.


Plut. in
Cic.

larly exasperated against all those, who, through an obstinate aversion to him, had renewed the war in Africa, accused him, in the usual forms, of an uncommon zeal and violence in prosecuting that war. Cæsar is said to have privately encouraged the prosecution, and ordered the cause to be tried in the forum, where he sat upon it in person, strongly prepossessed against the criminal, and determined to lay hold of any plausible pretence of condemning him: but the force of Cicero's eloquence, exerted with all his skill in a cause which he had much at heart, got the better of all his prejudices, and extorted a pardon from him against his will⁴. This Li-

⁴ "The merit of this speech," says Dr. Middleton, "is too well known to want to be enlarged upon: those who read it will find no reason to charge Cicero with flattery: but the free spirit, which it breathes, in the face of that power to which it was suing for mercy, must give a great idea of the art of the speaker, who could deliver such bold truths without offence; as well as of the generosity of the judge who heard them not only with patience, but approbation." Middl. p. 173—175.

"Observe, Cæsar," says he, "with what fidelity I plead Ligarius's cause, when I betray even my own by it. O that admirable clemency, worthy to be celebrated by every kind of praise, letters, monuments! M. Cicero defends a criminal before you, by proving him not to have been in those sentiments in which he owns himself to have been: nor does he yet fear your secret thoughts, or while he is pleading for another, what may occur to you about himself. See, I say, how little he is afraid of you. See with what a courage and gaiety of speaking your generosity and wisdom inspire me. I will raise my voice to such a pitch that the whole Roman people may hear me. After the war was not only begun, Cæsar, but in a great mea-


garius, after his return, lived in great confidence with Brutus, who found him a fit per-

Y. R. 707.

Bef. Chr.

45.

406 Cons.



sure finished, when I was driven by no necessity, I went, by choice and judgment, to join myself with those who had taken arms against you. Before whom do I say this? Why before him who, though he knew it to be true, yet restored me to the republic, before he had even seen me; who wrote to me from Egypt, that I should be the same man that I had always been; and, when he was the only emperor within the dominion of Rome, suffered me to be the other; and to hold my laurelled fasces, as long as I thought them worth holding.—Do you then, Tubero, call Ligarius's conduct wicked? For what reason, since that cause has never yet been called by that name? Some indeed call it mistake, others fear; those, who speak more severely, hope, ambition, hatred, obstinacy, or, at the worst, rashness; but no man besides you has ever called it wickedness. For my part, were I to invent a proper and genuine name for our calamity, I should take it for a kind of fatality, that had possessed the unwary minds of men; so that none can think it strange that all human counsels were over-ruled by a divine necessity. Call us then, if you please, unhappy, though we can never be so under this conqueror; but I speak not of us who survive, but of those who fell: let them be ambitious; let them be angry; let them be obstinate; but let not the guilt of crime, of fury, of parricide, ever be charged on Cn. Pompey and on many of those who died with him. When did we ever hear any such thing from you, Cæsar? Or what other view had you in the war but to defend yourself from injury? —You considered it, from the first, not as a war, but a secession; not an hostile, but a civil dissension: where both sides wished well to the republic; yet, through a difference, partly of counsels, partly of inclinations, deviated from the common good: the dignity of the leaders was almost equal; though not, perhaps, of those who followed them; the cause was then dubious, since there was something which one might approve on either side; but now that must needs be thought the best, which the gods have favoured; and after the experience of your clemency, who

Y. R. 707.
 Ref. Chr.
 45.
 406. Cons.

son to bear a part in the conspiracy against Cæsar; but, happening to be taken ill near the time of its execution, when Brutus in a visit to him began to lament, that he was fallen sick in a very unlucky hour; he presently raising himself upon his elbow, and taking Brutus by the hand, replied: "Yet still, Brutus, if you mean to do any thing worthy of yourself, I am well." Nor did he disappoint Brutus's opinion of him, for we find him afterwards in the list of the conspirators.

Cicero composed, at this time, his panegyric upon Cato^s, which is lost; but, from the ac-

can be displeased with that victory, in which no man fell who was not actually in arms."

It would have been difficult for Cæsar to have been angry with these bold truths.

^s Dr. Middleton (p. 160) and Abbé Mongault imagine, that Cicero had been left a guardian to Cato's son, as he was also to young Lucullus, Cato's nephew. "This testimony of Cato's friendship and judgment of him," says the former of these writers, "might induce him the more readily to pay this honour to his memory. It was a matter, however, of no small deliberation, in what manner he ought to treat the subject: his friends advised him not to be too explicit and particular in the detail of Cato's praises, but to content himself with a general encomium, for fear of irritating Cæsar, by pushing the argument too far. In a letter to Atticus, (xii. 4.) he calls this an Archimedean problem; 'but I cannot hit upon any thing,' says he, 'that those friends of yours will read with pleasure, or even with patience: besides, if I should drop the account of Cato's votes and speeches in the senate, and of his political conduct in the state, and give a slight commendation only of his constancy and gravity, even this will be more than they care to hear: but the man cannot be praised as he deserves, unless it be particularly explained, how he foretold all that has happened to us; how he took arms to prevent its happening; and

counts given of the work by antiquity, it appears, that he spared no pains to adorn it. Brutus, also, composed and published a piece on the same subject. Cæsar, far from expressing any resentment, affected to be pleased with them; yet declared that he would answer Cicero's; and Hirtius, in the mean while, drew up a little piece, in the form of a letter to Cicero, filled with objections to Cato's character, but with high compliments to Cicero himself; which Cicero took care to make public, and called it a specimen of what Cæsar's work was like to be. Cæsar's answer was not published till the next year, upon his return from Spain, after the defeat of Pompey's sons. It was a laboured invective; answering Cicero's book paragraph by paragraph, and accusing Cato with all the art and force of his rhetoric, as if in a public trial before judges; yet with expressions of great respect towards Cicero; whom, for his virtues and abilities, he compared to Pericles and Theramenes of Athens: and in a letter upon it to Balbus, which was

Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.

Tac. An.
iv. 34.
Quint. iii.
7.
Plut. in
Cic.

parted with life rather than see it happen.'" These were the topics, which he resolved to display with all his force. And the doctor thinks, that this work was a remarkable proof of his being no temporiser at this time. But, since Cæsar and his friends were so much pleased with the work; it is very evident that they did not find their condemnation in it. His orations for Marcellus, for Ligarius, and afterwards for Dejotarus, may be called, with as good reason, remarkable proofs of his courage and veracity, whereas they are extraordinary examples of falseness and servile adulation. If we examine his private correspondence at this period, we shall find, that he acted a double part; making his

Y. P. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.

Ad Att.
xiii. 46.
Middl. p.
193.

shewn by his order to Cicero, he said, that, by the frequent reading of Cicero's Cato, he was grown more copious; but, after he had read Brutus's, thought himself more eloquent.

Brutus, about this time, took a resolution of putting away his wife Claudia, to marry Porcia, Bibulus's widow, and his uncle Cato's daughter; a step for which he was much censured; since Claudia had no stain upon her character; was nobly born; the sister of Appius Claudius; and nearly allied to Pompey: so that his mother Servilia, though Cato's sister, seems to have been averse to the divorce, and strongly in the interest of Claudia against her niece. Cicero's advice upon it was, that if Brutus was resolved upon the thing, he should do it out of hand, as the best way to put an end to people's talking; by shewing that it was not done out of levity or complaisance to the times, but

court, on the one hand, to Cæsar, and passing his whole time with Cæsar's friends, of whom he was continually asking favours; while, on the other hand, he was perpetually complaining of the state of affairs, in the bitterest and most unreasonable terms, to republicans, and to Pompeians then in exile.—The following letters accordingly will give the reader a most satisfactory account of his sentiments and way of life during Cæsar's administration: and we shall accompany them with some remarks.


CICERO TO PAPIRIUS PÆTUS.

Ep. Fam.
ix. 16.
Melm. viii.
20.

“Your letter afforded me a very agreeable instance of your friendship, in the concern it expressed lest I should be uneasy at the report which had been brought me hither by Silius;” [This man had brought an account from the army

to take the daughter of Cato, whose name was now highly popular: which Brutus soon after complied with, and made Porcia his wife. And Cicero, when he separated from Terentia, in the beginning of this year, had thoughts of marrying the daughter of Pompey. Nothing shews better how much they presumed on Cæsar's mildness. He married, however, Publilia, a young woman with a great fortune, to whom he was guardian, to satisfy, says Plutarch, his creditors with her money. This drew upon him a great deal of censure; and was certainly an act of the greatest injustice to Terentia, who had lived with him upwards of thirty years, and had made him the father of two children extremely dear to him.

Y. R. 707.
Bef. Chr.
45.
406 Cons.



in Africa, that some witticisms of Cicero had been reported to Cæsar, which had given him offence.] "I was indeed before perfectly sensible how much you was disturbed at this circumstance, by your care in sending me duplicates of a former letter upon the same subject: and I then returned such an answer as I thought would be sufficient to abate, at least, if not entirely remove this your generous solicitude. But since I perceive, by your last letter, how much this affair still dwells upon your mind; let me assure you, my dear Pætus, that I have employed every artifice (for we must now, my friend, be armed with cunning, as well as prudence) to conciliate the good graces of the persons you mention: and, if I mistake not, my endeavours have not proved ineffectual. I receive indeed so many marks of respect and esteem from those who are most in Cæsar's favour, that I cannot but flatter myself they have a true regard for me. It must be confessed, at the same time, that a pretended affection is not easily discernible from a real one, unless in seasons of distress. For adversity is to friendship what fire is to gold; the only infallible test to discover the genuine from the counterfeit: as, in all other

circumstances, they both bear the same common signatures. I have one strong reason, however, to persuade me of their sincerity : as neither their situation, nor mine, can by any means tempt them to dissemble with me. As to that person [Cæsar] in whom all power is now centered, I am not sensible that I have any thing to fear : or nothing more, at least, than what arises from that general precarious state in which all things must stand where the fence of laws is broken down ; and that it is impossible to pronounce with assurance of any event, which depends wholly upon the will, not to say the caprice, of another. But this I can with confidence affirm, that I have not, in any single instance, given him any just occasion to take offence : and, in the article you point out, I have been particularly cautious. There was a time, it is true, when I thought it well became me, by whom Rome itself was free, to speak my sentiments with freedom : but, now that our liberties are no more, I deem it equally agreeable to my present situation not to say any thing that may disgust either Cæsar or his favourites. But, were I to suppress every rising raillery, that might pique those at whom it is directed, I must renounce, you know, all my reputation as a wit : and, in good earnest, it is a character upon which I do not set so high a value as to be unwilling to resign, if it were in my power. However, I am in no danger of suffering in Cæsar's opinion, by being represented as the author of any sarcasms to which I have no claim : as his judgment is much too penetrating ever to be deceived by any imposition of this nature. I remember your brother Servius, whom I look upon to be one of the most learned critics that this age has produced, was so conversant in the writings of our poets, and had acquired such an excellent and judicious ear, that he could immediately distinguish the numbers of Plautus from those of any other author. Thus Cæsar, I am told, when he made his large collection of apophthegms, constantly rejected any piece of wit that was brought to him as mine, if it happened to be spurious : a distinction he is much more able to make at present, as his particular friends pass almost every day of their lives in my company. As our conversation generally turns upon a variety of subjects, I frequently strike out thoughts which they look upon as not altogether void perhaps of spirit and ingenuity. Now

these little sallies of pleasantry, together with the general occurrences of Rome, are commonly transmitted to Cæsar, in pursuance of his own express directions: so that, if any thing of this kind is mentioned by others as coming from me, he always disregards it. You see then, that the lines you quote with so much propriety, from the tragedy of Oenomaus, contain a caution altogether unnecessary. For tell me, my friend, what jealousies can I possibly create? Or who will look with envy upon a man in my humble situation? But, granting I were in ever so enviable a state, yet, let me observe, that it is the opinion of those philosophers who alone seem to have understood the true nature of virtue, that a good man is answerable for nothing farther than his own innocence. Now, in this respect, I think myself doubly irreproachable: in the first place, as having recommended such public measures as were for the interest of the commonwealth; and, in the next, when I found I was not sufficiently supported to render my counsels effectual, that I did not deem it advisable to contend farther by arms against a superior strength. Most certainly, therefore, I cannot justly be accused of having failed in the duty of a good citizen. The only part, therefore, that now remains for me, is to be cautious not to expose myself, by any indiscreet word or action, to the resentment of those in power: a part which I hold likewise to be agreeable to the character of true wisdom. . . . But to turn from the serious to the jocose part of your letter.—The strain of pleasantry you break into immediately after having quoted the tragedy of Oenomaus, puts me in mind of the modern method of introducing, at the end of those graver dramatic pieces, the buffoon humour of our low mimes, instead of the more delicate burlesque of the old Atellan farces. Why else do you talk of your paltry polypusses, and your mouldy cheese? In pure good-nature, it is true, I formerly submitted to sit down with you to such homely fare: but more refined company has improved me into a better taste: for Hirtius and Dolabella, let me tell you, are my preceptors in the science of the table: as, in return, they are my disciples in that of the bar. But I suppose you have already heard, that they frequently declaim at my house, and I sup at theirs.”

TO THE SAME.

Ep. Fam.
ix. 18.
Melm. viii.
22.

“Your very agreeable letter found me wholly disengaged at my Tusculan villa. I retired hither during the absence of my pupils [Hirtius and Dolabella] whom I have sent to meet their victorious friend in order to conciliate his good graces in my favour. As Dionysius, the tyrant, after he had been expelled from Syracuse, opened a school, it is said, at Corinth; in the same manner, being driven from my dominions in the forum, I have erected a sort of academy in my own house; and I perceive, by your letter, that you approve the scheme. I have many reasons for approving it too: and, principally, as it affords me, what is highly expedient in the present conjuncture, a means of establishing an interest with those in whose friendship I may find a protection. How far my intentions in this respect may be answered, I know not: I can only say, that I have hitherto had no reason to prefer the different measures which others of the same party with myself have pursued; unless, perhaps, it would have been more eligible not to have survived the ruin of our cause. It would so, I confess, had I died either in the camp, or in the field: but the former did not happen to be my fate; and, as to the latter, I was never engaged in any action. But the inglorious manner in which Pompey, together with Scipio, Afranius, and your friend Lentulus, severally lost their lives, will scarcely, I suppose, be thought a more desirable lot. As to Cato’s death; it must be acknowledged to have been truly noble: and I can still follow his example, whenever I shall be so disposed: let me only endeavour, as in truth I do, not to be compelled to it by the same necessity: and this, indeed, is my first reason for engaging in my present scheme. My next is, that I find it an advantage not only to my health, which began to be impaired by the intermission of exercises of this kind, but also to my oratorical talents, if any I ever possessed; which would have totally lost their vigour, if I had not had recourse to this method of keeping them in play. The last benefit I shall mention (and the principal one, I dare say, in your estimation) is, that it has introduced me to the demolishing a greater num-

ber of more delicious peacocks, than you have had the devouring of paltry pigeons in all your life. The truth of it is, whilst you are humbly sipping the meager broths of the sneaking Aterius, I am luxuriously regaling myself with the savoury soups of the magnificent Hirtius. If you have any spirit then, fly hither, and learn, from our elegant bills of fare, how to refine your own. To encourage you to do so, you shall be honoured with a chair and cushion next to mine, and sit the second great pedagogue in my celebrated school."

The following letter to his friend NIGIDIUS FIGULUS, who was then in exile, is in a more melancholy strain :

Ep. Fam.
iv. 13.
Melm. ix.
3.

" Though I have been long looking out for an occasion of writing to you, yet I have not only been unable to meet with any particular subject for that purpose, but find myself utterly at a loss even to furnish out a common letter. The calamities of our country have spoiled me for those jocose epistles, with which, in happier days, I used to entertain my friends: as fortune has rendered me incapable of writing, or in truth of thinking upon any subject of a cheerful nature. There remains another species of letters of a grave and serious cast, peculiarly adapted to these miserable times. But as a letter of this kind ought to contain either some promise of assisting you to surmount your misfortunes, or some arguments to support you under them; from these too I am likewise excluded. Sunk, indeed, as I am into the same abject fortune as yourself; what assistance can I possibly offer you? The truth is, I am obliged to have recourse myself to the aid of others: and I have much more reason to lament that I live upon these disgraceful terms, than to rejoice that I am still in being. I say not this from any extraordinary injuries which I have suffered in my own person: as indeed there is nothing, which in the present conjuncture I could wish for myself, that Cæsar has not voluntarily offered me. Nevertheless, the sorrows that oppress my heart are of so severe a nature, that I think myself guilty of a crime in still continuing to live. For I live deprived of many of my most intimate friends, whom death, or those public calamities which have driven them from their country, have separated from me: as I have likewise

lost, by the same means, all those whose good-will I formerly conciliated, when, by your assistance, I successfully stood forth in defence of the republic. I have the unhappiness, at the same time, to be placed in the midst of the general wreck and plunder of their fortunes: and not only have the pain to hear, (but, what is far more affecting) am a spectator of the dissipation of the estates which belonged to those illustrious associates, who assisted me in extinguishing the flames of that dangerous conspiracy. In a word, I have the mortification to find myself utterly divested of all credit, authority, and honours in that republic, where I once flourished in the full possession of these glorious distinctions. Cæsar, it is true, acts towards me with the utmost generosity: but his generosity cannot restore what I have lost by the general violence and confusion of the times. Thus, bereaved of those advantages to which I was habituated by genius, by inclination, and by custom, I imagine the world is no less dissatisfied with me than I am with myself. Formed indeed as I was by nature to be perpetually engaged in the noblest and most important occupations, I am now deprived of every means, not only of acting, but thinking to any public purpose. There was a time when my assistance could have raised the obscure, and protected even the guilty; but now I cannot so much as send a favourable promise to Nigidius; to the virtuous and learned Nigidius; to the man who once flourished in the highest credit, and who was always my warmest friend! Thus you see that I am totally disqualified from writing letters to you of this kind.

“ The only subject, that remains to me then, is to endeavour to draw off your mind from its inquietudes, by laying before you such arguments as may afford you a well-grounded consolation. But, if ever any man was peculiarly qualified to employ the strongest reasonings of this nature, either for his own use, or for that of others, most undoubtedly it is yourself. Such, therefore, as may be drawn from the refined sources of philosophy, I will not pretend to touch; but shall leave them entirely to your own suggestions. Whatever is worthy of a man of true wisdom and fortitude; whatever is agreeable to that character you have sustained in the world, and to those studies in which you so early excelled; whatever, in short, is expected from a great and

exalted mind in the circumstances wherein you are placed, your own reflections will best supply. I will only take upon myself therefore to inform you of what I have been able to discover from my being situated in Rome, and giving a particular attention to every occurrence that passes. I will venture then with confidence to assure you that your present troubles, (perhaps too I might add, that those of the republic itself) will not be of long continuance. For, in the first place, Cæsar seems well-inclined to recal you from exile: and, trust me, I speak this from no hasty conjecture. On the contrary, I examine his sentiments and disposition so much the more strictly, as I am less biassed in his favour by any particular connexions. I am persuaded then that the single reason for his delaying to restore you is, that he may, with a better grace, refuse the same favour to others, against whom he is more warmly incensed. I am sure, at least, that all his most intimate friends and favourites both think and speak of you highly to your advantage. In the next place, the populace, or rather, I should say, the whole community in general, are strongly in your interest. And, let me add, that the republic herself, whose power at present, it is true, is certainly inconsiderable, but who must necessarily, however, recover some degree of credit; the republic herself, believe me, will soon obtain your restoration from those who at this time hold her in subjection. In this respect therefore I may venture even to promise you some assistance. With this view, I shall closely attach myself to Cæsar's favourites; who are all of them indeed extremely fond of me, and spend much of their time in my company: as I shall insinuate myself into an intimacy with Cæsar; to which my own modesty has hitherto proved the single obstruction. In short, I shall pursue every probable means of this kind (and some too that I dare not commit to paper) in order to obtain your return. As to other articles of assistance, I am sensible there are many who are perfectly well inclined to offer you their services; but you may depend upon me as the first and forwardest in that number."

TO CURIUS.

"There was a time when I thought you made a very injudicious choice, by preferring a foreign country to your

Ep. Fam.
vii. 23.
Melm. ix.
25.

own. I imagined that Rome (while yet alas! it was Rome) must be far more suitable, I will not only say than Patræ, but even than the noblest city in the Peloponnesus, to a man of your amiable and elegant turn of mind. But now, on the contrary, I look upon your having retired into Greece, when our affairs were well nigh desperate, as a strong proof of your great penetration: and I consider your absence not only as a very judicious, but a very happy resolution. Yet, why do I call it happy, when it is impossible that happiness should be the portion of any man in these wretched times, who possesses the least degree of sensibility? However, that desirable privilege, which you, who were at liberty to leave Italy, enjoy by travelling, I have procured by another method: and I can, in some sort, say, no less than yourself, that I live

Where nor the name, nor deeds accurs'd, I hear,
Of Pelops' impious race——

For, as soon as my levee is over, (which is somewhat more frequented than formerly; a patriot being now looked upon as a sight of all others the most uncommon*) I shut myself up in my library. And it is there, my friend, that I am employed in compositions which you will find, perhaps, to be animated with all that spirit, which you once said so ill agreed with my dejection and despair; when you reproached me at your house, for not acting up to the fortitude that appeared in my writings, I must confess, I could not at that time forbear lamenting the wretched fate of the republic: to which I was the more tenderly attached as I had not only been distinguished with its honours, but had greatly assisted it by my services. And even now that time (which wears out the sorrows of the weakest minds) together with reason (which ought to have the strongest influence for that purpose) have jointly contributed to compose my breast: yet I still lament to see the commonwealth thus fallen, without a hope of ever rising more! There is nothing, however, that can at present be justly imputed to him, in whom all power

* A true patriot was a sight in all ages too uncommon, it must be owned, not to have been worth remarking: but whether those who visited Cicero, in order to view so singular a curiosity, were disappointed or not, is a question, which does not require great sagacity to determine.

is now vested : unless, perhaps, it be that he has more than he ought. And, as to what is past, our fate and our follies have had so large a share in all that has happened, that we cannot complain with a good grace. As little reason is there to hope that affairs will mend. I cannot, therefore, but conclude my letter as I began it, with admiring your judgment, if it were choice, or your fortune, if it were chance, which led you from this displeasing scene."

The ingenious author of the life of Cicero, after having presented to his reader a few extracts from the foregoing letters, has made the following observations : " It is certain that there was not a man in the republic, so particularly engaged, both by principle and interest, to wish well to its liberty, or who had so much to lose by the subversion of it, as he : for, as long as it was governed by civil methods, and stood upon the foundation of its laws, he was undoubtedly the first citizen in it ; had the chief influence in the senate ; the chief authority with the people : and, as all his hopes and fortunes were grounded on the peace of his country, so all his labours and studies were perpetually applied to the promotion of it. It is no wonder, therefore, in the present situation of the city, oppressed by arms and a tyrannical power, to find him so particularly impatient under the common misery, and expressing so keen a sense of the diminution of his dignity, and the disgrace of serving where he had been used to govern. Cæsar, on the other hand, though he knew his temper and principles to be irreconcilable to his usurped dominion, yet out of friendship to the man, and a reverence for his character, was determined to treat him with the greatest humanity ; and, by all the marks of personal favour, to make his life not only tolerable, but easy to him : yet all that he could do had no other effect on Cicero than to make him think and speak sometimes favourably of the natural clemency of their master ; and to entertain some hopes from it, that he would be one day persuaded to restore the public liberty : but, exclusive of that hope, he never mentions his government, but as a real tyranny, or his person in any other style, than as the oppressor of his country."

Middl. p.
159.

Is it not amazing to hear Dr. Middleton talk in this strain ? Had Cicero been used to govern Rome ? Cicero ever a slave

to the great, the perpetual panegyrist of the triumvirs, and their tool to all the purposes of their ambition; who was no sooner abandoned by them, than he fell a sacrifice to the resentment of a young rake whom he had offended. “It is not wonderful that he should express so keen a sense of the diminution of his dignity.” Was there then more dignity in his behaviour before the triumvirate, when, contrary to the views of the aristocracy, to ingratiate himself with Pompey, he defended the Gabinian and Manilian laws? After the triumvirate was formed, who was the promoter of Cæsar’s power, but he? Of Crassus’s, that man whom he abhorred, but he? Who was the advocate of all the miscreants of the state, but he? Cicero all his life talked of his dignity, and could give a just definition of true dignity, when he pleased: but in his actions certainly he never shewed any, if dignity consists in an upright, open, generous behaviour, and not in prating to a senate or a mob right or wrong.—“He was impatient under the common misery.” But was really the state miserable under Cæsar’s administration? Did he not restore order and peace in a distracted government? Did he not immediately set about making the most salutary laws? Was he not so intent upon their execution, as to be inclined to delay his expedition into Parthia, to give them, by his presence in the city, a greater force? Did not the people, under his short dominion, taste all the sweets of liberty but the name? And did not that empty name, under their own government, tolerate all the outrageous barbarity and injustice of the most absolute tyranny? Were order and affluence no public blessings, because they were the gift of Cæsar? Did not Cicero himself enjoy the greatest ease and liberty, and more power, by his interest with Cæsar, than he ever had in the republic? And, when we view him in this tranquillity, opposed to the late tempestuous times he had been tossed in, was it gratitude in Cicero that he still talked of Cæsar as the oppressor of his country? Or, were the recovered sweets of life, which Cicero was now tasting, all imbittered, because the generosity of Cæsar had no title to make them secure to him? If such indulgence were the effect of tyranny, what name should Cicero have given to that upright republic that banished him?

Cibber, p.
202.

But was not Cæsar the immediate destroyer of the Roman liberty? Certainly he was not: “Had Rome at the time of
Id. p. 198.

the civil war been mistress of herself, both Pompey and Cæsar must have equally obeyed her. Though her government was not legally changed, it was so visibly altered by time and accidents, that it had then as much the appearance of an elective monarchy as of a republic, its ancient liberty having scarce any one privilege left, but that of voting by the sword, what should be the name of the man that was to destroy it.—Had not the republic almost consumed itself for want of an uncontrollable magistrate? And was it better that the whole had perished, than that an uncommissioned power should have presumed to save the remains of it? Was so unasked a favour an injury, when public violence was grown too strong for the old laws; had not necessity, when she had no laws, a right to form new ones for her own use? And what possible power, but that of Cæsar, could have assisted that necessity to make them? Though form and order be indispensable in the quiet execution of laws, yet there may be critical seasons or times of danger, when the breaking through them may be equally necessary, and which the Roman republic, under their happiest settlement, thought it sometimes advisable to comply with; and in such cases made a temporary dictator, to take care the commonwealth came to no harm. Thus, by parity of reason, when Pompey had, by his intimidating army, made himself little less than such a dictator, had not Cæsar just as good a right to displace him? So that, whatever title was wanting to Cæsar's office, his office at least became necessary.—Admitting then that, out of the ruins of this self-subverted republic, Cæsar had for some time designed to erect a monarchy, what more salutary expedient could, in their present distractions, be hoped for? Wherein was his usurpation a more public grievance, than in throwing water upon a house in flames? Would Pompey have held the imperial hand over them with more gentleness than Cæsar? This is the only material consideration, since without a master Rome could not live. Now it is agreed on all sides, that Pompey's victory would have been a cruel one; and so intent were his followers upon destruction and proscriptions, that Cæsar's clemency struck them with amazement, and they could not believe their senses."

But should not Cæsar have restored the commonwealth, as Sylla did? Sylla's settlement was no restoration of the

public liberty, or of the true democratic government; he changed the constitution of the state and made it aristocratic; which, we are told by politicians, is the worst of governments. This aristocracy subsisted but a few years; Pompey by his conquests acquired so much wealth, glory, and power, that he became of course the master of the republic; till Cæsar, by his conquests, glory, and power, became his competitor: part of the state chose to adhere to Pompey, another part sided with Cæsar. Cæsar had success, and shewed he deserved it by his moderation and clemency. To have relinquished the sovereign authority would have been to have acted as an enemy to his country, since, having it in his power to do universal good, he would have chosen to have thrown the state into the same confusions and convulsions out of which it had so luckily and so gently emerged. “And why should we suppose a soul so elevated as Cæsar’s could be ignorant of advantages to be derived from his greatness, or could think that the power of doing universal good could have a joy or glory superior to it?” Did not Cicero himself encourage him to keep his authority, and lay before him the strongest motives for this purpose, in his speech for Marcellus? And, if Cæsar had taken Cicero into his council, and flattered his vanity by giving him the appearance of a share in the administration, who can doubt but he would have had, in our orator, a zealous panegyrist of all his actions, who, at the time that he made the complaints which have occasioned these reflections, writes thus to his friend Aulus Cæcina, *Fam. vi. 6. Melm. ix. 34.* “I shall now, indeed, be enabled to employ my zeal more effectually than heretofore, as I make great and daily advances in Cæsar’s friendship; not to mention my interest also with his favourites, who distinguish me with the first rank in their affection.” In the same letter he raises the hopes of his friend, then in exile, by the consideration of Cæsar’s magnanimous conduct: “I cannot but observe to you, that I have often occasion to admire the justice and judgment of Cæsar; who never speaks of Pompey, but in terms of the highest honour. Should it be said, that, whatever regard he may shew to his memory, he treated his person upon many occasions with great asperity: let it be remembered, that these instances cannot reasonably be imputed to Cæsar, but were the natural consequences of war. But how fa-

vourably has he received many of us, and myself in particular, who were engaged in the same party? Has he not appointed Cassius to be his lieutenant? Has he not given the government of Gaul to Brutus? and that of Greece to Sulpicius? In a word, highly incensed as he was against Marcellus, has he not in the most honourable manner restored him to his friends and to his country? Cicero succeeded so well in his application to Cæsar's favour, that, the following year, when he had any thing to ask, he wrote directly to himself: and his letters do but ill support what Dr. Middleton says of his shyness during Cæsar's administration.

CHAP. X.

Cæsar's war in Spain against Pompey's sons. The honours decreed him by the senate. His triumph, and those of his two lieutenants Q. Fabius and Q. Pedius. Cicero's grief for the death of his daughter Tullia. His writings during his retreat at this time.

C. JULIUS CÆSAR, Dictator III. Consul IV. sine Collega.

M. ÆMILIUS LEPIDUS, Mag. Equit.

IN the end of the year Cæsar was called away in great haste into Spain to oppose the attempts of Pompey's sons. The city was left without consuls or prætors, under the government of Lepidus, general of the horse, and six prefects to administer justice. The tribunes and the ædiles were the only magistrates elected in the ordinary form.

After the defeat of Afranius, Cæsar appointed to the government of Spain Q. Cassius Longinus, who was tribune with Antony when the

Y. R. 708.

Bef. Chr.

44.

407 Cons.



Hirt. de


Bell. Alex.

Y. R. 708.

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civil-war broke out, and fled with him to Ravenna. He had been quæstor there under Pompey, and was well acquainted with the country: but his violence and avarice, during his quæstorship, had rendered him the object of the public hatred; and he had been wounded in an attempt made upon his life. Invested by Cæsar with sovereign authority, he applied himself wholly to gain the hearts of his soldiers by largesses and a relaxation of military discipline, hoping to find in his army a bulwark against the resentment of the people: and, at the same time, to satisfy the demands of his avarice, he committed all kinds of acts, both of injustice and cruelty. This behaviour brought him into contempt even with the ministers of his violence, and produced a second conspiracy which broke out, when, pursuant to Cæsar's orders, he was setting out for Mauritania, in order to give king Juba employment at home, and hinder him from sending succours to Pompey, as he had already done. The conspirators, who were all of Italica, a city founded by the elder Scipio in Bætica, set upon him in open day, and gave him several wounds; but, none of them proving mortal, he had the satisfaction to revenge himself on them by tortures and death. The act of the conspirators was approved by a great part of the army, as well as of the people. Two of the legions, who had formerly served under Varro, Pompey's lieutenant, soon shewed their disaffection by an open mutiny; and, their hatred to Cassius reviving their affection for Pompey, they de-

Sevilla la
veia.


clared for him, and engraved his name on their bucklers. Three legions continued faithful to Longinus, not through any regard for him, but purely on account of their attachment to Cæsar. The city of Corduba, where a great many Romans were settled, detested also Longinus, but were unwilling to abandon Cæsar's interest. This commotion might have proved fatal to Cæsar, had not the quæstor Marcellus Eserninus united all Longinus's enemies under Cæsar's name and authority : which was effected with more ease, as accounts came about this time of the victory at Pharsalia. Longinus on his side had called to his assistance Bogud, king of Mauritania, who was in Cæsar's alliance, and their two combined armies waged war for some time against Marcellus, till Lepidus, proconsul in Nether Spain, coming soon after into Bætica, with a considerable force, Marcellus readily consented to his arbitration. Longinus was forced to do the same ; and, a short time after being informed that Trebonius, his successor, was arrived in the province, he put immediately to sea with all his treasure, and was lost in a storm in the mouth of the Iberus. But, as popular fury does not easily subside, this calm was of but short duration. Many, conscious of their offence, were afraid of Cæsar's resentment, and were well pleased to hear that Metellus Scipio had assembled a powerful army in Africa. They sent deputies to him to offer their service and demand his protection ; and Cn. Pompey was sent on this occasion, as has been related above, after he

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
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
Dio, l. xliii.

had made a fruitless attempt upon the kingdom of Bogud. The disaffected legions did not stay for his arrival, but, hearing that he was landed in the Balearian islands, and was there detained by sickness, they openly declared against Trebonius, and put themselves under the conduct of T. Scapula, and Q. Aponius, two Roman knights. As soon as young Pompey recovered his health, he joined his friends; and in a short time got together eleven legions, and drove Trebonius out of Bætica. His brother Sextus, in conjunction with Labienus and Varus, brought him the remainder of Scipio's fleet, and his land army was greatly strengthened by the fugitives from Africa; so that he was able to act powerfully both by sea and land. Cæsar, immediately after the defeat of Scipio and Juba, had sent Q. Fabius and Q. Pedius with part of his African army, and Didius with his fleet, to act against the sons of Pompey. This admiral had engaged with success the Pompeian fleet, commanded by Varus, and forced it to take refuge in a port called by Dio Crantia, which is probably that of Carteia: but the lieutenants could not make head against the enemy in the field; and Cæsar's presence was necessary to prevent the entire reduction of the province.


Cæsar therefore, called upon by the inhabitants that remained faithful to him, and by his own lieutenants, set out before the end of November, arrived at Obulco, near Corduba, in twenty-seven days, and surprised both his friends and enemies by his sudden appearance

among them. Cn. Pompey was at this time actually besieging Ulia, the only town of Bætica which held out against him. Cæsar found means to throw some succour into it, and marched himself to Corduba, where Sextus Pompey had locked himself up. Sextus called away his brother from Ulia to his assistance; but Cæsar, by that motion, had only in view to bring about a general and decisive action. Finding, however, that the two Pompeys had taken a fixed resolution to keep upon the defensive, he turned off to Ategua, the strongest fortress possessed by his enemies: and, in the depth of winter, and in the neighbourhood of a powerful army, carried it the nineteenth of February, when it surrendered at discretion. The garrison had offered to capitulate sooner, and surrender upon terms; but Cæsar answered, haughtily, "that he was used to prescribe conditions, not to receive them:" and he treated them, it is probable, with severity; for they had been guilty of great cruelty in cutting the throats of a great number of the inhabitants, who were thought to be in his interest, and whose bodies were thrown over the walls during the siege. Cn. Pompey, upon the news of the taking of Ategua, treated in the same manner, and for the same crime, seventy-four citizens of a neighbouring town. Acts of the greatest oppression and inhumanity were committed on both sides. The two armies, shifting continually their ground, in order to find opportunities to harass each other, advanced at length into the plains of Munda. There,

Y. R. 708.


Hirt. de
Bell. Hisp.
Dio, l. xliii.

Y. R. 708.
Bef. Chr.
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on the twenty-seventh of March, as Cæsar was preparing to move his camp, he was informed; that the enemy had been drawn up in order of battle ever since midnight. Pompey, dreading the contempt and desertion of his followers, who were all eager for a battle, had resolved to fight; and had chosen for that purpose an advantageous post on an eminence; defended on one side by a morass, and near the city of Munda, which, in case of bad success, would secure his retreat. Cæsar drew out his troops in the plain, between the two camps, placing his tenth legion as usual in the right, and the third and fifth in the left, with the auxiliary troops and cavalry. There he waited a little, to draw the enemy down; but seeing that they had no design to quit their post, he marched up to them, giving the word *Venus*. The word on Pompey's side was *Pietas*, in allusion to his intention of avenging that day his father's death. When Cæsar's troops came to the extremity of the plain, they halted a while, and Cæsar marked out to them how far they might advance with safety. This halt raised the spirit of the Pompeians, and encouraged them to advance a little way. At last the battle began, with a shout on both sides, and was obstinate. Pompey had not only the advantage of the ground, but the superiority in numbers; and his men were so circumstanced, as to be in a manner under a necessity of fighting desperately; being either soldiers, who had before served under Afranius and Varro, and had paid no regard to the par-

don Cæsar had granted them, having rebelled against Cassius; or slaves set at liberty, who, if taken prisoners, had nothing to expect but an ignominious punishment. At first, victory seemed to declare against Cæsar: not only his new-raised troops, but his veterans began to give ground: and, if we believe Suetonius and Florus, the day was so near being lost, that Cæsar was in suspense whether he should not kill himself. By all accounts, he gave himself incredible pains: quitting his horse, he took up a buckler, and advanced before the first ranks, and within ten feet of the enemy⁶, declaring, that he would not move from the spot. His example, and the imminent danger he was in, roused the courage of his soldiers, who were ashamed to abandon such a general; and the tenth legion, that invincible troop, particularly distinguished itself. But what determined the victory on Cæsar's side was the following circumstance: Bogud, king of Mauritania, who served in Cæsar's army, undertook, during the

Y. R. 708.
Bef. Chr.
44.
407 Cons.

⁶ Nullum unquam atrocius periculosiusque a Cæsare initum prælium, adeo ut plusquam dubio marte, descenderet equo, consistensque ante recedentem suorum aciem, increpita prius fortuna, quod se in eum servasset exitum, denunciaret militibus, vestigio se non recessurum; proinde viderent quem et quo loco imperatorem deserturi forent. Verecundia magis quam virtute acies restitutæ sunt, a duce quam a milite fortius. *Vel. Pat.* ii. 55. Itaque ablegato equo, similis furenti, primam in aciem Cæsar procurrit. Ibi prensare fugientes, confirmare, per totum denique agmen oculis, manibus, clamore, volitare. Dicitur in illa perturbatione, et de extremis agitasse secum, et ita manifesto vultu fuisse, quasi occupare manu mortem vellet. *Flor.* l. iv. c. 2.


Y. R. 708.
Bef. Chr.
44.
407 Cons.

action, to attack Pompey's camp : and Labienus, perceiving his motion, detached five cohorts to intercept the Moors, and protect it. Cæsar immediately cried out aloud, that the enemy was making off : and this false opinion, spreading itself instantly among the two armies, increased the courage of the one, and terrified the other. Cæsar's troops, especially the tenth legion, took this opportunity to press the enemy, whose ranks began to be in some confusion ; and, after a vigorous contest, entirely broke and discomfited them. Thirty thousand were killed on Pompey's side, among whom were Labienus and Varus, and three thousand Roman knights. All the legionary eagles and most of the colours were taken, with the fasces carried before the general ; and seventeen principal officers were made prisoners. The conqueror lost a thousand of his bravest soldiers, and had five hundred wounded. This bloody battle, which was the last in the civil war, was fought the same day on which Pompey the Great had set out from Brundisium to go into Greece. Cæsar is reported to have said, " that, in his other battles, he fought for victory, in this for his life." The Romans of the vanquished party fled, some to the camp, some to the city of Munda, some to Corduba, and others still farther. The camp was soon forced, but the city was in a condition to maintain a siege. Cæsar that very day invested it ; and we are told that the soldiers heaped together the dead bodies of the enemy to serve them instead of a rampart, planting in them


Plut. Ap-
pian.

Hirt. de
Bell. Hisp.
Flor. Dio.

their javelins and darts by way of palisades, with the bucklers hanging upon them; and that, to strike the greater terror into the besieged, they fixed all around the heads of the deceased. Cæsar left Fabius to command the blockade, and marched immediately to Corduba, to invest Sextus Pompey, who was governor of the place. But Sextus, upon the first intelligence of the entire ruin of his party, after having distributed what money he had among his troops, left the town about nine at night, under a pretence of going to find out Cæsar to treat of an accommodation. Scapula, who had been the chief occasion of the revolt of the province, had escaped thither out of the battle, and took upon himself the command of the place. When he found, however, that he was besieged, he assembled all his followers; and, ordering a funeral pile to be raised, and a magnificent supper served up, he put on his richest dress, and distributed his plate and ready money among his domestics; and, having supped cheerfully, and anointed himself, he commanded one of his freedmen to dispatch him, and another to set fire to the pile. After his death, a division arose among the inhabitants, between those who favoured Cæsar, and those in the interest of Pompey, with such a clamour that it was heard in Cæsar's camp. During the contests, some companies, composed partly of fugitives, partly of slaves, made free by Pompey, surrendered themselves to Cæsar: but the thirteenth legion prepared to defend the place, and with

Y. R. 708.
Bef. Chr.
44.
407 Cons.


Y. R. 708.
Bef. Chr.
44.
407 Cons.



that view possessed themselves of the walls and the towers in spite of all opposition. Upon this, the faction for Cæsar sent deputies to him for aid: and the thirteenth legion, irritated by this proceeding, and chusing rather to perish than to fall into the hands of the conqueror, set fire to the city. At this instant Cæsar's troops making their way into the town, a battle ensued, in which the greatest part of the legionaries perished, and twelve thousand of the inhabitants. Cæsar now marched towards Hispalis; but was met on the road by deputies from the inhabitants, who sued for their pardon, which he immediately granted. At the same time he was assured that the citizens were able to defend the town with their own forces, and to preserve it in his interest; but he thought proper to send thither his lieutenant Caninius, with some troops: and he himself encamped at a small distance. There was in the town a strong party of Pompeians, who, being displeased to see Cæsar's troops received within the walls, deputed secretly one Philo, a zealous partisan of Pompey, and well known in Lusitania, to beg assistance of Cecilus Niger, surnamed the Barbarous, who lay encamped not far off with a strong army of Lusitanians: and Philo, returning with a body of these towards night, got over the walls, surprised the centinels and garrison, shut the gates, and undertook to defend the place. Cæsar did not think proper to press the siege, lest despair should prompt the Lusitanians to set fire to the town. On the contrary, he placed

his guards in such a manner as to give them the hopes of making their escape, by sallying out in the night. They took the opportunity, as was foreseen, and in the sally set fire to the ships on the river Bætis (Guadalquivir); and, while Cæsar's men were employed in extinguishing the flames, endeavoured to get off; but, being overtaken by the cavalry, the greatest part of them were cut to pieces. From Hispalis, Cæsar marched to Asta, which submitted, and thence went to Gades.

During the siege of Hispalis, deputies arrived from Carteia⁷, with accounts of their having secured Cn. Pompey; the inhabitants hoping by this service to atone for their former offence, in shutting their gates against Cæsar. Pompey, after the battle of Munda, attended by a few horse and foot, had fled to that place, where his fleet lay, and which was about a hundred and seventy miles distant from Corduba. He was at first privately attended upon by those of his party, whom he secretly made acquainted with his arrival; but, seeing that great crowds assembled round him, and shewed some zeal for his service, he began to act more openly. But the faction which declared for him was inferior in point of strength and numbers to that which was in Cæsar's interest; and which, thinking to provide for their own safety and that of the place, had sent to him

Y. R. 708.

Bef. Chr.


44.

407 Cons.



⁷ A sea-port town, in Hispania Bætica, which some geographers have placed at the mouth of the Bætis, but is commonly supposed to have been situated in the streights of Gibraltar.


Y. R. 708.
Bef. Chr.
44.
407 Cons.



the above-mentioned deputies. Animosities within the city were carried to the greatest extremities; and Pompey himself, in a tumultuary action which happened, having received several wounds, did not think proper to stay in Carteia, but put to sea with thirty gallies. Didius, then at Gades, with Cæsar's fleet, hearing of what had passed, immediately sailed in pursuit of them; stationing at the same time some cavalry and infantry along the coast to prevent Pompey's retreat by land. Pompey had departed with so much precipitation, that he had not taken in a sufficient provision of water. This obliging him to stop in his way, Didius came up with him after four days' sailing, and while the greatest part of the soldiers and mariners were employed ashore, he took some of his ships, and burnt the rest. The unfortunate and wounded general, attended by a few followers, fled, in this extremity, with what expedition he could, to a place of strength, which happened to be at no great distance, and where he hoped to conceal himself. Being discovered, however, by a Lusitanian, he was soon surrounded by the troops sent after him by Didius: and, unable to defend himself in this post, he fled to another which was more tenable, the approach to it being extremely difficult. Didius's troops pursued him also to this retreat, and, after several fruitless attempts to storm it, determined to lay siege to it in form, and began to draw their lines, and to form a terrass. Pompey, seeing that he would soon be blocked up, be-

took himself again to flight; and, in this escape, having been forsaken by his few attendants, he hid himself in a cave, where he was discovered, and put to death. His head was brought to Cæsar, on the twelfth of April, as he was setting out from Gades to return to Hispalis. This was the end of the elder Pompey; who, though he had shewed great abilities for command, was yet unregretted by many of his party, on account of his violent and cruel disposition⁸.

Y. R. 708.
Bef. Chr.
44.
407 Cons.




⁸ "Sextus Pompey," says Cicero to Atticus, "has withdrawn himself from Corduba into Hither Spain: Cnæus is also fled, but I do not know whither, nor in truth do I care." In a letter to Torquatus, a Pompeian in exile, he says, "the world is every day more and more persuaded, that although there may be some little difference in the cause of the contending parties, there will be scarce any in the consequence of their success. As to one of them indeed, we have already in some sort experienced his disposition; and, as to the other, we are all of us sufficiently sensible how much is to be dreaded from an incensed conqueror." Ep. Fam. vi. 4. Melm. x. 16. "May I perish," says Cassius to Cicero, "if I be not solicitous about the event of things in Spain; as I would much rather keep our old and clement master, than try a new and cruel one. You know what a fool Cnæus is, and how he takes cruelty for a virtue; and yet he is sensible how much he has been the object of our ridicule. I fear, therefore, he would be apt to treat us somewhat roughly, and return our jokes with the point of his sword." He adds: "If you have any value for me then, you will not fail to let me know whatever will happen. Ah! my friend, how do I wish I were apprised whether you read this with an easy or an anxious mind. For, by that single circumstance, I should be determined what measures are proper for me to pursue; *quam velim scire, utrum ista sollicito animo, an soluto legas! sciam enim eodem tempore, quid me facere oporteat.*" Ep. Fam. xv. 19. Melm. x. 22. These

Y. R. 708.

Bef. Chr.

44.

407 Cons.



Didius, who had rendered Cæsar this service, did not live to receive his recompense. Proud of his success, and confident that all hostilities were over, he hauled some of his ships ashore to be refitted, and retired himself to a neighbouring fort; where he soon found himself invested by a strong body of Lusitanians, formed of several parties which had fled that way from Munda. He made daily sallies upon them to check their insolence; and this gave them an opportunity of projecting an ambuscade, in which they succeeded so well as to destroy him, with almost all his followers; a few only having escaped by swimming to the gallies at sea.

Munda was at last taken, after a siege of three weeks, and all Bætica submitted to the conqueror. The force of the Pompeians was now entirely broken. Even Sextus Pompey, the only remaining hope of his family and party, was reduced to the necessity of concealing himself in the mountains of Celtiberia⁹. The success of Cæsar was complete;

words seem to prove that he was then agitating in his mind what he executed the following year.

⁹ Cæsar paid Cicero the compliment of sending him an account of his success with his own hand. At the same time young Quintus Cicero, who made the campaign along with Cæsar, thinking to please his company, and to make his fortunes the better among them, began to play over his old game, and to abuse his uncle again in all places. Cicero, in his account of it to Atticus, says, "there is nothing new, but Hirtius has been quarrelling, in my defence, with our nephew Quintus, who takes all occasions of saying every thing bad of me, and especially at public feasts; and,

and, while he continued in Spain during the summer, he not only employed himself in providing for the future peace and settlement of the province¹, but found leisure to draw up his answer to Cicero's Cato.

Y. R. 708.
Bef. Chr.
44.
407 Cons.

During his absence there appeared a bold impostor, who began to make a great noise and figure in Italy, by assuming the name, and pretending to be the grandson, of Caius Marius; and several of the colonies and municipal towns, particularly those where the veteran soldiers were settled, acknowledged him for their patron. He wrote a pathetic letter to Cicero, to justify his claim and descent, and to implore his protection against the enemies of his family; "conjuring him by their relation; by the poem which he had formerly written in praise of Marius; by the eloquence of L. Crassus, his mother's father, whom he had likewise celebrated, that he

Middl. p.
198.

Ad Att.
xii. 49.

when he has done with me, falls next upon his father: he is thought to say nothing so credible, as that we are both irreconcilable to Cæsar; that Cæsar should trust neither of us: and even beware of me. This would be terrible, did I not see that our king is persuaded that I have no spirit left." Ad Att. xiii. 37.

¹ Dio tells us, that he committed great extortions, plundered the very temples, and particularly that of Hercules, at Gades, whose treasures he applied to his own use. But it is not probable that the needy Pompeians left much to plunder, or that Cæsar would seize, when he did not want it, treasure which his enemy had spared in his utmost distress. The same author relates, that the states, who had remained faithful to him, yet paid for the freedom of the city, and the privileges, which he granted them.

Y. R. 708.

Bef. Chr.

44.

497 Cons.



would undertake the defence of his cause."

Cicero (who, if he had really been the son of C. Marius, would have been his distant relation, his grandfather having married Marius's aunt) answered him very gravely, "That he could not want a patron, when his kinsman Cæsar, so excellent and generous a man, was now master of all; yet, that he also should be ready to favour him." But Cæsar at his return, knowing him to be a cheat, banished him out of Italy; since, instead of being what he pretended to be, he was found to be only a farrier, whose true name was Herophilus.

Val. Max.
ix. 15.

Middl. p.
211.

While Cæsar remained in Spain, Antony set forward from Italy, to pay his compliments to him there, or to meet him at least on the road in his return towards Rome; but, when he had made about half the journey, he met with some dispatches, which obliged him to return back in all haste to Rome. This raised a new alarm in the city; and especially among the Pompeians, who were afraid that Cæsar, having now subdued all opposition, was resolved, after the example of former conquerors, to take his revenge in cool blood on all his adversaries; and had sent Antony back as the properest instrument to execute some orders of that sort. Cicero himself had the same suspicion, and was much surprised at Antony's sudden return, till Balbus and Oppius eased him of his apprehensions, by sending him an account of the true reason of it: which, contrary to expectation, gave no

uneasiness to any body, but Antony himself. Antony had bought Pompey's houses in Rome, and the neighbourhood, with all their rich furniture, at Cæsar's auction, soon after his return from Egypt; but, trusting to his interest with Cæsar, never dreamt of being obliged to pay for them. Cæsar, however, had sent peremptory orders to L. Plancus, the prætor, to require immediate payment of Antony, or to levy the money upon his sureties, according to the tenor of their bond. This was the cause of his quick return, to prevent that disgrace, and to find some means of complying with Cæsar's commands. Cicero tells us, in his invective against Antony, that it provoked him to such a degree, that, in the height of his resentment, he is said to have entered into a design of taking away Cæsar's life; of which Cæsar himself complained openly in the senate.

Y. R. 708.
Bef. Chr.
44.
407 Cons.

Philipp. ii.
29.

Cæsar returned to Rome before the end of August, and seems to have passed the greatest part of the month of September at Lavicanum, his country-seat; where he made his will on the thirteenth, which he committed to the care of the eldest of the vestals. During his residence in this place, every thing was prepared for a most splendid triumph for his victory over Pompey's sons, as over a foreign enemy; and it was celebrated on the first of October². It was followed by two public

² We are told that the people, instead of admiring and applauding this triumph, as he expected, were sullen and silent; considering it, as it really was, a triumph over them. Middl. p. 213.

Y. R. 708.
Bef. Chr.
44.
407 Cons.

Dio, l. 44.

dinners with plenty of the most esteemed and costly wines of Chios and Falernum. He now proclaimed a general amnesty, and it was probably on this occasion that a temple was built to Clemency, where his statue was placed near to that of the goddess, joining hands with her. He also divested himself of the consulship and conferred it upon Q. Fabius Maximus and C. Trebonius for the remaining months of the year. The consul Fabius and Q. Pedius, who, in quality of Cæsar's lieutenants, had reduced some parts of Spain, were allowed also the honour of a triumph, though there had been no example of inferior officers partaking of the honours of the general under whose auspices they had served. The triumph of Fabius was celebrated on the thirteenth of October, and

selves ; purchased by the loss of their liberty and the destruction of the best and noblest families of the republic : and that they had before given the same proof of their discontent at the Circensian games ; where Cæsar's statue, by a decree of the senate, was carried in procession along with those of the gods ; for they gave none of their usual acclamations to their favourite deities as they passed, lest they should be thought to give them to Cæsar. Atticus sent an account of this triumph to Cicero, who says in answer to him, " Your letter was agreeable, though the show was so sad :—the people, however, behaved bravely, who would not clap even the goddess Victory, for the sake of so bad a neighbour." But, if Cæsar committed any irregularity in this triumph over Pompey's sons and the Spaniards, he was engaged to it by the senate, who voted for the victory a supplication of fifty days, though the conqueror had writ no public letter to Rome on his success : the triumph was the necessary consequence of the supplication.

that of Pedius on the twelfth of December. But the magnificence of Cæsar's made these appear contemptible; for their models of the conquered towns, which were always a part of the show, being made only of wood, whereas Cæsar's were of silver or ivory, Chrysippus merrily called them the cases only of Cæsar's towns.

Y. R. 708.


Bef. Chr.

44.

407 Cons.

The senate now accumulated upon Cæsar all the titles that flattery could invent. He was declared imperator or emperor in a sense that conferred upon him the command of all the forces of the republic; perpetual and sole master of manners, and with this office the management of all the revenues: he was styled the father and deliverer of his country, and a temple was raised to Liberty, because he had procured it to the Roman people. His person was declared sacred, like those of the tribunes; and the month Quintilis was called Julius, because he was born in it. He was allowed the privilege of wearing constantly a crown of laurel, and on festival days the triumphal robe; of having a distinct seat in all public shows; a golden chair in the senate-house and in the forum; a statue in all the towns, and in all the temples of the city: two in the rostra, one of which had a civic crown, because he was the saviour of the people: and the other had an obsidional crown, because he was the saviour of his country; one in the temple of Quirinus with this inscription, "To the invincible god;" and one in the capitol with those of the ancient

Y. R. 708.
Bef. Chr.
44.
407 C.



kings. He was allowed to hang up the *opima spolia* in the temple of Jupiter Feretrius, that no feature of Romulus should be wanting in him : and, in the Circensian games, his image in ivory was ordered to be carried in a chariot in the same manner as those of the gods. This was not all ; he had a pulvinar, or bed of state, in the temples, on which his image was laid ; temples were erected to him ; he was called Jupiter Latialis ; and a new fraternity of Luperci was instituted to his honour, and called by his name ; of which Antony was the head, and Q. Cicero, the son, one of the members³ ; an honour which none of the immortal gods enjoyed, besides Mars and his son Quirinus, the founders of the state. Many, however, of these pretended honours we only hear of in Appian and Dio, and I cannot but think that these Greek historians, who were grown accustomed to the extravagant appellations given to the subsequent emperors, imagined that they had also been bestowed on the first of them. The last of these writers has likewise informed us, that some of the senators voted, that this god, this Jupiter Latialis, should take to himself as many wives as he pleased, and whom he pleased ; and

³ There had been hitherto but two fraternities of Luperci, called Fabiani and Quintiliani. The Luperci Julii were instituted the year before, after the African war. Vide Ad Att. xii. 5. Cicero very much disapproved of his nephew's conduct, but the father was pleased with it : *Quintus pater quartum vel potius millesimum nihil sapit, qui lætetur Luperco filio et Statio, ut cernat duplici dedecore cumulatam domum.*

that the tribune Helvius Cinna had actually prepared a law to this effect. From this circumstance, so false and ridiculous, it may be gathered what degree of credit should be given to this historian. In the profusion of honours conferred on Cæsar, both his friends, it is said, and enemies eagerly concurred: the first out of zeal for his glory, and a spirit of adulation; the latter to load him with public envy, and bring him into contempt; and indeed it appears, from a letter of Antony to Octavius, that Cicero used to boast, "that they had imposed upon Cæsar, and ruined him by this show of respect for his person."

Y. R. 708.
Bef. Chr.
44.
407 Cons.

On the last day of December, Fabius having died suddenly in the morning, C. Caninius Rebilus was named by Cæsar to the vacancy at one in the afternoon; whose office was to continue only through the remaining part of that day⁴.

⁴ This wanton profanation of the sovereign dignity of the empire raised a general indignation in the city; and a consulate so ridiculous gave birth to much raillery and many jokes, which are transmitted to us by the ancients (Macrob. Sat. ii. 3. Dio, p. 236.); of which Cicero, who was the chief author of them, gives us the following specimen, in his account of the fact: "I no longer," says he, in a letter to Curius, "either advise or desire you to come home to us, but want to fly somewhere myself, where I may hear neither the name nor the acts of these sons of Pelops. It is incredible how meanly I think of myself for being present at these transactions. You had surely an early foresight of what was coming on, when you ran away from this place; for, though it be vexatious to hear such things, yet that is more tolerable than to see them. It is well that you were not in the field, when, at seven in the morning, as they were proceeding to an election of quæstors, the chair of Q.

Middl. p.
219.

Ep. Fam.
vii. 30.

Y. R. 708.

Bef. Chr.

44.

407 Cons.

Cæsar had had so many creatures and dependents who expected the honour of the consulship from him, as the reward of their services, that it was impossible to oblige them all in a regular way, so that he was forced to contrive the expedient of splitting it, as it were, into parcels; and conferring it for a few months, or weeks, or even days, as it happened to suit his convenience: and, as the thing itself was now but a name, without any real power, it was of little moment for what term it was granted; since the shortest gave

Maximus, whom they called consul, was set in its place; but, his death being immediately proclaimed, it was removed; and Cæsar, though he had taken the auspices for an assembly of the tribes, changed it into an assembly of the centuries; and, at one in the afternoon, declared a new consul who was to govern till one the next morning. I would have you to know, therefore, that, whilst Caninius was consul, nobody died; and that there was no crime committed in his consulship, for he was so wonderfully vigilant that, through his whole administration, he never so much as slept. These things seem ridiculous to you, who are absent; but, were you to see them, you would hardly refrain from tears. What, if I should tell you the rest? for there are numberless facts of the same kind; which I could never have borne, had I not taken refuge in the port of philosophy with our friend Atticus, the companion and partner of my studies." Suetonius in Cæs. p. 80, tells us that the people themselves would not acknowledge a three months' consul: for, when, upon Fabius's entrance into the theatre, his officers, according to custom, proclaimed his presence, and ordered the people to make way for the consul, the whole assembly cried out, He is no consul. I cannot see what injury Cæsar either did the state, or particular persons, by making over to others an office, or the title of an office, which the senate had named him to for his life.

the same privilege with the longest, and a man, once declared consul, ever after enjoyed the rank and character of a consular senator.

Y. R. 708.
Bef Chr.
44.
407 Cons.

He now granted a general pardon to all those who had borne arms against him; replaced the statues of Sylla and Pompey, which had been thrown down; and, disbanding his Spanish guard, threw himself intirely upon the affections of his citizens. And it was probably on this occasion that a temple to New Concord, mentioned by Dio, was built, in imitation of that of Camillus; and a festival for the restoration of peace and harmony in the republic ordered to be celebrated every year.

Dio, l. 44.

Cicero's daughter, Tullia, died in the beginning of this year, in child-bed, to the inexpressible grief of her father. She was about two and thirty years old at the time of her death; and, by the few hints which are left of her character, appears to have been an excellent and admirable woman. She was most affectionately and piously observant of her father; and, to the usual graces of her sex, having added the more solid accomplishments of knowledge and polite letters, was qualified to be the companion, as well as the delight, of his old age; and was justly esteemed not only as one of the best, but the most learned, of the Roman ladies. It is not strange, therefore, that the loss of such a daughter, in the prime of her life, and in the most comfortless season of his own, should affect him with all that grief, which the greatest calamity could

Middl. p.
180.

Y. R. 708.

Bef. Chr.

44.

407 Cons.

imprint on a temper naturally timid and desponding. His friends were very officious in making their compliments of condolence, and in administering arguments of comfort to him. Among the rest, Cæsar himself, in the hurry of his affairs in Spain, wrote him a letter on this occasion, dated from Hispalis, the last of April⁵. Their remonstrances, however,

⁵ The following letter of S. Sulpicius is thought to be a masterpiece of the consolatory kind; for which reason, and because Sulpicius has acted a considerable part in this history, we shall insert it here, to bring the reader more acquainted with the talents of this consular senator, whom Cicero in his letters often treats with much contempt:

“ I was exceedingly concerned, as, indeed, I ought to be, to hear of the death of your daughter Tullia; which I looked upon as an affliction common to us both. If I had been with you, I would have made it my business to convince you, what a real share I take in your grief; though that kind of consolation is but wretched and lamentable, as it is to be performed by friends and relations, who are overwhelmed with grief, and cannot enter upon their task without tears, and seem to want comfort rather themselves, than to be in a condition to administer it to others. I resolved, therefore, to write to you, in short, what occurred upon it to my own mind; not that I imagined that the same things would not occur also to you, but that the force of your grief might possibly hinder your attention to them. What reason is there then to disturb yourself so immoderately on this melancholy occasion? Consider how fortune has already treated us; how it has deprived us of what ought to be as dear to us as our children; our country, credit, dignity, honours. After so miserable a loss as this, what addition can it possibly make to our grief, to suffer one misfortune more? Or how can a mind, after being exercised in such trials, not grow callous, and think every thing else of inferior value? But is it for your daughter's sake, that you grieve? Yet, how often must you necessarily reflect, as I myself frequently do, that

had but little effect upon him: all the relief that he found was from reading and writing;

Y. R. 708.


Bef. Chr.

44.

407 Cons.

those cannot be said to be hardly dealt with, whose lot it has been, in these times, without suffering any affliction, to exchange life for death. For what is there in our present circumstances that could give her any great invitation to live? What business? What hopes? What prospect of comfort before her? Was it to pass her days in the married state, with some young man of the first quality? (for you, I know, on the account of your dignity, might have chosen what son-in-law you pleased out of all our youth, to whose fidelity you might safely have trusted her.) Was it then for the sake of bearing children, whom she might have had the pleasure to see flourishing afterwards, in the enjoyment of their paternal fortunes, and rising, gradually, to all the honours of the state, and using the liberty to which they were born in the protection of their friends and clients? But what is there of all this, which was not taken away, before it was even given to her? But it is an evil, you'll say, to lose our children.—It is so; yet, it is much greater to suffer what we now endure. I cannot help mentioning one thing, which has given me no small comfort, and may help also perhaps to mitigate your grief. On my return from Asia, as I was sailing from Ægina towards Megara, I began to contemplate the prospect of the countries around me: Ægina was behind, Megara before me: Piræus on the right; Corinth on the left; all which towns, once famous and flourishing, now lie overturned, and buried in their ruins: upon this sight, I could not but think presently within myself, alas! how do we poor mortals fret and vex ourselves, if any of our friends happen to die, or to be killed, whose life is yet so short, when the carcasses of so many noble cities lie here exposed to me in one view? Why wilt thou not then command thyself, Servius, and remember, that thou art born a man? Believe me, I was not a little confirmed by this contemplation: try the force of it therefore, if you please, upon yourself; and imagine the same prospect before your own eyes. But to come nearer home; when you consider how many of our greatest men have perished lately at

Y. R. 708.
Bef. Chr.
44.
407 Cons.



and he drew up at this time a treatise of consolation for himself, from which he professes

once; what destruction has been made in the empire; what havock in all the provinces: how can you be so much shocked to be deprived of the fleeting breath of one little woman? Who, if she had not died at this time, must necessarily have died a few years after, since that was the condition of her being born. But recall your mind from reflections of this kind to the consideration of yourself, and think rather on what becomes your character and dignity: that your daughter lived as long as life was worth enjoying, as long as the republic stood; had seen her father prætor, consul, augur; been married to the noblest of our youth; had tasted every good in life; and, when the republic fell, then quitted it: what ground is there then, either for you, or her, to complain of fortune on this account? In short, do not forget that you are Cicero; one who has been always used to give advice and prescribe to others; nor imitate those paltry physicians, who pretend to cure other people's diseases, yet are not able to cure their own; but suggest rather to yourself the same lesson, which you would give in the same case. There is no grief so great, which length of time will not alleviate: but it would be shameful in you to wait for that time, and not to prevent it by your wisdom; besides, if there be any sense in the dead, such was her love and piety to you, that she must be concerned to see how much you afflict yourself. Give this therefore to the deceased; give it to your friends; give it to your country; that it may have the benefit of your assistance and advice, whenever there shall be occasion: lastly, since fortune has now made it necessary to us to accommodate ourselves to our present situation, do not give any one a handle to think, that you are not so much bewailing your daughter, as the state of the times, and the victory of certain persons. I am ashamed to write any more, lest I should seem to distrust your prudence, and will add therefore but one thing farther, and conclude: We have sometimes seen you bear prosperity nobly, with great honour and applause to yourself; let us now see that you can bear adversity with the same moderation, and without think-

to have received his greatest comfort. The design of it was not only to relieve his own mind, but to consecrate the virtues and memory of Tullia to all posterity: nor did his fondness for her stop here, but suggested the project of a more effectual consecration, by building a temple to her, and erecting her into a sort of a deity. In his letters to Atticus, we find the strongest expressions of his resolution and impatience to see this design executed. Yet, after all his zeal, or pretended eagerness and solicitude about this temple, it was never actually built by him⁶.

Y. R. 708.
Bef. Chr.
44.
407 Cons.

ing it a greater burthen than you ought to do; lest, in the number of all your other virtues, this one, at last, be thought to be wanting. As to myself, when I understand that your mind is grown more calm and composed, I will send you word how all things go on here, and what is the state of the province. Adieu." Ep. Fam. iv. 5. Middleton, 183.

⁶ Abbé Mongault, ad Att. xii. 1. and Dr. Middleton, p. 190, remark, that this fact seems to confirm what the author of the book of Wisdom observes on the origin of idolatry; that it was owing to the fond affection of parents, seeking to do honour to their deceased children. "The father," says he, "oppressed with unexpected grief for the sudden death of his child, after making an image of him, began to worship him as a god, though he was but a dead man; and enjoined certain rites and mysteries to his servants and dependants." (Wisd. xiv. 15.) But it was not Cicero's real thought, after all, to exalt his daughter into a deity: he knew it to be absurd, as he often declares, to pay divine honours to dead mortals; and tells us how their very publicans had decided that question in Bœotia: for, when the lands of the immortal gods were excepted out of their lease, by the law of the censors, they denied that any one could be deemed an immortal god, who had been once a man; and so made the lands of Amphiaras and Tropho-

Y. R. 708.
Bef. Chr.
44.
407 Cons.

7 In the leisure of the retired life which he led, after the death of Tullia, Cicero composed

nius pay the same taxes with the rest: (De Nat. Deor. iii. 19.) Yet, in a political view, he sometimes recommends the worship of those sons of men, whom their eminent services to mankind had advanced to the rank of inferior gods, as it inculcated, in a manner the most sensible, the doctrine of the soul's immortality: (De Leg. ii. 11.) And, since a temple was the most ancient way of doing honour to the dead who deserved it, (Plin. Hist. 27.) he considered it as the most effectual method of perpetuating the memory and praise of Tullia; and was willing to take the benefit of the popular superstition, and follow the example of those ancients, who had polished and civilized human life by consecrating such patterns of virtue to the veneration of their fellow-citizens.

7 His extraordinary affliction, it may be here remarked, gave occasion to suspicions very dishonourable, which are thought to be hinted at in the thirty-eighth letter of the twelfth book to Atticus: "You say, that it is time to shew a little more strength of mind, and you tell me, that certain persons talk concerning me in more severe terms than either you or Brutus have informed me by your letters: if some people look upon my spirit to be broken, and my faculties impaired, let them know in what company I employ my time, and they will be sensible that I cannot be blameable, since I have already so much recovered as to bring my mind to such a composed state as to be able to write on difficult subjects: and that, if I have chosen them as an amusement to my grief, I am praiseworthy to have taken up with one so becoming a man of letters." The author of an invective against him, under the name of Sallust, openly accuses him of an incestuous commerce with this beloved daughter. And Servius tells us, that Virgil was thought to have glanced at him in this verse:

Hic thalamum invasit natæ vetitosque Hymenæos.

Dio, who betrays every-where the greatest rancour against our orator, has inserted the same charge against him, in a speech he has made for Calenus, in answer to his second Philippic: but there is nothing in all Cicero's letters, or in

several works : his Hortensius ; a treatise in the way of dialogue, in which he undertakes the defence of philosophy against Hortensius, to whom he assigned the part of arraigning it : his Academics, in four books, containing a particular account and defence of the philosophy of the Academy, which he addressed to Varro⁸ : his excellent treatise *de finibus*, or of the chief good and ill of man, in five books, which he addressed to Brutus, in return for a present of the same kind, which Brutus had sent him a little before, viz. a treatise upon virtue ; and his Tusculan disputations, in five books also, upon as many different questions in philosophy, the most important and useful to the happiness of human life. The first teaches how to condemn the terrors of death, and to look upon it as a blessing, rather than an evil ; the second, to support pain and affliction with a manly fortitude ; the third, to appease all our complaints and uneasinesses under the accidents of life ; the fourth, to mo-

Y. R. 708.
Bef. Chr.
44.
407 Cons.

his behaviour in any part of his life, that gives the least credit to so malicious an aspersion.

⁸ Cicero wrote also at this time a little piece, in the way of a funeral encomium, in praise of Porcia, the sister of Cato, and wife of Domitius Ahenobarbus, Cæsar's mortal enemy. Varro and Lollius attempted the same subject ; and Cicero desires Atticus to send him their compositions : but all the three are now lost : though Cicero took the pains to revise and correct his, and sent copies of it afterwards to Domitius, the son, and Brutus, the nephew of that Porcia.

Y. R. 708.

Bef. Chr.

44.

407 Cons.

derate all our passions ; the fifth, to evince the sufficiency of virtue to make men happy⁹.

After Cæsar's arrival, Cicero was persuaded by his friends to leave solitude and the country, and to come to Rome ; where he soon found an opportunity of employing his interest and eloquence in the service of king Dejotarus. This prince had already been deprived by Cæsar of part of his dominions, for his adherence to Pompey ; and was now in danger of losing the rest, from an accusation preferred against him by his grandson, of a design pretended to have been formed by him against Cæsar's life, when Cæsar was entertained in his house, four years before, on his return from Egypt. The charge was groundless and ridiculous ; but, under his present disgrace,

⁹ It appears likewise, that he was pressed at this period by Atticus, and his other friends, and even by Brutus himself, to draw up something to be addressed to Cæsar ; and it was certainly an undertaking suitable to his dignity and character. He drew up a letter accordingly, which was communicated to Hirtius and Balbus, for their judgment upon it, whether it was proper to be sent to Cæsar : but these not thinking it advisable to send it, unless some passages were softened, Cicero was so much disgusted, that he dropped entirely the design. " As for the letter to Cæsar," says he to Atticus, " I was always very willing that Hirtius and Balbus should first read it ; for, otherwise, I had both been wanting in civility to them, and if I had happened to give offence, exposed myself also to danger. They have dealt ingenuously and kindly with me, in not concealing what they thought ; but what pleases me the most is, that by requiring so many alterations, they give me an excuse for not writing at all." Ad Att. xii. 51.

any charge was sufficient to ruin him; and Cæsar's countenancing it so far as to receive and hear it, shewed a strong prejudice against the king, and that he wanted only a pretence for stripping him of all that remained to him.

Brutus also interested himself very warmly in the same cause; and, when he went to meet Cæsar, on his road from Spain, made an oration to him at Nicæa, in favour of Dejotarus; which startled Cæsar, and gave him occasion to reflect on what he had never perceived before, the invincible fierceness and vehemence of Brutus's temper. The present trial was held in Cæsar's house; where Cicero so manifestly exposed the malice of the accuser and the innocence of the accused, that Cæsar, being determined not to acquit, yet ashamed to condemn him, chose the expedient of reserving his sentence to farther deliberation till he should go in person into the East, and inform himself of the whole affair upon the spot. Cicero says, "that Dejotarus, neither present nor absent, could ever obtain any favour or equity from Cæsar: and that, as often as he pleaded for him, which he was always ready to do, he could never persuade Cæsar to think any thing reasonable that he asked for him." He sent a copy of his oration to the king; and, at Dolabella's request, gave another likewise to him: excusing it, as a trifling performance, and hardly worth transcribing; "but I had a mind," says he, "to make a slight present to my old host and friend, of

Y. R. 708.

Bef. Chr.

44.

407 Cons.

Ep. Fam.
ix. 12.

Y. R. 708. coarse stuff, indeed, yet such as his presents
 Bef. Chr. usually are to me.”
 44.

407 Cons.

Middl. p.
 217.

Some little time after this trial, Cæsar, to shew his confidence in Cicero, invited himself to spend a day with him at his house in the country, and chose the third day of the Saturnalia for his visit; a season always dedicated to mirth and feasting amongst friends and relations¹. Cicero gives Atticus the following account of the entertainment, and how the day passed between them. “O this guest,” says he, “whom I so much dreaded! Yet I had no reason to repent of him, for he was pleased with his reception. When he came the evening before, on the eighteenth, to my neighbour Philippus, the house was so crowded with soldiers, that there was scarce a room left empty for Cæsar to sup in: but Barba Cassius relieved me; for he assigned me a guard, and made the rest encamp in the field; so that my house was clear. On the nineteenth, he stayed at Philippus’s till one in the afternoon; but saw nobody; was settling accounts, I guess, with Balbus; then took a walk on the shore; bathed after two; heard the verses on Mamurra², at which he never changed counte-

Ad Att.
 xiii. 52.

¹ This festival, after Cæsar’s reformation of the calendar, began on the seventeenth of December, and lasted three days. Macrob. Saturn. i. 10.

² Mamurra was a Roman knight, and general of the artillery to Cæsar in Gaul; where he raised an immense fortune, and is said to have been the first man in Rome who incrustated his house with marble, and made all his pillars of solid marble. (Plin. Hist. xxxvi. 6.) “He was severely

nance; was rubbed, anointed, sat down to table. Having taken a vomit just be-

Y. R. 708.

Bef. Chr.

44.

407 Cons.

lashed," says Dr. Middleton, "together with Cæsar himself, for his excessive luxury, and more infamous vices, by Catullus, whose verses are still extant, and the same, it has been thought, that Cicero refers to, as being first read to Cæsar at his house." Middl. p. 217. The verses of Catullus are as follow:

*Quis hoc potest videre, quis potest pati,
Nisi impudicus, et vorax, & helluo?
Mamurram habere quod comata Gallia
Habebant unctum et ultima Britannia:
Cinæde Romule, hæc videbis et feres,
Et impudicus, et vorax, et aleo.* Ep. 30.

*Pulchrè convenit improbis Cinædis,
Mamurræ Pathicoque Cæsarique.* Ep. 58.

Suetonius speaking of these verses, says, *Valerium Catullum, a quo sibi versiculis de Mamurra perpetua stigmata imposita non dissimulaverat, satisfaciendam, eadem die adhibuit cænæ: hospitioque patris ejus, sicut consueverat, uti perseveravit.* In Cæs. 73. Now Bayle, art. Catulle, remarks very justly, that, if what Suetonius asserts be true, viz. that, if Cæsar continued to lodge at the house of Catullus's father, after his reconciliation with the son, these cannot be the verses read at Cicero's house: because Cæsar, after this supper, never saw Verona, where Catullus's father lived: and we must conclude, that the offence given by Catullus, and his reconciliation, were before Cæsar's last journey to Gaul; and the verses now read to him were by another hand.

The reader, perhaps, will not readily understand the time and manner of Cæsar's passing from Philip's house to Cicero's in this short account of it: but it must be remembered, that their villas were adjoining to each other on the Formian coast near Cajeta; so that, when Cæsar came out of Philip's at one, he took a walk upon the shore for about an hour, and then entered into Cicero's; where the bath was prepared for him, and, in bathing, he heard the verses on

Y. R. 708. fore³, he eat and drank freely, and was very
 Bef. Chr. cheerful. The supper was good and well-
 44.
 407 Cons. served:

But our discourse at table, as we eat,
 For taste and seasoning still excell'd our meat.


Besides Cæsar's table, his friends were plentifully provided for in three other rooms; nor was there any thing wanting to his freedmen of lower rank and his slaves; but the better sort were elegantly treated: in a word, I acquitted myself like a man: yet he is not a

Mamurra; not produced by Cicero, for that would not have been agreeable to good manners, but by some of his own friends, who attended him, and who knew his desire to see every thing that was published against him, as well as his easiness in slighting or forgiving it.

³ The custom of taking a vomit both immediately before and after meals, which Cicero mentions Cæsar to have done on different occasions, (Pro Dejot. 7.) was very common with the Romans, and used by them as an instrument both of their luxury and of their health: "They vomit," says Seneca, "that they may eat; and eat, that they may vomit." (Cons. ad Helv. 9.) By this evacuation before eating, they were prepared to eat more plentifully; and, by emptying themselves presently after it, prevented any hurt from repletion. Thus Vitellius, who was a famous glutton, is said to have preserved his life by constant vomits, while he destroyed all his companions, who did not use the same caution: (Sueton. 12. Dio, lxxv. 734.) and the practice was thought so effectual for strengthening the constitution, that it was the constant regimen of all the athletæ, or professed wrestlers, trained for the public shows, in order to make them more robust. So that Cæsar's vomiting before dinner was a sort of compliment to Cicero, as it intimated a resolution to pass the day cheerfully, and to eat and drink freely with him. Middl. p. 217.

guest, to whom one would say, at parting, Pray call upon me again as you return : once is enough. We had not a word on business, but many on points of literature : in short, he was delighted with his entertainment, and passed the day agreeably. He talked of spending one day at Puteoli, another at Baiæ. Thus you see the manner of my receiving him ; somewhat troublesome, indeed, but not uneasy to me. I shall stay here a little longer, and then to Tusculum. As he passed by Dolabella's villa, his troops marched close by his horse's side, on right and left ; which was done nowhere else. This I had from Nicias⁴."

Y. R. 708.
Bef. Chr.
44.
407 Cons.



⁴ It is certainly to be regretted that Cicero suppressed the letter which, as we just now observed, he had prepared to address to Cæsar on the state and regulation of public affairs. There remain, however, two epistles, which were written to Cæsar on the same subject, and which have been generally, and with good reason, ascribed to Sallust. These, as they contain many important truths, and throw a considerable light on the times of which we write ; and as they discover to us the regulations which an eminent genius and historian thought necessary to remove the disorders into which the Roman state had fallen, and are generally but little attended to ; we shall beg leave to offer to the reader. That epistle, which is called the second, was certainly the first ; and was written before the battle of Pharsalia : the other, called the first, was written after Cæsar had obtained that battle. It is for this reason that we have altered the order in which these pieces appear in the different editions of the Roman historian.

THE FIRST EPISTLE OF SALLUST TO C. JULIUS CÆSAR,
CONCERNING THE REGULATION OF THE COMMON-
WEALTH.

" I am not insensible how difficult and nice a task he

undertakes, who ventures to offer advice to princes and governors; or to any one invested with high authority. The number of counsellors with whom such persons are surrounded, and the great uncertainty of future contingencies, which the most cautious and penetrating politician cannot sufficiently guard against, are very discouraging considerations: and what makes the office still more ungrateful, the worst laid schemes will frequently have a more prosperous event than the most rational and prudent counsels. So capricious is the sway of fortune in the disposal of almost all human affairs!

“ But, notwithstanding these discouragements, since my early inclinations led me to the study of state affairs, and as I have, with the utmost application, pursued that knowledge, not so much with a view to obtain employments, which I have often seen procured by means the most base and unworthy; but rather that I might thoroughly inform myself of the nature of our constitution civil and military; what is the true state of her strength with regard to her men, her arms, and her revenue: therefore, though I may, perhaps, suffer in my reputation, and be thought too forward in the attempt, yet my regard to your dignity and fame has, after mature deliberation, prevailed with me above such apprehensions; and I am determined to run any hazard, where I have the least prospect of an accession to your glory. And be assured it was not without previous consideration, nor so much with a view to the circumstances of your fortune, that I took up this resolution, as because, among your other distinguished qualities, I have ever experienced in you this most admirable one, that the greatness of your soul is more conspicuous in adversity than prosperity.—But the fame of your illustrious qualities is a subject I need not expatiate on: it is already so great, that sooner were men wearied in admiring and celebrating, than you in performing glorious actions. Nor was it out of any fond conceit of my own abilities, that I have presumed to lay before you my sentiments concerning the commonwealth; but, as your thoughts have been hitherto taken up with another scene of business, with the toils of a camp, with battles, with triumphs, and military commands, I thought it not unseasonable to awake your attention to the regulation of civil affairs: for, if your only aim and inten-

tion be to repel the furious attack of your enemies upon your dignity, and defend the grants of the people against the consul who opposes them, these are views below the virtue of Cæsar. But, if you are still animated by the same spirit with which, from your first entrance into public life, you successfully opposed and overset the faction of the nobility, and rescued the Roman people from the yoke of slavery; and with which you baffled, in your prætorship, though unarmed, all the attempts of your armed adversaries, and have since performed such great and glorious exploits, that even your enemies have nothing to object against you but your superior greatness: if the same virtuous spirit still possess you, give your attention to the plan I shall propose for the regulation and government of the commonwealth; which plan I am persuaded, you will find to be proper and advisable, or, at least, to require but little alteration.

“ Now, since Pompey, either from a kind of infatuation, or blindly bent upon opposing you, has been so rash and imprudent as to throw the whole power of the state into the hands of its enemies [the aristocracy] and has thus put all into confusion, it is incumbent upon you to restore the commonwealth, and replace it upon its proper foundation [by asserting the sovereignty of the people]. The first step he took was that of committing to a few senators, an absolute authority in the direction of the revenue, the sumptuary laws, and judicial proceedings; whilst the people, in whom the sovereign power had before been lodged, were left in a state of subjection and slavery. The judicial authority is, indeed, as formerly, nominally vested in the three orders of the republic; but the real power is in the hands of the faction, who, with unbridled dominion, controul all things; who give to one man and take from another; dispose of every thing, as they please; who ensnare the virtuous and innocent, and raise none but their own creatures to posts of honour: how notorious soever their crimes be, how flagitious soever their lives, and infamous soever their reputation, this scandalous insufficiency excludes them not from the magistracy; and thus exalted, they seize, they plunder whatever they have an inclination to: in short, their whole conduct is like that of a victorious army ravaging an enemy's city: lust and passion animate them; licentiousness is their

only law. But, under these afflicting circumstances, it would, I own, be some alleviation to our misfortunes to see men of abilities in possession of arbitrary dominion, acquired by bravery ; but, instead of that, we see a despicable faction of base, cowardly wretches, whose only strength and courage lie in the feeble efforts of words, masters of sovereign power, which fell into their hands by accident, and has been yielded to them by a base, perfidious man [Pompey], and exercising that power with extreme arrogance and cruelty. For in any of our former contests and civil wars, were ever so many and such illustrious families extirpated? Did ever any before pursue their conquests with such impetuous fury, such exorbitant unbridled licentiousness? Even Sylla, who thought the laws of war gave an unlimited licence to the conqueror, though he conceived that the terror of punishment added strength to his cause, yet was satisfied with a few instances of severity to his enemies, and chose to win others to his party by lenity and benevolence, rather than the dread of revenge. But such moderate resentment suits not the sanguinary temper of Cato, Domitius, and the rest of that faction. No less than forty senators, together with numbers of young men of promising abilities, have, by their orders, been butchered, like so many victims destined to slaughter ; nor could the blood of all these miserable citizens glut the thirst of those most implacable tyrants. The doleful cries of helpless orphans, the weakness of aged parents, the groans of men, and the lamentations of women, made not the least impression on their unrelenting hearts : so far from it, that they grew every day more and more inflamed, both in their words and actions ; and, by injurious practices, degraded many from their employments, drove many into exile.” [Pompey was guilty of great partiality in his third consulship, and probably of cruelty, since Tacitus, speaking of his conduct at this time, says, that, being chosen to correct the public enormities, his remedies proved more grievous to the state than its distempers. Appius, in his censorship, acted in the same partial manner, and his authority was subservient to the views of the aristocracy. Among others of the contrary faction he degraded our author and turned him out of the senate. Hence this description of the injustice and cruelty of his enemies is, perhaps, full of resentment, and may be exaggerated].

“ And there is no occasion to shew how they stand affected towards you. Base cowards as they are, they would yet gladly sacrifice their lives to procure your disgrace and ruin. Yes,—far less is the pleasure they taste in that sovereignty, which is unexpectedly fallen into their hands, than the anxiety they feel, when they view your exalted glory : for, to accomplish your destruction, they chuse rather to run the hazard of slavery, and esteem it a more eligible situation, than to see you the happy instrument of raising the empire of Rome, great as it is, to the highest pitch of glory and dominion.

“ These considerations will convince you, how absolutely necessary it is to use the utmost care and circumspection in forming your schemes for the establishment and security of the commonwealth. What occurs to me I shall freely offer without any reserve : but, how far the methods I shall propose are just and practicable, I leave to the determination of your own judgment.

“ By the primitive constitution of the republic, as our histories inform us, the people were divided into two orders, patricians and plebeians : originally the exercise of the supreme jurisdiction was lodged in the former ; but, as the latter was the stronger body, this superior force often excited them to withdraw to mount Aventine, in defence of their liberties : the constant effect of which secession was, that the power of the patricians was diminished, and the rights and privileges of the people augmented. But what contributed most to the security of their liberty was this, the laws had their due force, and the power of the magistrate was subservient to them. Nor was it then” [during the perfect democracy settled by the Licinian laws] “ affluence of fortune, or an arrogant passion for preccedence, but the character of a regular life and gallant exploits, that distinguished the nobility from the commonalty : even men in the lowest station, whether occupied in their farms at home, or serving in the wars, just provided with the necessary and decent supports of life, were amply satisfied themselves, and gave ample satisfaction to the state. But when, being thrust out of possession of their lands, by a gradual usurpation, they, through indigence, and idleness (having nothing to do), could no longer have any fixed abodes, then they began to covet the wealth of other men, and to put their

own liberty and the commonwealth to sale. Thus fell, by degrees, the ancient power of the Roman people, who had before been lords of the world, and given laws to all nations; and they, who jointly exercised sovereign authority, have, each individual separately, sold themselves to slavery and bondage.

“Now, a multitude thus disposed, not only corrupt and degenerate in their manners, but also, by their different courses and pursuits, so alienated from each other, as to be incapable of any coalition and unanimity, are, I apprehend, very ill qualified to assume the government of the commonwealth. But, if the number of citizens be augmented, such a regulation would rouse up a general ardour in support of the common liberty; for then one part of the people will be animated to preserve the liberty they are admitted to; and the other to shake off the yoke of slavery, which has hitherto disgraced them. These new enfranchised citizens, joined to some of the old ones, should, I think, be settled in our colonies; by which means we shall not only be furnished with greater supplies for recruiting our armies, but the people, being then employed in useful occupations, will no longer disturb and embroil the state.” [We have seen above, that this was one of the measures taken by Cæsar for the better settlement of the state.] “I am not insensible, that, when you attempt the execution of this scheme, you will expose yourself to the fury and severe resentments of the nobility; who will immediately take fire, grow angry, and exclaim, that the very foundation of the constitution is undermined, that the ancient citizens are robbed of their privileges, and reduced to a state of slavery, and this free republic converted into a regal government, when any single person assumes an arbitrary power of augmenting the number of citizens. I confess, indeed, it is my settled opinion, that whoever attempts to render himself popular, at the expense of the commonwealth, is guilty of a crime, the grievous effects of which will fall on his own head: yet, at the same time, I will venture to say, he who has not resolution enough to undertake such designs, as are at once beneficial to the public, as well as his own private interests, is justly chargeable with the imputation of indolence and pusillanimity. When M. Livius Drusus was tribune of the people, it was his fixed purpose and resolution, to exert his

utmost endeavours in favour of the nobility ; nor did he, at first, ever enter upon any measures without their consent and authority. And yet those sons of faction, ever influenced by the maxims of treachery and falsehood, rather than fidelity and honour, no sooner considered what a number of men, should Drusus succeed, would owe the mighty obligation to one single person ; and, as it is reasonable to imagine, when each reflected on his own base and perfidious heart, conceived, that Drusus would act in the same manner they were conscious they themselves should act in the same situation ; apprehending therefore, that his professions of such singular regard for their interest was only an artifice to raise himself to sovereignty, they opposed him with the utmost vigour, and frustrated all his designs in their favour. These observations will engage you to fortify yourself with the greatest attention and circumspection with all the support you can possibly procure.

“ To subdue a fair and open enemy is, to the brave and gallant man, no mighty difficulty ; but, in contriving or in avoiding secret stratagems and latent perils, generous and noble souls are by no means adroit and expert. For your better security therefore, when you have augmented the number of citizens, as the power of the people will be restored, let it be your principal concern to cultivate good manners, and, by a firm coalition, unite the old and new citizens. But the greatest service you can possibly do to your country, to your fellow-citizens, to yourself, and your posterity, is to extinguish that extravagant passion for riches, which is so prevalent amongst us ; or, at least, give such a check to it as the circumstances of the times will permit. And, unless this be done, neither in the city nor in the camp, neither in the administration of public or private affairs, can any due order, any regular economy, be expected. For where the love of money once prevails, it proves always too powerful for discipline, and suppresses all good dispositions ; nor is the firmest mind able to resist its efforts ; but, sooner or later, falls a victim to this passion. Numerous are the instances that occur in history, what princes, what states and nations, have intirely owed, to the oppressive weight of their opulence, the loss of those mighty empires, which have been the glorious acquisitions of virtuous poverty. Nor is it at all surprising : for when an upright man beholds one of less merit, more caressed and esteemed,

upon no other recommendation but a superior fortune, at first, it has no other effect than to raise his indignation, and stagger him with perplexities; but, when he has still every day fresh experience that pomp and splendor triumph over genuine glory and honour; wealth and opulence over worth and merit; his mind is at last alienated; he deserts the cause of virtue, and flies to the tents of voluptuousness. It is doubtless the love of glory that stimulates and supports industry: stripped of that attracting charm, virtue in herself appears to men with a very forbidding aspect, and under a very unamiable form. In short, wherever riches are in high esteem, there all worthy accomplishments, there honour and probity, modesty and chastity, must lose all their regard, become neglected and despised. For, in the pursuit of virtue, men are confined to one road only; a road too surrounded with perils and difficulties: but, in quest of riches, great is the latitude they take, and every one pushes forward what way he pleases; and by any means, honourable or dishonourable, strives to obtain his end. Above all things, therefore, you must determine to crush this prevailing power of gold. And I am persuaded, that no one hereafter will judge a man more or less qualified for judicial offices, or the administration of the commonwealth, if you put election of consuls and prætors upon such a footing, that the real worth and merit, and not wealth and riches, must of necessity prevail in the choice." [We have seen also that Cæsar had nothing so much at heart as the execution of his sumptuary laws.]

"As to the appointment of magistrates, it will be the safest and most convenient method to invest that power in the people. If you confine it to a few, you approach too near a regal government; if you suffer the elections to be carried by bribery, that were base and dishonourable. It is my opinion, therefore, that all of the first class of the people should be intitled to the privilege of standing candidates for judicial offices; but I think it advisable that their number should be augmented. It is well known that neither the people of Rhodes, nor any other free state were ever dissatisfied with the judgments of their courts, where rich or poor, just as it fell out, were promiscuously joined together in all consultations, even of the greatest, as well as the smallest importance. But, as to the election of magistrates, the law enacted by C. Gracchus, when tribune of the people, is by no

means to be despised : That, out of the five classes, promiscuously, those centuries who were to give their suffrages should be chosen by lot. When the people are thus reduced to an equality, and superiority of fortune no longer gives superior claim to dignity and honour, the only contention, that can then remain, will be, who shall surpass each other in virtue and merit. These remedies, which I have prescribed, will, I apprehend, prove a very easy and effectual cure for the evils attending riches. For our admiration, or desire of any objects, arises from the use and advantage we propose from them ; it is from the hopes of gain that men are prompted to iniquitous courses : take away that incitement, and you will find no man alive will be any longer a villain, when a villain can be no longer a gainer. But, whilst the temptation to riches remains, avarice, like a savage beast of the desert, is insufferably outrageous and cruel : which way soever she flies, she lays waste whole towns and countries ; confounds all things human and divine, without distinction : nor walls nor armies are able to obstruct her imperious violence ; she falls upon all in her way, robs all she meets, robs them of their reputation, their chastity, their children, parents, and country : all become the prey of this universal plunderer. And yet there is a remedy for this mighty evil : take away all esteem and honour from riches, and virtue will instantly recover her vigour, and be able to triumph over the rage of this devouring pestilence.

“ But, though all men, whether friends or enemies, allow this to be true, yet, such is the factious spirit of the nobility, that you must expect violent opposition from that quarter. This is the grand obstruction you will meet with ; if you can remove that, by guarding yourself against their dark deceit and base stratagems, all the rest of your way will be smooth and easy. Base stratagems I may justly call them, for, were they influenced by any virtuous principle, it would prompt them rather to emulate than envy the worthy. But as sloth and indolence, and dulness and invincible stupidity, press heavy upon them, the only efforts they can make are clamorous complaints and invidious reproaches against that high renown, which they look upon as a tacit reflection on their own infamous reputations. But what necessity is there to say any more about them ? You want

not to be informed of their characters. You are no stranger to M. Bibulus, the man who, by irresistible courage and great abilities, forced his way to the consular dignity! Yes—You must doubtless be sensible of this, because you know him to be a creature scarce endowed with the faculty of speech; who has indeed a heart disposed to any villany, but not a head to contrive and execute it! What is there to be apprehended from such a man as this, a man to whom the very consulship, the highest office in the state, was the highest disgrace? And, as to L. Domitius, what magnanimity can there be in him, when every part of his body is defiled with some foul vice, some detestable crime or other: his tongue with falsehood and lies, his hands with blood, his feet with ignominious flight; and his pollutions, in other respects, are so abominably shameful, that even the bare mention of them would be an unpardonable indecency? Cato is the only man amongst them who has any sort of merit; the dexterity of his parts, his eloquence, his artifice and penetration, are no contemptible qualifications: but they are no other than what may be acquired by Grecian discipline. The nobler qualifications, fortitude, vigilance, and unwearied industry, are not to be learned from the Greeks. For can a people, who had neither vigour nor spirit to defend the liberty of their own country, be qualified to instruct others in those arts and accomplishments that are necessary for the support of empire? As to the rest of the faction, they are a set of noblemen so utterly insignificant, so excessively dull and senseless, that, like stupid statues, their names and titles are their only ornaments.—As for L. Posthumius and Favonius, they appear to me not unlike the additional lading, which is taken into a large ship, above the ordinary burden: if she arrives safe at her port, it may be of use; but had the mariners met with tempestuous weather, those goods would have been first thrown over-board, as they were of the least value.” [What Sallust says here of the nobles agrees very well with the character Cicero gives, in his letters to Atticus, of the *honest*, or the *fishpondmen*; but the picture he draws of Cato is very unlike that which he has given us of the same man in his history of Catiline’s conspiracy. There Cato is put upon an equality with Cæsar in noble birth, eloquence, greatness of spirit and glory: and simplicity of life, regular conduct, and invincible strictness, are mentioned as

his acknowledged virtues. He contended not, it is said, in wealth with the wealthy, nor with the factious in practices of faction; but in bravery he yielded not to the most courageous; nor in temperance to the most reserved; nor in purity of morals to the most innocent: he aimed not so much to appear, as to be a virtuous man; and the less he courted renown, the more it followed him. Sallust, when he wrote the conspiracy of Catiline, had not, probably, been exasperated by persecutions, or had retired from all public business, and was perfectly at his ease: whereas, in this epistle, his language is that of a lately provoked enemy. Cicero ad Att. vii. 15. speaks of Favonius and Posthumius, as vain weak men, of importance only in their own conceit: *Uni Favonio leges ab illo nobis imponi non placebat; sed is haud auditus in concilio.*—*Posthumius autem, de quo nominatim senatus decrevit, ut statim in Siciliam iret, Fuffanoque succederet, negat se sine Catone iturum: et suam in senatu operam auctoritatemque magni aestimat.* This Posthumius is probably the same man whom Cicero mentions, in another letter to Atticus, ix. 2. as having joined Cæsar before Pompey left Italy: and this circumstance seems to prove that this epistle of Sallust was written upon the rupture between Cæsar and Pompey, and before the former was master of Brundisium.]

“ Having thus given you my judgment concerning the restitution of the plebeian power, and the reformation of their manners; I will now point out to you the steps which it will be advisable to take, with regard to the senate.

“ No sooner was my age and reason ripe for application, but I turned my thoughts to literature, rather than the exercise of arms and riding: and, as nature had given me greater strength of mind than body, I chose to inure the most able and vigorous part to labour and fatigue; and, in the pursuit of this course, the observations I have made, in my constant application to study, and the informations of men, as well as books, have thoroughly convinced me that all empires and states in the world have prospered and flourished, as long as they pursued wise and wholesome counsels: but, when partiality, fear, and voluptuousness corrupted those counsels, their strength soon began to decline: then they lost their dominion, and, at last, their liberty.

“ I confess it is my settled opinion, that whoever is placed in an eminent station, and has a greater share of property in

any state, is ever found to be most concerned for its security and preservation. As to others, they have but one motive to engage their attention, their liberty. But the man who, by virtue and bravery, has acquired riches, fame, and dignity, has those additional incitements. And therefore whenever he sees any dangers threatening the state, the apprehension alarms his mind, rouses all his thoughts and cares, and excites his utmost pains and labour; his liberty, his glory, his property are at stake, and he will defend them. His vigilance is seen in all places, his activity in every quarter: for, the more flourishing his circumstances are, when the constitution is secure, the more anxious, the more resolute and vigorous, will be his endeavours, when he apprehends it to be in danger. These considerations convince me, that in a constitution, where the people are to put in execution the determinations of the senate, as the body does the dictates of the mind, prudence and policy are indispensable qualifications in the fathers; sagacity and penetration talents unnecessary in the people—Our ancestors, though oppressed with grievous wars, held out with unwearied industry, after infinite losses, and when their money was exhausted. Such was their magnanimity, that neither the formidable strength of their enemies, nor the emptiness of their treasury, nor any unprosperous events could subdue their invincible spirit. The acquisitions they made by virtue they did not part with but with life: and they owed their success, not so much to their courage in the field, as to the wisdom, the boldness, and the constancy of their counsels. For, in those happy days, all the members of the commonwealth, firmly cemented together, acted as one man; had no other views but her welfare; entered into no cabals but against the public enemy: and every individual exerted his abilities both of mind and body, not to aggrandise himself, but his country. Far different are the practices which prevail in this age; for now a set of noblemen, enervated with indolence and sloth, who never faced an enemy in battle; unexperienced in war, unacquainted with military toils and hardships, trained up to faction only within the walls of the city; arrogantly usurp sovereign authority over all the nations upon earth: whilst the fathers, whose salutary counsels have hitherto preserved the state in all her difficulties, are driven, like the waves of the sea, this way or that, by arbitrary impulse; one day

enact laws, the next repeal them, just as it suits the caprice, the resentments, and arrogance of these lordly oppressors; for that alone is allowed to be the rule to estimate public good or evil.

“ But if now, in your regulations, you restore to the senators their common privileges and equal liberty, or contrive for them some secret method of giving their suffrages, then would the exorbitant power some of the nobility possess soon be diminished, and the commonwealth would rise again and prosper. But though an attempt to bring the interest and influence of the whole body upon a level may be thought impracticable, since some of them made their entrance into the world upon the bottom of anticipated honours and dignity, and a numerous train of clients; whereas the generality of others, senators not by descent but creation, cannot have, in all respects, equal influence and advantages: yet they should, at least, be freed from any restraint of awe or terror in giving their suffrages. When every one can thus act, as it were, in obscurity, then the dread of any man’s arrogant power will no longer force him to comply with measures prejudicial to his own interest and liberty. Liberty is a jewel of high estimation; the worthy and the unworthy, the coward and the brave, equally love and admire it. But, admired as it is, we often see men, alarmed by the dread of superior strength, tamely give up that inestimable treasure to the demands of a public robber. Weak and infatuated man! Liberty or bondage is the subject of contention; and, whilst the victory is yet uncertain, they receive the ignominious yoke, the worst lot that could have befallen them, had their resistance been unsuccessful.

“ Two expedients, therefore, I would propose to confirm the senatorial power; first to augment their number; and then to make it a rule, that each shall give his suffrage by tablets. By the one, every man, being skreened under the protection of a veil, will not be intimidated from acting according to the dictates of his own mind. By the other, the additional numbers will be an additional service and security to the state. For such is our present situation, that our public deliberations are very ill attended: some few are engaged in judicial offices; some are taken up with domestic concerns or the service of their friends; but the more general cause of their absence is, not so much any other avocation,

as the intolerable arrogance of those lofty oppressors, who have usurped such exorbitant power, for now some of the ancient nobility, with a few of the new-created senators, whom they have taken in as a farther support to the faction, censure, approve, and decree, by their own absolute authority ; and act, in every instance, just as their own arbitrary will inclines them. But, if you augment the number of senators, and oblige them to give their suffrages by tablets, then would those haughty rulers soon abate their arrogance, when they found they must submit to the determination of those very men, over whom they have exercised such rigorous, such despotic sway.

“ When you have examined these expedients, you may, perhaps, ask me, what number it is advisable to add to the senatorial order ; and in what manner, and for what purposes, I would advise the distribution of them into their several parts and distinct offices : and, as I have proposed the committing the judicial proceedings to the first class of the people, in what form they should be distributed, and what shall be the number of each different division ? It would not be difficult to draw up a particular plan ; but I thought it advisable, first, to propose a general scheme, and to have your approbation of that, before I proceeded farther. If you think my expedients just and true in general, you will find the rest very easy and obvious. I will not deny, that I have a strong ambition to see the justness and propriety of these regulations confirmed by their happy consequences : for, from your success and prosperity, I shall expect to derive some share of glory and reputation to myself. But yet far greater is my desire, much more ardent my passion, to see the commonwealth restored, whatever expedients are used, with as much expedition as it can possibly be effected. Liberty is a happiness I prefer infinitely above the highest acquisitions of fame and glory : and let me intreat, let me beseech and exhort you, now that you have raised yourself to the highest military renown, and gloriously triumphed over the warlike nation of the Gauls, not to suffer the mighty Roman empire, hitherto invincible, to perish and decay, or be dissolved by civil wars or inveterate discord. Should such a calamity happen through your fault, be assured, Cæsar, that, neither day nor night, will you be free from pungent remorse ; the sense of such a corroding guilt will ever disturb

your rest, and your afflicted mind will be incessantly racked with madness and despair. For I look upon it as an incontestible truth, that the Deity constantly inspects the actions of all the human race ; nor will the virtues or vices of any one pass unregarded ; but, agreeably to the different nature of them, they will be followed by a different retribution. These may not, indeed, be the immediate effects, but they are the constant expectation of every man, arising from the consciousness of his actions.

“ Imagine now that the genius of Rome, attended by your ancestors, were to accost you at this important crisis : you would hear them delivering their sentiments in the following strain : Remember, Cæsar, that it is from us you derive your descent, from a race of virtuous and valiant heroes. We gave thee existence in this flourishing city, to be the support of our dignity, a strength to our establishment, and a terror to our adversaries. And, when from us you received your life, you received, with it, all the acquisitions, which were the fruits of our infinite toils and perils, a country the most powerful and extensive, a place and family the most illustrious in that country ; to all which, we took care to add many excellent accomplishments, joined to an affluent fortune, acquired with honour ; in short, all the felicities that adorn a settled peace, all the rewards that crown a successful war. Think not that, in return for these extensive obligations, we require from thee any undertaking inconsistent with virtue and probity. No—what we expect at thy hands is the restoration of falling liberty. Accomplish this, and every corner of the universe will instantly be filled with the applause of such a virtuous achievement. What ! though you have already given many illustrious proofs of great abilities, both in your civil and military capacity, yet in this, Cæsar, thou art not singular ; there are many brave, magnanimous spirits, who have arrived to the same degree of glory.

But, if you would surpass all others, arise now and rescue, from the brink of ruin, this most renowned, this mighty empire. Then, indeed, wilt thou rise to matchless greatness, and shine in unrivalled lustre ! But should a different fate attend this state, should it perish through the malignity of the distemper that afflicts it ; who sees not that universal wars, desolation, and slaughter will attend her fall ? But if you feel a generous ardour to do the most acceptable service to

us and to your country, assert the liberty of the commonwealth, and save the sinking state: then will succeeding ages view thee exalted above all the human race, and, even after death, with singular felicity, gathering fresh laurels of praise. For it sometimes happens that the clouds of adverse fortune cast a shade on living grandeur, and oftentimes the blasts of envy check its growth. But, when the hero yields to fate, malice and detraction expiring with him, his merit becomes more and more conspicuous, and daily rises to higher degrees of fame and glory.

“ Thus, Cæsar, I have presented you with a brief plan of such regulations as, I apprehend, will contribute most to the public good, and your own interest. But, whatever scheme you think proper to pursue, I beseech the immortal gods that it may have a prosperous event, and that both you and your country may reap the fruits of your successful endeavours.”

THE SECOND EPISTLE OF SALLUST TO C. JULIUS CÆSAR,
CONCERNING THE REGULATION OF THE COMMON-
WEALTH.

“ It heretofore prevailed, as an established truth, that kingdoms and empires, and whatever other objects men eagerly pursue, were only the gifts of fortune; since they were often capriciously bestowed upon the undeserving, and never enjoyed by any, without a sensible diminution and decay. But experience has convinced us that Appius the poet was not mistaken when he said, that every man is the architect of his own fortune. In you, especially, Cæsar, is this maxim verified; in you, who have so far surpassed all others, that sooner were men wearied in celebrating your glorious actions, than you in performing them. But still, as in the finished works of architecture, so in the acquisitions of heroic virtue, the utmost attention is required; if they are neglected, their beauty will soon be impaired; or, for want of care to support them, the noblest structures may fall to ruin. For it is not without reluctance that any man submits to the sovereign authority of another; and, however just and mild he may be in the exercise of such power, still we are apt to be under apprehensions of oppression from him whose situation enables him to oppress when he pleases. Nor are such apprehensions without foundation; for those who get the reins of

government into their hands are, in their conduct, generally influenced by an absurd maxim, that, the more base and degenerate the people are, the more secure is the power of the sovereign. But far different ought to be your measures, Cæsar; and, as you yourself are virtuous and brave, who are to give laws, it is highly expedient to make the people so, who are to receive them. For the worst of men are always found most impatient under the restraints of government.

“Indeed, when I consider, that the exercise of your power in the course of the war, has been more gentle than that of others in the times of peace: when I see your victorious troops demanding the gratification of plundering the conquered; and when I consider, that the conquered are your fellow-citizens; I must confess that these difficulties, which you have to encounter in settling your conquests, are greater than any, before you, have met with. But out of these difficulties you must resolve to extricate yourself, and settle the commonwealth upon a firm establishment for the future; an undertaking to be effected, not so much by the force of arms, or by triumphs over enemies, as by a method much more noble as well as difficult; by the wholesome institutions of laws, and the sanctions of discipline and peace. An affair, therefore, of such high importance, calls upon all, not only those of eminent abilities, but also those who are less distinguished, to communicate their sentiments, and offer the best advice in their power: for it is my opinion, that the future happiness or misery of Rome entirely depends upon the methods you take in settling your victories.

“That this great end may be more easily and effectually accomplished, I beg your attention to a few things, which occur to my thoughts upon this occasion.

“You have been engaged, illustrious general, in a war against an eminent adversary, a man of immense wealth and boundless ambition; but more distinguished by his fortune than any prudence and sagacity in his conduct. Amongst his adherents, some few followed his arms, whose enmity to you had no other foundation than the injustice they had done you: others were drawn to his party by the tie of affinity, or some personal obligation. Not one of them had any share in his power; for, could he have submitted to a participation of dominion, the whole world would not have felt the shock of a devouring war. The rest of his party,

the vast multitudes of the common people, that were in his camp, were drawn thither, not so much by their own judgment, as by the prevailing example of others, whom they looked upon as more discerning than themselves." [The evidence of these truths we have already seen in the course of this history.] "In this juncture, a set of wretches, whose infamous luxury had left nothing unpolluted, encouraged by malicious reports, with the hopes of seizing the commonwealth, came over to your camp; and there, without any reserve, threatened death and rapine, and all the miseries of unrestrained licentiousness, to those who engaged in neither party. But many of them, when they found you would neither cancel their debts, nor suffer your fellow-citizens to be treated as public enemies, withdrew from your camp. Some few of them, indeed, still remained, imagining they should enjoy greater ease and security there than they could in the city: so terrible an apprehension had they of the power and rage of creditors. It is almost incredible what numbers, and what men of high rank and distinction went over to Pompey also upon the very same motives; and, during the whole course of the war, adhered to him, as a sacred and inviolable sanctuary to people under such difficulties and distresses.

"Now, as the success of your arms has made you the arbiter of war and peace; that you may put such an end to the one, as may be a demonstration of your regard to your fellow-citizens, and make the other as honourable and lasting as possible; consider well what are the most advisable steps for the regulation of your own conduct; since it is on you only that this affair entirely depends. It is my opinion, that the rigid exercise of power tends rather to render it vexatious and uneasy, than firm and lasting; nor is it possible for any man to make himself an object of dread to the many, but, at the same time, a reciprocal dread of the many must recoil upon himself. And to be in such a situation is to be eternally involved in a state of warfare on all sides perilous: for, to whatever quarter you betake yourself, no security is to be found, surrounded as you are with continual dangers, and alarmed with terrible apprehensions. Very different is the situation of those, whose power is tempered with mildness, and moderated by humanity and benevolence! Every thing around them appears fair, flourishing, and happy; and the

very enemies of the nation shew them more favour and esteem than those of a contrary character meet with from their own citizens. And can any one say that I am prompted to give this advice by a partial regard to the conquered party, or a sinister view to detract from the glory of your triumphs? No doubt I deserve this censure, for declaring that such treatment as foreign nations, nations naturally our foes, have met with from us and our ancestors, ought not to be denied to our fellow-citizens, and that we Romans should not, like savage barbarians, insist upon the retaliation of blood and slaughter.

“ Have they then forgot the reproaches they lately cast upon Pompey, and upon Sylla’s cruel use of victory? How Domitius, Carbo, and Brutus, with several others, were slain; that they fell not, when under arms in the field; not in the heat of battle, by the common calamity of war; but, after that was over, even when they were supplicating mercy, they were most inhumanly murdered by Pompey. Have they forgot how the people of Rome were, like so many cattle, butchered in the field of Mars? Bloody and inhuman has been the use other conquerors, before you, have made of their victories! Dreadful were the scenes of private slaughters, unexpected massacres, women flying into the bosoms of their children, and children into the bosoms of their parents, and in all quarters, our habitations plundered and demolished! The very men who acted this bloody part would now persuade you to pursue the same measures: as if the only motive of the war had been, whether you or Pompey should have an arbitrary power of oppressing mankind; as if you had not restored the commonwealth, but seized it as a prey of your successful arms; and as if the flower of our army, and the choicest of our veteran troops, took up arms against brethren and parents, and some even against their own offspring, from this motive only, that the most abandoned of men might, from the calamities of others, procure means to indulge their insatiable appetites, or that their enormous lives might reflect dishonour on the worthy men engaged in the same cause, and so stain the glory of their conquests. I venture to speak thus, because I am persuaded you are no stranger to the conduct of every individual amongst them, and how far they observed the rules of moderation,

even when the event of the war was uncertain; and how some of them gave such a loose to debauchery and licentious festivity, in the very field of battle, as men of their years could not have indulged themselves in, without a blemish to their reputation, even in time of peace and tranquillity.

“ I see no occasion to say any more of the disposition of military affairs.

“ As to the establishing of peace, since that is the great point you and your friends have in view; consider, in the first place, I beseech you, the nature of the affair now under deliberation: for thus, by distinctly separating the arguments on both sides, you will, of course, open a way to right measures. I own, when I reflect with myself, that whatever had a beginning has naturally a determined period, I am persuaded, that, whenever the fatal destruction of Rome’s empire approaches, it can only happen when her citizens are harassed with intestine wars: in that critical juncture, when their strength is worn out and their spirits exhausted, they will fall a prey to some foreign prince or state. But, were it possible to preserve harmony amongst ourselves, the whole world, all the nations of the earth in confederacy, would not be able to diminish or shake this mighty empire. Therefore, to secure all the advantages of unanimity, and to remove and prevent all the mischiefs of dissensions and divisions, is the great point that requires your perpetual attention. The best way to effect this is to give a check to the fashionable vices of licentious profuseness and rapine; not by reinforcing those obsolete laws, which the depravity of the times has rendered contemptible; but by obliging every man to live within the bounds of his fortune. For now a prevailing custom has taught the Roman youth to look upon it as a laudable and gallant behaviour to squander away, not only their own, but other men’s fortunes; and to deny themselves, or their dependents, no sort of gratification whatsoever. This they call manly conduct, this, true greatness of soul; whilst modesty passes for stupidity; and moderation, as the quality of an abject inactive spirit. Possessed with such notions, when once engaged in a profligate course, they run on with unbridled fury; and no sooner do their old supplies fail them, but they fall with impetuous violence upon our allies, sometimes upon our fellow-citizens, disturb

the order and tranquillity of government, and, by any means whatsoever, would raise a new fortune to repair the ruins of the old one.

“ Since, therefore, this is the present situation of our affairs, it seems to me absolutely necessary to crush the power of the usurers, that every man may take upon him the management of his own affairs. To effect this the only true and natural method would be to oblige the magistrates, in their judicial proceedings, to promote rather the interest of the people in general, than to favour the narrow interest of the creditors, and to establish their glory and reputation upon their endeavours to add strength to the commonwealth, and not on such measures as tend to diminish it.

“ I am very sensible what disgust the first advances in this reformation will give, to those especially, who, after victory, expected rather greater latitude to their licentious inclinations, than any stricter discipline and restraints. But, if you regard more the true interest of the commonwealth than the loose desires of these men, you will prevent their outrageous intentions, and settle both them and us, and all our allies, in a firm state of peace and tranquillity. But, if the youth are permitted to go on in their present pursuits, then will Cæsar’s exalted glory soon fall to the ground; and Rome itself will fall with Cæsar. Give me leave to add, that it is with a view of procuring peace, that men of sense and understanding enter into war; and under all the toils and hardships attending it, they are supported by the prospect of future tranquillity. If this great end be not effectually accomplished, what does it avail, whether you conquer or are conquered?

“ Wherefore, in the name of the immortal gods, take upon you the care and protection of the commonwealth, and bravely push through all difficulties, with your wonted vigour and resolution. For either you, Cæsar, can heal the wounded state, or it will be in vain for any other to attempt the cure. And what is that we now require at your hands? You are not called to bloody executions, to cruel and rigorous proceedings; methods which would sooner depopulate the state, than correct its manners; but only to give a check to the base practices and licentious debauchery of the Roman youth. This, this only, is the true notion of clemency; to prevent such vices as deserve the punishment of expulsion;

to put a stop to extravagant follies, and the pursuits of false pleasures; and to establish union and harmony in the state.

“ I must confess here, I am sensible, that the greatness of this important undertaking raises doubts and fears in other men; but to me it gives the strongest assurances of success: for matters of small moment are below the notice of so exalted a genius. Great indeed is the task, and great will be the reward, if you accomplish it!

“ Now one grand point, which demands your attention, is, that the people, whose minds are at present corrupted, with gifts of corn, and other public largesses, apply themselves to their respective occupations. Such an application would divert their thoughts from giving any disturbance to the government: the youth also should be taught to turn their pursuits from riotous expense, and the thirst of riches, to a course of industry and the study of virtue. And this great end you will accomplish, by putting an effectual stop to the use which men now make of money, and stripping that fruitful source of evils of the esteem it has gained in the world. For, whenever I have examined by what steps illustrious heroes rose to the height of renown, by what means any people enlarged their conquests, and to what causes the ruin of mighty kingdoms and states was to be ascribed; in either case I always discovered the same good or evil cause, constantly producing the same good or evil effects: and that the successful were always such as held riches in contempt; the unsuccessful such as coveted and admired them. Nor, indeed, is there any possible method to rise to glory and immortal fame, but by subduing the thirst of riches and sensual pleasures, and giving a free scope to the exercise of the mind; not fondly soothing and gratifying the demands of unreasonable and corrupt inclinations; but by inuring it to labour and patience, to wholesome discipline and valiant exploits. A man may raise a pompous palace in the town, or villa in the country; he may furnish them with magnificent hangings and statues, with other expensive ornaments, and thus make every thing in them conspicuous, but himself; yet, from the richness of such decorations, he is so far from deriving any honour or glory, that he himself casts a blemish upon their lustre. And, as for such as are so abandoned, that they pass not a day without twice overcharging their stomachs, not a night without dishonouring their bed

with polluted embraces; when once the mind, designed by nature to govern and controul, is thus become a slave to degenerate passions, in vain will they attempt to rouse her up to exercise, when her vigour is decayed, and her faculties impaired. Men of this character having neither spirit nor abilities, must unavoidably confound and destroy themselves and every scheme they engage in. Now these and all other evils which afflict the state, together with the high value and esteem that is set upon riches, would be effectually cured, if neither the offices of magistracy, nor any other things which are the objects of men's eager pursuits, can hereafter be obtained by the influence of money. Proper care, should, at the same time, be taken, that Italy and the provinces be put in a more secure situation; an affair which requires no great penetration to accomplish: the same remedy will answer, where the evil is the same; for there too, as well as in the city, the public ravagers have plundered and seized every thing they met with, forsaking their own habitations, and, in violation of all justice and equity, possessing those of other people. It is no less necessary to put a stop to that unjustifiable partiality, which has hitherto prevailed in our army, where some of the people have been forced to bear the fatigue of warfare for thirty years, whilst others have been entirely excused from the service. It is likewise my opinion, that the corn, which has hitherto been usually the reward of the worthless and inactive, should be sent to our municipal towns and colonies, and there distributed to the soldiers when they return home after their discharge from service.

“ I have now, as briefly as the case would admit, laid before you such regulations as appear to me most conducive to the good of the commonwealth, as well as your own reputation and glory: and, I apprehend, it will not be improper for me to add a word or two in relation to this my undertaking. There is scarce any man who does not believe himself furnished with all the faculties that make up a true and distinguishing judgment; or at least, endeavours to make the world believe so: but, certainly, all men in general have so violent a propensity to blast and condemn the performances of others, that the faculties of speech are too slow to utter the quick suggestions of their hearts. That I have laid myself open to such men is a consideration, that

does not, in the least, afflict me. Had I been silent on such an occasion, I should have been less able to have borne the reflection. For, whether you pursue the methods I have pointed out, or others occur, which may be thought more advisable, still I have given the best advice I was capable of, and contributed my utmost assistance towards the regulation of the commonwealth.

“ I have nothing more to do, but to follow you with my earnest wishes, that whatever measures you pursue may be attended with approbation, and crowned with success by the immortal gods.”

END OF THE TENTH VOLUME.

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